The paper focuses on the philosophical challenges of governance over trustless ledgers, namely Bitcoin Layer 2 solutions in El Salvador. Blockchain adoption in El Salvador is an example of policy based on a ‘frontier epistemology’ (Nickles 2009 ), creating a situation where “facts are uncertain, values are in dispute, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993 ). Trustless ledgers play a role of such ‘frontiers’ of knowledge and governance that support a variety of technocratic, heuristic, (...) and experimental policy approaches. They challenge the traditional knowledge frameworks and governance processes responsible for attempts to embed (align) predetermined ideologies (values and stakes) into the technology over standards. Instead, as amalgams of social, political, legal, and economic interventions, ledgers function simultaneously as a contract, a monetary system, a political value commitment, and a governance structure. By integrating facts, values, and stakes into algorithms, they define the frontiers of epistemology and governance in two opposing ways. On the one hand, trustless ledgers embody Augustine’s Civitas Dei (the City of God) as a new design (novum consilium) that promises a future world (futurum saeculum) (Augustine 1968 ). With a promise of a system, where everyone is ‘free’ to not being able to ‘sin’ (non posse peccare - delet the res non peccare), social agency is reduced to a code of a trustless infrastructure. On the other hand, ledgers support experimental (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012 ) and heuristic policymaking (Nickles 2009 ) that saves social agency and cuts ‘through traditional discovery/justification and descriptive/ normative distinctions’ (Nickles 2009 ). The distributed ledgers as governance experiments then redefine Civitas Terrena’s governance as a challenge of ‘heuristic appraisal’ (Nickles 2009 ), ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997 ), and ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012 ). To elaborate on the blockchain governance experiments, we will use two Bitcoin initiatives in El Salvador (Bitcoin City and Bitcoin Beach) and discuss them in the context of a broader adoption of blockchain in South America. (shrink)

Economic competitive advantage depends on innovation, which in turn requires pushing back the frontiers of various kinds of knowledge. Although understanding how knowledge grows ought to be a central topic of epistemology, epistemologists and philosophers of science have given it insufficient attention, even deliberately shunning the topic. Traditional confirmation theory and general epistemology offer little help at the frontier, because they are mostly retrospective rather than prospective. Nor have philosophers been highly visible in the science and technology policy realm, despite (...) philosophy’s being a normative discipline. This paper suggests a way to address both deficits. Creative scientists, technologists, business managers, and policy makers face similar problems of decision-making at their respective frontiers of knowledge. These areas should therefore be fertile ground for both epistemologists and philosophers concerned with policy. Here I call attention to the importance of heuristic appraisal for “frontier epistemology” and to policy formation. Evaluation of the comparative promise or expected fertility of available options comprises a cluster of activities that cut across traditional discovery/justification and descriptive/normative distinctions. The study of weak modes of reasoning and evaluation is especially relevant to socio-economic policy. (shrink)

Many scientific models are non-representational in that they refer to merely possible processes, background conditions and results. The paper shows how such non-representational models can be appraised, beyond the weak role that they might play as heuristic tools. Using conceptual distinctions from the discussion of how-possibly explanations, six types of models are distinguished by their modal qualities of their background conditions, model processes and model results. For each of these types, an actual model example – drawn from economics, biology, (...) psychology or sociology – is discussed. For each case, contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of such a model offers a genuine opportunity to learn – i.e. justifies changing one’s confidence in a hypothesis about the world. These cases then offer novel justifications for modelling practices that fall between the cracks of standard representational accounts of models. (shrink)

According to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), certainty-associated emotions increase risk taking compared with uncertainty-associated emotions. To date, this general effect has only been shown in static judgement and decision-making paradigms; therefore, the present study tested the effect of certainty on risk taking in a sequential decision-making task. We hypothesised that the effect would be reversed due to the kind of processing involved, as certainty is considered to encourage heuristic processing that takes into account the (...) emotional cues arising from previous decisions, whereas uncertainty leads to more systematic processing. One hundred and one female participants were induced to feel one of three emotions (film clips) before performing a decision-making task involving risk (Game of Dice Task; Brand et al., 2005). As expected, the angry and happy participants (certainty-associated emotions) were more likely than the fearful participants (uncertainty-associated emotion) to make safe decisions (vs. risky decisions). (shrink)

Attempts to apply the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory to cognition in a systematic way has been well under way since the early 90s and has been recognised as a “third contender” to computationalist and connectionist approaches :441–463, 1996). Nevertheless, it was also realised that such an application will not lead to a solid paradigm as straightforwardly as was initially hoped. In this paper I explicate a method for assessing such proposals by drawing upon Lakatos’s Criticism and the growth (...) of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London, pp 91–195, 1970) methodology of scientific research programs. MSRP focuses on the heuristics of a particular field and gauges the model/theory building stratagems by reference to theoretical and empirical progress, on the one hand, and the continuity and the autonomy of the way the field’s heuristic generates its series of models/theories, on the other. The requirement of continuity and autonomy afford distinct senses of ad hoc-ness, which serve as an effective tool to detect various subtleties which may otherwise be missed: the present approach identifies shortcomings missed by Chemero’s radical embodied cognitive science and falsifies Chemero’s claim that the methodological powers of his model-based account is on a par with computationalism. In general, I claim that MSRP is relevant to current methodological issues in cognitive science and can supplement debates regarding “local” assessments of methodologies, such as that between mechanical versus covering-law explanations. MSRP must at least be viewed as a necessary constraint for any methodological considerations in cognitive science. (shrink)

