In “Being Judgement Possibility,” Hölderlin posits that the division between subject and object produced in conscious knowledge requires admitting a being as the ground of that knowledge’s unity. Commentators argue over the way to access such being according to Hölderlin. For Dieter Henrich, being is a presupposition recognized reflexively. Manfred Frank, by contrast, maintains that Hölderlin grants direct access to it in an “intellectual intuition.” This article addresses the respective interpretations of both authors. It shows that Frank’s interpretation is closer (...) to the textual evidence than Henrich’s interpretation. Frank’s interpretation also allows one to explain better the way in which the division between subject and object avoids leading to dispersal. Finally, this article considers the insufficiency of Frank’s interpretation so as to clarify an issue that he himself advances in the course of his argument: how the I manages to distinguish itself in the sphere of intuitable objects. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este trabajo intento determinar, a partir de textos escogidos de todas las épocas de la producción teórica de Carl Schmitt, de qué manera este autor entiende la comprensión jurídica y de qué manera este modo de comprensión tiene alcances generales para la comprensión práctica. En la medida en que el derecho tematiza las condiciones y los polos de la comprensión, la posición del jurista se distancia tanto de la inclinación hacia el polo ideal, que Schmitt identifica con la (...) racionalidad tecnológica, cuanto de la inclinación hacia el polo real, que Schmitt liga a ciertas formas del romanticismo y el pensamiento teológico. RESUMO Neste artigo, tento determinar, a partir de textos selecionados de todos os períodos da produção teórica de Carl Schmitt, como esse autor entende a compreensão jurídica e como esse modo de compreensão tem alcance geral para a compreensão prática. Na medida em que o direito estuda as condições e os polos de compreensão, a posição do jurista distancia-se da inclinação para o polo ideal, que Schmitt identifica com a racionalidade tecnológica, bem como da inclinação para o polo real, que Schmitt conecta com certas formas de romantismo e pensamento teológico. (shrink)

The article approaches Salomon Maimon’s reinterpretation of the notions of the thing in itself and the given within the framework of criticism. For Maimon they do not refer to a transcendence that is directly unattainable by knowledge. In this attempt, he tries to explain the given on the basis of the action of constitutive understanding. With this, he triggers the passage from transcendental Kantian philosophy to the idealism of Fichte. Nonetheless, his position faces the subsequent problem of explaining how the (...) constitution of the given from understanding (infinite) can become compatible with the criticism it takes on. On affirming that an uncognoscible item is the basis of knowledge, namely, infinite understanding, he set aside the explanation of knowledge in terms of what is revealed in it and in doing so would be resorting to external uncognoscible conditions. (shrink)

De acordo com as interpretações mais conhecidas (por exemplo, Hofmann, Strauss, Löwith ou Kuhn), o pensamento jurídico e político de Carl Schmitt mantém distância de Aristóteles. Este artigo tem a intenção de mostrar que a concepção de direito de Schmitt, apesar de ser desenvolvida em um contexto diferente, contém semelhanças significativas com o entendimento de direito em Aristóteles. Para mostrar essa proximidade, considera-se especialmente a noção de totalidade presente no conceito aristotélico de polis, que implica que a unidade política é (...) o principal modo de se realizar o direito. According to mostly known interpretations (e.g.: Hofman, Strauss, Löwith or Kuhn), the legal and political thought of Carl Schmitt keeps distance from Aristotle's. This article intends to show that Schmitt's concept of law, despite developed in a different context, holds significant likelihood with Aristotle's comprehension of law. With the Purpose of building this proximity, the notion of entirety present in the Aristotelic concept of polis implies that political unit is the main way to accomplish law. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt, one of the most influential legal and political thinkers of the twentieth century, is known chiefly for his work on international law, sovereignty, and his doctrine of political exception. This book argues that greater prominence should be given to his early work in legal studies. Schmitt himself repeatedly identified as a jurist, and Hugo E. Herrera demonstrates how for Schmitt, law plays a key role as an intermediary between ideal, conceptual theory and the messiness and complexity of practical, (...) concrete situations. Law is concerned precisely with balancing the extremes of theory and reality, and in this respect, Schmitt associates it with philosophical thinking broadly as being able to understand and explain the tensions in human experience. Reviewing and analyzing prevailing interpretations of Schmitt by Jacques Derrida, Heinrich Meier, and others, Herrera argues that the importance of Schmitt's legal framework is both significant and overlooked. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el comentario de Maimon al intento kantiano de vincular sensibilidad y entendimiento. En la Crítica de la razón pura, Kant distingue dos facultades de conocimiento, que deben ser unidas para que el conocimiento objetivo sea posible. Maimon cuestiona que la vinculación sea realizable. Luego de exponer el punto de partida kantiano, se analizan los argumentos maimonianos, planteando dificultades sistemáticas que afectarían al intento de vinculación kantiano.

One of the problems in post-Kantian discussions is the way in which the self procures access to itself. Kant rejects intellectual intuition in human knowledge. Nonetheless, he supposes an access of the self to itself as subject in all conscious knowledge. It is then fitting to ask how this access can occur. Because, if the self is to be taken precisely as subject, in other words as an activity that knows objects, this knowledge of the self should be of a (...) different kind to that in which all the objects already constituted by that activity are known. Fichte or Schelling are usually taken to be the first to have addressed and tried to solve this problem. But Salomon Maimon had already done so in 1789 and had proposed a solution based on intellectual intuition. The aim of this article is to reconstruct Maimon’s arguments, evaluate his proposal, and specifically show that his attempt is the first in which the Kantian problem is addressed and a solution put forward. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendo probar que en el pensamiento de Francisco Antonio Encina existe una reflexión sobre la comprensión. Esa reflexión, a diferencia de lo que han sostenido algunos autores, tiene un talante filosófico, en el sentido de que en ella se exponen pertinentemente los polos entre los que se realiza la comprensión, los extremos hacia los que puede inclinarse la actividad comprensiva y las condiciones básicas que ha de reunir una comprensión de los asuntos humanos calificable como pertinente, adecuada (...) o correcta. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo pretendo probar que en el pensamiento de Francisco Antonio Encina existe una reflexión acerca de la comprensión. Esa reflexión, a diferencia de lo que han sostenido algunos autores, tiene un talante filosófico, en el sentido de que en ella se exponen pertinentemente los polos entre los que se realiza la comprensión, los extremos hacia los que puede inclinarse la actividad comprensiva y las condiciones básicas que ha de reunir una comprensión de los asuntos humanos calificable como (...) pertinente, adecuada o correcta.: In this article, I intend to prove that at the foundation of Francisco Antonio Encina’s thought there is a reflection on human understanding. This reflection, unlike what some authors have argued, has a philosophical scope. In it are exposed, in a relevant manner: the poles between which understanding is made; the extremes toward which comprehensive activity can lean; and the basic conditions that must be met by an understanding of human affairs that can be qualified as pertinent, adequate or correct. (shrink)