O presente trabalho examina os aspectos históricos da extração do óleo de canela-sassafrás (Ocotea pretiosa Mez), rico em safrol, no Alto e Médio Vale do Itajaí, a partir de 1940, por iniciativa de Otto Grimm, no município de Rio do Sul. Apresenta-se o tema no contexto da memória química em Santa Catarina, e discutem-se os procedimentos utilizados, e principalmente os motivos que levaram tal indústria incipiente a não se converter em uma indústria de química fina. Para tanto, são apresentados (...) alguns dados pertinentes à química do safrol, indicando que tal indústria poderia ter evoluído, bem como os aspectos econômicos e sociais que, ao lado da proibição do corte da canela-sassafrás, levaram em 1990 à extinção definitiva dessa "química fina que poderia ter sido". (shrink)

In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.

Defenders of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology (or what I call practicalism) need to address two main problems. First, the view seems to imply, absurdly, that knowledge can come and go quite easily—in particular, that it might come and go along with our variable practical interests. We can call this the stability problem. Second, there seems to be no fully satisfying way of explaining whose practical interests matter. We can call this the “whose stakes?” problem. I argue that both problems can (...) be addressed in roughly the same terms. More exactly, I argue that by first clarifying the whose stakes? problem an answer to the stability problem naturally falls out. (shrink)

In this paper I elucidate various ways in which understanding can be seen as an excellence of the mind or intellectual virtue. Along the way, I take up the neglected issue of what it might mean to be an “understanding person”—by which I mean not a person who understands a number of things about the natural world, but a person who steers clear of things like judgmentalism in her evaluation of other people, and thus is better able to take up (...) different perspectives and view them with a sympathetic eye. Being an understanding person in this sense seems to be a character-level virtue that interestingly combines moral and epistemic elements; it also seems to be a virtue particularly needed in our age of deep political division, where it is commonly said that failures of mutual understanding are partly to blame for this problem. (shrink)

I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.

Der Dominikanertheologe Domingo de Soto war in der friedensethischen Tradition bisher unbekannt - zu Unrecht, wie diese Arbeit zeigt: Denn Soto war nicht nur eine im 16. Jahrhundert anerkannte geistige Grosse und einflussreiche Person des gesellschaftspolitischen Lebens. Sein umfangreiches literarisches Werk zur Rechtstheologie, Philosophie, Sakramententheologie und damals aktuellen Themen war massgeblich fur die Verbreitung der Lehre der Schule von Salamanca mitverantwortlich. Diese Arbeit nimmt sein gesamtes Werk in den Blick, um aus den vielen in seinen Schriften verstreuten Stellen zu Frieden (...) und Krieg seine Friedensethik zu rekonstruieren. (shrink)

Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) war einer der bedeutendsten deutschen Philosophen vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und gilt neben Wilhelm Windelband als einer der Hauptvertreter der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus. Seine auch heute noch anregende Philosophie hatte großen, interdisziplinären wie internationalen Einfluss. Die philologisch-kritische Ausgabe macht die Schriften endlich wieder verfügbar.

Der Autor geht von der Frage nach der Brauchbarkeit der herkömmlichen wissenschaftstheoretischen Konzeptionen zur Lösung der tatsächlichen Pobleme einer rationalen Erkenntnispraxis aus. Er betrachtet unter diesem Gesichtspunkt nicht nur den Verifikationismus des Logischen Empirismus und auch den Falsifikationismus Poppers als unzureichend. Er hält darüber hinaus selbst die jüngeren Versuche einer Neubestim- mung der erkenntnistheoretischen Rationalitätsproblematik, wie sie von T.S. Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend u.a. unternommen wurden, bereits im Ansatz für verfehlt. Grimm entwirft die Skizze einer Erkenntnistheorie in strikt pragmatisch-handlungstheoretischer Perspektive (...) und greift dabei nicht nur auf ein reinterpretiertes Nutzenoptimierungsprinzip der theoretischen Ökonomie, sondern auch auf neuartige Wissensbebegriffe sowie auf zentrale Elemente der Erkenntnismetaphysik Kants zurück. (shrink)

In this paper non-normal worlds semantics is presented as a basic, general, and unifying approach to epistemic logic. The semantical framework of non-normal worlds is compared to the model theories of several logics for knowledge and belief that were recently developed in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is shown that every model for implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), for awareness, general awareness, and local reasoning (Fagin and Halpern), and for awareness and principles (van der Hoek and Meyer) induces a non-normal worlds (...) model validating precisely the same formulas (of the language in question). (shrink)

The paper is replaced by a new version (12-2019): DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3572846 -/- Physical phenomena emerge from the quantum fields everywhere in space. However, not only the phenomena emerge from the quantum fields, the law of the conservation of energy must have its origin from the same spatial structure. This paper describes the relations between the main law of physics and the mathematical structure of the “aggregated” quantum fields.

