"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

The chapter's concern is meta‐theoretical and pertains to the nature of human rights theory. Interestingly, most human rights theorists do not spend much time stating what their theory is a theory of, and hence what kind of theory it should be. The chapter argues in favour of taking the legal dimension of human rights more seriously and, more specifically, for a legal theory of human rights. Making (...) class='Hi'>human rights law the object of human rights theory has two advantages: one substantive and the other methodological. First of all, it makes for a deeper understanding of the nature of human rights as a practice, and hence of many questions in human rights theory. A second benefit lies in the resources of legal theorizing, and in particular the latter's experience in explaining and evaluating normative practises. A related contribution of the proposed legal human rights theory is that it can bridge the gap that has grown within existing human rights theories between human rights practice and human rights standards, and so‐doing reconcile so‐called “political” and “ethical” human rights theories out of their sterile opposition. (shrink)

This essay is an analysis of the theory of human rights based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, with special reference to the Summa Theologiae. The difference between a jus naturale found in Aquinas and the theory of human rights developed by the sixteenth century scholastic philosophers is articulated. The distinction between objective natural rights—“what is right”—and subjective natural rights—“a right”—is discussed noting that Aquinas held the former position and that later scholastic (...) philosophers beginning with the Salamanca School of the Second Scholasticism developed the latter position. The subjective theory of rights evolved into the modern and contemporary account of individual human rights. The essay ends with an argument suggesting that Aquinas’s theory of objective human rights can serve as the ontological foundation for a robust theory of both positive and negative subjective natural rights. (shrink)

Can we respond to injustices in the world in ways that do more than just address their consequences? In this book, Brooke A. Ackerly argues that what to do about injustice is not just an ethical or moral question, but a political question about assuming responsibility for injustice. Ultimately, Just Responsibility offers a theory of global injustice and political responsibility that can guide action.

Kristen Hessler argues that philosophy can best contribute to understanding human rights by exploring the full range of their use in practice. Her approach emphasizes how human rights activism and adjudication can both reveal and dismantle unjust social hierarchies. The result is an innovative vision of interdisciplinary human rights scholarship.

The ideas of m macdonald, Wm t blackstone, A I melden, J feinberg, V kudryavtsev, G vlastos, M p golding, A rand, E mack, A gewirth, R nozick, R dworkin and others on human rights are sketched and discussed in this installment in "american philosophical quarterly's" "recent work" series.

Despite being a seemingly straightforward moral concept (that all humans have certain rights by virtue of their humanity), human rights is a contested concept in theory and practice. Theorists debate (among other things) the meaning of “rights,” the priority of rights, whether collective rights are universal, the foundations of rights, and whether there are universal human rights at all. These debates are of relatively greater interest to theorists; however, a given (...) meaning of “human rights” implies a corresponding theory of change and through that can be an important guide to the practice of human rights activists and their funders. In practice, any organization can describe their work as “rights based.” This article clarifies the practices of human rights activists and their funders that are consistent with a theory of human rights as (1) universal, (2) interdependent across groups and categories of people, (3) indivisible across issue areas and claims, and (4) measured by the enjoyment of rights. (shrink)

As sociologists deepen their examinations of human rights in their teaching, research, and thinking, it is essential that such work is conducted in a manner that is both mindful and critical of the knowledge we are building upon in sociology and human rights. As the authors of this volume reveal, creating sociological knowledge that examines human rights for the expansion of human rights is something that sociologists are well equipped to undertake, whether (...) through the use of mathematics, comparative-historical analysis, the study of emotions, conversations, or social psychology. In these chapters you will find the roots of the study of human rights deep within sociological research and thinking as well as emerging techniques that will push the discipline as it seeks to expand understanding of human rights together with so many other aspects of the social condition. (shrink)

This article reassess Rorty’s contribution to human rights theory. It addresses two key questions: (1) Does Rorty sustain his claim that there are no morally relevant transcultural facts? (2) Does Rorty’s proposed sentimental education offer an adequate response to contemporary human rights challenges? Although both questions are answered in the negative, it is argued here that Rorty’s focus on suffering, sympathy, and security, offer valuable resources to human rights theorists. The article concludes by (...) considering the idea of a dual approach to human rights, combining Rorty’s emphasis on sentiment with an analysis of patterns of responsibility for the underfulfilment of human rights. (shrink)

