This article explores in greater depth the historiographical traditions concerning Herennius Pontius, a Samnite wisdom-practitioner who is said by the Peripatetic Aristoxenus of Tarentum to have been an interlocutor of the philosophers Archytas of Tarentum and Plato of Athens. Specifically, it argues that extant speeches attributed to Herennius Pontius in the writings of Cassius Dio and Appian preserve a philosophy of “extreme proportional benefaction” among unequals. Greek theories of ethics among unequals such as those of Aristotle (...) and Archytas of Tarentum, which aim for moderation, can be distinguished from that attributed to Herennius Pontius, which is circumstantial and stipulates extreme responses to extremes. Romans, in particular Appius Claudius Caecus and Sulla, celebrate and espouse proverbial wisdom strikingly similar to the theory of “extreme proportional benefaction” associated with Herennius Pontius, and in contrast to Greek ethics of moderation. Such comparisons suggest that starting in the late fourth century BCE, Romans and Samnites may have held shared ideological principles, as defined against Greek cultural paradigms. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with a similar entry of the lexica of Thomas Magister and Ps-Ammonius concerning the semantic difference between συγγρα- φεῖς and ἱστορικοί. The entry is proven to be ultimately descended from the lost lexicon Περὶ τῶν διαφόρως σημαινομένων of Herennius Philon (2nd cent. AD); this lexicon in its lost unabridged form seems to have influenced the distinction συγγραφεῖς / ἱστορικοί in the preface of the historical work of Eustathius on the sack of Thessalonica by the Normans. (...) The paper investigates the possibility of a Hellenistic grammatical substratum in Philon’s distinction; based on the evidence of literary texts and inscriptions, the paper asserts that the distinction (probably received by Philon from a Hellenistic-era grammatical source) was already vanishing in Philon’s days. (shrink)

Summary The portrayal of Pontius Pilate as a single-handed prefect is one of the many incongruous and implausible elements found in the Gospel accounts of Jesus of Nazareth’s passion. Moreover, a striking imbalance in these accounts emerges: whilst Romans appear only at the last phase of the story, earlier the only people plotting against Jesus are Jews. There is every indication that some key information has been dropped. The present paper, after taking into account the traces of anti-Roman aspects (...) in Jesus’ career, surveys what is known about the consilia of Roman provincial governors and the sources of information available to them, and, for the first time, applies this knowledge to a critical reconstruction of the story underlying the Gospels, thereby providing a missing link to understand it. (shrink)

Ebejer and Morden (Paternalism in the Marketplace: Should a Salesman Be His Buyer's Keeper?, Journal of Business Ethics 7, 1988) propose limited paternalism as a sufficient regulative condition for a professional ethic of sales. Although the principle is immediately appealing, its application can lead to a counter-productive ethical quandary I call the Pontius Pilate Plight. This quandary is the assumption that ethical agents' hands are clean in certain situations even if they have done something they condemn as immoral. Since (...) limited paternalism can give rise to this queer conclusion in the salesperson/buyer relationship, the principle is suspect. It may be a necessary condition for ethical sales, but is not sufficient. This discussion concludes by suggesting two additional criteria which, when complemented by the limited paternalism principle, are jointly sufficient. (shrink)

El autor de este trabajo pretende situar al personaje de Pilato en el contexto histórico y político en el que gobernaba una provincia de escaso relieve en el extenso mundo del Imperio Romano. También analiza algunos de los hechos de Pilato, casi todos ellos negativos. Pilato desaparece de la historia; el autor sigue su posterior destino, pasando a la literatura, al Ife de la antigua Iglesia y a la leyenda dentro de una doble corriente: una favorable y otra otra desfavorable (...) al que fue juez de Cristo. (shrink)

This paper investigates the ascription of a passage in Isidore’s Differentiae to the jurist Modestinus. A collection of philological notes by the humanist scholar Barthius reports the existence of a (now lost) manuscript that credited lemma 1.434 Codoñer to one Orenius, which has ever since usually been emended into Herennius (sc. Modestinus). It is possible to place this witness in the stemma of the Differentiae. Careful study of Barthius’ reported readings from the manuscript not only indicates that it was (...) peripheral to the tradition, but it also allows us to point out the (skilful) hand of an editor/interpolator, who may have been responsible for the addition of the name Orenius. (shrink)

The basic position underlying the argument here stated is that rationality, the distinguishing characteristic of homo sapiens is a social product and that man could not be a rational animal if he were not already a social one.