Previous studies of the history of optics reveal that the confrontation between the emission theory of light and the undulatory theory of light in Britain occupied a considerable period during the early nineteenth century. After the majority of British physicists accepted the undulatory theory in the mid-1830s a few emissionists in Britain did not immediately surrender. They continued to fight a rear-guard action against the undulatory theory, hoping that someday they could reinstate their theory.’ The longevity of the confrontation between (...) the emission and the undulatory theory is consistent with recent philosophical and sociological accounts of science, which expect scientific controversy to last a considerable time. Lakatos’s philosophical account, for example, holds that a degenerating theory does not disappear immediately and may revive at any time through a burst of ‘heuristic power’. But this account only allows one universal standard-the verification of excess empirical content-as the basis for both the generation and the closure of scientific controversies.’ On the other hand, sociological accounts such as actor-network theory have also done much to dispel the impression that rapid closure is inevitable in scientific controversies. But perhaps they risk a new orthodoxy: that controversy itself is inevitable. (shrink)

In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion* M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.I (...) argue, among other things, (I) that thesis-LW is defended on some very dubious assumptions; (II) that Worrall's criterion* M falters under three clear cases two of which at least*M should accomodate, and that part of* M's failure can be linked to its being hooked to thesis-LW. By arguments analogous to the ones which serve* M, I show thatcontra John Worrall and John Watkins, thesis-LW is testable; finally, (III) if we accept arguments for thesis-LW and* M we are left with a skeptical conclusion with respect to the choice of a historiographical model which Worrall by parity of reasoning should accept, but does not. (shrink)

A lot of philosophy taught to science students consists of scientific methodology. But many philosophy of science textbooks have a fraught relationship with methodology, presenting it either a system of universal principles or entirely permeated by contingent factors not subject to normative assessment. In this paper, I argue for an alternative, heuristic perspective for teaching methodology: as fallible, purpose- and context-dependent, subject to cost-effectiveness considerations and systematically biased, but nevertheless subject to normative assessment. My pedagogical conclusion from this perspective (...) is that philosophers should aim to teach science students heuristic reasoning: strategies of normative method choice appraisal that are sensitive to purposes, contexts, biases and cost-effectiveness considerations; and that we should do so by teaching them exemplars of such reasoning. I illustrate this proposal at the hand of three such exemplars, showing how they help students to appreciate the heuristic nature of both methods and methodology, and to normatively assess method choice in such circumstances. (shrink)

For nearly two decades, the process of reviewing the ethical merit of research involving human subjects has been based on the application of principles initially described in the U.S. National Commission's Belmont Report, and later articulated more fully by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Recently, the use of ethical principles for deliberating about moral problems in medicine and research, referred to in the pejorative sense as “principlism”, has come under scrutiny. In this paper we argue that (...) these principles can provide a foundation for the source of ethical appraisal of human research, but are not themselves wholly adequate for this purpose. Therefore, we further propose that (1) principles should be understood as heuristics that can be “specified” as described by DeGrazia (1992), and (2) that the principle‐based approach should be supplemented by formally incorporating “sensitivity to context” into the evaluation of clinical trials. (shrink)

For nearly two decades, the process of reviewing the ethical merit of research involving human subjects has been based on the application of principles initially described in the U.S. National Commission's Belmont Report, and later articulated more fully by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Recently, the use of ethical principles for deliberating about moral problems in medicine and research, referred to in the pejorative sense as “principlism”, has come under scrutiny. In this paper we argue that (...) these principles can provide a foundation for the source of ethical appraisal of human research, but are not themselves wholly adequate for this purpose. Therefore, we further propose that (1) principles should be understood as heuristics that can be “specified” as described by DeGrazia (1992), and (2) that the principle‐based approach should be supplemented by formally incorporating “sensitivity to context” into the evaluation of clinical trials. (shrink)

For nearly two decades, the process of reviewing the ethical merit of research involving human subjects has been based on the application of principles initially described in the U.S. National Commission's Belmont Report, and later articulated more fully by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Recently, the use of ethical principles for deliberating about moral problems in medicine and research, referred to in the pejorative sense as “principlism”, has come under scrutiny. In this paper we argue that (...) these principles can provide a foundation for the source of ethical appraisal of human research, but are not themselves wholly adequate for this purpose. Therefore, we further propose that principles should be understood as heuristics that can be “specified” as described by DeGrazia , and that the principle‐based approach should be supplemented by formally incorporating “sensitivity to context” into the evaluation of clinical trials. (shrink)

