Als atmospharisch bergendes Gefuhl steht Heimat in einem fruchtbaren Spannungsfeld vielfaltiger gesellschaftlicher Einflusse. In Zeiten der Globalisierung verandern sich die Voraussetzungen fur die Konstitution von Heimat insbesondere durch Mobilitat, Migration, soziale Unsicherheit und Ideologisierung. Die Beitrage des Bandes diskutieren das Spannungsfeld von Eigenem und Fremdem aus verschiedenen theoretischen Perspektiven. Mit Beitragen von Amalia Barboza, Gernot Bohme, Simone Egger, Jurgen Hasse, Karen Joisten, Reinhard Knodt, Hermann Schmitz, Carolin Stapenhorst und Nina Trcka.

Unsere von den Medien gelenkte Aufmerksamkeit gilt zumeist den grossen Themen aus Politik, Okonomie und Gesellschaft. Das Kleine, Einfache, Banale und lebensweltlich Ubersehene hingegen erscheint kaum der Beachtung wert. In diesem Buch werden vier alltagliche Situationen herumraumlichen Erlebens zum Anlass phanomenologischer Reflexion - ein zufallig angreifender aversiver Geruch, das Warten in Airport-Lounges, das Wehen des Windes und das Gebannt-werden von Atmospharen der Stille. Mikrologische Beschreibungen detaillierten Situationserlebens lassen uns hinsehen, wo es schein- bar nichts zu sehen gibt. Im Fokus steht (...) potentiell alles, was sich in wacher Achtsamkeit erkunden lasst. Die phanomenologische Durchquerung des Einfachen und scheinbar Banalen eroffnet nicht nur Einblicke ins Ubersehene auf Seiten der Objekte. Auf der Subjektseite scharft sie das Selbst-Bewusstsein und macht alltaglich gelebte Beziehungen zum eigenen Selbst wie zum Herumwirklichen dem Nachdenken zuganglich. (shrink)

Peter Abelard's autobiography, the Historia calamitatum, is one of the best-known medieval texts, especially because of the story of his love for Heloise which it recounts. In recent decades, there was so much controversy about the authenticity of the documents concerning Abelard and Heloise that the critical interpretation of the texts was relegated to the sidelines. The present volume provides a way out of this impasse. In it, the famous text is subjected to a series of exemplary analyses from the (...) perspectives of seven different 20th century literary theories (aesthetics of reception, Foucault, Gender Studies, Rhetorical Stylistic Analysis, Psychology of Literature, Cultural Studies, Deconstruction). The analyses are preceded by the Latin text of the Historia calamitatum with a modern German translation. This is thus the first time that the Historia calamitatum has been presented in a bilingual edition. (shrink)

How do we talk meaningfully about the sacred in contexts where conventional religious expression has so often lost its power? Inspired by the influential work of David Jasper, this important volume builds on his thinking to identify sacrality in a world where the old religious and secular debates have exhausted themselves and theology struggles for a new language in their wake. Distinguished writers explore here the idea of the sacred as one that exists, paradoxically, in a space that is both (...) possible and impossible: profoundly theological on the one hand, but also deeply this-worldly and irreligious on the other. This is a sacredness that is simultaneously 'present' and 'absent': one which encompasses – as Jasper himself characterises it – 'the impossible possibility of an absolute vision'. The book teaches us that the sacred assumes a renewed potency when fully engaged with the creativity that happens across religion, literature, philosophy and the arts. (shrink)

In this text Hasse presents a new, inclusive, posthuman learning theory, designed to keep up with the transformations of human learning resulting from new technological experiences, as well as considering the expanding role of cyborg devices and robots in learning. This ground-breaking book draws on research from across psychology, education, and anthropology to present a truly interdisciplinary examination of the relationship between technology, learning and humanity. Posthumanism questions the self-evident status of human beings by exploring how technology is changing (...) what can be categorised as "human". In this book, the author applies a posthumanist lens to traditional learning theory, challenging conventional understanding of what a human learner is, and considering how technological advances are changing how we think about this question. Throughout the book Hasse uses vignettes of her own research and that of other prominent academics to exemplify what technology can tell us about how we learn and how this can be observed in real-life settings. Posthumanist Learning is essential reading for students and researchers of posthumanism and learning theory from a variety of backgrounds, including psychology, education, anthropology, robotics and philosophy. (shrink)

