The loss of the federally protected constitutional right to an abortion is a threat to the already tenuous autonomy of pregnant people, and may augur future challenges to their right to refuse unwanted obstetric interventions. Even before Roe’s demise, pregnancy led to constraints on autonomy evidenced by clinician-led legal incursions against patients who refused obstetric interventions. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court found that the right to liberty espoused in the Constitution does not extend to a (...) pregnant person’s right to an abortion. With Roe’s demise, the right to request specific types of care has been vitiated. The same argument underpinning that holding may now become ballast for attacks on the traditionally more robust right, the right to refuse. Here we discuss how the elevation of fetal and embryonic rights may lead to a cascade of medical intrusions and deprivations of liberty against pregnant persons, and offer an argument opposing these improprieties. (shrink)

In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is what grounds (...) reliable use of induction is based on an inference to the best explanation of the success of our inductive practices. As such, the argument for the existence of natural kinds employs a form of ampliative inference. But induction is likewise a form of ampliative inference. Given both of these facts, my account of the reliability of induction is subject to the objection that it provides a circular justification of induction, since it employs an ampliative inference to justify an ampliative inference. In this paper, I respond to the objection of circularity by arguing that what justifies induction is not the inference to the best explanation of its reliability. The ground of induction is the natural kinds themselves. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Ferry est titulaire de la Chaire de Philosophie de l'Europe de l'Université de Nantes, professeur honoraire en Science politique et Philosophie morale à l'Université libre de Bruxelles, auteur notamment des Puissances de l'expérience (1991), l'une des oeuvres les plus importantes récemment publiées dans le champ de la philosophie sociale et politique, de la philosophie tout court (Paul Ricoeur), La Question de l'État européen (2001), Les Grammaires de l'intelligence (2004), La Raison et la Foi (2016).

A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.

The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of issues to (...) do with fittingness that aren’t covered extensively by the volume’s chapters in order to indicate avenues for further research. (shrink)

Published in 1982 by CUP (pb. 2009) it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.

From the timeless wisdom of ancient Greece through to Christianity, the Enlightenment, existentialism and postmodernism, A Brief History of Thought brilliantly and accessibly explains the enduring teachings of philosophy - including its profound relevance in today's world as well as its essential role in achieving happiness and living a meaningful life. This lively journey through the great thinkers challenges every one of us to learn to think for ourselves and asks us the most important question of all: how can we (...) live better? (shrink)

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or "becoming") that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons (...) are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered. (shrink)

For political and literary theorists working on race, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man is a canonical text. Most political theorists approach the novel through what this essay calls a “martyr reading,” though martyrdom is just one of several political strategies explored in the work. This essay highlights an alternative in Ellison’s repertoire. The “trickster reading” developed here better accounts for several key scenes in the novel and also shows the limits of martyrdom as a technique of democratic politics. While other democratic (...) theorists have identified Ellison with redemptive or deliberative aims, the novel’s references to Homer’s Odyssey, with its own trickster-hero, license a trickster reading of Invisible Man. Tricksters do not take on suffering, loss, or sacrifice in the hope of redemption nor are they necessarily committed to the virtues of deliberation. Instead, they evade sacrifice by resorting routinely to irony, cunning, and refusal. This reading demonstrates the importance of these techniques to Ellison’s vision and to our politics today. (shrink)

Background: Current practice frequently fails to provide care consistent with the preferences of decisionally-incapacitated patients. It also imposes significant emotional burden on their surrogates. Algorithmic-based patient preference predictors (PPPs) have been proposed as a possible way to address these two concerns. While previous research found that patients strongly support the use of PPPs, the views of surrogates are unknown. The present study thus assessed the views of experienced surrogates regarding the possible use of PPPs as a means to help make (...) treatment decisions for decisionally-incapacitated patients. -/- Methods: This qualitative study used semi-structured interviews to determine the views of experienced surrogates [n=26] who were identified from two academic medical centers and two community hospitals. The primary outcomes were respondents’ overall level of support for the idea of using PPPs and the themes related to their views on how a PPP should be used, if at all, in practice. -/- Results: Overall, 21 participants supported the idea of using PPPs. The remaining five indicated that they would not use a PPP because they made decisions based on the patient’s best interests, not based on substituted judgment. Major themes which emerged were that surrogates, not the patient’s preferences, should determine how treatment decisions are made, and concern that PPPs might be used to deny expensive care or be biased against minority groups. -/- Conclusions: Surrogates, like patients, strongly support the idea of using PPPs to help make treatment decisions for decisionally-incapacitated patients. These findings provide support for developing a PPP and assessing it in practice. At the same time, patients and surrogates disagree over whose preferences should determine how treatment decisions are made, including whether to use a PPP. These findings reveal a fundamental disagreement regarding the guiding principles for surrogate decision-making. Future research is needed to assess this disagreement and consider ways to address it. (shrink)