The ampliativity of deduction has been defended in several ways—such as the semi-decidability of the theories, the surprise of unexpected consequences, the need of new individuals in deduction, or ampliative inference as deduction with suppressed premises (Dummett, Frege. Philosophy of mathematics. Duckworth, London, 1991; Hintikka, Logic, language-games and information. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973; Musgrave, Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific change. Kluwer, Boston, 1989; Rota, Indiscrete thoughts. Birkhäuser, Boston, 1997). These lines of defensive arguments fail if we characterize ampliativity (...) in a strong way, that is, in terms of ‘novelty’ stricto sensu, as an inferential process producing genuinely new pieces of information in the conclusion of a reasoning (Cellucci, Rethinking logic. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013; Ippoliti, Heuristic reasoning. Springer, Basel, 2015). Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a weaker stance of the ampliativity of deduction and its usefulness. This requires interpreting novelty more loosely, that is, as the inferential production of new relations among known entities. This stance maintains that, in this sense, deduction can provide us with new knowledge. Thus, a typical deductive activity, as re-proving theorems, can be thought as heuristic and ampliative because it establishes new relations between known elements (e.g. between given axioms or properties and the statement of the theorem). I argue that also this line of defence is defective for it does not account for the necessity and usefulness of reproving theorems. In particular, a foundationalist, axiomatic-deductive viewpoint does not fully account for the usefulness and the weak ampliative power of deduction. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Don Ross’s application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science. Against Ross’s critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic’, I argue that the compatibility hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several strengths of a procedural approach to modelling cognitive processes underlying (...) individual decision making, compared to a multiple-agent approach which Ross promotes. I argue that the debate between economists and psychologists are both theoretical and empirical, but cannot be resolved by appealing to the ideal of unification. (shrink)

The last forty years have produced a dramatic reversal in leading accounts of science. Once thought necessary to (explain) scientific progress, a rigid method of science is now widely considered impossible. Study of products yields to study of processes and practices, .unity gives way to diversity, generality to particularity, logic to luck, and final justification to heuristic scaffolding. I sketch the story, from Bacon and Descartes to the present, of the decline and fall of traditional scientific method, conceived as (...) The Central Planning Bureau for Science or as Rationality Czar. I defend a deflationary account of method and of rational judgment,. with emphasis on heuristic appraisal and cognitive economy. (shrink)

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant formulates teleological principles, or rather ideas, and explicates them referring to concrete examples of natural science such as chemistry, astronomy, biology, empirical psychology, and physical geography. Despite the increasing interest in the systematic relevance of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and its importance for Kant’s conception of natural science, the numerous historical sources for the regulative use of reason have not yet been investigated. One that is very central is Maupertuis’ principle (...) of least action. In 1781, Kant transformed teleology into heuristics and methodology, but in doing so, he partially develops a teleology which was disqualified by Maupertuis because its starting point lies in the construction of animals or plants, the structure of the earth, and the immensity of the celestial bodies. Based on Maupertuis’ principle of action, it can be shown that the Appendix forms a systematic interface between Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and Critique of Judgement which allows the reconstruction of Kant’s regulative use of reason and its specific status in the context of natural science and his critical appraisal of Maupertuis. (shrink)

Exploring emotions, in terms of their evolutionary origin; their basic neurobiological substratum, and their functional significance in autonomous agents, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions. Our aim is to provide a naturalized explanation – mostly based on an interactivist model of emergent representation and appraisal theory of emotions – concerning basic aesthetic emotions in the formation of aesthetic judgment. We suggest two processes the Cognitive Variables Subsystem (CVS) which is fundamental for the accomplishment of the function (...) of heuristic learning; and Aesthetic Appraisal Subsystem (AAS) which primarily affects the elicitation of aesthetic emotional meanings. These two subsystems (CVS and AAS) are organizationally connected and affect the action readiness of the autonomous agent. More specifically, we consider the emotional outcome of these two subsystems as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty that emerges in the particular interaction. (shrink)

In this article, I critique the commonly accepted distinction between commercial and altruistic surrogacy arrangements. The moral legitimacy of surrogacy, I claim, does not hinge on whether it is paid (‘commercial’) or unpaid (‘altruistic’); rather, it is best determined by appraisal of virtue-abiding conditions constitutive of the surrogacy arrangement. I begin my article by problematising the prevailing commercial/altruistic distinction; next, I demonstrate that an assessment of the virtue-abiding or non-virtue-abiding features of a surrogacy is crucial to navigating questions about (...) the moral legitimacy of surrogacy; in the final part, I reject other moral heuristics that might be proposed as alternatives to the commercial/altruistic dichotomy, and reiterate that a virtue-ethical framework is the most suitable way forward. (shrink)

The standard theory of electoral accountability treats the electorate as an appraiser of government performance on a range of complex issues, which re-elects or de-elects depending on its evaluation of that performance. This paper draws from studies on voter knowledge and behaviour to present a dilemma for the standard theory: either voters do not know how well their rulers have performed, or if they do, they do not base their votes on that knowledge. It is shown that, on either horn (...) of the dilemma, the standard account of electoral accountability fails, and that attempts to deflate the dilemma through heuristic and aggregative approaches to voter knowledge, or proposals for alternative systems of government, are also inadequate. The paper then sets out and defends an alternative conception of electoral accountability, which holds that electoral accountability is not about micro-assessing a government’s actions. Rather, it is about preventing political rulers from committing or allowing substantial harms to come upon those they govern. This alternative conception is compatible with a realistic view of voter knowledge and behaviour, but nonetheless makes electoral accountability an essential component of a well-functioning democratic system. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with explaining some of the principal theoretical developments in elementary particle physics and discussing the associated methodological problems both in respect of heuristics and appraisal. Particular reference is made to relativistic quantum field theory, renormalization, Feynman diagram techniques, the analytic S-matrix and the Chew — Frautschi bootstrap.