Le 13 novembre 2015, beaucoup d'acteurs politiques, médiatiques ou de témoins des attentats parisiens répétaient en boucle : " Nous sommes en guerre. " Cette expression ambigüe n'a pas permis de mieux comprendre ce qui s'était passé. Elle interroge d'autant plus si l'on considère que, durant les années 2000, l'on avait annoncé la fin de la guerre au profit de l'avènement d'" opérations de police " et d'" états de violence ". En s'attachant à restituer ce qui fut pensé sous (...) le nom de guerre à partir des écrits de Clausewitz, Mao, Schmitt et l'administration Bush, Catherine Hass nous montre que la guerre n'apparaît pas ou ne disparaît pas selon les périodes mais qu'elle change de mode selon la politique à l'oeuvre, redistribuant ses catégories - ami, ennemi, antagonisme, nation, révolution, terrorisme... Le pari de ce livre est que des pensées révolues de la guerre peuvent constituer une forme de recours pour réfléchir notre contemporain, à l'instar de la Syrie ou de Daech. Docteure en anthropologie politique, Catherine Hass est spécialisée dans l'étude du contemporain. Après avoir mené des enquêtes essentiellement sur les jeunes issus des quartiers populaires, ses recherches portent, depuis plus de dix ans, sur le nom de guerre et l'examen de quelques-unes de ses configurations politiques, actuelles comme révolues. (shrink)

Schmitz zieht in diesem Buch die Bilanz eines mehr als fünfzigjährigen Fortschreitens im Dienst der Aufgabe, den Menschen ihr wirkliches Leben begreiflich zu machen. Er stellt zu diesem Zweck vier Säulen seines Werkes vor - unter den Titeln: Subjektivität, Mannigfaltigkeit, Leib und Gefühl, Welt - und bringt grundlegende Fragestellungen der Neuen Phänomenologie zur Sprache: Der Leib war seit der...

The way people live is neither a task, nor an action, nor a function. Rather, living expresses how people carry out their lives in places and spaces. One’s home in the broader sense (beyond ‘one's own four walls’) is the earth as a whole. In order for living to be successful on both a local and global scale, and for the earth not to become overly inhabited, people must live in a good way. But where extraction (from the resources of (...) nature as well as the social sphere) breaks the principle of conservation, living becomes a matter of care for the habitability of the earth in the future. That is why today an ethical revision of all the ways and means in which people are on the earth is required. (shrink)

This paper examines a looming reproducibility crisis in the core of the hard sciences. Namely, it concentrates on molecular modeling and simulation (MMS), a family of methods that predict properties of substances through computing interactions on a molecular level and that is widely popular in physics, chemistry, materials science, and engineering. The paper argues that in order to make quantitative predictions, sophisticated models are needed which have to be evaluated with complex simulation procedures that amalgamate theoretical, technological, and social factors (...) – leading to problems with reproducibility. Thus, for methodological reasons, the predictive success causes a reproducibility problem. (shrink)

On Moral Certainty, Justification and Practice presents a view of morality that is inspired by the later Wittgenstein. Hermann explores the ethical implications of Wittgenstein's remarks on doubt, justification, rule-following, certainty and training, offering an alternative to interpretations of Wittgenstein's work that view it as being intrinsically ethical. The book scrutinises cases in which doubt and justification do not make sense, and contrasts certain justificatory demands made by philosophers with the role of moral justification in concrete situations. It offers (...) an account of moral certainty, which is linked to a view of moral competence. Contrary to the views propounded by philosophers who emphasise the importance of moral principles, it is argued that moral agency is first and foremost a matter of having certain capacities. The book takes an anti-intellectualist stance and remains close to concrete practices. The practice-based view of morality it endorses has implications for moral education, intercultural moral dialogue and the prospects for moral agreement, change and progress. (shrink)