Recognizing the immense purchasing power of children, marketing researchers often gather information from them. Given the vulnerability of these children as research subjects, this paper explores the different ethical standards that marketing researchers could adopt in their research efforts. The Paternalistic Ethical Standard and the Limited Paternalistic Ethical Standard are discussed and the ethical quandary known as the Pontius Pilate Plight is identified in the context of the latter standard. An enhanced version of the Limited Paternalistic Standard is suggested (...) as an ethical guide for marketing researchers. Based on interviews with professional marketing researchers to gauge the applicability of the proposed standard, managerial implications are identified. (shrink)

Do logical paradoxes, like Eubulides’s Liar Paradox (the claim that the sentence “I am now lying” is true if and only if it is false), have any “existential” significance or are they mere brain puzzles for the mathematically minded? The paper argues that Randall Jarrell’s poem, “Eighth Air Force”, contains a poetic use of Eubulides’ Liar Paradox, spoken by Pontius Pilate’s wife in her statements about the “murder” of Jesus, in order to capture, symbolically, the inherent universal duplicity (inauthenticity) (...) of human life, specifically, the fact that human life, even in its true statements about fundamental moral-existential issues, is an inseparable blend of “truth” and “lies.”. (shrink)

Herennius Philo of Byblos is the subject of a notice in the Suda, which states that he was a grammarian born in Nero's time who lived to such an advanced age that he was still composing works in the reign of Hadrian. The titles listed include: On the Acquisition and Choice of Books; On Cities and their Eminent Citizens; and On the Reign of Hadrian . His name, like that of Flavius Josephus, could imply the patronage of a Roman (...) family; we may suppose that, like Porphyry and Maximus of Tyre, he was a Phoenicean by origin who had adopted the tongue and culture of the Greeks. (shrink)

Pontius Pilate is one of the most enigmatic figures in Christian theology. The only non-Christian to be named in the Nicene Creed, he is presented as a cruel colonial overseer in secular accounts, as a conflicted judge convinced of Jesus's innocence in the Gospels, and as either a pious Christian or a virtual demon in later Christian writings. This book takes Pilate's role in the trial of Jesus as a starting point for investigating the function of legal judgment in (...) Western society and the ways that such judgment requires us to adjudicate the competing claims of the eternal and the historical. Coming just as Agamben is bringing his decades-long Homo Sacer project to an end, Pilate and Jesus sheds considerable light on what is at stake in that series as a whole. At the same time, it stands on its own, perhaps more than any of the author's recent works. It thus serves as a perfect starting place for readers who are curious about Agamben's approach but do not know where to begin. (shrink)

Herennius Philo of Byblos is the subject of a notice in the Suda, which states that he was a grammarian born in Nero's time who lived to such an advanced age that he was still composing works in the reign of Hadrian. The titles listed include: On the Acquisition and Choice of Books; On Cities and their Eminent Citizens; and On the Reign of Hadrian. His name, like that of Flavius Josephus, could imply the patronage of a Roman family; (...) we may suppose that, like Porphyry and Maximus of Tyre, he was a Phoenicean by origin who had adopted the tongue and culture of the Greeks. (shrink)

I say: “Oh, what a beautiful surrealist picture!” With quite precise awareness: this páthos, these emotions of mine do not stem from our common sense. An aesthetic judgment is founded on an immediate subjective intuition: an emotion or a free feeling of a single subject towards an object. A universal sense, possibly. Some judgments of ours in ethics and in law are no different from our perceptions in front of art. It would be the same for a hypothetical sentence of (...) the judge that concluded with these words: “I acquit Arsenio Lupin because of his magnificent handlebar moustache like that of Guy de Maupassant”. Everyone would think intuitively that it is an unfair sentence. Is there aesthetics of terror? The case that the article intends to examine is that of the famous kidnapping and murder of the Italian statesman Aldo Moro by the “Brigate Rosse” [Red Brigades] (1978). The method used here consists in studying the image of the kidnapping as iconic documentation of reality, and, above all, as an ethical-legal judgment about the terrorist crime. Moro was photographed during his kidnapping. There are at least two pictures. Both constitute an extraordinary source for a judgment on the basis of an image. In both of them, Aldo Moro is pictured in front of a Red Brigades banner during the captivity. In what sense do these pictures document an aesthetic judgment concerning the “case Moro”? The answer can be found in a remarkable iconic coincidence of these pictures with a masterpiece by Georges Rouault (Paris 1871-1958) devoted to the theme of the “Ecce Homo”. The Gospel in the “Ecce Homo” scene (John: 19, 4-5) narrates how Pontius Pilate wanted to arouse the compassion of the people with a scourging and the exposure of Jesus to the crowd. The plate under consideration is entitled “Qui ne se grime pas?” [Who does not have a painted face?] and is a key work in Rouault’s suite of prints Miserere, dated for 1923. (shrink)