Einleitung.--Die begriffliche Erkenntniss der Körperwelt.--Natur und Geist.--Natur und Geschichte.--Die historische Begriffsbildung.--Naturphilosophie und Geschichts-Philosophie.

Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) fut, avec Windelband et Lask, l'un des principaux representants de l'ecole neokantienne de Heidelberg, qui se differencie essentiellement de l'ecole de Marbourg par la facon dont elle redefinit l'idealisme transcendantal a partir de la problematique de la validite, heritee notamment de la philosophie de Lotze. Les six articles reunis ici, publies par Rickert dans la revue Logos entre 1911 et 1932, dessinent les grandes lignes d'une philosophie systematique des valeurs qui ne se veut pas seulement une (...) theorie transcendantale du valoir dans son opposition a l'etre, mais aussi, en tant que doctrine des visions du monde, l'elaboration d'une reponse philosophique a la question du sens de la vie. A cote de recherches architectoniques portant sur la determination et l'articulation des differents domaines axiologiques, mais aussi sur les problemes generaux lies a la definition de la philosophie comme doctrine des valeurs, ces articles entretiennent une constante polemique a l'endroit de tout intuitionnisme et de toute philosophie de la vie. Contre le biologisme qui fait du vivant la valeur absolue et contre la denonciation intuitionniste de la science comme intellectualisme, l'affirmation de la transcendance des valeurs garantit pour Rickert le droit d'une philosophie scientifique et critique de la culture, qui en apprehende la vie propre en rendant compte de l'articulation des valeurs et de l'effectivite empirique au sein d'un systeme des valeurs qui reste ouvert sur l'infinie nouveaute et l'inepuisable richesse du monde historique. (shrink)

In Phenomena of Power, one of the leading figures of postwar German sociology reflects on the nature, and many forms of, power. For Heinrich Popitz, power is rooted in the human condition and is therefore part of all social relations. Drawing on philosophical anthropology, he identifies the elementary forms of power to provide detailed insight into how individuals gain and perpetuate control over others. Instead of striving for a power-free society, Popitz argues, humanity should try to impose limits on (...) power where possible and establish counterpower where necessary. Phenomena of Power delves into the sociohistorical manifestations of power and breaks through to its general structures. Popitz distinguishes the forms of the enforcement of power as well as of its stabilization and institutionalization, clearly articulating how the mechanisms of power work and how to track them in the social world. Philosophically trained, historically informed, and endowed with keen observation, Popitz uses examples ranging from the way passengers on a ship organize deck chairs to how prisoners of war share property to illustrate his theory. Long influential in German sociology, Phenomena of Power offers a challenging reworking of one of the essential concepts of the social sciences. (shrink)

Der Begriff ‚Bioethik‘ bezeichnet zumeist denjenigen Teilbereich der Angewandten Ethik, der sich mit dem Umgang mit Leben bzw. Lebewesen beschäftigt. Die Bioethik lässt sich ihrerseits in die Teilbereiche Medizinethik, Tierethik und Umweltethik untergliedern. Auch wenn diese Untergliederung durchaus gebräuchlich ist, zeigt sie doch, dass thematische Zuordnungen und disziplinäre Grenzziehungen in der Angewandten Ethik nicht unproblematisch sind.

Die Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsethik ist diejenige Teildisziplin der Angewandten Ethik, die sich mit ethischen Problemen von Forschung und Wissenschaft beschäftigt. Man kann die Forschungsethik in drei Bereiche gliedern: Ein erster Bereich hat Prinzipien und Normen zum Gegenstand, die für alle Wissenschaftler als Wissenschaftler gelten. Ein zweiter Bereich ist mit Methoden befasst, die in der Wissenschaft zur Anwendung kommen. Ein dritter Bereich der Forschungsethik beschäftigt sich schließlich mit den Zielen von Forschung bzw. mit ethischen Fragen, die solche Ziele aufwerfen.