Any account of “what is special about the human brain” (Passingham 2008) must specify the neural basis of our unique ability to produce speech and delineate how these remarkable motor capabilities could have emerged in our hominin ancestors. Clinical data suggest that the basal ganglia provide a platform for the integration of primate-general mechanisms of acoustic communication with the faculty of articulate speech in humans. Furthermore, neurobiological and paleoanthropological data point at a two-stage model of the phylogenetic evolution of this (...) crucial prerequisite of spoken language: (i) monosynaptic refinement of the projections of motor cortex to the brainstem nuclei that steer laryngeal muscles, presumably, as part of a “phylogenetic trend” associated with increasing brain size during hominin evolution; (ii) subsequent vocal-laryngeal elaboration of cortico-basal ganglia circuitries, driven by human-specificFOXP2mutations.;>This concept implies vocal continuity of spoken language evolution at the motor level, elucidating the deep entrenchment of articulate speech into a “nonverbal matrix” (Ingold 1994), which is not accounted for by gestural-origin theories. Moreover, it provides a solution to the question for the adaptive value of the “first word” (Bickerton 2009) since even the earliest and most simple verbal utterances must have increased the versatility of vocal displays afforded by the preceding elaboration of monosynaptic corticobulbar tracts, giving rise to enhanced social cooperation and prestige. At the ontogenetic level, the proposed model assumes age-dependent interactions between the basal ganglia and their cortical targets, similar to vocal learning in some songbirds. In this view, the emergence of articulate speech builds on the “renaissance” of an ancient organizational principle and, hence, may represent an example of “evolutionary tinkering” (Jacob 1977). (shrink)

Einleitung. Auftakt ; Welt, Anschauung, Weltanschauung : Begriffshorizonte für Musik ; Weltanschauung und Kunst ; Der Begriff "Weltanschauung" ; Zur Konzeption des Buches : Ästhetisch-kulturelle Inbilder der Moderne ; Ästhetische und gesellschaftlische Moderne -- Gemeinschaft. Eine Idee und ihre Korruption : zur Einführung ; Das Finale von Beethovens neunter Symphonie -- Bildung. Anagogische Formationen : zur Einführung ; Symphonische Mythen bei Franz Liszt ; Musiklyrische Schicksalsformen bei Johannes Brahms -- Religion. Religion, Nation, Kunst : zur Einführung ; Geistliche Weltanschauungmusik von (...) Bach, Mendelssohn Bartholdy und Brahms ; Konfessionelle Markierungen bei Max Reger ; Verheißung und Erlösung im Bühnenweihfestspiel Parsifal -- Heldentum. Im Ausgang von der Eroica : zur Einführung ; Totenfeier und Gedächtniskultur bei Wagner und Mahler ; Diskursnormen bei Richard Strauss und Max Reger ; Kommunismus gegen Nationalsozialismus : Ideologien im Kampf um Deutschland -- Liebe. Destruktion und Kosmogonie : zur Einführung ; Frau Minne in Wagners Tristan und Isolde ; Lyric-Energien bei Schönberg und Zemlinsky ; Schöpfung aus Liebe : Gustav Mahlers Faust-Komposition in der Achten Symphonie -- Allnatur. Von "Natur" bis "All" : zur Einführung ; Nietzsche-Spiegelungen mit Delius, Strauss und Mahler ; Der Atem des Monismus bei Schönberg und Webern ; Der Gesang der Planeten in Kosmos-Musik Langgaards und Hindemiths. (shrink)