And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord; who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried; he descended into hell; the third day he rose again from the dead; he ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz’s Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novissima Sinica, 1699–1999Patrick RileyThe Preface to Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica 1 contains an important but highly compressed and abbreviated quintessence of his theory of justice or jurisprudence universelle—a version so compressed and abbreviated that one must have a broader and fuller understanding of this universal jurisprudence before one can entirely appreciate what Leibniz has to say about Christian charity, Platonism, and geometry in (...) the Novissima Sinica itself. Above all, one wants to know why Leibniz, in the key paragraph of the Preface to Novissima Sinica, should describe the Chinese emperor as just and charitable and as a (more or less) “Platonic” geometer who is as wise as he is charitable. And why should Leibniz contrast this “wisely charitable” Chinese ruler with the Pontius Pilate who irresponsibly asked, “What is truth?” and then permitted the judicial murder of the very Christ who did most to make charity and justice coextensive by saying, “A new law I give unto you, that ye love one another”? 2 The wise course, therefore, is to throw enough light on Leibnizian universal jurisprudence in general to make his moral-political utterances in Novissima Sinica intelligible in particular.In 1693, four years before the publication of Novissima Sinica, Leibniz revealed the outlines of his jurisprudence universelle in the Codex Iuris Gentium:a good man is one who loves everybody, so far as reason permits. Justice, then, which is the virtue which regulates that affection which [End Page 217] the Greeks call philanthropy, will be most conveniently defined... as the charity of the wise man, that is, charity which follows the dictates of wisdom... Charity is a universal benevolence, and benevolence the habit of loving or of willing the good. Love then signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another..., the happiness of those whose happiness pleases us turns into our own happiness, since things which please us are desired for their own sakes. 3Slightly later, in La véritable piété, Leibniz indicated what this view of justice entails:those who... reduce justice to [mere] rigor, and who fail altogether to understand that one cannot be just without being benevolent... in a word, not only those who look for their profit, pleasure, and glory in the misery of others, but also those who are not at all anxious to procure the common good and to lift out of misery those who are in their care, and generally those who show themselves to be without enlightenment and without charity, boast in vain of piety which they do not know at all, whatever appearance they create. 4The central idea of Leibniz’s “universal jurisprudence,” which aims to find quasi-geometrical, eternal moral verities equally valid for all rational beings, human or divine, is that justice is “the charity of the wise” (caritas sapientis), 5 that it is not mere conformity to sovereign-ordained “positive” law given ex plenitudo potestatis (in the manner of Hobbes); nor is it mere “refraining from harm” or even “rendering what is due” (the neminem laedere and suum cuique tribuere of Roman law). 6 The equal stress on “charity” and on “wisdom” suggests that Leibniz’s practical thought is a kind of fusing of Platonism—in which the wise know the eternal truths such as absolute goodness (Phaedo 75d), which the gods themselves also know and love (Euthyphro 93-10e) and which therefore deserve to rule (Republic 443d-e) 7 —and of Pauline Christianity, whose key moral idea is that charity or love is the first of the virtues (“though I speak [End Page 218] with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal”). 8 Historically, there is nothing remarkable in trying to fuse Platonism and Christianity. Augustine’s thought (particularly the early De Libero Arbitrio) is just such a fusion. 9 But Leibniz was the last of the great Christian Platonists, and left the world just as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant were about to transform and “secularize” it.I. If one decomposes caritas sapientis into its parts, charity and wisdom, the provenance of both elements is clear enough... (shrink)

John Punch (or Ponce; Latin Joannes Poncius, or, occasionally, Pontius, 1599/1603–1661), an Irish Franciscan in exile, unorthodox Scotist and a skilled collaborator of the famous Luke Wadding, is interesting for his fresh and open-minded approach to traditional Scotist doctrines. His take on the theory of relations, which is the topic of this paper, is no exception. As I will show, in his Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti1 he only pretends to be defending a doctrine considered to be traditionally (...) "Scotist," his true mind being apparently quite different.In Punch's time, several competing theories of relations were in currency. The basic insight common, at least as a point of departure, to all scholastics... Read More. (shrink)