This timely book by internationally regarded scholar of ethics and social/political philosophy, Michael Boylan, focuses on the history, application and significance of human rights in the West and China. Boylan engages the key current philosophical debates prevalent in human rights discourse today and draws them together to argue for the existence of natural, universal human rights. Arguing against the grain of mainstream philosophical beliefs, Boylan asserts that there is continuity between human rights (...) and natural law and that human beings require basic, essential goods for minimum action. These include food, clean water and sanitation, clothing, shelter and protection from bodily harm, including basic healthcare. The achievement of this goal, Boylan demonstrates, will require significant resource allocation and creative methods of implementation involving public and private institutions. Combining technical argument with four fictional narratives about human rights, the book invites readers to engage with the most important aspects of the discipline. (shrink)

International human rights concepts and documents figure prominently within theories of global justice. Appeals to human rights often rely on theories and interpretations that rank human rights in relation to one another designating some as more important or more crucial than others such that they may or must be given priority. In this paper I argue that hierarchical ranking of human rights should be rejected by theorists of global justice because such ranking: (...) (a) undermines the effectiveness with which human rights operate as principled constraints on state actors; and (b) is inconsistent with the international legal framework and practice from which the human rights concepts and documents draw their rhetorical force. Instead theorists of global justice should accept the indivisibility principle, which states that all human rights are interrelated and interdependent and must be treated on the same footing and given the same emphasis. The attraction of hierarchical ordering rests on misguided concerns about the practicality of indivisibility that fail to properly distinguish between rights and claims and ignore important dimensions of human rights implementation and assessment. I argue that indivisibility is both pragmatically defensible, provides a better theoretical grounding for understanding complaints about violations, and offers a better framework for understanding the relationship between human rights and legitimacy than hierarchical ordering. (shrink)

Bringing Human Rights Education to US Classrooms presents ten research-based human rights projects powerfully implemented in a range of U.S. classrooms, from elementary school through community college and university. In these classrooms, the students--primarily young people of color who have experienced or witnessed human rights abuses such as discrimination and poverty--are exposed for the first time to thinking about their own lives and the world through an empowering human rights lens. Unique in (...) integrating theory and classroom practice, and in addressing human rights issues with special relevance for communities of color in the US, Katz and Spero provide indispensable guidance for those studying and teaching human rights. (shrink)

Recent developments in empirical fields such as developmental psychology and neuroscience have led to a re-evaluation of empathy as a natural human faculty and the fundament of altruism and morality. This essay examines the inherent relations between empathy and human rights conceived of as moral norms. Taking into account the importance of empathy gives us a better understanding and thus reconstruction of the (evolution of) human rights protection, particularly their motivational basis. This may remedy some (...) descriptive shortcomings of traditional human rights theories regarding the relevance of emotion, altruism and human nature. However, human rights are highly complex phenomena with an important normative dimension and as such they neither can nor should be reduced to mere feelings like compassion or empathy. (shrink)

Knowledge about the ‘other’ is one of the founding pillars for the development of global political theory. Although human rights are an important part of the moral and legal discourse on global governance, there is still a gap between these theories and detailed accounts of human rights violations and the context for resistance. This article examines the treatment of the ‘other’ in a specific country (Iran), and the oppression as Muslims of Iranians living abroad, in (...) order to begin to fill this gap. More specifically, it is argued that anthropology, journalism and diaspora literature about Iran provide useful input for the field of global political theory on human rights, democratisation and global justice. This literature helps bring home the realities of human rights violations, contributes to a better understanding of injustice and ways of creating social change, and illuminates issues of universality and difference that are of direct relevance to global political theory. (shrink)