Could a computer be programmed to make moral judgments about cases of intentional harm and unreasonable risk that match those judgments people already make intuitively? If the human moral sense is an unconscious computational mechanism of some sort, as many cognitive scientists have suggested, then the answer should be yes. So too if the search for reflective equilibrium is a sound enterprise, since achieving this state of affairs requires demarcating a set of considered judgments, stating them as explanandum sentences, and (...) formulating a set of algorithms from which they can be derived. The same is true for theories that emphasize the role of emotions or heuristics in moral cognition, since they ultimately depend on intuitive appraisals of the stimulus that accomplish essentially the same tasks. Drawing on deontic logic, action theory, moral philosophy, and the common law of tort, particularly Terry's five-variable calculus of risk, I outline a formal model of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence along the foregoing lines, which defines the abstract properties of the relevant mapping and demonstrates their descriptive adequacy with respect to a range of common moral intuitions, which experimental studies have suggested may be universal or nearly so. Framing effects, protected values, and implications for the neuroscience of moral intuition are also discussed. (shrink)

What are the relevant values to the appraisal of research programs? This question remains hotly debated, as philosophers have recently proposed many lists of values potentially relevant to scientific appraisal. Surprisingly, despite being mentioned in many lists, little attention has been paid to fruitfulness. It is unclear how fruitfulness should be explicated, and whether it has any substantial role in scientific appraisal. In this paper, I argue we should explicate fruitfulness as the capacity to develop of research (...) programs. Moreover, I provide a novel strategy to assess and compare the fruitfulness of programs focused on their research questions and heuristics. To illustrate how this strategy would work, I will discuss a case study, namely the adaptationist program in evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

Despite the growing importance of ‘social value’ as a central feature of research ethics, the term remains both conceptually vague and to a certain extent operationally rigid. And yet, perhaps because the rhetorical appeal of social value appears immediate and self-evident, the concept has not been put to rigorous investigation in terms of its definition, strength, function, and scope. In this article, we discuss how the anthropological concept of liminality can illuminate social value and differentiate and reconfigure its variegated approaches. (...) Employing liminality as a heuristic encourages a reassessment of how we understand the mobilization of ‘social value’ in bioethics. We argue that social value as seen through the lens of liminality can provide greater clarity of its function and scope for health research. Building on calls to understand social value as a dynamic, rather than a static, concept, we emphasize the need to appraise social value iteratively throughout the entire research as something that transforms over multiple times and across multiple spaces occupied by a range of actors. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of science there has been a great deal of rather vague talk about the 'heuristic fruitfulness' (or what Peirce called the 'esperable uberty') of theories. It is my aim in the present paper to add some precision to these discussions by linking this 'fruitfulness' to the satisfaction of certain heuristic criteria. In this manner the demarcation between 'discovery' and 'pursuit' becomes blurred. As a case study, I present the competition between the paraparticle and colour models (...) of quarks in the late 1960s. I argue that the eventual appraisal of the latter as the more fruitful of the two was based on the incorporation of a particular symmetry principle, regarded as a heuristic guideline, rather than on non-epistemic factors concerning 'cognitive resources' and the like. (shrink)

: Only the rise of science allowed us to identify scriptural ontologies as fantastic conceits, as anthropomorphizations of an indifferent universe. Now that science is beginning to genuinely disenchant the human soul, history suggests that traditional humanistic discourses are about to be rendered fantastic as well. Via a critical reading of Adrian Johnston’s ‘transcendental materialism,’ I attempt to show both the shape and the dimensions of the sociocognitive dilemma presently facing Continental philosophers as they appear to their outgroup detractors. Trusting (...) speculative a priori claims regarding the nature of processes and entities under scientific investigation already excludes Continental philosophers from serious discussion. Using such claims, as Johnston does, to assert the fundamentally intentional nature of the universe amounts to anthropomorphism. Continental philosophy needs to honestly appraise the nature of its relation to the scientific civilization it purports to decode and guide, lest it become mere fantasy, or worse yet, conceptual religion. (shrink)

Risk perception is important in determining health-protective behavior. During the rise of the COVID-19 epidemic, we tested a comprehensive structural equation model of risk perception to explain adherence to protective behaviors in a crisis context using a survey of 572 Italian citizens. We identified two categories of protective behaviors, labeled promoting hygiene and cleaning, and avoiding social closeness. Social norms and risk perceptions were the more proximal antecedents of both categories. Cultural worldviews, affect, and experience of COVID-19 were the more (...) distal predictors. Promoting hygiene and cleaning was triggered by the negative affective attitude toward coronavirus and mediated by an affective appraisal of risk. The deliberate dimension of risk perception predicted only avoiding social closeness. Social norms predicted both types of behaviors and mediated the relations of cultural worldviews. Individualism, more than hierarchy, shaped the affective evaluation of coronavirus. The model was an acceptable fit to the data and accounted for 20% and 29% of the variance in promoting hygiene and cleaning, and avoiding social closeness, respectively. The findings were robust to the effect of sociodemographic factors. Taken together, our findings confirmed the empirical distinction between affective and deliberate processes in risk perception, supported the validity of the affect heuristic, and highlighted the role of social norms as an account for why individualistic people were less likely to follow the prescribed health-protective behaviors. Implications for risk communication are discussed. (shrink)

