Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics. Edited by Craig Calhoun and John McGowan, viii + 362 pp. $54.95 cloth $21.95 paper. Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés and American Political Thought after World War II. Edited by Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Horst Mewes, and Elisabeth Glaser‐Schmidt, x + 208 pp. $49.95/£35.00 cloth, $16.95 paper. Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later. Edited by Larry May and Jerome Kohn, viii + 384 pp. $40.00 cloth, $17.50 paper.
From 2006 through mid-2018, there have been 125 [Formula: see text] recorded earthquakes within the Fort Worth Basin and the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. There is general scientific consensus that this increase in seismicity has been induced by increases in pore-fluid pressure from wastewater injection and from cross-fault pore-pressure imbalance due to injection and production. Previous fault stress analyses indicate that many of the faults are critically stressed; therefore, careful consideration should be taken when injecting in close proximity to these (...) structures. Understanding the structural characteristics that control geomechanical aspects of these earthquake-prone faults is vital in characterizing this known hazard. To improve understanding of faults in the system, we have developed a characterization using a new basin-wide fault interpretation and database that has been assembled through the integration of published data, 2D and 3D seismic surveys, outcrop mapping, earthquakes, and interpretations provided by operators resulting in a 3D structural framework of basement-rooting faults. Our results show that a primary fault system trends northeast–southwest, creating a system of elongate horsts and grabens. Fault architectures range from isolated faults to linked and cross-cutting relay systems with individual segments ranging in length from 0.5 to 80 km. The faults that have hosted earthquakes are generally less than 10 km long, trend toward the northeast, and exhibit more than 50 m of normal displacement. The intensity of faulting decreases to the west away from the Ouachita structural front. Statistical analysis of the fault length, spacing, throw, and linkage tendency enables a more complete characterization of faults in the basin, which can be used to mitigate the seismic hazard. Finally, we find that a significant percentage of the total population of faults may be susceptible to reactivation and seismicity as those that have slipped recently. (shrink)
We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)
Witnessing to the strong present-day interest in the formation of the great scholastic syntheses of the thirteenth century are the large number of studies devoted to the lesser thinkers of the preceding century. The English-born Robert of Melun is one of these so far largely neglected authors. Despite the edition of his major works in Louvain by R. M. Martin, little has been written on this gifted pupil of Abelard. Horst cuts a large and central piece out of Robert's (...) "system": the doctrines of the Trinity and of God. After a detailed analysis of the sources of his thinking, the Trinity is dealt with and then God. Under the pen of Robert, the sharp dialectical method of Abelard serves to elaborate Augustine's speculation on the Trinity. Yet the author—in line with the contemporary interest in trinitology—is not satisfied to expound the subtle distinctions Robert made but strives to show also how they can have a bearing on the "economy of salvation." There is a rather liberal dose of lengthy Latin quotes, footnotes mushroom, and secondary literature is quoted by the yard. To sum up: this is a serious and articulate treatment of two central questions of scholastic theology and we are glad to read the promise of a continuation treating Robert's anthropology, angelology, and his views on the First Man.—M. J. V. (shrink)
Ist Geschichtsdarstellung ein transparentes Fenster zu einer faktischen Vergangenheit? Oder verlieren Fakten ihre Verbindlichkeit zugunsten der Repräsentation? Der vorliegende Band weist einen vermittelnden Weg zwischen diesen Extremen. Jenseits der positivistisch verstandenen historischen Fakten sowie der infolge des linguistic turn häufig behaupteten Unzugänglichkeit und Unentscheidbarkeit der faktischen Vergangenheit wird die Geschichtsdarstellung selbst als das eigentlich Greifbare zur Geltung gebracht. Geschichte ist demnach in ihrer Darstellung zu suchen – unabhängig davon, ob es sich um historiographische Quellen, literarische Texte, Gemälde oder um Museen (...) als mediale Darstellungsräume handelt. Die Beiträge gehen einem breiten Spektrum unterschiedlicher Dimensionen von Geschichtsdarstellung nach. Medien, Methoden und Strategien bilden dabei die zentralen Koordinaten, anhand derer Geschichtsdarstellung mit ihren narrativen und bildlichen Ausdrucksformen exemplarisch erörtert wird. Mit Beiträgen von Wolfgang Frühwald, Werner Goez, Thomas Kirchner, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Otto Gerhard Oexle, Antonios Rengakos, Hermann Schäfer, Jörg Schönert, Howard Weinbrot, Horst Wenzel und Gernot R. Wieland. (shrink)
