Results for 'Higher-order theories of consciousness'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness.Jonathan Farrell - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2743-2761.
    Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness aim to account for conscious states when these are understood in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper considers two arguments concerning this aim, and concludes that ambitious theories fail. The misrepresentation argument against HO theories aims to show that the possibility of radical misrepresentation—there being a HO state about a state the subject is not in—leads to a contradiction. In contrast, the awareness argument aims to bolster HO theories by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of higher-order representational theories of consciousness. Representational theories of consciousness attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been fairly popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  3.  95
    Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness are Empirically False.N. Greely - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):30-54.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness come in many varieties, but all adopt the 'transitivity principle' as a central, explanatory premise. The transitivity principle states that a mental state of a subject is conscious if and only if the subject is aware of it. This higher-order awareness is realized in different ways in different forms of higher-order theory. I argue that empirical studies of metacognition have falsified the transitivity principle by showing that there can (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5.  84
    Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Blackwell. pp. 288–297.
    Higherorder theories purport to account for the conscious character of such states in terms of higherorder representations. This chapter focuses on three classes of higherorder theory of phenomenal consciousness, including inner‐sense theory, actualist higherorder thought theory, and dispositionalist higherorder thought theory. All three of these higherorder theories purport to offer reductive explanations of phenomenal consciousness. Inner‐sense theory has important positive virtues, but faces problems; whereas (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  6.  66
    Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Heidelberg Problem.Josh Weisberg - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:340-357.
    It is widely held that consciousness is partially constituted by a “pre-reflective” self-consciousness. Further, it’s argued that the presence of pre-reflective self-consciousness poses a problem for “higher-ordertheories of consciousness. Higher-order theories invoke reflective representation and so do not appear to have the resources to explain pre-reflective self-consciousness. This criticism is rooted in the Heidelberg School’s deep reflection on the nature of self-consciousness, and accordingly, I will label this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Higher-order theories of consciousness.David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.
  8.  1
    Higher-order theories of consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2004 - In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  9. A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Joseph LeDoux & Richard Brown - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (10):E2016-E2025.
    Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  10. Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2004 - In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  11. Higher-order Theories of Consciousness.Paula Droege - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    **No longer available - article has been replaced by an updated entry.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Higher-order Theories of Consciousness.David Rosenthal - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  13. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology.Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.) - 2004 - John Benjamins.
    Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher- (...) thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A). (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.
    ABSTRACTAmbitious Higher-order theories of consciousnessHigher-order theories that purport to give an account of phenomenal consciousness – face a well-known objection from the possibility of ra...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Franz Brentano and Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Denis Fisette - 2015 - Argumentos 7 (3):9-39.
    This article addresses the recent reception of Franz Brentano's writings on consciousness. I am particularly interested in the connection established between Brentano's theory of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness and, more specifically, the theory proposed by David Rosenthal. My working hypothesis is that despite the many similarities that can be established with Rosenthal's philosophy of mind, Brentano's theory of consciousness differs in many respects from higher-order theories of consciousness (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. Prefrontal lesion evidence against higher-order theories of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.
    According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious only when represented by another mental state. Higher-order theories must predict there to be some brain areas (or networks of areas) such that, because they produce (the right kind of) higher-order states, the disabling of them brings about deficits in consciousness. It is commonly thought that the prefrontal cortex produces these kinds of higher-order states. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  17. A Euthyphro Dilemma for Higher-order Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Abstract: According to a higher-order theory of consciousness, you are in a conscious (psychological) state if and only if you are conscious of being in that state. This paper develops and discusses a Euthyphro dilemma for theories of this sort; that is, a dilemma which asks whether the state is conscious because you are conscious of being in it, or, alternatively, whether you are conscious of being in it because it is conscious. I focus on two (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Higher-order theories of consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2014 - In Consciousness. Polity.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Higher-order theories of consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2014 - In Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Polity.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  63
    A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Jesse M. Mulder - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3):449-465.
    Higher-order theories account for intransitive consciousness by using the transitive notion ‘awareness-of.’ I argue that this notion implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that, if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; while using the higher-order strategy to capture not only intransitive consciousness but also the relevant kind (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?Fred Adams & Charlotte Shreve - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (3):251-257.
    In this article, we will describe higher order thought theories of consciousness. Then we will describe some examples from synesthesia. Finally, we will explain why the latter may be relevant to the former.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  22. A dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness.Isabel Gois - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.
    Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  62
    Epistemic Warrants and Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Perception.James Edwards & Dimitris Platchias - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:343-364.