Publishers love titles that begin How or Why. Better still, How and Why, combining edification with utility. The target group is that overlap between the self-help audience and the idly curious—which is to say, most of us. And since emotions are very much about self-help and self-harm, they offer rich pickings in a burgeoning market. Flanagan's How to Do things with Emotions is a philosopher's take on moral emotions, the allusion to J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (...) chiming with the self-help milieu. Reviewing cases, Flanagan points out that most scientific work in this field derives from experiments on psychology students, about as unrepresentative a slice of humanity as you could find. For Flanagan, they are too WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) to tell us much about the non-weird majority. To learn to “do emotions better,” he argues, we have to look farther afield. Although the emotional lives of cultural others are surely different from those taking Psychology 101, at some functional level they might be similar. Work out the conceptual logic and practical rationale of culturally elaborated emotions—Minangkabau “shame,” Ifaluk “righteous anger,” American “road rage”—and there is scope for comparison. Indeed, anthropology has shown as much, and it is from anthropology that Flanagan takes his cues. To mention two famous cases, what can we learn about anger management from Utku igloo-dwellers and Ilongot headhunters? Mutually dependent for survival in their snowy isolation, the Utku cannot risk getting angry. (They mercilessly tease their children into learning the futility of anger.) In the jungles of Luzon, Ilongot youths cast away their anger in externally directed violence: headhunting as cathartic sport. We can think of parallels closer to home.Flanagan's vigorously argued book, a tour de force of its kind, is both an anatomizing of anger and shame—two moral emotions we tend to “do badly”—and a proposal to “change how we do these emotions.” Indignation is fine, but anger that is vengeful or “pain-passing,” rather than righteous, is irrational and socially harmful. Shame can be incapacitating and cruel (the undeserved burn of a Twitter pile-on). What we need is reflective anger directed at injustice and a “mature sense of shame” that reminds us of the social contract and stops us misbehaving.In its How-and-Why format, the book combines theory and practice, metaethics with moralism. Here is how a prof should do self-help. But if the diagnosis is well made, the remedy is hard to imagine. As Flanagan recognizes, moral sentiments and practices are embedded in intricate forms of life and not readily detachable. Anger Utku-style is not a transferable skill, nor are educative routines forged in social ecologies remote from our own. Lacking serviceable models, Flanagan falls back on the anthropological justification that knowledge of cultural diversity expands our sense of human possibility, of other roads taken. In a globalizing world, difference is its own reward. For me, an anthropologist, that maxim is enough. Yet difference bedevils comparison, jinxing the units, warping criteria. Most languages lack a word for emotion or an equivalent umbrella concept; nor do emotion words translate well across languages. Emotion may be an incoherent notion, or at best a heuristic.Flanagan's use of the WEIRD tag makes things a bit too easy. Does it cover farmhands and factory workers? Are we so democratic, anyway? More damagingly, a typological approach blurs the circumstances of family, community, and biography that define an emotional episode and shape its phenomenology, the way it is felt and experienced—what a violent outburst or fearful exit means in the context of a life. Take Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim, who flees a scene of failure and derails his life. It requires a long narrative to unravel the implications of his jumping ship and the paralyzing shame he experiences before the judgment of society. Or consider the scene in Anna Karenina in which the dignified and self-important Karenin, apprised of Anna's adulterous liaison, agonizes over the threat to his existence. To call his response jealousy would not scratch the surface. Characteristically for Tolstoy, the emotions go unnamed. Instead, we witness Karenin's fervid deliberations (emotions involve thoughts), vacillations (emotions have action tendencies), anguished calculations of impending scandal (emotions are appraisals), and bodily changes (emotions are cognized feelings). We shudder at the brutal metaphors through which he grasps his predicament and its cure: like rooting out a bad tooth, he decides. That welter of particularities escapes the theorist who needs clear-cut, comparable units, formulaic instances of jealousy or anger. But what are you left with if you omit the details? What would remain of Karenin's existential crisis?The novelist's privileged access to subjectivity is, of course, unavailable to the scientist, but the larger context of plot and character—a history of relations that gives emotional episodes their shape and power—has its analog in the ethnographic domain. Emotions are public as well as private events, their meanings and effects depending on a fit with social reality, a clash of perspectives. In thought and feeling, we are never really alone. All of which suggests that narrative, fictional or nonfictional, can capture the ongoing moment in a way that eludes other methods. If what we are after is living emotion, it is the movie, not the snapshot, that surely matters. No point in comparing “emotions” no one ever really experienced outside of an experiment.But there's the rub. In generalization—the goal of emotion theory—an emotion's social meaning, personal significance, pragmatic function, and narrative context get stripped out. All that makes it what it is! Even in doggedly empirical anthropology, detailed emotional episodes are rare (Jean Briggs's Utku ethnography Never in Anger, published in 1970, is still unsurpassed). Instead we get recollections and summary examples, lacking the constitutive detail, real-time evolutions, and consequences of the real thing. Yet these must serve for comparison, fodder for countless theoretical speculations. Are we at risk of analyzing faux emotions and building theories on cardboard constructions?An empty Arctic stage, a handful of characters, life simplified to survival: Briggs is a hard act to follow. Bare life does not make for basic emotions. On the white set, emotions prove hard to parse. That gruff hesitation, that flashing glint—are they tokens of anger? Empathy will not suffice. As Briggs shows, narrative context is all. And in our more cluttered emotional worlds, the value of backstory, interwoven biographies, and emotional plots is all the greater. Flanagan is right; we must do emotions better. (shrink)

