Machine generated contents note: Preface Introduction Chapter 1: Russell and Moore Chapter 2: Wittgenstein, The Vienna Circle, and Logical Positivism Chapter 3: Responses to Logical Positivism, Quine, Kuhn, and American Pragmatism Chapter 4: Ordinary Language Philosophy and Later Wittgenstein Chapter 5: Responses to Ordinary Language Philosophy- Logic, Language, and Mind Chapter 6: The Rebirth of Metaphysics Chapter 7: Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds- Kripke, Putman, and Donnellan Chapter 8: Ethics and Metaethics in the Analytic Tradition Epilogue: (...) class='Hi'>AnalyticPhilosophy Today and Tomorrow. (shrink)
The main stream of academic philosophy, in Anglophone countries and increasingly worldwide, is identified by the name 'analytic'. The study of its history, from the 19th century to the late 20th, has boomed in recent years. These specially commissioned essays by forty leading scholars constitute the most comprehensive book on the subject.
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analyticphilosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as (...) an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen. Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart. (shrink)
The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analyticphilosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analyticphilosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analyticphilosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding of it. (...) This is especially unsatisfactory since such understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analyticphilosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analyticphilosophy as illusory. (shrink)
This critical review of Soames's history of analyticphilosophy evaluates Soames's enterprise by reference to the degree to which it achieves his goals of (i) providing an overview of analyticphilosophy 1900-75, (ii) explaining what the most important analytic philosophers thought, (iii) selecting some of the most important works of each philosopher for discussion, and (iv) properly evaluating the developments of the period. On all counts Soames's history is found sorely wanting. The overview (...) it offers is riddled with distortion, its explanations are frequently mistaken and uncomprehending, its selection is demonstrably inadequate and its evaluations ill-informed and ill-judged. (shrink)
_A Brief History of AnalyticPhilosophy: From Russell to Rawls_ presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analyticphilosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analyticphilosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical (...) concepts Includes listings of suggested further readings Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)
This paper sets out an agenda for the study of the history of analytic and post-analytic political philosophy. It builds on a growing literature on the history of analyticphilosophy to make three main suggestions. First, analyticphilosophy arose as part of a wider shift from the developmental historicism of the nineteenth century to more modernist modes of knowledge. Second, analyticphilosophy included a wide range of approaches to moral (...) and political issues, many of which reflected distinctive concepts of analysis, logic, and science. Third, analyticphilosophy only became widespread when the work of Quine and Wittgenstein moved it in a more post-analytic direction. Crucially, the move toward post-analyticphilosophy inspired people to rediscover and reinvent other traditions, including liberal humanism, democratic republicanism, virtue ethics, and historicism. The resulting history provides a fluid and diverse understanding of arguably the most powerful philosophical movement of the twentieth century. (shrink)
This book offers new perspectives on the history of analytical philosophy, surveying recent scholarship on the philosophical study of mind, language, logic and reality over the course of the last 200 years. Each chapter contributes to a broader engagement with a wider range of figures, topics and disciplines outside of philosophy than has been traditionally associated with the history of analytical philosophy. The book acquaints readers with new aspects of analytical philosophy’s revolutionary past while (...) engaging in a much needed methodological reflection. It questions the meaning associated with talk of 'analytic' philosophy and offers new perspective on its development. It offers original studies on a range of topics – including in the philosophy of language and mind, logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics – and figures whose relevance, when they is not already established as in the case of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, are just now beginning to become the topic of mainstream literature: Franz Brentano, William James, Susan Langer as well as the German and British logicians of the nineteenth century. (shrink)
In ‘Brentano’s Methodology as a Path through the Divide’, Röck makes two related claims. Röck argues that there exists a philosophical dilemma between description and logical analysis, and that the current divide between continental phenomenology and analyticphilosophy may be seen as a consequence of the dilemma. Röck further argues that Brentano’s work integrates description and logical analysis in a way which ‘can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary (...) class='Hi'>philosophy’. Without disputing Röck’s claim about the suitability of Brentano’s work for such an integration, this paper questions by examining the influence of Brentano and his school on early analyticphilosophy. As recent scholarship in the history of analyticphilosophy demonstrates, contrary to Röck’s contention, many prominent analytic philosophers conversed with Brentano and his school’s conceptions of phenomenological description. (shrink)