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are (...) correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically. (shrink)

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is (...) a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and (...) unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

Der Verfasser beschreibt in lebendiger Weise das Werden seiner «philosophischen Existenz», wobei er besonders Ereignisse schildert, die ihm auf der Suche nach Sinn wichtig sind. So profiliert sich in immer wieder neuen Abwandlungen die Erfahrung, dass, wenn man sich einer Aufgabe zur Verfügung stellt und sich von Widerständen nicht bestimmen lässt, sondern «aus sich heraustritt», sich die Dinge fügen und zu einer ungeahnten positiven Wirkung führen können. Darin zeigt sich, dass das Seiende darauf angelegt ist, laufend aus sich herauszugehen, zu (...) «ek-sistieren», um in dieser Auseinandersetzung tiefer zu sich selbst zu kommen. Diese philosophische Autobiographie gliedert sich nach den vier Lebensetappen: Kindheit, Jugend, berufliche Aktivität, Seniorenalter. Den Band beschließt eine Skizze der Grundzüge der Philosophie des Autors, zu der die vorausgegangene Lebensdarstellung einen existentiellen Zugang ermöglicht; umgekehrt gewinnt so die Aussage des Lebens eine philosophische Fundierung. Das Buch leistet von einer neuen Seite her - einer philosophisch reflektierten Lebenserfahrung - einen aktuellen Beitrag zur geistigen Auseinandersetzung. Es vermittelt zugleich eine Ermutigung zum Wagnis menschlicher «Ek-sistenz». (shrink)

Examines the diverse cultural influences which have shaped the basic philosophical traditions of India "Indian philosophy was at the heart of Zimmer's interest..

This book is the culmination of Heinrich Meier's acclaimed analyses of the controversial thought of Carl Schmitt. Meier identifies the core of Schmitt's thought as political theology--that is, political theorizing that claims to have its ultimate ground in the revelation of a mysterious or supra-rational God. This radical, but half-hidden, theological foundation unifies the whole of Schmitt's often difficult and complex oeuvre, cutting through the intentional deceptions and unintentional obfuscations that have eluded previous commentators. Relating this religious dimension to (...) Schmitt's support for National Socialism and his continuing anti-Semitism, Meier compels the reader to come to terms with the irreconcilable differences between political theology and political philosophy. His book will give pause to those who have tended to gloss over the troubling aspects of some of Schmitt's ideas. With editions in German, French, Italian, and now English, Meier's two books on Schmitt have dramatically reoriented the international debate about Carl Schmitt and his significance for twentieth-century political thought. "Standing far above the rest . . . is Heinrich Meier's new study, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts , which covers all of Schmitt's writings. . . . Meier's work has forced everyone to take a second look at the assumptions underlying Schmitt's better-known writings and reconsider some that have been ignored."--Mark Lilla, reviewing the German edition in The New York Review of Books. (shrink)

This book, by one of the most prominent interpreters of Leo Strauss's thought, was the first to address the problem that Leo Strauss himself said was the theme of his studies: the theologico-political problem or the confrontation with the theological and the political alternative to philosophy as a way of life. In his theologico-political treatise, which comprises four parts and an appendix, Heinrich Meier clarifies the distinction between political theology and political philosophy and reappraises the unifying center of Strauss's (...) philosophical enterprise. The book is the culmination of Meier's work on the theologico-political problem. It will interest anyone who seeks to understand both the problem caused by revelation for philosophy and the challenge posed by political-religious radicalism. The appendix makes available for the first time two lectures by Strauss that are immediately relevant to the subject of this book and that will open the way for future research and debate on the legacy of Strauss. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse the Wittgensteinian critique of the orthodoxy in animal ethics that has been championed by Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. While Crary frames it as a critique of “moral individualism”, we show that their criticism applies most prominently to certain forms of moral individualism (namely, those that follow hedonistic or preference-satisfaction axiologies), and not to moral individualism in itself. Indeed, there is a concrete sense in which the moral individualistic stance cannot be escaped, and we believe (...) that it is this particular limitation that justified Crary’s later move to a qualified version of moral individualism. At the same time, we also argue that there are significant merits to the Wittgensteinian critique of moral individualism, which pertain to its attack on the rationalism, naturalism, and reductionism that characterise orthodox approaches to animal ethics. We show that there is much of value in the Wittgensteinians’ call for an ethics that is more human; an ethics that fully embraces the capacities we are endowed with and one that pays heed to the richness and complexity of our moral lives. (shrink)

Although Schmitt never answered Strauss publicly, in the third edition of his book he changed a number of passages in response to Strauss’s criticisms.

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are (...) correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically. (shrink)