Since the 1970s, estrogen have sometimes been used in adolescent girls to reduce very tall adult expected height. Worries about long-term effects have led to a proposal to link treatment data with cancer registers. How should one deal with informed consent for such a study? We designed a qualitative study with semi-structured telephone interviews. From 1200 women who were to be followed-up in cancer registers, we randomly selected 22 women. Major themes were a wish to be involved and a positive (...) attitude to the proposed register research. The women did not express worry after reading the study protocol, but did convey considerable frustration that this research had not been initiated earlier. Active consent was not seen as crucial. We found strong interest in a high participation rate and a concern over missing data. The selection of information and consent or the decision to go ahead without consent in register follow-up is a delicate balancing act. Study participants wish to be contacted, but acknowledge the primary goal of answering important questions. Our study provides support for safeguarding privacy in epidemiological linkage studies and in follow-up of medical treatment without losing the scientific value by requesting for informed consent. (shrink)

A certain conception of Hell is inconsistent with God's traditional attributes. My argument is novel in focusing on considerations involving vagueness. God is in charge of the selection procedure, so the selection procedure must be just; any just procedure will have borderline cases; but according to the traditional conception, the afterlife is binary and has no borderline cases.

The case is discussed for the doctrine of hell as posing a unique problem of evil for adherents to the Abrahamic religions who endorse traditional theism. The problem is particularly acute for those who accept retributivist formulations of the doctrine of hell according to which hell is everlasting punishment for failing to satisfy some requirement. Alternatives to retributivism are discussed, including the unique difficulties that each one faces.

Christians have often held that on the day of judgment God will condemn some persons who have disobeyed him to a hell of everlasting torment and total unhappiness from which there is no hope of escape, as a punishment for their deeds up to that time. This is not the only way that hell has been or could be conceived of, but it has been the predominant conception in the Christian church throughout much of its history and it is the (...) one on which I shall focus in this paper. (shrink)

Benjamin Matheson has recently critiqued the escapist account of hell that we have defended. In this paper we respond to Matheson. Building on some of our work in defense of escapism that Matheson does not discuss we show that the threat posed by Matheson’s critique is chimerical. We begin by summarizing our escapist theory of hell. Next, we summarize both Matheson’s central thesis and the main arguments offered in its defense. We then respond to those arguments.

Ted Sider’s paper “Hell and Vagueness” challenges a certain conception of Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God’s justice. Sider’s inconsistencyargument works only when supplemented by additional premises. Key to Sider’s case is a premise that the properties upon which eternal destinies superveneare “a smear,” i.e., they are distributed continuously among individuals in the world. We question this premise and provide reasons to doubt it. The doubts come from two sources. The first is based on evidential considerations borrowed (...) from skeptical theism. A related but separate consideration is that supposing it would be an insurmountable problem for God to make just (and therefore non-arbitrary) distinctions in morally smeared world, God thereby has sufficient motivation not to actualize such worlds. Yet God also clearly has motivation only to actualize some member of the subset of non-smeared worlds which don’t appear non-smeared. For if it was obvious who was morally fit for Heaven and who wasn’t, a new arena of great injustice is opened up. The result is that if there is a God, then he has the motivation and the ability to actualize from just that set of worlds which are not smeared but which are indiscernible from smeared worlds. (shrink)

Theodore Sider’s puzzle in Hell and Vagueness has generated some interesting responses in the past few years. In this paper, I explore yet another possible solution out of the conundrum. This solution implies three ways of denying a binary conception of the afterlife. I argue that while these solutions might first seem tenable, they might still succumb to a Sideresque revenge puzzle.

Heaven falls into chaos during God's absence, and Hell becomes fairly democratic. With Lucifer caged up and out of the picture, demons build a relatively civil society through contracts. This is sovereignty by institution as opposed to acquisition. The leviathans are unlike the angels in that the angels lacked a unity of wills. Driven by their nature, people—and angels—cannot live in harmony without a central and absolute authority to keep them in order. Without the presence of God to command the (...) angels there can be no peace, only a natural state of war. The fact that even the heavenly host can fall into a Hobbesian state of nature does not bode well for humanity, but maybe that's why business has been so good for the King of the Crossroads. Each demon, after all, has willingly agreed to enter into the civil society of Hell. (shrink)

