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Henry Albert Finch [4]Henry A. Finch [4]
  1.  25
    The Methodology of the Social Sciences. [REVIEW]E. N., Max Weber, Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch - 1951 - Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):25.
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  2.  25
    Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses.Henry A. Finch - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):293-307.
    Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the power (...)
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  3.  14
    Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses.Henry A. Finch - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):293-307.
    Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ~H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ~H and H: the power of a new observation to (...)
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  4.  23
    Validity Rules for Proportionally Quantified Syllogisms.Henry Albert Finch - 1957 - Philosophy of Science 24 (1):1-18.
    Since the time, about a century ago, when DeMorgan, Boole and Jevons, inaugurated the study of the logic of numerically definite reasoning, no one has been concerned to establish the validity rules for a very general type of numerically definite inference which is a strong analogue of the classical syllogism. The reader will readily agree that the traditional rules of syllogistic inference cannot even begin to decide whether the following proportionally quantified syllogism is a valid argument: at most 4/7 p (...)
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  5.  15
    An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory.Henry Albert Finch - 1957 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (3):368-378.
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  6.  28
    Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses, Part II.Henry A. Finch - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (4):391-404.
    Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the power (...)
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  7.  5
    An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory.Henry Albert Finch & Richard C. Jeffrey - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (1):145-146.
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  8.  24
    Due Care in Explicating Counterfactuals: A Reply to Mr. Jeffrey.Henry Albert Finch - 1959 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1):117-118.