Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture “is” and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.
In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on “cold” cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution.
Fully interpreted, Lewis's dynamic systems modeling of emotion encompasses psychological-adaptation thinking and individual and group differences in normal and abnormal behavior. It weakens the categorical perspective in evolutionary psychology and the clinical sciences; and suggests continuity between “normal” or “abnormal” behavior in whatever way this is self and culturally constituted, although culture/linguistic factors and selfhood are neglected. Application of a dynamic systems model could improve formulation of clinical problems.
Ethnomedicine is the field that analyzes medical traditions comparatively. An ethnomedical approach is used in the essay to analyze the topic of medical ethics. General properties of medical ethics as realized in different societies are outlined. These pertain to the healer's relations with clients, with other healers, and with the group or society. The conditions of medical practice and the influence of social and political factors that affect them are discussed in relation to medical ethical questions. Unique developments of contemporary (...) medical science that affect and condition practice and raise new ethical questions are examined in light of ethnomedical generalizations. The essay aims to clarify the cultural bases of medicine generally and ethical aspects of medical practice and care more specifically. (shrink)
Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.
Fully interpreted, Lewis's dynamic systems modeling of emotion encompasses psychological-adaptation thinking and individual and group differences in normal and abnormal behavior. It weakens the categorical perspective in evolutionary psychology and the clinical sciences; and suggests continuity between or behavior in whatever way this is self and culturally constituted, although culture/linguistic factors and selfhood are neglected. Application of a dynamic systems model could improve formulation of clinical problems.
In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution.
Summary and ConclusionsThis paper presents the argument that the character of illness in psychiatry requires embracing phenomena which falls outside the area of concern of basic biologic sciences. The argument is developed by introducing the idea of a “theory of illness,” a cultural trait of a society, and by examining features of our biomedical theory of illness. The disease “depression” is then examined in terms of this theory. A basic point made is that an appraisal of any medical system involves (...) dealing with social factors and cultural conventions. Another one is that the effective and prudent application of biomedical knowledge requires dealing with neurobiologic as well as social and cultural factors that in a complementary fashion provide understanding about the organization and meaning of behavior. An emphasis on the organization and meaning of behavior, with the aim of uncovering illness conditions which can be effectively controlled, is and very likely will continue to be a central concern of psychiatry. (shrink)
Disease represents a principal tentacle of natural selection and a staple theme of evolutionary medicine. However, it is through a small portal of entry and a very long lineage that disease as sickness entered behavioural spaces and human consciousness. This has a long evolutionary history. Anyone interested in the origins of medicine and psychiatry as social institution has to start with analysis of how mind and body were conceptualised and played out behaviourally following the pongid/hominin split and thereafter. The early (...) evolution of medicine provides a template for clarifying elemental characteristics of mind and minding. Sickness and healing in chimpanzees represents an early manifestation of (ethno) medicine, termed a behavioural tradition, which is found played out in routines of helping, caring, and healing as well as other social behaviours. Chimpanzees seem to know they are sick since they resort to self-medication when exhibiting signs and symptoms of disease. Also, they help those exhibiting physical and cognitive disability. Among hominins, awareness of consequences and implications of sickness and coping with them represented an important feature of human consciousness and a major factor in the origins of vaunted human abilities involving language, cognition, and culture as we know them. A philosophical examination of the early evolution of sickness and healing provides a window into an understanding of evolving human capacities such as self-awareness, awareness and implications of suffering, theory of mind, altruism, conceptual grasp of sickness and healing and morality. (shrink)
Pain is a biological and subjective phenomenon. Clear understanding of its features is essential. Wierzbicka’s analysis accomplishes this. This comment discusses the relevance of her approach for the study of early evolution of medicine. The comment has six parts: (a) Wierzbicka’s theory and method; (b) its application to pain; (c) relevance of pain for the study of ethnomedicine, the cultural understanding of sickness and healing; (d) significance of natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) for understanding the evolution of human thought and behavior; (...) (e) relevance of NSM for studying biological and cultural evolution of early medicine; and (f) summary and conclusion. (shrink)
Erdelyi grants emotional and cognitive qualities that can modulate consciousness and probably overlap with what is typically attributed to Such a broad appellation of repression explains virtually all behavior and lacks specificity. Repression and attention elucidate behavior in different clinical, cognitive, and cultural contexts. Refining these influences, we identify a few lacunae in Erdelyi's account.