Pesetsky’s (1987) ‘‘aggressively non-D-linked’’ wh-phrases (like who the hell; hereinafter, wh-the-hell phrases) exhibit a variety of syntactic and semantic peculiarities, including the fact that they cannot occur in situ and do not support nonecho readings when occurring in root multiple questions. While these are familiar from the literature (albeit less than fully understood), our focus will be on a previously unnoted property of wh-the-hell phrases: the fact that their distribution (in single wh-questions) matches that of polarity items (PIs). We lay (...) out the key data supporting this claim, embed the PI nature of wh-the-hell phrases in the theory of polarity developed in Giannakidou 1998, 1999, 2001, and establish the link between the lexical content of these phrases and their PI status by identifying wh-the-hell as a dependent PI. We subsequently exploit the PI status of wh-the-hell to explain the more familiar puzzles mentioned above, showing that these are not peculiarities specific to wh-the-hell but manifestations of the general properties of the class of PIs that wh-the-hell belongs to. The syntactic aspects of the polarity analysis of wh-the-hell are shown to have important consequences for the fundamental properties of wh-movement in English. (shrink)

The text Jié tuō dào lùn, or Chinese translation of *Vimuttimagga mentions the Avīci Hell all of a sudden in the section on the cognitive process. The problematic phrase wújiān shēng Āpídìyù has been interpreted in different ways by several scholars. Japanese scholars tend to skip the phrase, or regard the term Āpídìyù as a typographic error. Given that we do not have an original text, however, the phrase needs to be understood as it is. In contrast, the English translation (...) interprets the term wújiān as a name of hell, and considers it as a synonym of Āpídìyù, namely the Avīci Hell. Even though the Chinese term wújiān itself is usually understood as the Avīci Hell, namely, Wújiāndìyù or Āpídìyù, of which the corresponding Pāli is Avīci-niraya, it is not the case here since a hell as such has nothing to do with the cognitive process. Assuming that the term Āpídìyù is not a typographic error, I propose to understand this problematic phrase as the simile in the sentence ‘seven mind-moments [immediately proceed just as one who has performed] the Five Sins is reborn into the Avīci Hell [as soon as he dies]’. The term wújiān meaning ‘no-gap’ in the cognitive process section conveys that there is not any intermission between the successive mind-moments. In Pāli perspectives, it implies that the successive mind-moments are in the proximity condition. The Jié tuō dào lùn was likely to use a metaphor in order to set a rule for governing the cognitive process rather than making a specific technical term. (shrink)

Jerry L. Walls aims to demonstrate in his book Hell: The Logic of Damnation that some traditional views of hell are still defensible and can be believed with intellectual and moral integrity. Focusing on the issues from the standpoint of philosophical theology, Walls explores the doctrine of hell in relation to both the divine nature and human nature. He argues, with respect to the divine nature, that some traditional versions of the doctrine are compatible not only with God's omnipotence and (...) omniscience, but also with a strong account of His perfect goodness. The concept of divine goodness receives special attention since the doctrine of hell is most often rejected on moral grounds. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Threshold-Hell Christianity conflicts with the pro-life position on abortion. The specific type of Christianity is that which also accepts threshold deontology and the existence of hell. Threshold deontology is the view that ordinarily moral duties consist of non-consequentialist side-constraints on the pursuit of the good but that in some cases these side-constraints are overridden. My strategy is to establish that a person who brings about an abortion guarantees that the aborted individual goes to heaven (...) and that it is morally permissible to guarantee someone goes to heaven. It follows that if Threshold-Hell Christianity is true, then abortion is morally permissible. (shrink)

En la obra dramática A puerta cerrada (1944), el filósofo y literato Jean-Paul Sartre plantea la relación interpersonal como plena de conflicto e imposibilidad para llevar a cabalidad los ideales dialógicos. Las conclusiones a las que llega Sartre serán confrontadas con la propuesta del filósofo judío Emmanuel Levinas, con el fin de vislumbrar sus tesis en torno a la alteridad, mostrando cómo, en vez de acuerdos racionales que superen lo diverso y lo engloben en la totalidad, habrá que recibir al (...) Otro y responderle en la trascendencia que exige su infinitud. The Philosopher and Writer Jean-Paul Sartre, in the dramatic work No Exit (1944), claims the inter-subjective relationship is full of conflict and that it is impossible to reach the dialogical ideal. We will confront Sartre´s conclusions from the proposal of the jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in order to see his thesis about otherness. We will explain how, instead of some rational agreements that overcome the diversity inside totality, it is necessary to receive the other and respond to him in the transcendence that Infinity requires. (shrink)

In this paper I contribute to the ongoing debate on hell in three ways: (1) I distinguish between three questions that play a key role in any discussion of the doctrine of hell; (2) I argue positively for the need of a doctrine of hell for Christian theism; (3) after evaluating several theological positions, I argue that the doctrine of hell should be construed as intrinsically bound up with the Christian conviction that God is love and wants to live with (...) human beings in a relationship of mutual love and fellowship. From this perspective on hell I provide some fresh criticisms on the positions of John Hick, Thomas Talbott, and Charles Seymour. (shrink)