The thesis of my paper is that argumentation theory provides a promising heuristic framework for addressing issues raised by the rationality debates in the philosophy of science, in particular the issues connected with scientific controversies over the appraisal and choice of competing theories. The first part of the paper grounds this thesis historically. In criticizing the logical empiricists, Thomas Kuhn set the stage for the subsequent opposition between a normative, anti-sociological philosophy of science and a descriptive, anti-philosophical sociology (...) of knowledge. But he also hinted at the main lines of a multi-dimensional theory of argumentation which might frame a wide range of current investigations into scientific reasoning. In the second part of the paper I focus on the central normative aspect of this framework, dialectical argumentation, and clarify the key challenge, the underdetermination of theories by evidence. In the third part, I attempt to get beyond the dichotomy informing the rationality debates by reformulating the problem of theory choice within a broader context of scientific rationality. (shrink)

In Section I, different characterizations of the theoretical status, systematic importance and possible applications of cybernetics in the human sciences are sketched, according to view points currently developing in Soviet and Eastern science. Significant differences from the Western scientific approaches are pointed out. The connection of this field with work on heuristics and systems theory is briefly dealt with. Section II gives a critical appraisal of the ideas of B. V. Birjukov on the humanization of logic. The question of (...) the possibility of a special logic of creativity according to this and similar methods in cybernetics is outlined, followed by a short critical analysis. Section III gives a short general introduction to some problems of the comparison of formal with dialectical logic, criticizes the work of J. Erpenbeck and H. Hörz on lawlike sentences and proposes a new scheme for dialectical hypothesis formation. A Critical comparison with some recent developments in Soviet philosophy forms the conclusion. (shrink)

In Section I, different characterization of the theoretical status, systematic importance and possible applications of cybernetics in the human sciences are sketched, according to view points currently developing in Soviet and Eastern science. Significant differences from the Western scientific approaches are pointed out. The connection of this field with work on heuristics and systems theory is briefly dealt with. Section II gives a critical appraisal of the ideas of B. V. Birjukov on the 'humanization of logic'. The question of (...) the possibility of a special logic of creativity according to this and similar methods in cybernetics is outlined, followed by a short critical analysis. Section III gives a short general introduction to some problems of the comparison of formal with dialectical logic, criticizes the work of J. Erpenbeck and H. Hörz on lawlike sentences and proposes a new scheme for dialectical hypothesis formation. A Critical comparison with some recent developments in Soviet philosophy forms the conclusion. (shrink)

The essential role of classical mechanics in the “old quantum theory” is well known. With the rise of a genuine quantum formalism, classical analogies remained a powerful heuristic tool. However, classical insights soon proved problematic, and in some cases, even counterproductive. The case of the implementation of quantum canonical transformations provides a distinguished case study for the historian studying the circumstances which led to the transformation theory of London, Dirac and Jordan. -/- The attempts to use canonical transformations in (...) strict analogy to classical practice met serious difficulties as soon as one tried to accommodate the action-angle scheme. At some point, the very consistency of quantization went addressed because of the unclear quantum equivalence of classically equivalent Hamiltonians. -/- The early attempts, often beset with ill-defined problems, are illustrative of the lack of understanding of the underlying mathematical scheme. The latter had to be properly appraised before the problem of the meaning of changing variables in quantum theory could be solved. This is why the latter proved instrumental in the discovery of transformation theory. -/- Some of the problems which arose then are still highly instructive from the foundational point of view, and worth to be rediscovered, beyond their historical interest. (shrink)

Lakatos’s approach to prediction and novel facts is of considerable interest. Prediction appears in his conception in at least three different levels: a) as an important aim of the research programs; b) as a procedure -a key method- for increasing our scientific knowledge both theoretically and empirically; and c) as the way to assess the scientific character of knowledge claims -means for evaluating results-. At all these levels he envisions a close connection between prediction and novel facts. The paper has (...) four aims. First, to examine his concept of “prediction” in Lakatos’s MSRP, taking into account different aspects (semantical, logical, epistemological, methodological and axiological). Second, to clarify the notion of “novel facts”, which requires the consideration of the various ways in which new facts can be understood. Third, to examine the prediction of novel facts as criterion of appraisal (theoretical, empirical and heuristical). Fourth, to explore Lakatos’s approach (i.e., the concept of prediction linked to novel facts) in connection with the field of economics, in order to shed new light on issues that have been discussed in recent years. (shrink)

Scientists and philosophers generally agree that the replication of experiments is a key ingredient of good and successful scientific practice. “One-offs“ are not significant; experiments must be replicable to be considered valid and important. But the term “replication“ has been used in a number of ways, and it is therefore quite difficult to appraise the meaning and significance of replications. I consider how history may help - and has helped - with this task. I propose that: 1) Studies of past (...) scientific episodes in historical context and of recent philosophical contributions to the discussion are heuristic tools for exploring and clarifying the meaning of that concept. 2) The analysis of the development of the methodological imperative of replication sheds light on the significance scientists have attached to it, thereby contributing further to the clarification of the concept. 3) The analysis of the history of philosophical thought about methods and scientific methodology helps understand why philosophers have not paid much attention to the analysis of the concept of replication. (shrink)

Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) formed a key component of the ‘new sociology of technology’, which emerged in mid-1980s and heralded the entry of social constructivist theory into the domain of technology from science. A large number of empirical case studies were generated using SCOT methodology in the following three decades, encompassing a wide range of technological artefacts or systems. This essay reviews the trajectory of SCOT as a distinct intellectual tradition in technology studies. First, an attempt is made to (...) appraise and classify the main strands of criticisms against SCOT that have come up over the years. Second, this essay discusses several new conceptual heuristics, which were successively incorporated by the original authors of SCOT, along with the concomitant broadening of analytical units and research questions. We conclude that, while SCOT demonstrated its resilience as a dynamic scholarly tradition and constantly adapted itself to address criticisms through the incorporation of new conceptual tools, the consequent methodological transition had profound implications for SCOT as a theory, somewhat undermining its original agenda and methodological distinctiveness in social studies of technology. (shrink)

Lakatos' MSRP is utilized to provide a response to Koertge's claim (in her ‘Does Social Science Really Need Metaphysics?’) that the heuristic significance of metaphysics has been vastly overrated. By outlining the hard cores and positive heuristics of the two major research programmes in economics (namely, the ‘orthodox’ and ‘Marxist’ research programmes), the paper demonstrates (in opposition to Koertge's claim) not only that the metaphysical statements in the respective hard cores are far from vague but also how these exert (...) an important regulative influence both on the theories and economic policy recommendations generated within the respective programmes. It also indicates how the adoption of the MSRP method of appraisal in economics would help to protect against the danger of entrenched metaphysical dogmatism with its implications not only for economic policy recommendations but also for moral and political recommendations. * We appreciate the assistance given by Professor N. Koertge, who provided us with translations of her articles, and the helpful comments of an anonymous referee. (shrink)

Theories of different and independent types of intelligence constitute a Lakatosian research program, as they all claim that human intelligence has a multidimensional structure, consisting of independent cognitive abilities, and that human intelligence is not characterized by any general ability that is of greater practical importance, or that has greater predictive validity, than other, more specialized cognitive abilities. This paper argues that the independent intelligences research program is degenerating, since it has not led to novel, empirically corroborated predictions. However, despite (...) its flaws, the program provides an illustrative example of some of the philosophical problems that inhere in Lakatos’s so-called “methodology”. Indeed, Lakatos’s conceptions of the negative heuristic, the positive heuristic, and the relationship between scientific appraisal and advice are all vulnerable to objections. The upshot is that theories of independent intelligences indeed teach us more about philosophy of science than about the nature of human intelligence. (shrink)

China's encounter with Western cultures since the late Qing was generally viewed as a one-side “borrowing” and a radical “break” from traditional culture. “Westernization” became the dominant characteristic of the descriptions and interpretations of modern Chinese culture. Although Wang's work on comparative Chinese and Western philosophical studies has received much attention, there has been little attention given to the problem of Western influences, the domination of which, when appraising Wang's thought has persisted for a long time and has caused many (...) misunderstandings regarding his literary-aesthetic and philosophical thinking. Using the hermeneutical lens of Kierkegaard and especially Heidegger to look through to help correct our vision of interpreting Wang in light of his own culture, we propose that there is a specific Chinese sensibility crucial for understanding his use of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, a sensibility that has been ignored by those who later sought to reconstruct and evaluate his earlier studies. We use the idea of “tragedy” heuristically to show the connections and differences between Wang Guowei and Schopenhauer and propose how renjian jingshen played an important role in Wang's cultural “borrowing” from Schopenhauer. Such a conclusion is contrary to the common understanding of Wang as a devoted follower of Schopenhauer's “pessimistic” philosophy. (shrink)

Against the background of the fact that speakers not seldom intend to convey imports which deviate from the linguistically expressed meanings of linguistic items, the present article addresses some consequences of this phenomenon which appear to still be neglected in textual studies. It is suggested that understanding behaviour is in some respect a primary objective of exegesis and that due attention must be attributed to the high diversity of behaviour-related criteria by which interpretations of linguistic items are to be evaluated. (...) Although we intimate in addition that individual (meaningful) sentences occurring either in oral conversations or in written documents generally exhibit a multiplicity of contents of diverse types and that the circumstance that sometimes only a content equalling the linguistic significance of a pertinent unit matters for purposes of interpretation is caused by a material coincidence of different varieties of content, the tenets advocated in the paper do not essentially depend on that view. On the other hand, the following assumptions are relevant in the present connection: (a) A number of deviances between imports conveyed by linguistic utterances and literal meanings of expressions occur due to maxims of linguistic behaviour that are quite independent of lexical and syntactic features of individual natural languages. (b) It is by no means an exceptional phenomenon that imports not derivable by grammatical rules of a particular language alone possess primary importance for interpretation and textual exegesis. In view of significant affinities between understanding of sentences and of texts it is argued that the consideration of diverse aspects of behaviour possesses relevance for textual exegesis at least in the following respects: (1) By delivering a heuristic device for discerning problems affecting adopted interpretations it encourages searches for alternatives. (2) It provides means for evaluating the degree of acceptability of particular textual exegeses and possibly rejecting them on a more rational basis than mere intuition. (3) It offers possibilities for critically assessing the validity of explicit arguments advanced in favour of or in opposition to some interpretation. (4) It furnishes a background for assessing certain disputes about translation. The dimension of linguistic behaviour also attains importance in connection with questions of exegesis which are not concerned with assessments of (propositional) contents intended to be communicated, such as the ascertainment of the function which some argument possesses in a context. For substantiating the thesis that omission of raising relevant questions concerning behaviour is not an isolated phenomenon two examples will be employed: (1) A discussion concerning the exegesis of a crucial passage of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, (2) a critical appraisal of a recent publication dealing with the interpretation of the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā-s. (shrink)