This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third, exemplified by Mark Johnston, has, the chapter claims, disjunctivist features. (...) None of these responses to the argument is plausible. (shrink)

It is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first year or two, they meet what appears to them to be powerful defenses of scientific naturalism and crushing critiques of the basic Christian story (BCS), and many are thrown into doubt. They think to themselves something like this: "To be honest, I am troubled about the BCS. While the problem of evil, the apparent cultural basis for the diversity (...) of religions, the explanatory breadth of contemporary science, naturalistic explanations of religious experience and miracle reports, and textual and historical criticism of the Bible, among other things, don’t make me believe the BCS is false , I am in serious doubt about it, so much so that I lack belief of it. In that case, how can I have Christian faith? And if I don’t have faith, how can I keep on praying, attending church, affirming the creed, confessing my sins, taking the sacraments, singing the hymns and songs, and so on? I can’t, unless I’m a hypocrite. So integrity requires me to drop the whole thing and get out." Of course, our student is not alone. Many Christians find themselves for some portion of their lives somewhere on the trajectory from doubt to getting out. Indeed, Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. What should we say to them? Some will say “Get out!,” welcoming the development as a path to liberation. We explore a different response in this essay. (shrink)

Bioethics' interdisciplinary base -- Patient-centered care -- Evidence-based medicine and pay-for-performance -- Community dialogue -- Overview : bioethics, power, and learning to see -- Cross-cultural concerns -- Race and health disparities -- Disabilities -- Environmental and global issues -- New technologies -- Conclusion.

Ces dernières années, la philosophie politique a trouvé un second souffle. Depuis la parution de la Théorie de la justice, au début des années 1970, et sous le double mouvement du déclin des idéologies et de l'écroulement du système communiste, de nouveaux débats sont apparus. Comment combiner le respect des droits individuels et le maintien d'une ambition collective? Comment intégrer au libéralisme politique un projet communautaire? Quelles doivent être les relations entre l'individu, l'Etat et la société? Comment répondre au malaise (...) et au déficit de légitimité que connaissent les démocraties occidentales? Ces interrogations ont permis d'imposer des voix nouvelles - celles de John Rawls ou de Jürgen Habermas -, mais aussi, plus récemment, celles des auteurs dits " communautariens " : Michaël Sandel, Michaël Walzer et Charles Taylor. Ces discussions sont également l'occasion d'en revenir aux fondateurs de la pensée politique contemporaine et de vérifier ainsi l'actualité de la réflexion d'Emmanuel Kant, de Friedrich Hegel, de Karl Marx, d'Alexis de Tocqueville, de John Stuart Mill ou, plus près de nous, de Sigmund Freud et de Max Weber pour penser les problèmes politiques et spirituels de notre temps. Cet ouvrage aimerait donner un aperçu des problématiques actuelles de la théorie politique. Pour la sélection des auteurs étudiés, la question de la liberté a servi de fil conducteur. (shrink)

Whereas traditional nominalists accept the realist's challenge to solve a 'Problem of Universals', the Ostrich Nominalist responds that there is no such Problem to answer. I suggest that Ostrich Nominalist arguments expose a genuine flaw in the realist project. However, I argue, Ostrich Nominalism is ultimately defeated by a problem about the analysis of qualitative sameness and difference. Qualitative sameness and difference are adequately understood only as sameness or difference in some respect. The need to say what these respects of (...) sameness and difference are (if not universals) constitutes a genuine Problem of Universals; consequently—I claim—the Ostrich Nominalist is mistaken. (shrink)

A survey of Howard Gardner's contributions to our understanding of learning, and how to create environments that support growth in all learners across the lifespan.