Human rights are often taken for granted, but "What is the basis of human rights?" This is no easy answer, De Xiao Weiqi, in his 2004 book of this difficult the problem. He considered the following four main theories: First, the external theory: the root cause of human rights outside the law, such as human rights divine theory; Second, the intrinsic theory: the root cause of human rights (...) within the law - law positivism ; three, rationalist approaches: human rights is based on rational intuition ; Fourth, experience-based approaches: human rights from human experience, especially experience the experience of injustice. He made ​​the first three theories are severely criticized, and to promote a fourth to experience-based approaches. This paper points out that although the experience of Germany and Xiao Weiqi theory have many advantages, but it is evidence of human rights legislation are vague and inconsistent standards of the Department, and its invention on human rights can not provide more solid foundation. In fact, these issues are perceived more or less de Xiao Weiqi, he repeatedly pointed out that the need for external to the human rights legal standards, I think the divine rights theory is to provide a basis for human rights may be one of the world. De Xiao Weiqi theory of divine criticism of human rights have a good reminder, but I think it still can not rule out the Christ-centered Christian contemporary human rights theory. Human rights are often taken for granted but in fact the origin or foundation of human rights is not an easy question. Alan Dershowitz tries to tackle this thorny issue in his 2004 book: Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights. He mainly considers four theories: 1) externalism, eg, the divine source of human rights theory; 2) Internalism, eg, legal positivism; 3) Rationalism, eg, the claim that human rights are founded upon rational intuitions; 4) Experiential approach, ie, human rights are derived from our historical experience of serious wrongs or injustice. He severely criticizes the first three theories, and defends the fourth. In this article, I will point out that despite quite a few merits of Dershowitz's theory; his criteria for the validation of human rights are vague or even inconsistent. His general stance of constructivism towards moral and human rights claims, moreover, are unable to provide solid foundations for human rights. In fact Dershowitz is to some extent aware of these problems, and he feels that human rights do need an objective external source, if only it is possible. I think the theistic worldview is indeed able to provide this objective external source. Dershowitz has raised a lot of good questions for the divine source theory but I argue that in the end they cannot exclude the possibility of a contemporary Christocentric theory of human rights. (shrink)

The question of what is truly just in the matter of a country's currently established human-rights interpretations appears not to be the same as the question of what it is morally right to do by way of coercively effectuating a given set of such interpretations. There are grounds for contending that acts of support for a coercive political regime can be justified morally on the condition that the regime's prevailing human-rights interpretations are made continuously available to (...) effective, democratic critical re-examination. However, it is not possible ever finally to know whether that condition is satisfied. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between human rights and democracy within both the theoretical and empirical field. It is an innovative study that offers tools for democratizing existing global political institutions.

Beginning with Margaret Somers and Christopher Roberts’ review of the sociology of human rights and Bryan Turner and Malcolm Waters’ debate therein, the author presents some of the questions which have been so far been the focus of this sociological sub-discipline. This review raises the question of ‘rights’ as a subject of study, and the normative consequences therein. From here, the author introduces recognition theory as a potential participant in these discussions around human rights. (...) The author traces recognition theory from its Hegelian origins to the work of Axel Honneth, and the critiques of Nancy Fraser, Frantz Fanon, and Glen Sean Coulthard. Despite Fanon and Coulthard’s critical accounts, they reinforce the value of recognition within any sociology of human rights. Lastly, the author briefly engages with Alasdair MacIntyre as both a dialogical participant, and a means towards dialogue in the first place between recognition theory and human rights. Concluding, the author argues that the normative and descriptive nature of recognition theory offers a useful tool to aid in sociological theorizations of human nature and rights, while addressing some of the problems raised by early theorists of the sub-discipline and preventing siloing of the sub-discipline within a universalist or particularist vein. (shrink)

In this article I draw on resources from the African philosophical tradition to construct a theory of human rights grounded on dignity that presents a challenge to the globally dominant, autonomy-based approach. Whereas the latter conceives of human rights violations as degradations of our rational nature, the former does so in terms of degradations of our relational nature, specifically, our capacity to be party to harmonious or friendly relationships. Although I have in the past presented (...) the basics of the Afro-relational approach, in this article I defend it from objections and also go on the offensive by arguing that understanding the human rights violations of torture and rape to be (roughly) behavior that treats innocent parties in an extremely discordant or unfriendly way is, if not more plausible than standard Kantian understandings, then at least a promising alternative to them. (shrink)