Empirical philosophy of religion is usually appraised in light of its theological uses, rather than in terms of its relation to philosophical forms of empiricism. The present paper examines the empirical theism of Henry Nelson Wieman by relating it to Carl Hempel's critique of functionalism, Karl Popper's use of falsifiability, and the growth of post–empiricist anti–foundationalism in epis–temology. It is concluded that Wieman's argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent; that his theistic perspective nevertheless offers an important heuristic (...) device in line with fal–libilism, and that his radical empiricism anticipates recent anti–foundationalist trends. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Interpreting from the IntersticesThe Role of Justice in a Liberal Democracy—Lessons from Michael Walzer and Emmanuel LevinasNicholas R. Brown (bio)1As anyone who is familiar with more recent theological debate can attest, the appraisal of the liberal democratic tradition has undergone a radical reevaluation in the wake of Stanley Hauerwas’s and Alasdair MacIntyre’s scathing critiques. As a result of their blistering assault, religious ethicists and philosophers now find themselves (...) operating within a discursive milieu that is almost the photo negative of the one they previously inhabited. For what has followed After Virtue and After Christendom is a situation in which compliance with liberal democratic norms is now perceived as actively inveighing against justice rather than as an integral prerequisite to its pursuit.There are cracks, however, beginning to emerge in the MacIntyre/Hauerwas edifice. For what is becoming disputed and increasingly so among a growing chorus of religious ethicists and philosophers is whether their critical reading of liberal democracy offers the most [End Page 155] helpful or even the most biblical way to think through its own moral dimensions as well as those undergirding its relationship with justice.It is the emergence of these criticisms that forms the basis for this essay. For the thesis that I wish to advance below is that liberal democracy offers religious ethicists and philosophers alike a moral framework and vocabulary from which it is possible to comprehend and enact the normative precepts encapsulated within a biblical understanding of justice. Accordingly, some aspects of my argument will build upon the rhetorical trajectories that have been already charted by the ethicists and philosophers I mention above.What distinguishes my approach, however, is that I will proceed from a more focused examination of some of the ethical and political undercurrents found within contemporary Jewish thought. More specifically, I want to probe the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the political philosophy of Michael Walzer, for I believe the juxtapositional methodology of interpretation which informs each of their perspectives is illustrative of an interstitial hermeneutic that helps further illuminate the moral compatibility between biblical and democratic accounts of justice.2By now, MacIntyre’s and Hauerwas’s critiques of the liberal democratic tradition have been so thoroughly documented, discussed, and dissected that a review of their perspectives cannot help but have a certain pleonastic quality.Probably the most significant and disturbing problem that MacIntyre and Hauerwas see belying the liberal democratic tradition stems from its conception of time and space, or more precisely, its lack thereof. For what they discover upon a more careful probing of its moral and epistemological underpinnings is a pursuit of transcendence not dissimilar to Gnostic metaphysics. In the case of liberalism, however, the existential encumbrances to be excised are not corporeal and carnal in nature, but historical and social. [End Page 156]Such conditionalities, surmise liberal theorists, are so shot through with conceptual prejudices that they comprise an interpretative straight-jacket that vitiates against the kind of objectivity necessary to engage in a nonparochial process of moral and political discernment. For it is precisely this ability “to be able to stand back from any and every situation in which one is involved, from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgment on it from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity” which MacIntyre sees as constituting “the essence of moral agency” of modern liberalism (AV 31–32). Therefore, “liberalism is successful,” maintains Hauerwas, “exactly because... [it] provide[s] that philosophical account of society designed to deal with” the moral and political implications such a social and historical denuding portends, namely “a system of rules that will constitute procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their various interests.”1However, what liberalism defines as success MacIntyre and Hauerwas see as anything but. Instead, both judge its “system of rules” to be an insidious prescription for a particularly virulent form of moral nihilism and political bankruptcy. For by stripping moral and political discourse of their historical and social referents, liberalism, ironically and tragically, eviscerates itself of the very heuristic and discursive practices necessary to make those... (shrink)

The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics offers an overview of standard microeconomics and general equilibrium theory. These are not the whole of orthodox economics, and orthodox economics is not the whole of economics. But orthodox economics dominates the profession, and the theoretical core of microeconomics and general equilibrium theory – what I called ‘equilibrium theory’ – is central to most orthodox economics. Unlike many methodological works, which focus almost exclusively on the empirical problems of equilibrium theory and its applications, (...) ISSE is also concerned with the structure, strategy and heuristics of equilibrium theorizing, and it attempts to link questions about theory appraisal to questions about structure and strategy. It is addressed both to philosophers interested in epistemological questions posed by the social sciences and to economists interested in reflecting on and improving their discipline. Its inspiration lies in the work of John Stuart Mill. (shrink)