How should belief in creation affect our theoretical understanding of knowledge? In this essay I argue that traditional views of knowledge, illustrated by Plato and Descartes, cannot do justice to the integral meaning of reality as God’s creation. Making use of two metaphors, the visual metaphor for theoretical knowledge and the biblical one of hearing the divine promise-command to be, I sketch the outlines of a theoretical framework that takes belief in creation as its starting point. My approach is based (...) upon insights of Reformational philosophy and leads to a view in which beliefs and propositions concerning isolated states of affairs are replaced by an emphasis on the concrete situations in which knowing occurs. Important notions like rationality and objectivity lose their central place to responsibility and acknowledgement. I claim that in this way the biblical understanding of reality as God’s creation can be better appreciated than in approaches that take their starting point in Greek and modern philosophical conceptions. (shrink)

In this review essay, I discuss how Lambert Zuidervaart relates to the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd in two of his books. He himself calls his work in this regard a critical retrieval. To answer the question as to how far this characterization is justified, we will look at Zuidervaart’s discussion of the religious antithesis and the transcendental critique, his idea of macrostructures and societal evil, and his view of truth and knowledge.

In a recent issue of this journal René van Woudenberg meditated “on the question what ‘aspects’ and ‘functions’, within the bounds of CP 1, are supposed to be.”2 This meditation demands a reaction. The purpose of this paper is to “shed … at least some light on the question which … of the two is the more intelligible and useful notion”. Its aim is “not to discuss any theory about modal aspects … but to establish what the phenomena are that (...) such theories are about.” I believe that the paper does not succeed in its goal. My response is divided in two parts. First I will discuss some of the arguments that Van Woudenberg uses in his analysis of the possible ways to understand both ‘aspects’ and ‘functions’. In this part I will try to show that the arguments used do not achieve what the paper aims at. In a second part I will discuss some deeper issues that are at stake. Here I will argue that it is not possible to understand the idea of ‘aspects’ or ‘functions’ apart from the philosophical paradigm of which it is a part. In fact, I will try to show that Van Woudenberg’s analysis depends upon a theoretical conception that is basically different from that of reformational philosophy as conceived by Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. Ultimately, what might be at stake is the question how Christians should pursue philosophy. Is it possible to translate the basic concepts of reformational philosophy into those of mainstream analytical philosophy without the former loosing their critical intent? (shrink)

It is no easy task to respond to the 95 theses on Herman Dooyeweerd by J. Glenn Friesen. The theses are not complete in rendering Dooyeweerd’s thought. For example, his analyses of the history of philosophy and his legal philosophy are hardly touched upon. Yet the theses cover a wide range of topics that are central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Therefore, to give a wellargued assessment of all of them would require more than one issue of this journal. Fortunately the editors (...) have put severe restrictions on the amount of space that is available. So I will limit myself to some comments. My first comment concerns the method of Friesen and the misunderstandings it sometimes leads to. Second I mention some points where I disagree with his interpretation. Third I discuss the idea of supratemporality. I agree with Friesen that it is central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy but I have problems with the views of Dooyeweerd himself. Then I will deal with another issue where my main problem is with Dooyeweerd, the idea of theoretical thought as opening up naïve thinking. I end with some concluding remarks. They concern my general assessment of the theses and what I see as the importance of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. (shrink)

In de vorige jaargang van dit tijdschrift heb ik twee artikelen gepubliceerd over de wijsgerige theologie van de zogenaamde Utrechtse school. Daarop is gereageerd door respectievelijk M. Sarot, G. van den Brink en V. Brümmer. Er zijn drie punten waarop ik de discussie graag kort wil voortzetten: logische consistentie en conceptuele coherentie als norm voor het geloof, het verfijnde realisme, en de eigen aard van de theologie in vergelijking met het concrete geloven. In feite gaat het daarbij steeds om de (...) eigen aard van het geloof. Daarin ligt ook de reden ruimte te vragen voor deze reactie. Het lijkt mij van bijzonder belang voor de theologie dat het concrete geloven op de juiste manier wordt verstaan. Alleen dan kan de theologie dit geloof werkelijk dienen. Dat geldt tegenover het gevaar van versubjectivering van het geloof evenzeer als tegenover dat van verintellectualisering. (shrink)

Not all questions for explanation are answered by referring to a cause. Yet many answers to questions like: Why is something the case? Why does this occur? do mention a cause or are phrased as a causal explanation. Salmon seems to suggest that even functional explanations might sometimes be reformulated as a causal one. As an illustration of a functional explanation he mentions the fact that jackrabbits in the southwestern part of the United States have extremely large ears because they (...) constitute an effective mechanism for the temperature regulation these rabbits need in the hot, arid regions they inhabit. Following Salmon’s causal account of a functional explanation one could phrase the answer to the question: What is the cause of the long ears of the jackrabbits? as: The hot and arid nature of the habitat where they live. Understood in this way, it is the heat of the area that is the cause of the extremely long ears of the jackrabbits. Yet there are some problems with this kind of a cause. The causal connection between the heat and the long ears is of a different nature than the one between the heat and the rise of the body temperature. The functional explanation even rephrased as a causal one can hardly be understood just in terms of a physical cause and effect. The causal effect of heat in relation to the development of long ears depends on the goal or function they serve for the survival of the jackrabbit under the specific conditions of its habitat. (shrink)

In het boek Exodus, hoofdstuk 3, wordt verteld hoe God aan Mozes verschijnt in een brandende braambos. De HEER heeft het lijden van Israel in Egypte gezien en wil hen daaruit bevrijden. Daartoe wordt Mozes naar de farao gestuurd om tegen hem te zeggen dat hij Israel moet laten gaan. Met die boodschap moet Mozes eerst naar Israel zelf. Vandaar zijn vraag: wat zullen zij zeggen? Zullen zij mij geloven, als ik zeg dat ik gestuurd ben door de God van (...) hun vader, van Abraham, Isaak en Jakob? Zullen zij niet vragen: wie is die God? Hoe is zijn naam? In antwoord daarop spreekt God de bekende woorden: ‘Ik ben die Ik ben.’ Mozes moet tot de Israelieten zeggen: ‘Ik ben heeft mij tot u gezonden.’ En verder: ‘De HEER, de God van uw vaderen, de God van Abraham, de God van Isaak en de God van Jakob, heeft mij tot u gezonden. Dit is mijn naam voor eeuwig en zo wil Ik aangeroepen worden van geslacht tot geslacht.’. (shrink)