    We present a new account of perceptual consciousness, one which gives due weight to the epistemic commitment of normal perception in familiar circumstances. The account is given in terms of a higher-order attitude for which the subject has an immediate perceptual epistemic warrant in the form of an appropriate first-order perception. We develop our account in contrast to Rosenthal's higher-order account, rejecting his view of consciousness in virtue of so-called ‘targetless’ higher-order (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higherorder theories of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):790-813.
    Proponents of the higherorder (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state‐producing areas are damaged, then arguing that these kinds of deficit do not occur in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25.  23
    Empty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness.Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (64):91-100.
    According to higher order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious when there is a HO state about it. However, some HO states do not seem to be about other existing mental states. It is possible to resolve this problem since targetless HO states resemble HO states that misrepresent but the assumption that HO states always target other existing mental states is at odds with the theory since HO states are not only necessary but also (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Animals, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Higher-Order Theories of Mind.Beth Seacord - 2011 - Philo 14 (2):201-222.
    Some advocates of higher-order theories of consciousness believe that the correct theory of consciousness together with empirical facts about animal intelligence make it highly unlikely that animals are capable of having phenomenally conscious experiences. I will argue that even if the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is correct, there is good evidence (taken from experiments in mind reading and metacognition, as well as considerations from neurophysiology and evolutionary biology) that at least (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. A simple point about an alleged objection to higher-order theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - unknown
    For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  8
    Some Comments on Josh Weisberg’s ‘Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Heidelberg Problem’.Gerhard Preyer - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:358-367.
    Josh Weisberg discusses what he calls the “Heidelberg Problem” (named after Dieter Henrich’s Heidelberg School). However, he mischaracterizes this problem and believes he is able so resolve the problem, as mischaracterized, as well as meet the de se constraint, in the theoretical frame of reference of the Higher-Order Thought Monitoring theory of consciousness. This commentary highlights the fundamental flaw in his approach, while encouraging further philosophical exchange with our American philosophical colleagues about the “Heidelberg Problem”.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  18
    A Review Of Rocco J. Gennaro, Higher-order Theories Of Consciousness: An Anthology. [REVIEW]Michael Bruno - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, brings together fourteen new essays exploring the relative merits of and problems with higher-order representation theories of consciousness. The anthology is divided into two parts. Part I contains articles by proponents of HOR theories arguing for their favorite version of the theory, responding to well-known objections, and exploring potentially vindicating empirical results. Part II contains critical articles which attempt to press (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):131-148.
    ABSTRACT I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character—the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that the relevant higher-order representations have a cartographic format.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.David Rosenthal - 2002 - In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  33. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1996 - John Benjamins.
    This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  34.  45
    Quotational higher-order thought theory.Kevin Timpe - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  35. Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness.Jennifer Matey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, or: What is it Like to Think that One Thinks that P?Richard Brown & Pete Mandik - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. Higher-order representation theories of consciousness.W. G. Lycan - 2009 - In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 346--350.
  39. Varieties of higher-order theory.David Rosenthal - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  40. The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of consciousness has not adequately distinguished between the following two claims. (Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M. (The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M. -/- While I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  67
    The utility of conscious thinking on higher-order theory.George Seli - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):303 - 316.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness posit that a mental state is conscious by virtue of being represented by another mental state, which is therefore a higher-order representation (HOR). Whether HORs are construed as thoughts or experiences, higher-order theorists have generally contested whether such metarepresentations have any significant cognitive function. In this paper, I argue that they do, focusing on the value of conscious thinking, as distinguished from conscious perceiving, conscious feeling, and other forms (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness.Hakwan Lau - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of brain and mind: physical, computational, and psychological approaches. Boston: Elsevier.
    It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  43. The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  44. A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):3-4.
  45. Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness.Richard Brown, Hakwan Lau & Joseph E. LeDoux - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (9):754-768.
    Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g. first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  46. The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.
    The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  47.  75
    Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.
    Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  48.  93
    The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. Second Version.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):361-384.
    Monitoring approaches to consciousness claim that a mental state is conscious when it is suitably monitored. Higher-order monitoring theory makes the monitoring state and the monitored state logically independent. Same-order monitoring theory claims a constitutive, non-contingent connection between the monitoring state and the monitored state. In this paper, I articulate different versions of the same-order monitoring theory and argue for its supremacy over the higher-order monitoring theory.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  49. A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness.H. C. Lau - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of brain and mind: physical, computational, and psychological approaches. Boston: Elsevier.
  50. Higher-order theories do just fine.Matthias Michel & Hakwan Lau - forthcoming - Cognitive Neuroscience.
    Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the ‘small network argument’ and the ‘other systems argument’. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to explain why higher-order theories do just fine.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000