Aujourd’hui délaissées, parfois devenues gênantes, les collections médicales furent pourtant à l’avant-garde du renouveau de la médecine au début du XIXe siècle, avant que celle-ci ne devienne la médecine telle que nous la connaissons aujourd’hui. Selon une vision courante de l’histoire de la médecine, les collections médicales auraient perdu de leur utilité lorsque la médecine a accédé au statut de science expérimentale, les musées d’anatomie faisant alors place aux laboratoires. Les collections d’anatomie-pathologie comme le musée Dupuytren ne seraient que le (...) reliquat de cette histoire, le témoignage d’un échec méthodologique à opposer aux succès de la physiologie expérimentale. Cette narration de l’histoire de la médecine est-elle cependant correcte ? Dans quels buts épistémologiques les médecins ont-ils créé ces collections ? Quelles connaissances cherchaient-ils à obtenir par ce biais ? Plus généralement, pourquoi collecter en médecine – et en science – et pourquoi collectionner ? Pour répondre à ces questions, je m’intéressai principalement dans cette contribution aux pratiques de collecte et de collection chez les médecins de la Société Anatomique de Paris au XIXe siècle et au rôle joué par ces pratiques dans la construction de la collection Dupuytren. (shrink)

The idea that science is objective, or able to achieve objectivity, is in large part responsible for the role that science plays within society. But what is objectivity? The idea of objectivity is ambiguous. This paper distinguishes between three basic forms of objectivity. The first form of objectivity is ontological objectivity: the world as it is in itself does not depend upon what we think about it; it is independent of human thought, language, conceptual activity or experience. The second form (...) of objectivity is the objectivity of truth: truth does not depend upon what we believe or justifiably believe; truth depends upon the way reality itself is. The third form of objectivity is epistemic objectivity: this form of objectivity resides in the scientific method which ensures that subjective factors are excluded, and only epistemically relevant factors play a role in scientific inquiry. The paper considers two problems that arise for the notion of epistemic objectivity: the theory-dependence of observation and the variability of the methods of science. It is argued that the use of shared standard procedures ensures the objectivity of observation despite theory-dependence. It is argued that the variability of methods need not lead to epistemic relativism about science. The paper concludes with the realist suggestion that the best explanation of the success of the sciences is that the methods employed in the sciences are highly reliable truth-conducive tools of inquiry. The objectivity of the methods of the sciences leads to the objective truth about the objective world. (shrink)

« Ce que j’appelle la “révolution de l’amour”, c’est-à-dire la naissance de la famille moderne, enracinée dans le passage du mariage arrangé au mariage choisi par et pour l’amour, a transformé nos vies. Elle apporte un nouveau principe de sens, qui requiert une nouvelle philosophie. Elle ne bouleverse pas seulement nos existences privées, mais tout notre rapport au collectif. C’est ce que j’appelle le “deuxième humanisme”». Le premier fut un humanisme de la Loi et de la raison. C’était celui des (...) Lumières et des droits de l’homme, des républicains français et de Kant. Le deuxième humanisme est un humanisme de la fraternité et de la sympathie. Ma conviction est qu’il est désormais la seule vision du monde portée par le souffle d’une utopie positive. Car l’idéal qu’elle vise à réaliser n’est plus celui des nationalismes ni de l’idée révolutionnaire. Il ne s’agit plus d’organiser de grands massacres au nom de principes mortifères qui se voulaient extérieurs et supérieurs à l’humanité, mais de préparer l’avenir de ceux que nous aimons le plus, c’est- à-dire des générations futures... » L. F. Luc Ferry s’entretient ici avec Claude Capelier, agrégé de philosophie et conseiller scientifique du Conseil d’analyse de la société. Luc Ferry est agrégé de philosophie, docteur d’État, agrégé de science politique. Il est philosophe. Ses livres sont traduits à l’étranger dans une trentaine de langues. Il a notamment publié chez Odile Jacob Vaincre les peurs et Qu’est-ce que l’Homme? (en collaboration avec Jean-Didier Vincent), qui ont été d’immenses succès. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Quelle place accorder aujourd'hui aux religions dans les démocraties? Que peut-on espérer du dialogue entre croyants et non-croyants dans une société devenue plurielle et sécularisée? Quel rôle peut jouer la religion dans la modernité du XXIe siècle? Le philosophe français Jean-Marc Ferry prend à bras-le-corps ces questions difficiles, laissées en déshérence ou livrées aux excès de tous bords. Refusant les pièges d'un laïcisme souvent ignorant, tout comme les hégémonies religieuses, il reprend le fil d'une (...) longue tradition philosophique qui a toujours pris au sérieux la question religieuse, même quand elle s'y opposait. Dans ce livre qui fera date, le philosophe rassemble pour la première fois sous la forme d'une conversation l'ensemble de sa réflexion sur la religion dans la modernité. Au cours de sa réflexion, Jean-Marc Ferry invite à considérer les "Lumières de la religion", une expression malicieuse par laquelle il entend signifier que les religions ne sont pas en opposition avec la modernité. A la condition de devenir réflexives et critiques, et d'accepter les règles du jeu démocratique, elles peuvent apporter une précieuse participation à la vie commune, au bénéfice de tous.". (shrink)