In the first chapter I have introduced Carnapian intensional logic again st the background of Frege s and Quine s puzzles. The main body of the d issertation consists of two parts. In the first part I discussed Carnapi an modal logic and arithmetic with descriptions. In the second chapter, I have described three Carnapian theories, CCL, CFL, and CNL. All three theories have three things in common. F irst, they are formulated in languages containing description terms. Sec ond, they (...) contain a system of modal logic. Third, they do not contain th e unrestricted classical substitution principle, but they do contain the classical substitution principle restricted to non-modal formulas and t he Carnapian substitution principle, which says that two terms can be s ubstituted salva veritate if they are necessarily coreferential. There a re two major differences between the three theories. First, CCL and CFL allow universal instantiation with description ter ms, whereas CNL does not. Moreover, the quantificational theo ry of the CCL is classical, whereas the quantificational theo ry of CFL is a free logic. Another difference is t hat CCL and CFL contain different description principles. Most import antly, the description principle of CCL ensures that even imp roper descriptions have a denotation, whereas the description principle of CFL does not guarantee this. CNL does not have a description prin ciple. In the third chapter, I have studied collapse arguments for CCL, CFL, and CNL. A collapse argument is an argum ent for the following statement: if p is true, then it is nec essarily true. A crucial role in the proofs of these collapse results wa s played by so-called self-predication principles, which say that unde r certain conditions the predicate that expresses the descriptive condition can be combined by the description term formed ou t of that predicate with the result being a true sentence. In this chapt er I have discussed a collapse argument for the extension of CCL with a self-predication principle, I have given a collapse argument for a similarly extended CFL, and most importantly, I have gi ven a collapse argument for the extension of CNL with a self- predication principle. Finally, I have argued that the relevant self-pre dication principles are unsound under a Carnapian interpretation. In the fourth chapter, I have studied the extension of Peano Arithmetic with a Carnapian modal logic C, which is a dummy l etter standing for either CCL or CFL. One can prov e that the principle of the necessity of identity is a theorem of CPA. This implies that one gets a collapse result for CPA. The standard principle of weak induction was crucial for the proof. O ne can also prove that, if one assumes a particular self-predication pri nciple, and if one assumes the principle of strong induction or, equivalently, the least-number principle, then one gets a partial collap se of de re modal truths in de dicto modal tr uths. I have argued that, if the box operator is interpreted as a metaph ysical necessity operator, then Platonists would not be inimical to the collapse result. But if CPA is extended with a physical theor y, then there is a threat that physical truths become physical necessiti es. It was shown that, under a Carnapian interpretation, the standard pr inciple of weak induction is unsound, and that it can be replaced by a C arnapian principle of weak induction that is sound. The probl em of logical and mathematical omniscience prevents ordinary Carnapian i ntensional logic from being taken seriously as a logic adequate for desc ribing the principles of demonstrability. Yet many of the proof-theoreti c results of the first part carry over to the part on Carnapian epistemi c arithmetic with descriptions, since proof-theoretic results are indepe ndent of the informal reading of the operators. In the fifth chapter, I looked at extensions of arithmetic with a modal logic in which the box operator is interpreted as a demonstrability oper ator. A first extension in that sense is Shapiro s Epistemic Arithmetic. Shapiro himself offered the problem of mathematic al omniscience as a reason why it is difficult to find a model theory fo r EA.Horsten attempted to provide a model theory via the deto ur of Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic. The attention of the reade r was drawn to an incoherence in the model theory of. Two al ternative solutions were presented and, after a short discussion of the problem of de re demonstrability one of those alternatives wa s chosen. The discussion of the problem of de re demonstrabil ity made it clear that it would be interesting to study the epistemic pr operties of notation systems. Horsten himself provided a framework for t his, viz. Carnapian Epistemic Arithmetic, and he started a systematic study of the epistemic properti es of notation systems within that framework. However, he did not provid e non-trivial but adequate models. To make a start with solving the prob lem of finding good models for CEA, I introduced Carnapian Mo dal-Epistemic Arithmetic In constructing CMEA I incorporated the lesson about the principle of weak induction learnt in the fourth chapter. In the sixth chapter, I gave a critical assessment of an argument concerning the limits of de re demonst rability about the natural numbers. The conclusion of the Description Ar gument is that it is undemonstrable that there is a natural number that has a certain property but of which it is undemonstrable that it has tha t property. A crucial step in the Description Argument involved a self-p redication principle. Making good use of one of the results obtained in the third chapter, I proved a collapse result for the background theory against which the Description Argument was formulated. I concluded that either the either the Description Argument is sound but its conclusion i s trivial, o r the Description Argument is unsound, or it is a cheapshot. As an appendix I included an article co-authored by prof. dr. Leon Horst en and me. The topic of the article is indirectly related to some other topics investigated in my dissertation. Also, it backs up one of the addition al theses I might be asked to publicly defend during my doctoral exam. T he topic of the appendix is the set of the so-called paradoxes of stric t implication. Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. Pace Lowe, it is argued that Lowe s notion of implication d oes not achieve this aim. Moreover, a general argument is offered to the effect that no other variation on Lewis notion of constantly strict imp lication describes the logical behaviour of natural language conditional s in a satisfactory way. (shrink)
Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)
The contributions to this volume all deal with the crucial problem of change in the religious traditions of the ancient world. They range from broad overviews to detailed case-studies, discussing examples from Greek, Roman, Jewish, Christian and Manichaean literature.