In this article, I address the question why God would create a world with damned human beings in it when (presumably) he could create a better world without damned human beings. Specifically, I explain and defend what I call the “perfection of the universe argument.” According to this argument, which is Augustinian and Thomistic in origin, it is entirely and equally consistent with divine goodness for God to create a world with damned human beings in it or a damnation-free world (...) so long as God ensures that each world is good as a whole. I then respond to two different objections to this argument. Finally, I show how the perfection of the universe argument leaves room for hoping that we live in a world in which no human being is damned and God affords every human being a life that is good as a whole. (shrink)

Ted Sider argues that a binary afterlife is inconsistent with a proportionally just God because no just criterion for placing persons in such an afterlife exists. I provide a possible account whereby God can remain proportionally just and allow a binary afterlife. On my account, there is some maximum amount of people God can allow into Heaven without sacrificing some greater good. God gives to all people at least their due but chooses to allow some who do not deserve Heaven (...) to enter out of grace. Although this model implies a precise cutoff between those who enter Heaven and those who do not, I have argued that there is a precise point where God best serves justice and some greater good. Although God’s actions may appear arbitrary and ‘whimsically generous,’ it is merely because we are ignorant of the precise cutoff point that best serves his purposes. (shrink)

Revenge is a powerful word. It can conjure up the scheming, embittered individual, plotting the downfall of his enemies well beyond reason and morality – or, more seriously, tragic cycles of violence and blood vendettas, spiraling into entrenched civil conflict over generations. Philosophers have argued that the consequences and the moral psychology of revenge mean it is incompatible – even antithetical – to any plausible conception of moral repair. In this paper I challenge that incompatibility by suggesting that, in contexts (...) of unresponsive and imperfect institutional justice, appropriate acts of vengeance may both create accountability and express solidarity, thus contributing to moral repair. Drawing on past work by French (2001) and MacLachlan (2016), as well as two films with feminist avengers as protagonists, Hard Candy (2005) and Promising Young Woman (2021), I sketch an approach to virtuous third-party vengeance as a starting point for broader, more reparative, understandings of legitimate personal interventions after wrongdoing. -/- . (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 5, Page 899-906, September 2022.

In this paper, I offer some brief reflections on Jordan Wessling’s book, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity. I explain what I take to be its strengths in articulating an account of divine love that solves a variety of problems that classical theism cannot solve. Then I articulate a potential problem for Wessling’s account of divine love and hell.

Heightened concern with global issues has led to shifts in corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. To capture the distinct nature of this global focus, researchers have developed a three-generation CSR typology. In this paper, we first evaluate the usefulness of this typology for understanding corporate approaches to CSR by examining how several companies position themselves thematically in CEO introductions to sustainability reports. On the basis of this, we then evaluate the practical value of this typology for assisting those who work (...) with CSR strategy. The analysis revealed expressions of all three CSR generations, with third-generation thinking being apparent, but not dominant. It also verified that the three-generation CSR typology can be an instructive means of both evaluating as well as framing a company's approach to sustainability, though with modifications. On the basis of the identified strengths and weaknesses of the typology, we develop a practitioner-focused, three-tiered model that can strategically guide the development of CSR programs. (shrink)

Based on themes in Aquinas, this paper adds to the defense of the doctrine of an eternal hell, focusing on the state of those in hell after the resurrection. I first summarize the Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-soul unity, showing why existence as a separated soul is truncated and unnatural. Next, I discuss the soul-body reunion at the resurrection, which restores an essential aspect of human nature, even for the damned. This reveals the love of God (...) since He gives the damned the best human existence they can possibly have given their disordered wills. Finally, I defend this position against three important objections. (shrink)

In a recent work, Kenneth Himma argues that the doctrines of exclusivism and hell in Christian theology lead to a reductio when combined with certain ethical principles about reproduction; he concludes that if both doctrines are true, then it is morally impermissible to procreate. Since the Christian tradition holds that procreation is at least morally permissible, if the argument is valid, then one or more of its premises should be abandoned. In response to this argument, I will present several theological (...) and philosophical objections, showing that no inconsistency has been demonstrated in holding Christian exclusivism, a traditional doctrine of hell, and the moral permissibility of procreation. (shrink)

Assuming that the only epistemically relevant experiential report is the one made in the present moment, it may be unclear how individuals ground their responses to stable-trait assessments. ….

On the back cover of the original French edition of Sartre's Le scénario Freud (The Freud Scenario), the promotional blurb poses the question: "Est-ce ici Sartre qui analyse Freud ou Freud qui analyse Sartre?" (Is Sartre analyzing Freud here, or is Freud analyzing Sartre?). We do not, for obvious reasons, have anything of Freud's on Sartre, but we do have quite a lot of Sartre on Freud, and great quantities of Sartre on Sartre. It has sometimes seemed to me that (...) reading through everything that Sartre wrote—not just the autobiographical material but everything, including the carnets and the cahiers and the letters—might be a bit like having him in analysis. The speed and apparent openness with which he produced his texts, page after page in that quick yet legible script that French writers seem to turn out so effortlessly, mimic some of the conditions of free association, and an analytically sensitive eye, like the analyst's ear in therapeutic sessions, could no doubt piece together a plausible account of the Sartrean unconscious. (shrink)

Article 14 of the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child declares, “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” In this paper I will consider whether signatory nation-states may be in breach of this article by permitting religious groups to communicate the concept of Hell to children in a particular way.