Quand on a renoncé à démontrer l'existence de Dieu ou l'immortalité de l'âme, est-il encore rationnel de postuler que Dieu existe ou que l'âme est immortelle? Peut-on croire rationnellement dans l'incertitude la plus totale? Jean-Marc Ferry montre précisément en quoi la religion réflexive le permet. Celui qui s'y engage ne se prévaut d'aucun accès privilégié à la vérité. Au départ, cet engagement procède moins d'une croyance que d'une résolution. Il s'agit, en effet, d'un acte de pure liberté, dépourvu d'assise, acte (...) risqué qui fait que l'on accorde ou non sa confiance au réel. Ensuite seulement, entre l'athée et le croyant, les expériences pourront être confrontées ; et c'est quand l'un et l'autre assument pleinement leur absolue ignorance métaphysique que raison et religion peuvent enfin être conciliées. (shrink)

This paper describes the scientific practices of the anatomists from the Société Anatomique de Paris (1803–1873) who were collecting anatomical and pathological specimens in Nineteenth-Century Paris and which led to the building of the anatomy and pathology Musée Dupuytren (1835–2016). The framework introduced by Robert Kohler to describe collecting sciences (2007) is useful as a tool to identify the set of diverse practices within pathological anatomy in nineteenth-century Paris. However, I will argue that anatomy and pathology collecting had specific features (...) compared to most collecting sciences. Two main collecting practices could be distinguished: first, “finding” anatomical specimens and second, keeping these specimens. The first kind of practices were at least rhetorically and explicitly motivated by Auguste Comte’s positive philosophy. But “finding” an anatomy or pathology specimen could not be completely compared to finding an object or making a simple observation, as dissecting as well as some experimental practices were also involved. Heterogeneous practices thus coexisted within collecting in anatomy and pathology. Epistemological as well as pragmatic tensions arose. On top of Kohler’s framework, I introduce Sabina Leonelli’s concept of “data journey” to offer a narrative of the diversity of collecting practices involved in the Société Anatomique de Paris and the Musée Dupuytren. I use the concept to analyse how this diversity of practices impacted knowledge production. (shrink)

An exploration of Immanuel Kant's account of war and the controversies that have arisen from its interpretation. This book brings the ideas of Kant's critical philosophy to bear on one of the leading political and legal questions of our age: under what circumstances, if any, is recourse to war legally and morally justifiable?

Cette parole d'Emmanuel Levinas touche le coeur d'une actualité, celle de notre rapport occidental à la mort, qui résume le contexte dans lequel la mort nous fait problème, C'est ce contexte qui permet aussi d'éclairer la difficile question des "fins de vie" sous nos latitudes. S'engage la bataille idéologique : puis-je ou non disposer de mon existence? Des deux côtés, on invoque la dignité humaine, que ce soit pour réclamer le droit de "mourir dans la dignité" ou pour justifier l'interdiction (...) de toute forme d'euthanasie au nom du "caractère sacré" de la vie humaine. La "dignité humaine" devrait-elle justifier tout et son contraire? Il importe plutôt d'en élucider la notion et le fondement, en commençant par faire le clair sur les interprétations concurrentes et leurs implications pratiques. L'approche pluridisciplinaire de l'ouvrage favorisera une lecture critique au sein de laquelle différents points de vue s'inscrivent dans des moments distincts : Moment d'attestation, celui des praticiens aux prises avec la réalité des hôpitaux et des unités de soins palliatifs. Ils expérimentent au jour le jour le drame et la tragédie des passages de la phase curative à la phase palliative puis à la phase terminale ; Moment d'information, d'analyse exégétique et critique, touchant notamment à l'état du droit ; Moment de problématisation. De quoi et vers quoi? Tout logiquement, en direction des fondements philosophiques, c'est-à-dire de ce qui justifie que l'on prenne telle ou telle décision importante concernant les soins, l'arrêt des soins, la fin de vie, voire l'arrêt de la vie. (shrink)