Daniel Ciunajcis Marcin Moskalewicz Time-Space of History. Transcendental Conditions of Practicing History as PoliticsThe article deals with the issue of time-space in modern historiography, and the main thesis is that time-space is a transcendental condition of the possibility of the practice of history and that modern victory of time over space has various negative implications that are underscored and analyzed. In the first part of the article, the authors present classical asymmetric concepts – Greeks vs. Barbarians and Christians vs. Pagans (...) – as analyzed by Reinhardt Koselleck. In the second part of the article, the advent of a new Christian temporality is being examined via Karl Barth’s interpretation (as presented in his Dogmatics in Outline) of Pontius Pilate’s last judgment over Jesus Christ. In this context three aspects of temporality are being discerned: the horizon of expectation represented by Jesus Christ, the space of experience represented by the Jewish community and eternity represented by Pontius Pilate. Pilate is recognized as taking the place of God in the political order: himself an embodiment of state, a symbol of its transcendence, and a transcendental condition of possibility of modern political life. In the third part the authors defend the thesis that thinking is an embodied phenomenon. While applying and criticizing Hannah Arendt, they indicate that thinking should be taken as an original source of human temporality and as a condition of possibility of organizing external space. The authors emphasize Arendt’s conception of a metaphor as a bridge between the sensible and the supersensible, with due attention to both differences and similarities between thinking and acting. Next, the authors analyze some consequences of their thesis for storytelling and political history being organized today mostly according to mere chronological paradigm. In the fourth part of the article, the authors pay attention to spatial organization of politics, arguing against Karl Schlögel, who claims that in late modern times national historiography was responsible for the dominance of the spatial paradigm. The argument defended is that even in the case of seemingly spatial organization of politics and history – as for example in a map – the temporal order is playing a predominant, even if hidden, role, and that space is being analyzed and valued according to temporal criteria. The predominantly temporal dynamics of modernization and modern supremacy of the future – as presented in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe Lexicon by Bielefeld School – is interpreted as a sign of loss and a symptom of narrowing our image of history. Keywords: time-space in modern historiography, transcendental condition of possibility of the practice of history, Reinhardt Koselleck, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

I say: “Oh, what a beautiful surrealist picture!” With quite precise awareness: this páthos, these emotions of mine do not stem from our common sense. An aesthetic judgment is founded on an immediate subjective intuition: an emotion or a free feeling of a single subject towards an object. A universal sense, possibly. Some judgments of ours in ethics and in law are no different from our perceptions in front of art. It would be the same for a hypothetical sentence of (...) the judge that concluded with these words: “I acquit Arsenio Lupin because of his magnificent handlebar moustache like that of Guy de Maupassant”. Everyone would think intuitively that it is an unfair sentence. Is there aesthetics of terror? The case that the article intends to examine is that of the famous kidnapping and murder of the Italian statesman Aldo Moro by the “Brigate Rosse” [Red Brigades] (1978). The method used here consists in studying the image of the kidnapping as iconic documentation of reality, and, above all, as an ethical-legal judgment about the terrorist crime. Moro was photographed during his kidnapping. There are at least two pictures. Both constitute an extraordinary source for a judgment on the basis of an image. In both of them, Aldo Moro is pictured in front of a Red Brigades banner during the captivity. In what sense do these pictures document an aesthetic judgment concerning the “case Moro”? The answer can be found in a remarkable iconic coincidence of these pictures with a masterpiece by Georges Rouault (Paris 1871-1958) devoted to the theme of the “Ecce Homo”. The Gospel in the “Ecce Homo” scene (John: 19, 4-5) narrates how Pontius Pilate wanted to arouse the compassion of the people with a scourging and the exposure of Jesus to the crowd. The plate under consideration is entitled “Qui ne se grime pas?” [Who does not have a painted face?] and is a key work in Rouault’s suite of prints Miserere, dated for 1923. (shrink)