Je mehr über unser Bildungswesen publiziert und getagt wird, umso heilloser scheint die Verwirrung in der Sache zu werden. Zudem droht im Dickicht jahrzehntelanger Reformen, Gegenreformen und Reform-Reformen das Pädagogische zu Gunsten bürokratischer und ökonomischer Maßstäbe zu verschwinden. In Kritik dieser Tendenz geht es dem Autor darum, die Pädagogik wieder als eine eigentümliche, unverwechselbare und gesellschaftlich notwendige Praxis des Forderns und Förderns zu entdecken und sie gegen unangemessene ideologische und wissenschaftliche Ansprüche von außen zu verteidigen. Dabei wählt der Autor eine (...) Perspektive von unten - aus der Sicht derer, die pädagogisch handeln müssen. Der Band entwirft einen Vorstellungszusammenhang, von dem aus der gegenwärtige Zustand des Bildungswesens besser verstanden und im Hinblick auf künftige Verbesserungen kritisch reflektiert werden kann. (shrink)

Die klassischen Gegenuberstellungen in der Philosophie gleichen oft dem Verschieben von Figuren im Theater oder auf dem Schachbrett. Das liegt daran, dass man alles fur einzeln und Identitat mit etwas fur selbstverstandlich halt. Es versteht sich aber nicht von selbst, dass alles, was ist, selbst ist. Selbstsein, Einzelheit, Identitat mit etwas haben tiefliegende und kontingente Voraussetzungen in der Dynamik des spurbaren Leibes. Von dieser hangt durch die subjektiven (nicht neutralen) Tatsachen des affektiven Betroffenseins auch das Selbstbewusstsein der Person ab. Um (...) sich mit etwas zu identifizieren, muss sie sich schon kennen, und dafur bedarf sie der leiblichen Dynamik, wie fur alles Konkrete der aus dieser sich ergebenden leiblichen Kommunikation. Durch die Ambivalenz von Eintauchen in den Leib und Auftauchen aus ihm wird die Person labil und zwiespaltig. Als Wege zu ihrer Stabilisierung und Integration werden hier die Fassung, die Komik und der Humor erortert. Alle Erfahrung wird auf leibliches Verstehen zuruckgefuhrt. Aber was ist der spurbare Leib im Gegensatz zum sichtbaren und tastbaren Korper? Er muss erst begrifflich freigelegt werden, denn seine eigentumliche Ausdehnung und Dynamik waren der europaischen Intellektualkultur unbekannt. (shrink)

Baron d’Holbach was a critic of established religion, or a philosophe, in late 18 th -century France. His work is often perceived as less inventive than the work of other materialist philosophes, such as Helvétius and Diderot. However, I claim that d’Holbach makes an original, unjustly overlooked move in the criticism of religious moral teaching. According to the materialist philosophes, this teaching claims that true happiness is only possible in the afterlife. As an alternative, Helvétius and Diderot offer theories according (...) to which the experience of pleasure constitutes happiness, the end of all human desire. In contemporary terms, these theories would represent psychological hedonism. But, as Diderot himself admits, they have a problem in accounting for why people seem to naturally regard some pleasures as preferable to others. I argue that in response to this challenge, instead of accepting the psychological hedonism of his fellow materialists, d’Holbach shows how one can abstain from reducing happiness to pleasure and yet remain a materialist. (shrink)

Outlines of Metaphysic - dictated portions of the lectures of Hermann Lotze is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1884. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly publishes these books and contributes to (...) the preservation of literature which has become rare and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)

Autonomy was an important political concept in ancient Greece. Kant made it the ground of morality: only acting motivated by autonomous reason is moral. But he admits that reason does not have a power to motivate us: desires can always override it. Thus it seems that human reason is not autonomous. The principle of autonomy, however, is an intrinsic part of Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” and his rationalism about the grounding of morality. Questioning the former would lead to fideism or to (...) skepticism while rejecting the latter to reductionism. Neither course is less problematic for grounding morality than the principle of autonomy is. I suggest that Aristotle can help us to see how this dilemma can be avoided. Unlike Kant and many others, he does not seek to ground morality beyond our experience. The Aristotelian understanding of human beings as capable of evaluating one another’s actions with the language of purposefulness can explain which actions are moral without falling into the dilemma implied by the Kantian principle of autonomy. (shrink)