This article explores the ways in which Janelle Monáe’s audiovisual performances leverage black female flesh to trouble historically constituted imaginings of ‘the human’. Tracking Monáe’s audiovisual aesthetics across ‘Many moons’ and Dirty Computer, I interrogate acoustic and imagistic resonances that recall the repeating horrors of bondage, and which also constitute performative ‘fabulations’ whereby freedoms that are engendered specifically by and within black female flesh might be imagined. Monáe ‘enfleshes’ the cyborg to critique cyberfeminist and posthumanist theories that advocate for material (...) dissolution as a framework for liberation, as well as to trouble black women’s historical relationships to the category ‘human’. Rather than understand Dirty Computer as a (re)turn to the human Monáe, I contend that the project extends the artist’s longstanding critical engagement with the black female cyborg and black sonic cyberfeminist liberatory potentialities. (shrink)

The Concept of Hell examines a wide range of topics, problems, and concepts of interest to philosophers, theologians, and anyone curious about religious thinking concerning damnation. Acting as a platform for philosophers from many different views and traditions, this book provides a myriad of approaches to thinking about Hell. From the nature of Hell to philosophical justifications of damnation, to the way in which Hell informs us about our relationships with each other, the discussions offer a tantalizing exploration of how (...) philosophical thinking can engage Hell in a wide variety of ways from many different perspectives. Anyone with a desire to think about what happens after we die, damnation, and related religious and theological issues will find The Concept of Hell interesting and enlightening. (shrink)

[The following is a draft abstract:] -/- This book aims to diagnose and tackle a problem concerning God's action. If God has good reasons for everything He does, then it does not seem as if God could do otherwise than He does. If God were to do otherwise than what He has good reason to do (we might think) God would act arbitrarily. While this general problem has been dealt with in various ways by philosophers, I propose that a specific (...) version of that problem is serious and has not been adequately resolved. If sin is in no way good for anyone who commits it, or anything else, and God could have prevented each of our sins from occurring, then how could God allow each of our sins for good reasons? In particular, how could God allow each sin on account of the good of the person who commits the sin? The worst case of this problem concerns God's decisions to allow anyone to remain in a sinful state forever and end up in hell. -/- The book makes progress toward resolving this problem by working through a series of related proposals: that anyone being in hell is impossible; that God cannot prevent our sins or allows them for no reason at all or requires them to achieve His purposes; that God does not care about us all but only the elect. After rejecting these alternatives, I outline the way in which God merely foreknows our sins but does not require or necessitate or cause sin to occur. Then, I propose that God allows sin, and even damnation, on account of His love for us. There is nothing that can happen to us which would cause God to stop loving us; and there is always hope for us, even when things appear most hopeless. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to consider Hell as a concept around which there cluster various different difficulties, and to see how and on what conditions some of these difficulties could be overcome, the whole paper illustrating, albeit by reference to a particular topic, and so with obvious restrictions, the character of theological argument, the nature of theological assertions, and the kind of empirical grounding that must be given to them.

In this paper I would like to consider Hell as a concept around which there cluster various different difficulties, and to see how and on what conditions some of these difficulties could be overcome, the whole paper illustrating, albeit by reference to a particular topic, and so with obvious restrictions, the character of theological argument, the nature of theological assertions, and the kind of empirical grounding that must be given to them.

This essay aims to establish two theses. First, hell is unjust. Second, God ought not (or perhaps cannot) impose hell on human beings. In support of these theses, Stephen Kershnar argues that human beings do not deserve hell because they either cannot cause an infinite amount of harm or are not responsible for doing so. Also, since humans don’t have infinitely bad characters, hell can’t be deserved on the basis of character. Since humans don’t deserve hell, God may not (or (...) perhaps cannot) impose unjust punishments and hence may not (or cannot) send or allow persons to go to hell. (shrink)

I begin with an inconsistent set of three propositions, each of which has the following characteristic: We can find prima facie support for it in the Bible. I then classify theologians according to which proposition they reject, and I identify three different pictures of God: the Augustinian picture, the Arminian picture, and the universalist picture. Finally, I explore some hermeneutical problems and suggest a way in which those who hold the universalist picture might interpret some of the texts upon which (...) the doctrine of eternal punishment has traditionally rested. (shrink)