The paper discusses the peculiarities of the analytic approach to the history of Ancient philosophy in the context of other, more popular approaches and genres. This approach is based on finding out an implicit argumentation and problems in the philosophical texts, and establishing logical connections between them. The paper also considers the perspectives of application of this approach to patristic texts. In addition, it shows the necessity of formalization and symbolization in the analytichistory of (...)philosophy. (shrink)
Philosophy written in English is overwhelmingly analyticphilosophy, and the techniques and predilections of analyticphilosophy are not only unhistorical but anti-historical, and hostile to textual commentary. Analytic usually aspires to a very high degree of clarity and precision of formulation and argument, and it often seeks to be informed by, and consistent with, current natural science. In an earlier era, analyticphilosophy aimed at agreement with ordinary linguistic intuitions or common sense (...) beliefs, or both. All of these aspects of the subject sit uneasily with the use of historical texts for philosophical illumination. In this book, ten distinguished philosophers explore the tensions between, and the possibilities of reconciling, analyticphilosophy and history of philosophy. Contributors: M. R. Ayers, John Cottingham, Daniel Garber, Gary Hatfield, Anthony Kenny, Steven Nadler, G. A. J. Rogers, Tom Sorell, Catherine Wilson, Yves Charles Zarka. (shrink)
Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This work pursues certain themes in the rise and development of analyticphilosophy, focussing in particular on the relationship between Aristotelian and Fregean logic, and the emergence and evolution of interest in questions of meaning, with reference to Frege and Wittgenstein. ;In the introductory chapter I consider the general relationship between analyticphilosophy and the history of philosophy, suggesting the need for a (...) closer examination of the 'paradigm shift' from syllogistic theory to modern logic. In Part One I undertake this examination, with a chapter outlining the development, nature and purpose of Aristotle's logical theory, followed by a chapter describing Frege's achievement in the Begriffsschrift. My central concern here is with the emergence of a conception of sense--as grounded in the notion of logical equivalence. Aristotle, I argue, had no such conception; and it only emerged as Frege was led to reflect on the differences between his own logical system and traditional logic. ;In Part Two I consider the tightening of the 'bonds of sense' which Frege created, looking first at Frege's logicist project and then at Wittgenstein's Tractatus . I describe the epistemological motivation of Frege's work and the way that this led him to distinguish between Sinn and Bedeutung, and I argue that there is a fundamental tension in his mature thought between a semantic and an epistemic conception of sense. This tension was ironed out, however, in the early work of Wittgenstein, who rigorously thought through the implications of the semantic conception. I trace the evolution of his early ideas, in the framework provided by Frege and Russell, and explain how his saying/showing distinction shaped both his account of logic and his picture theory of language. ;In Part Three I discuss Wittgenstein's later philosophy, showing how it developed in response to problems he later perceived in both his own earlier work and the writings of Frege. I describe the shift from simples to samples, and explain his conception of meaning as use and his remarks on rule-following . In the final chapter, I consider the implications of our discussion of sense for the issues as to the nature of logic and the role of philosophical analysis. (shrink)
ABSTRACTWith the recent revival of moral intuitionism, the work of W. D. Ross has grown in stature. But if we look at some recent well-regarded histories, anthologies and companions of analyticphilosophy, Ross is noticeably absent. This discrepancy of assessments raises the question of Ross’s place in the history of analyticphilosophy. Hans-Johann Glock has recently claimed that Ross is not an analytic philosopher at all, but is instead a ‘traditional philosopher’. In this article, (...) I will identify several undeniable features of analyticphilosophy that Ross’s work bears: a focus on linguistic analysis, great respect for pre-theoretical thoughts, the conviction that philosophy is a collaborative, piecemeal enterprise and so on. Such an investigation, I claim, reveals two historically significant results: Ross was the first ethicist to fully draw from commonsense beliefs about morality in light of characteristic analytic considerations to secure his theory. Two, concerning the matter of whether the notion... (shrink)
Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer, (eds) Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1996; pp. xvi + 383; Hans-Johann Glock, (ed.) The Rise of AnalyticPhilosophy, Blackwell, 1997; pp. xiv + 95; Matthias Schirn, (ed.) Frege: Importance and Legacy, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996; pp. x + 466; Stuart G. Shanker, (ed.) Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth Century, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IX, Routledge, 1996; pp. (...) xxxviii + 461; John Blackmore, (ed.) Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900-1906, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995; pp. xvi + 266. (shrink)
The purpose of _Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth's Vision of Historical Sciences_ is to discuss the revival of analytical philosophy of history proposed by Paul A. Roth. The authors characterize the status of philosophy of history and discuss its ontological, epistemological and explanatory dimensions.