W niniejszym artykule analizuję koncepcję Arystotelesa dotyczącą wymagań epistemicznych koniecznych do identyfikacji czynów moralnie dobrych. W Etyce Nikomachejskiej, Arystoteles zdaje się twierdzić, że jesteśmy w stanie rozpoznawać takie czyny, nie mając wiedzy o tym, dlaczego są one dobre. Inne twierdzenia zawarte w tych dziele, nie pozwalają jednak na bezkrytyczne przyjęcie tej tezy. Zdaniem Johna McDowella, Arystoteles uważał, iż dobro etyczne czynu jest zależne od kontekstu. Gdyby tak było, by rozpoznać dany czyn jako dobry, musielibyśmy wiedzieć jakie cechy danej sytuacji czynią (...) go dobrym. Bronię tezy, że nawet jeśli dobro czynu byłoby zależne od kontekstu, Arystoteles nie uważałby znajomości tego kontekstu za jedyny sposób rozpoznania czynu jako dobry. By tego dowieść, sięgam do dorobku współczesnej filozofii. Realizm wewnętrzny Hilarego Putnama pozwala wyjaśnić w jaki sposób podmiot rozpoznaje egzemplarze należące do danego rodzaju naturalnego, bez znajomości definicji tego rodzaju naturalnego. David Charles pokazuje, że Arystoteles podziela podobny pogląd, choć nie uważa, że podmiot musi zakładać, iż istnieje definicja danego rodzaju. Twierdzę, że ten aspekt teorii Arystotelesa może być zastosowany także do identyfikacji czynów moralnie dobrych. Jednostka może rozpoznawać dobre czyny jako czyny konieczne do prowadzenia cnotliwego życia. Nie musi wiedzieć dlaczego określone czyny są dobre. Wystarczy, że ma wizję dobrego życia, którą – jak twierdzi Arystoteles – może rozwinąć poprzez naśladowanie tych, którzy mają „oko doświadczenia”. (shrink)

Among the readers of Swedenborg, the Swedish thinker’s ‘theory of correspondences’ is often interpreted as treating empirical realities as only imperfect manifestations of spiritual realities. This interpretation that ascribes idealism to Swedenborg was originally proposed by Kant in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Although Kant criticizes Swedenborg’s theory, he considers it no inferior to the theories of Leibniz and Wolf, which can entice a reader of Swedenborg to take Kant’s interpretation at face value: even if Kant did not agree with (...) Swedenborg, at least he took him to be on par with these ‘serious’ philosophers. However, this paper attempts to show that unless a reader of Swedenborg is willing to endorse Kant’s disdain towards ‘enthusiasm’, Swedenborg should not be interpreted as a Platonic idealist, because he devised his theory of correspondences precisely in order to avoid such idealism. As few scholars have recently pointed out, Swedenborg, like Kant, thinks that all our cognitive abilities operate in the limits of time and space, i.e. in the empirical world, but for Swedenborg, as opposed to Kant, this does not imply that we cannot acquire knowledge of the spiritual world. According to these scholars, Swedenborg thinks that such knowledge can only be acquired mystically, which would render him a Platonic idealist, just as Kant claimed. However, this paper claims that pace the aforementioned scholars, this is not the only or even the default way of coming to know the spiritual world according to Swedenborg. The paper argues that when positing that every empirical and spiritual reality ‘correspond’ with one another, Swedenborg uses the Latin word correspondere in a technical sense. In other words, he thinks that any human cognition is both spiritual in the sense of involving a logical relationship between extension and spirit, and empirical by occurring in time and space. Thus, by cognising something in the empirical world, we also cognise something in the spiritual world, even if we were not capable of knowing spiritual realities in themselves. This element of Swedenborg’s theory distances him from Platonic idealism. The paper concludes with a suggestion that Kant might have perceived the limitations of his interpretation of Swedenborg later on, as signalled by the fact that in the early 1780s, Kant extended his conception of Platonism to include all philosophy other than his own. However, taking this road would make Platonic idealism an uninformative concept for an interpreter of Swedenborg and apt to be replaced by the term ‘enthusiasm’–the concept that Kant used when describing those with whom he disagreed. (shrink)