This paper explores the scientific viability of the concept of causality—by questioning a central element of the distinction between “fundamental” and non-fundamental physics. It will be argued that the prevalent emphasis on fundamental physics involves formalistic and idealized partial models of physical regularities abstracting from and idealizing the causal evolution of physical systems. The accepted roles of partial models and of the special sciences in the growth of knowledge help demonstrate proper limitations of the concept of fundamental physics. We expect (...) that a cause precedes its effect. But in some tension with this point, fundamental physical law is often held to be symmetrical and all-encompassing. Physical time, however, has not only measurable extension, as with spatial dimensions, it also has a direction—from the past through the present into the future. This preferred direction is time’s arrow. In spite of this standard contrast of time with space, if all the fundamental laws of physics are symmetrical, they are indifferent to time’s arrow. In consequence, excessive emphasis on the ideal of symmetrical, fundamental laws of physics generates skepticism regarding the common-sense and scientific uses of the concept of causality. The expectation has been that all physical phenomena are capable of explanation and prediction by reference to fundamental physicals laws—so that the laws and phenomena of statistical thermodynam- ics —and of the special sciences—must be derivative and/or secondary. The most important and oft repeated explanation of time’s arrow, however, is provided by the second law of thermodynamics. This paper explores the prospects for time’s arrow based on the second law. The concept of causality employed here is empirically based, though acknowledging practical scientific interests, and is linked to time’s arrow and to the thesis that there can be no causal change, in any domain of inquiry, without physical interaction. (shrink)

This study considers the role of epistemic turning points in the historiography of sexuality. Disentangling the historical complexity of scientia sexualis, I argue that the late 19th century and the mid-20th century constitute two critical epistemic junctures in the genealogy of sexual liberation, as the notion of free love slowly gave way to the idea of sexual freedom in modern western society. I also explore the value of the Foucauldian approach for the study of the history of sexuality in non-western (...) contexts. Drawing on examples from Republican China (1912—49), I propose that the Foucauldian insight concerning the emergence of a ‘homosexual identity’ in the West can serve as a useful guide for thinking about similar issues in the history of sexuality and the historical epistemology of sexology in modern East Asia. (shrink)

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...) to an accidentally true belief; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink)

The problem of the ‘Unity of the Proposition’ is the problem of explaining the difference between a content-expressing declarative sentence and a ‘mere list’ of referents. The prevailing view is that such a problem is to be solved metaphysically, either by reducing our ontology to exclude propositions or universals, or by explaining how it is possible for a certain kind of complex entity – the ‘proposition’– to ‘unify’ its constituents. I argue that these metaphysical approaches cannot succeed; instead the only (...) viable approach is linguistic, identifying features of the (type–) sentence itself that enable it to express a content. Thus the problem of the ‘Unity of the Proposition’ (distinguishing sentences from lists) is distinct from the problem of ‘propositional unity’ (explaining how the constituents of propositions form a unified content). I suggest that, while the latter problem is not pressing, the former does not permit of an answer which applies in generality in all languages; we can only fully explain the Unity of the Proposition for single languages or groups of similar languages. (shrink)

" Le point de départ de ce livre est une conférence dans laquelle j'ai présenté à un large public les points essentiels de mon livre, Apprendre à vivre.