Biologists and philosophers of science have recently called for an extension of evolutionary theory. This so-called ‘extended evolutionary synthesis’ seeks to integrate developmental processes, extra-genetic forms of inheritance, and niche construction into evolutionary theory in a central way. While there is often agreement in evolutionary biology over the existence of these phenomena, their explanatory relevance is questioned. Advocates of EES posit that their perspective offers better explanations than those provided by ‘standard evolutionary theory’. Still, why this would be the case (...) is unclear. Usually, such claims assume that EES’s superior explanatory status arises from the pluralist structure of EES, its different problem agenda, and a growing body of evidence for the evolutionary relevance of developmental phenomena. However, what is usually neglected in this debate is a discussion of what the explanatory standards of EES actually are, and how they differ from prevailing standards in SET. In other words, what is considered to be a good explanation in EES versus SET? To answer this question, we present a theoretical framework that evaluates the explanatory power of different evolutionary explanations of the same phenomena. This account is able to identify criteria for why and when evolutionary explanations of EES are better than those of SET. Such evaluations will enable evolutionary biology to find potential grounds for theoretical integration. (shrink)
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) debate is gaining ground in contemporary evolutionary biology. In parallel, a number of philosophical standpoints have emerged in an attempt to clarify what exactly is represented by the EES. For Massimo Pigliucci, we are in the wake of the newest instantiation of a persisting Kuhnian paradigm; in contrast, Telmo Pievani has contended that the transition to an EES could be best represented as a progressive reformation of a prior Lakatosian scientific research program, with the extension (...) of its Neo-Darwinian core and the addition of a brand-new protective belt of assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. Here, we argue that those philosophical vantage points are not the only ways to interpret what current proposals to ‘extend’ the Modern Synthesis-derived ‘standard evolutionary theory’ (SET) entail in terms of theoretical change in evolutionary biology. We specifically propose the image of the emergent EES as a vast network of models and interweaved representations that, instantiated in diverse practices, are connected and related in multiple ways. Under that assumption, the EES could be articulated around a paraconsistent network of evolutionary theories (including some elements of the SET), as well as models, practices and representation systems of contemporary evolutionary biology, with edges and nodes that change their position and centrality as a consequence of the co-construction and stabilization of facts and historical discussions revolving around the epistemic goals of this area of the life sciences. We then critically examine the purported structure of the EES—published by Laland and collaborators in 2015—in light of our own network-based proposal. Finally, we consider which epistemic units of Evo-Devo are present or still missing from the EES, in preparation for further analyses of the topic of explanatory integration in this conceptual framework. (shrink)
Contemporary evolutionary biology comprises a plural landscape of multiple co-existent conceptual frameworks and strenuous voices that disagree on the nature and scope of evolutionary theory. Since the mid-eighties, some of these conceptual frameworks have denounced the ontologies of the Modern Synthesis and of the updated Standard Theory of Evolution as unfinished or even flawed. In this paper, we analyze and compare two of those conceptual frameworks, namely Niles Eldredge’s Hierarchy Theory of Evolution (with its extended ontology of evolutionary entities) and (...) the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (with its proposal of an extended ontology of evolutionary processes), in an attempt to map some epistemic bridges (e.g. compatible views of causation; niche construction) and some conceptual rifts (e.g. extra-genetic inheritance; different perspectives on macroevolution; contrasting standpoints held in the “externalism–internalism” debate) that exist between them. This paper seeks to encourage theoretical, philosophical and historiographical discussions about pluralism or the possible unification of contemporary evolutionary biology. (shrink)
Que haya una singularidadEsta habría sido la consigna de los grupos. Toda consigna se dice de una ‘instrucción de carácter general que se da, o que se transmiten unas a otras las personas que intervienen en una misión...’ (Moliner 1984: 734). La consigna, por tanto, está referida en primer término a un don, sólo más tarde va a intervenir el cálculo, la conjura. En la consiga algo siempre se da, se ofrece como ‘instrucción de carácter general’, sin contenidos y sin (...) estrategia según reza el sig.. (shrink)
La intensión del presente trabajo es la de explorar la relación medios-fines exponiendo que la misma se presenta en la obra de John Dewey como camino y horizonte coherente y consistente de su propuesta filosófica y educativa. La relación medios-fines dirige la investigación llevándonos a una comprensión del conocimiento como practica evaluativa y transformadora. Esta concepción epistemológica sienta las bases para repensar la educación y la democracia y brinda elementos suficientes para superar las dicotomías pensamiento - emoción, hechos - valores (...) y sociedad-individuo. El método utilizado es la investigación. La educación y la democracia son los espacios en los cuales la relación medios-fines, ya sea en su fase natural o adaptativa, ya sea en su fase moral o critica, ya sea en su fase social o publica, encuentra unidad y continuidad. En la educación de, por y para la democracia la inteligencia y la actividad se interrelacionan mutuamente. (shrink)