This article investigates the question why even the existence of “moral conscience” became regarded with serious doubts among radical eighteenth-century French philosophes La Mettrie, d’Holbach, Diderot, and Voltaire, from the vantage point of conceptual history. The philosophes’ stance of regarding moral conscience only as a name for certain acquired prejudices both fails to engage with the conception of moral conscience upheld by their theistic opponents and stands in a sharp contrast to the moral thought of Protestant reformation, which – less (...) than two centuries earlier – had elevated moral conscience to a position of an infallible moral authority. The article argues, however, that, in spite of the opposition between these two conceptions of conscience, they might be connected, and that the former might have even been a consequence of the latter. It will be shown that the pre-Reformation conception of moral conscience, crystallized in Aquinas, presents it being based on our natural attraction to “the human good”. However, as this conception was not created by medieval theologians, but was inherited from non-theistic ancient philosophy, in principle it would have been as compatible with the deistic and atheistic worldviews of the philosophes as the other ancient philosophical concepts, such as “the human good” and “human nature”, that the philosophes continued using in their original, teleological senses. Having presented a brief overview of the history of moral conscience, the article proceeds to show how the Protestant reformers removed the attraction to the human good from moral conscience while making its normative guidance infallible. The article will suggest that, due to the prevalence of this, exclusively theological, conception of moral conscience in the intellectual environment shaped by Protestantism, several British thinkers of the seventeenth century, including Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who could not endorse the theological aspects of moral conscience, gradually reduced it into a mere acquired “sentiment”. As their philosophy was a major influence on the philosophes, the article concludes that the loss of a rational justification for moral conscience in the works of the British philosophers could have also been what motivated the philosophes to question moral conscience. (shrink)

Certain passages of Nicomachean Ethics seem to suggest a model of moral education that excludes those who have been misguided by their educators from being responsible for their character. I will argue, however, that this impression may result from misinterpreting the method of Aristotle’s moral educators. It is often thought, at least since Myles Burnyeat’s classic paper, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good’1, that according to Aristotle, a moral educator should tell to moral students which actions are good so that (...) they could begin to practice performing them. I will show that this interpretation is both exegetically problematic, and the likely cause of the above, uncharitable impression. I will argue that it would be more justifiable to interpret Aristotle to be maintaining that the moral students should discover good actions themselves, though trial and error, and that the moral educator might only be needed to keep them away from acting too badly, as Howard Curzer has proposed2. Since in order to discover good actions on his own, a moral student needs to exercise moral discernment, he could be held responsible of the character that he will develop even if his moral educators were misguided him. I will suggest that Aristotle might think that what enables even morally misled people to become morally discerning learners is synesis–ability to identify good actions on the basis of other people’s opinions. (shrink)

Among the readers of Swedenborg, the Swedish thinker’s ‘theory of correspondences’ is often interpreted as treating empirical realities as only imperfect manifestations of spiritual realities. This interpretation that ascribes idealism to Swedenborg was originally proposed by Kant in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Although Kant criticizes Swedenborg’s theory, he considers it no inferior to the theories of Leibniz and Wolf, which can entice a reader of Swedenborg to take Kant’s interpretation at face value: even if Kant did not agree with (...) Swedenborg, at least he took him to be on par with these ‘serious’ philosophers. However, this paper attempts to show that unless a reader of Swedenborg is willing to endorse Kant’s disdain towards ‘enthusiasm’, Swedenborg should not be interpreted as a Platonic idealist, because he devised his theory of correspondences precisely in order to avoid such idealism. As few scholars have recently pointed out, Swedenborg, like Kant, thinks that all our cognitive abilities operate in the limits of time and space, i.e. in the empirical world, but for Swedenborg, as opposed to Kant, this does not imply that we cannot acquire knowledge of the spiritual world. According to these scholars, Swedenborg thinks that such knowledge can only be acquired mystically, which would render him a Platonic idealist, just as Kant claimed. However, this paper claims that pace the aforementioned scholars, this is not the only or even the default way of coming to know the spiritual world according to Swedenborg. The paper argues that when positing that every empirical and spiritual reality ‘correspond’ with one another, Swedenborg uses the Latin word correspondere in a technical sense. In other words, he thinks that any human cognition is both spiritual in the sense of involving a logical relationship between extension and spirit, and empirical by occurring in time and space. Thus, by cognising something in the empirical world, we also cognise something in the spiritual world, even if we were not capable of knowing spiritual realities in themselves. This element of Swedenborg’s theory distances him from Platonic idealism. The paper concludes with a suggestion that Kant might have perceived the limitations of his interpretation of Swedenborg later on, as signalled by the fact that in the early 1780s, Kant extended his conception of Platonism to include all philosophy other than his own. However, taking this road would make Platonic idealism an uninformative concept for an interpreter of Swedenborg and apt to be replaced by the term ‘enthusiasm’–the concept that Kant used when describing those with whom he disagreed. (shrink)