Since the seventeenth century, our understanding of the natural world has been one of phenomena that behave in accordance with natural laws. While other elements of the early modern scientific worldview may be rejected or at least held in question—the metaphor of the world as a great machine, the narrowly mechanist assumption that all physical interactions must be contact interactions, the idea that matter might actually be obeying rules laid down by its Divine Author – the notion of natural law (...) has continued to play a pivotal role in actual scientific practice, in our philosophical interpretations of science, and in their its metaphysical implications. (shrink)
If I say “we are now living in England” or “grass is green in summer’ or ‘the cat is on the mat’ what I say will normally be true or false—the statements are true if they correctly report how things are, or correspond to the facts; and if they do not do these things, they are false. Such a statement will only fail to have a truth-value if its referring expressions fail to refer ; or if the statement lies on (...) the border between truth and falsity so that it is as true to say that the statement is true as to say that it is false. Are moral judgments normally true or false in the way in which the above statements are true or false? I will term the view that they are objectivism and the view that they are not subjectivism. The objectivist maintains that it is as much a fact about an action that it is right or wrong as that it causes pain or takes a long time to perform. The subjectivist maintains that saying than an action is right or wrong is not stating a fact about it but merely expressing approval of it or commending it or doing some such similar thing. I wish in this paper, first, to show that all arguments for subjectivism manifestly fail, and secondly to produce a strong argument for objectivism. But, to start with, some preliminaries. (shrink)
In late January of 1987, the State Treasurer of Pennsylvania, R. Budd Dwyer, shot himself to death in front of a dozen reporters and camera crews during a news conference in his office. Much was subsequently made in the popular press, and within the profession, about the difficult ethical decision television journalists were faced with in determining how much of the very graphic suicide tape to air. A review of the literature in this area suggests, however, that journalists have established (...) a set of relatively detailed conventions for dealing with events involving graphic depictions of death. Analysis of the Dwyer tape and interviews conducted with Pennsylvania television news directors show that eighteen of the twenty stations in the state that carry news used basically the same type and amount of footage in their evening newscasts. One decided to use no tape. One showed the moment of death. When the story broke around noon, two additional stations showed the moment of suicide, but they revised their story for the evening program. In addition, the wide majority of news directors interviewed said they had little difficulty in deciding how to edit the tape. The processing of the Dwyer story suggests that any ethical dilemmas faced by journalists during decision making were put aside for later consideration. The material was edited quickly and according to similar patterns, or conventions, around the state. The study suggests greater attention be given to the definition and interaction of personal professional values, in the ethical sense, and norms of news processing, in the sociological sense. (shrink)
Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)
An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery (...) how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well. (shrink)
Abstract In this article, which is the first of two to examine the ideas of R. S. Peters on moral education, consideration is given to his justificatory arguments found in Ethics and Education. Here he employs presupposition arguments to show to what anyone engaging in moral discourse is committed. The result is a group of procedural principles which are recommended to be employed in moral education. This article is an attempt to examine the presupposition arguments Peters employs, to comment on (...) the procedural principles he believes are presupposed, and to consider the strength of the presupposition argument. My conclusion is that Peters's arguments fail to establish the conclusion he arrives at, and that any gains from the form of argument he uses are hollow. (shrink)
On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)
… the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind. The law concerning punishment is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happiness, looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it.
R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’. The author argues the need to go beyond Collingwood, first by demonstrating the authenticity of available evidence, and secondly, using Namier as an example, by considering methodology as well as epistemology, and the need to relate past thoughts to their present context. The ‘law of the consumption of time’ encourages historians to focus on landmark events, theories and generalisations, thus breaking from (...) Collingwood's emphasis on fidelity to past ideas and interpreting the past from the concepts of the present. This conflict can only be reconciled by the study of historiography. (shrink)