In recent years, biologists and philosophers of science have argued that evolutionary theory should incorporate more seriously the idea of ‘reciprocal causation.’ This notion refers to feedback loops whereby organisms change their experiences of the environment or alter the physical properties of their surroundings. In these loops, in particular niche constructing activities are central, since they may alter selection pressures acting on organisms, and thus affect their evolutionary trajectories. This paper discusses long-standing problems that emerge when studying such reciprocal causal (...) processes between organisms and environments. By comparing past approaches to reciprocal causation from the early twentieth century with contemporary ones in niche construction theory, we identify two central reoccurring problems: All of these approaches have not been able to provide a conceptual framework that allows maintaining meaningful boundaries between organisms and environments, instead of merging the two, and integrating experiential and physical kinds of reciprocal causation. By building on case studies of niche construction research, we provide a model that is able to solve these two problems. It allows distinguishing between mutually interacting organisms and environments in complex scenarios, as well as integrating various forms of experiential and physical niche construction. (shrink)
Even though management scholars have offered several views on the process of corporate sustainability, these efforts have focused mainly on the technical aspects of sustainability while omitting the fundamental role played by individual moral competences. Therefore, previous work offers an incomplete and somewhat reductionist view of corporate sustainability. In this article, we develop a holistic framework of corporate sustainability in which both the moral and technical aspects of sustainability are considered. We do so by integrating the ethical, normative perspective of (...) the Catholic social teaching with the competitive view of the natural resource-based view. This framework highlights the importance of CST principles and ideas in developing executive moral competences such as moral sensitivity and awareness, and moral cognition and motivation. Moral competences, in turn, influence the organizational selection of environmental strategies, giving leaders the intrinsic motivation to promote both a longer-term stance on corporate sustainability efforts and a relentless search for greener business models. Such strategies move the firm closer towards achieving environmental sustainability. Hence, by bridging the individual, normative-ethical with the organizational, implementational levels of corporate sustainability, our framework provides a more realistic, coherent, and complete perspective on the complex process of achieving corporate sustainability. (shrink)
John Dewey’s philosophy has the notion of experience as backbone. The following paper regards experience as a method for doing philosophy, and a compromise grounding the entire philosophical project made by Dewey. Experience allows connecting cognition and affection in a natural way. Smart researching and arts creationappreciation are two modes to guide the progress of experience to a deeper level of meaning and from its own resources. The ideal way (the general description) of making part of the experience –which is (...) argued, smart and aesthetic– becomes stronger in the ideal of democracy. For this reason, Dewey’s philosophy of the experience works as a manner of interpreting democratic ideals. (shrink)
Horacio Spector provides an original and compelling moral justification of classical liberalism. Among the topics he discusses are the concepts of negative and positive freedom, the notion of a moral right, the link between positive freedom and personal autonomy, and the agent-relativity of moral reasons.
The paper studies first order extensions of classical systems of modal logic (see (Chellas, 1980, part III)). We focus on the role of the Barcan formulas. It is shown that these formulas correspond to fundamental properties of neighborhood frames. The results have interesting applications in epistemic logic. In particular we suggest that the proposed models can be used in order to study monadic operators of probability (Kyburg, 1990) and likelihood (Halpern-Rabin, 1987).
How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
The article focuses on representing different forms of non-adjunctive inference as sub-Kripkean systems of classical modal logic, where the inference from □A and □B to □A ∧ B fails. In particular we prove a completeness result showing that the modal system that Schotch and Jennings derive from a form of non-adjunctive inference in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is a classical system strictly stronger than EMN and weaker than K (following the notation for classical modalities presented in Chellas, 1980). The unified (...) semantical characterization in terms of neighborhoods permits comparisons between different forms of non-adjunctive inference. For example, we show that the non-adjunctive logic proposed in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is not adequate in general for representing the logic of high probability operators. An alternative interpretation of the forcing relation of Schotch and Jennings is derived from the proposed unified semantics and utilized in order to propose a more fine-grained measure of epistemic coherence than the one presented in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980). Finally we propose a syntactic translation of the purely implicative part of Jaśkowski's system D₂ into a classical system preserving all the theorems (and non-theorems) explicilty mentioned in (Jaśkowski, 1969). The translation method can be used in order to develop epistemic semantics for a larger class of non-adjunctive (discursive) logics than the ones historically investigated by Jaśkowski. (shrink)