Among the readers of Swedenborg, the Swedish thinker’s ‘theory of correspondences’ is often interpreted as treating empirical realities as only imperfect manifestations of spiritual realities. This interpretation that ascribes idealism to Swedenborg was originally proposed by Kant in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Although Kant criticizes Swedenborg’s theory, he considers it no inferior to the theories of Leibniz and Wolf, which can entice a reader of Swedenborg to take Kant’s interpretation at face value: even if Kant did not agree with (...) Swedenborg, at least he took him to be on par with these ‘serious’ philosophers. However, this paper attempts to show that unless a reader of Swedenborg is willing to endorse Kant’s disdain towards ‘enthusiasm’, Swedenborg should not be interpreted as a Platonic idealist, because he devised his theory of correspondences precisely in order to avoid such idealism. As few scholars have recently pointed out, Swedenborg, like Kant, thinks that all our cognitive abilities operate in the limits of time and space, i.e. in the empirical world, but for Swedenborg, as opposed to Kant, this does not imply that we cannot acquire knowledge of the spiritual world. According to these scholars, Swedenborg thinks that such knowledge can only be acquired mystically, which would render him a Platonic idealist, just as Kant claimed. However, this paper claims that pace the aforementioned scholars, this is not the only or even the default way of coming to know the spiritual world according to Swedenborg. The paper argues that when positing that every empirical and spiritual reality ‘correspond’ with one another, Swedenborg uses the Latin word correspondere in a technical sense. In other words, he thinks that any human cognition is both spiritual in the sense of involving a logical relationship between extension and spirit, and empirical by occurring in time and space. Thus, by cognising something in the empirical world, we also cognise something in the spiritual world, even if we were not capable of knowing spiritual realities in themselves. This element of Swedenborg’s theory distances him from Platonic idealism. The paper concludes with a suggestion that Kant might have perceived the limitations of his interpretation of Swedenborg later on, as signalled by the fact that in the early 1780s, Kant extended his conception of Platonism to include all philosophy other than his own. However, taking this road would make Platonic idealism an uninformative concept for an interpreter of Swedenborg and apt to be replaced by the term ‘enthusiasm’–the concept that Kant used when describing those with whom he disagreed. (shrink)

This article argues that contrary to a received interpretation, Emanuel Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences, according to which each empirical reality has a corresponding spiritual reality, is closer to Spinozistic monism than Neoplatonic idealism. According to the former, there is only one substance: God, which we can cognize through its spir­itual and material aspects. According to the latter, the material world consists of substances that receive their form through participation in the ideas of the spiri­tual world. The article will show that (...) although some of Swedenborg’s claims can appear as expressing Neoplatonic idealism, his reading of the Bible as a guide for moral improvement, his rejection of the religious mysteries that cannot be rationally understood, his various examples of correspondences, his view that we can cognize God by studying the correspondences, and his definition of God as the only substance, make evident that he does not consider the spiritual realities ideas in the Neoplatonic sense. The article will interpret Swedenborg to think that the spiritual realities are learned concepts that enable us to describe and experience the world as having spiritual significance and thus acquire a fuller cognition of God. (shrink)