TheApologyof Apuleius is a rare example of a complete forensic speech in Latin from the High Roman Empire. The prosecution on the charge ofmagiaof a renownedrhetorin the court of a Roman proconsul, who might himself have been a distinguished Stoic philosopher, offers modern scholars a remarkable opportunity to observe an encounter between scholarship and legal practice. Apuleius arrived in the city of Oea en route to Alexandria as part of a life of learning and travel. While visiting Oea, Apuleius met (...) his old schoolfriend Sicinius Pontianus, who encouraged him to wed his recently widowed mother Aemilia Pudentilla. The reason for this unusual request was Pontianus' wish that his mother would not marry someone unsuitable. Apuleius agreed and the marriage took place. However, it left Sicinius Aemilianus, a brother of Pudentilla's first husband, and Herennius Rufinus, Pontianus' father-in-law, aggrieved and they decided to pursue Apuleius through the courts. TheApology, which Apuleius later published as a record of his defence, has long attracted scholarly interest. Two commentaries have been published, the literary aspects analysed and the authenticity of the speech scrutinized. (shrink)

Belief is the affirmation of reality, but not all affirmations of reality are beliefs, for if we have, or have had, perceptual experience of a reality, we do not say, “I believe,” but “I see, hear, perceive, or remember.” Similarly, of the realities involved in our inner experience, we say, “What I had in mind, desired, hoped, or felt was…” or else say, more simply, “I was much moved, was in pain, felt affection or hatred, longed for, was thinking about, (...) knew.” On the other hand, there are realities of the perceptual order in which we may express belief, as when we say, “I believe that New Zealand exists, that nitrogen is a gas, that the earth is round, that William the Conqueror crossed the Channel in 1066, that Jesus Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, was buried, and rose again.” The realities in which we thus express belief are not realities which we ourselves have observed, but are such that they could have been observed by a person appropriately situated in time and in place. Hence in this case it is not the nature of the realities affirmed that differentiates belief from experience of either the perceptual or the inner type. The difference lies elsewhere. When we affirm a reality of which we ourselves have, or have had, perceptual experience, it is the reality itself, present to our perceiving mind, which alike determines the content of our affirmation and justifies us in making it. (shrink)

Une interrogation sur l'argumentation suivie de textes commentés : Rhéthorique à Herennius, Livre I, 3 et l' Empire rhétorique. Rhétorique et argumentation, chap. VI de C. Perelman.