This monograph reappraises the role of Bertrand Russell's philosophical works in establishing the analytical tradition in philosophy. It's main aims are to: * improve our understanding of the history of analytical philosophy * engage in the important disputes surrounding the interpretation of Russell's philosophy * make a contribution to central issues in current analytical philosophy. Drawing extensively from Russell's less well known and unpublished works, this book is a welcome addition to the literature and will (...) undoubtedly find a place on the bookshelves of philosophers around the world. (shrink)
Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the connections between them. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous (...) defense of Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth, making this compelling reading for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues. (shrink)
The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of (...) these concepts is bound up with the origins and development of analyticphilosophy itself. Understanding how these concepts were taken up, transfigured, and given up by the early analytic philosophers, enables us to recover and reanimate the debate amongst them that otherwise remains Delphic. This book begins from the early, originating texts of analyticphilosophy that have hitherto baffled commentators, including Moore's early papers, and engages afresh with the neglected contributions of philosophical figures that historians of analyticphilosophy have mostly since forgotten, including Stout and Whitehead. This sheds new light upon the relationships of Moore to Russell, Russell to Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein to Ramsey. (shrink)
Putting it very crudely, it might be said that in the much discussed opening three chapters that make up the section “Consciousness” of his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel sketches and “test-drives” various models for a consciousness able to experience and know the world.1 Kant had thought of objects of experience as necessarily having conceptual (as well as spatio-temporal) form, but non-conceptual (“intuitional”) content. But for Hegel, that objects show themselves to have a conceptual form emerges as one the first lessons (...) of experience as tracked in Chapter 1. Moreover, in contrast to Kant’s focus on the unity and stability of such form, Hegel wants to display a series in which successive “shapes of consciousness” emerge from the resolution of contradictions affecting their predecessors.2 We might say that while Kant had famously asserted the identity of “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general” and the “conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience”,3 Hegel points to the ever-present tension between them, examining the fate of particular conceptions of the constitution of objects in the light of the “experience” based upon those conceptions, and with this transforms philosophy’s task, as Kant conceives it. Thus in the place of the reconfigured metaphysical project signalled by Kant which gives a definitive map of “what reason brings forth entirely out of itself” via the discovery of “reason’s common principle”,4 Hegel radically historicizes reason into a series of particular finite forms, each driven to selfovercoming because of the constitutive contradictions at its centre. (shrink)
The interview took place in Oxford on 10 September 1992. While working from the tape on the text of the interview, I decided to gather references to books and articles in footnotes so that the reader may have a sense of the flow of the conversation. I then divided the text into sections, according to the topics which were discussed. Some material has been edited from the original transcript.
In this article I bring to light a group of scientific and philosophical ideas and intellectual currents from the early era of the significs movement, contemporaneous with the origins of early analyticphilosophy. Significs was a strong candidate for the science of language, meaning, and communication during the new century. Its heyday coincided with the forums of the Vienna Circle, yet its intellectual and cultural climate persisted until fading in the turmoil of the mid-century's analytic thought.
Many have tackled the question ‘What (if anything) is analyticphilosophy?’ I will not attempt to answer this vexed question. Rather, I address a smaller, more manageable set of interrelated questions: first, when and how did people begin using the label ‘analyticphilosophy’? Second, how did those who used this label understand it? Third, why did many philosophers we today classify as analytic initially resist being grouped together under the single category of ‘analytic (...) class='Hi'>philosophy’? Finally, for the first generation who described themselves as analytic philosophers, what was their intended contrast class? Relatedly, when did ‘continental philosophy’ become the standard opposition? Some evidence I present justifies received answers to these questions; other evidence supports surprising and unorthodox answers to these questions. (shrink)
Oskari Kuusela explores Wittgenstein's account of logic in the context of the history of analyticphilosophy. He presents Wittgenstein as developing the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries and credits him with resolving the long-standing dispute between the ideal language and ordinary language schools of analyticphilosophy.
This article argues that the relationship between analytical philosophy and the philosophy of intellectual history is conceptually uneasy and even antagonistic once the general philosophical viewpoints, and some particular topics, of the two perspectives are drawn out and compared. The article critically compares the philosophies of Quentin Skinner and Mark Bevir with the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, W.V.O. Quine and Donald Davidson. Section I compares the way in which these two perspectives view the task of (...)philosophy. Section II points to a critical difficulty in Bevir and Skinner’s use of analytical philosophy in their discussions on objectivity. In section III, another such critical juncture is identified in the topic of explanation. Finally, section IV suggests an interpretation for the character of the comparison. (shrink)
Analyticphilosophy has become the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. This book illuminates that tradition through a historical examination of a crucial period in its formation: the rejection of Idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the subsequent development of Russell's thought in the period before the First World War.
This edited volume systematically addresses the connection between Wilfrid Sellars and the history of modern philosophy, exploring both the content and method of this relationship. It intends both to analyze Sellars’s position in relation to singular thinkers of the modern tradition, and to inquire into Sellars’s understanding of philosophy as a field in reflective and constructive conversation with its past. The chapters in Part I cover Sellars’s interpretation and use of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Part (...) II features essays on his relationship with Peirce, Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, American pragmatism, behaviorism and American realism, particularly his father, Roy Wood. Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy features original contributions by many of the most renowned Sellars scholars throughout the world. It offers an exhaustive survey of Sellars’s views on the historical antecedents and metaphilosophical aspects of his thought. (shrink)