This book develops a philosophical conception of human rights that responds satisfactorily to the challenges raised by cultural and political critics of human rights, who contend that the contemporary human rights movement is promoting an imperialist ideology, and that the humanitarian intervention for protecting human rights is a neo-colonialism. These claims affect the normativity and effectiveness of human rights; that is why they have to be taken seriously. At the same (...) time, the same philosophical account dismisses the imperialist crusaders who support the imperialistic use of human rights by the West to advance liberal culture. Thus, after elaborating and exposing these criticisms, the book confronts them to the human rights theories of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, in order to see whether they can be addressed. Unfortunately, they are not. Therefore, having shown that these two philosophical accounts of human rights do not respond convincingly to those the postco lonial challenges, the book provides an alternative conception that draws the understanding of human rights from local practices. It is a multilayer conception which is not centered on state, but rather integrates it in a larger web of actors involved in shaping the practice and meaning of human rights. Confronted to the challenges, this new conception offers a promising way for addressing them satisfactorily, and it even sheds new light to the classical questions of universality of human rights, as well as the tension between universalism and relativism.. (shrink)

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of table -- Notes on contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction: environmental human rights and political theory -- 1 The rights of humans as ecologically embedded beings -- 2 Defining the natural in the Anthropocene: what does the right to a 'natural' environment mean now? -- 3 Reconciliation of nature and society: how far can rights take us? -- 4 The foundation of rights to nature -- (...) 5 Rights to natural resources and human rights -- 6 Making sense of the human right to landscape -- 7 What's so good about environmental human rights? Constitutional versus international environmental rights -- 8 Environmental human rights - concepts of responsibility -- 9 Future people's rights: dispelling an ontological worry -- 10 Human rights-based precautionary approaches and risk imposition in the context of climate change -- Index. (shrink)

Volume 16, Issue 1, April 2020, Page 105-109.

Questioning some of the repetitive and narrow theoretical writings on rights, a group of leading intellectuals examine human rights from philosophical, theological, historical, literary and political perspectives.

This work provides an innovative contribution to the legal-philosophical understanding of human rights theory.

ABSTRACTThis symposium brings together normative and empirical scholars in dialogue on Brooke Ackerly’s innovative and compelling recent monograph, Just Responsibility. Contributors discuss the book’s distinctive grounded normative theory methodology, its arguments for how individuals can take appropriate responsibility for global structural injustices, and its potential for practical impact.

While the critically oriented writings of Immanuel Kant remain the key theoretical grounds from which universalists challenge reduction of international rights law and protection to the practical particularities of sovereign states, Kant’s theory can be read as also a crucial argument for a human rights regime ordered around sovereign states and citizens. Consequently, universalists may be tempted to push Kant’s thinking to greater critical examination of ‘the human’ and its properties. However, such a move to (...) more theoretical rigour in critique only solidifies the subversive statism of Kant’s apparent universalism, as long as it remains embedded in his prior theory of critical philosophy that privileges a singular form of reason. Universalist theories of human rights can break with this contradiction only insofar as they also displace the right to philosophy from the subject and site of ‘civil’ man to a politics of theory where no such subject or site is guaranteed. (shrink)

In this paper I hope to show that a conception of human rights requires a view of the social ideal and the good life, and requires a view of the nature of human community. But what I say in favor of these points hardly amounts to a demonstration. Instead I try to exhibit how we think and talk about rights in general, and what the presuppositions of such thought and talk are. Throughout, I emphasize the pragmatic (...) side of rights-discourse and I try to establish some of the contexts in which such discourse can be significantly employed. Much of what I say is motivated by the consideration that an historically important factor in the generation of various rights, their acknowledgement and implementation, and their extension to increasingly larger segments of the population, has been the claims put forward and the demands made by individuals and groups against individuals and groups. This factor constitutes a suggestive clue for the development of a theory of rights. The treatment here, however, is largely programmatic and fragmentary. The space allotted does not permit more. Moreover, I lead up to—but do not go into—the social ideal and the human community. The title of this essay indicates its limited scope. The above points are, of course, hardly novel; many older writers laid great stress upon them. But of late they have not received the attention that they in my view deserve. What does it mean for someone to maintain a conception of human rights? How is this conception given any concrete content? The answers to these questions, I believe, ultimately lead to a consideration of social ideals and the human community. What follows is meant to stimulate new thinking on these old-fashioned topics. (shrink)