According to the Christian religion, Jesus was “crucified under Pontius Pilate; he suffered death and was buried. On the third day he rose again”. I take it that this rising again—the Resurrection of Jesus, as it’s sometimes called—is, according to the Christian religion, an historical event, just like his crucifixion, death, and burial. And I would have thought that to investigate whether the Resurrection occurred, we would need to do some historical research: we would need to assess the reliability (...) of the New Testament documents and related manuscripts; we would need to look into the credibility of the witnesses to his post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, and the like. The task looks rather daunting. But, according to David Hume, we don’t have to do anything of the kind. For no matter how strong the testimony in favor of a miracle is—indeed, even if we “suppose…that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof”—we have at our disposal a “full proof…against the existence of any miracle”. So we can avoid all that tedious historical work. We can simply use Hume’s shortcut, a proof against the existence of any miracle, and hence a proof against the Resurrection. So Hume says he has a “a decisive argument,” “an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion,” superstitious delusions like the Resurrection. There is good news and bad news in Hume’s proclamation. The good news is that he really has two arguments, not just one—or, at any rate, many scholars discern in his writings two arguments. The bad news is that neither succeeds; at any rate, try as I might, I can’t see how they do. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Missing the Cross?Types of the Passion in Early Christian ArtS. Mark Heim (bio)René Girard has frequently contended that the core of his best known theories is already contained in the Bible, that in the end he is "only a kind of exegete" (Girard and Treguer 1994, 196). To those who object that the Bible had to wait two thousand years to be read as he reads it, he protests (...) that this is a gross exaggeration: "three quarters of what I say can be found in Saint Augustine" (196). In the introduction to I See Satan Fall like Lightning, Girard puts it like this:The Passion accounts reveal a phenomenon that unbeknownst to us generates all human cultures and still warps our human vision in favor of all sorts of exclusions and scapegoating. If this analysis is true, the explanatory power of Jesus's death is much greater than we realize, and Paul's exalted idea of the cross as the source of all knowledge is anthropologically sound.(2001, 3)In other words, Girard's insight comes only in the train of revelation. The revelation in the biblical sources was not perfectly grasped in the religious traditions that flowed from them, and was frequently betrayed through the construction of sacrificial theologies. But Girard insists that its power was in significant measure perceived and effective from the beginning. His view of the meaning of the passion cannot be correct if he is the first one to see it. So it is no minor matter to ask whether in fact early Christians saw the connection of the cross with scapegoating that is so central for Girard.One point that appears to tell against Girard's case is the absence of images of the cross and crucifixion in the first four Christian centuries. A brutal realism about this specific event is the keystone of Girard's understanding of the passion narratives. The fact that the sight is literally hidden from view throughout this formative Christian period hardly appears consistent with his claims.There is a notable early Christian work of art, the so-called Brescia Casket (see fig. 1), that sheds some important light on the general question of the [End Page 183] representation of the passion and, even more dramatically, upon its interpretation in Girardian terms. The casket indicates that the widespread use of Old Testament types as representations of Christ, and specifically as representations of his passion, may partly explain the absence of literal depiction of the crucifixion. And the particular types involved fit extremely well with Girard's outlook. This essay draws out the connection—so far unremarked—between this significant work of early Christian art and Girard's reading of the passion. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.Brescia Casket. Ivory, late fourth century.Christ's passion and death were described in stark terms in the gospels and recounted explicitly from the beginning in the church's liturgy, teaching, and preaching. On this plane, there is no question of the centrality of the cross. Yet no literal depictions of the crucifixion survive in art from the first four Christian centuries. There is no entirely satisfactory explanation of why the cross would figure so centrally in Christian faith and worship, but be visually absent. Representations of Jesus in early Christian art most often display a healer, wonderworker, or teacher. In fact, the early centuries offer an odd inversion in creed and art. Early creeds focus on Jesus's beginnings and endings, "skipping right from 'born of the Virgin Mary' to 'suffered under Pontius Pilate,' with no mention of Jesus's life and work, while the art appears to take an opposite tack" (Jensen 2000, 131–32). Perhaps the frequent Christian use [End Page 184] of images of anchors and ship's masts, or of the chi-rho sign, served as their image of the cross. Perhaps the reality the scriptures described was too gruesome to easily picture, too readily ridiculed by outsiders, or too awesome and mysterious to present directly. Perhaps, in a persecuted and at times martyred church, such a sign would be realistically terrifying to many and dangerously seductive to some.That the... (shrink)

ExcerptDavid Lloyd Dusenbury, The Innocence of Pontius Pilate: How the Roman Trial of Jesus Shaped History. London: Hurst Publishers, 2021. Pp. 272. The Innocence of Pontius Pilate by David L. Dusenbury of the Danube Institute is a profound reflection on the differentiation of secular and religious authority that should excite theologians, historians, believers, as well as historical sociologists. The point of departure is the question of the innocence or guilt of Pilate, the Roman magistrate who condemned Jesus to (...) death, which has been a contested issue from soon after Jesus died to modern New Testament criticism. Was Pilate guilty of the highest crime— deicide—or had he been, in some sense, innocent or even just? More interesting than a mere overview of how different epochs and authors received the Pilate story, Dusenbury’s book investigates the ramifications of the only sense in which Pilate was innocent: he was innocent of an understanding of a kingdom not of this earth. As Paul puts it succinctly in I Corinthians: “None of the rulers of this age (saeculum) understood this [other kingdom]—for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (55). (shrink)

In the opening line of his essay ‘On Truth’, Francis Bacon ticks off Pontius Pilate for not giving the subject its due time and gravity—‘“What is truth?”, said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.’ If Pilate had stayed for an answer, he would have been waiting a long time—four centuries after Bacon, and twenty after Christ, the jury is still out. But things do seem to have been moving along quite nicely, this past century or so; (...) and as Pilate might note with satisfaction, he himself has been getting a better press. Perhaps Nietzsche’s extravagant compliment was a mixed blessing: Nietzsche declared (‘as offensively as possible’, as Will Durant [1929: 25] put it) that.. (shrink)

This review of one in the series of the monumental primary works of Kierkegaard shows him as the champion and, as it were, an inaugurator of the phenomenological turn in both philosophy and literature. The review touches upon serious issues regarding mass culture and Christianity. The review of the eighth volume in this series was published in January 2020, and these two reviews are the first by any Indian Hindu. While discussing Kierkegaard the reviewer touches upon John Caputo's theology derived (...) from Jürgen Moltmann's concept of a weak God. There are inadvertent typos in this review. (shrink)