Hugh Rice explains why belief in God need not be seen as a strange or irrational kind of belief, but can be a natural extension of our ordinary ways of thinking. He suggests that we should think of God in an abstract way, and he offers a satisfying account of the relationship between God and goodness. Anyone interested in the nature of God and the basis of religious belief will enjoy this book.

There is a familiar argument based on the principle that the past is fixed that, if God foreknows what I will do, I do not have the power to act otherwise. So, there is a problem about reconciling divine omniscience with the power to do otherwise. However the problem posed by the argument does not provide a good reason for adopting the view that God is outside time. In particular, arguments for the fixity of the past, if successful, either establish (...) His timelessness independently of the problem, or mean that the problem could not be solved by adopting the view that He is timeless. (Published Online April 7 2006). (shrink)

The main line of Lewis's account of causation is in terms of chains of counterfactual dependence. According to his original account , a causal chain is a sequence of two or more events, with counterfactual dependence at each step; and one event is a cause of another if there is a causal chain from one to the other. But some awkward cases involving redundant causation lead him to introduce the notion of quasi-dependence . Laurie Paul has suggested a way of (...) dealing with one important class of these cases in terms of dependence proper. I shall suggest a different way of dealing with this class of cases; I shall also suggest that it is possible to deal with other awkward cases too in terms of dependence proper. (shrink)

The main line of Lewis's account of causation is in terms of chains of counterfactual dependence. According to his original account, a causal chain is a sequence of two or more events, with counterfactual dependence at each step; and one event is a cause of another if there is a causal chain from one to the other. But some awkward cases involving redundant causation lead him to introduce the notion of quasi-dependence. Laurie Paul has suggested a way of dealing with (...) one important class of these cases in terms of dependence proper. I shall suggest a different way of dealing with this class of cases; I shall also suggest that it is possible to deal with other awkward cases too in terms of dependence proper. (shrink)

Can belief in God can be meritorious if not epistemically rational in the ordinary way? I argue that the primary condition to be met if a belief is to be meritoriousis that it is based on a good reason, and that to believe that something is so on the grounds that it would be good if it were can be to believe for a good reason.In particular I argue that to believe in God on the grounds that it would be (...) good if He existed can be to believe for a good reason, and that such a belief can,therefore, be meritorious. (shrink)

Hugh Rice; IV*—Practical Reasoning as Reasoning, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 49–64, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

Hugh Rice; IV*—Practical Reasoning as Reasoning, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 49–64, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

Linda Zagzebski has recently argued that there is a conflict between a common view of the asymmetry of time and various other metaphysical hypotheses. She identifies conflicts in the case of the modal arrow of time and in the case of the causal arrow of time. In the case of the modal arrow I argue that on one view there is no conflict and that on another the principle should be abandoned that there are entailments between propositions about the past (...) and the future. In the case of the causal arrow I argue that the conflict can be avoided by the adoption of a suitable closure principle. (shrink)