The paper takes off from the suggestion of Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen that Kuhn’s account of science may be understood in coherentist terms. There are coherentist themes in Kuhn’s philosophy of science. But one crucial element is lacking. Kuhn does not deny the existence of basic beliefs which have a non-doxastic source of justification. Nor does he assert that epistemic justification only derives from inferential relationships between non-basic beliefs. Despite this, the coherentist interpretation is promising and I develop it further in this (...) paper. I raise the question of whether Kuhn’s account of science can deal with the input objection to coherentism. I argue that the role played by problems in Kuhn’s theory of science ensures that there is input from the external world into scientists’ belief-systems. I follow Hoyningen-Huene in pointing to the causal role played by the external world in determining perceptual states. I next turn to the question of whether Kuhn’s rejection of foundationalism implies coherentism. I argue that Kuhn’s rejection of the one-to-one relation between object and experience is compatible with a foundationalist account of justification. Nor does Kuhn’s rejection of the given entail the same coherentist implications as Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given. (shrink)

in eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave MacMillan 2008).

A critique of Plantinga's free will defense. For an updated version of this critique, with a reply to objections from William Rowe and Alvin Plantinga, see my "The logical problem of evil: Plantinga and Mackie," in Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard‐Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, pp. 19-33.

Assainir moralement la situation internationale requiert sans doute davantage que ce que l’on peut attendre des seules vertus d’une éthique argumentative. Au-delà, il conviendrait de porter l’éthique du discours sur le registre d’une éthique reconstructive. De quoi s’agit-il? – D’une pratique du discours qui, à travers une thématisation que l’on souhaite coopérative, poursuit la reconstitution, par les intéressés, du drame qu’ils ont pu vivre avec toute leur subjectivité engagée dans une relation éventuellement jalonnée par le destin des oublis, des malentendus, (...) humiliations et violences de toute sorte. Cette pratique requiert ainsi une attitude autocritique, une disposition à entendre la réclamation de l’autre et à reconnaître sa souffrance du point de vue de la violence que j’ai pu lui infliger, volontairement ou non, ce qui suppose aussi une attitude correspondante chez l’autre, pour que puisse être menée à bien la réconciliation entre les protagonistes. En cela, l’éthique reconstructive peut être regardée comme une éthique de la reconnaissance doublée d’une éthique de la responsabilité. Rejoignez les fans sur Facebook.../... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Historical Survey with Interviews Moral Skepticism and the Serial Killer A Brief History of Serial Killers Serial Killers of the Ancient World Serial Killers of the Renaissance Serial Killers of the Nineteenth Century Serial Killers of the Early Twentieth Century The Golden Age of Serial Killers Serial Killers Today: Conversations on Motivation.

One of the many faces of Islam in Indonesia is the abangan Muslims or the abangans. As one of the most populous Muslim groups in the country, it is important to know them. To understand Indonesian Islam or Muslims, one cannot overlook them. The article argues that, amid recent escalating Muslim–Christian tension in the country, this majority Muslim group can play a significant role in enhancing Muslim–Christian relations in the future, on account of their worldview that emphasizes and maintains cosmic (...) harmony and balance of all existence. Their open and syncretic attitudes toward other religions may foster religious tolerance and coexistence. These are attested in the author’s personal engagement with them. It is suggested that Christians be more inclusive toward them, but, at the same time, be critical in engaging their worldview. These attitudes are necessary for building a mutual and peaceful Muslim–Christian relationship in the region. (shrink)

Proposals for a universal basic income have reemerged in public discourse for a variety of reasons. Marx’s critique of exploitation suggests two apparently opposed positions on a basic income. On the one hand, a basic income funded from taxes on labor would appear to be exploitative of workers. On the other hand, a basic income liberates everyone from the vulnerable condition in which one is forced to sell one’s labor in order to survive, and so seems to be one way (...) of abolishing exploitation at its root. This paper will develop a conception of exploitation that resolves the conflict in favor of basic income. The conception of exploitation is grounded in a liberal egalitarian conception of justice rather than in Marx’s labor theory of value or an exclusive focus on the worker-capitalist relation. This position is not premised on an acceptance of the basic institutions of capitalism, but rather is a standpoint from which to evaluate them. It is not necessary to downsize our ideas of freedom and equality. But it is less obvious than it appeared in classic Marxist formulations that socialism is necessary for social justice. To quote the title of a famous article, there could be a ‘capitalist road to communism’, if a substantial basic income is feasible in a capitalist society. (shrink)