Тhе question which animates Heidegger's paper (''Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik:) is: "How are God coming in phi1osophy?"; and it is only а sharpening of "th.e question of the onto-theologic character of philosophy". Hegel and Heidegger are bothunited and opposed as identity and difference. Both being and existing descend from difference. Equilibrium (Aпstrag) arranges the unit of being and existing.

Foreword Philip T. Grier The attempt to retrieve a work of scholarship buried under as much historical debris as was IA Il'in's original two-volume commentary on the philosophy of Hegel presented distinct challenges, as well as possible ...

The publication of volume 2 of Philip T. Grier’s translation of The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity completes the first appearance in English of any of the works of Russian philosopher I. A ...

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Smirnov was born on March 2, 1931. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1954. From 1957 till 1961 he was a lecturer in philosophy and logic at the Tomsk University. Since 1961 his scientific activity continued in Moscow at the Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of the USSR. From 1970 and till the last days of his life V. A. Smirnov was lecturer and then Professor at the Chair of Logic at Moscow State (...) University. V. A. Smirnov played an important role at the Institute of Philosophy of Russian Academy of Sciences being the Head of Department of Epistemology, Logic and Philosophy of Science and Technology, and the Head of Section of Logic. Last years he was the leader of the Centre of Logical Investigations of Russsian Academy of Sciences. In 1990-91 he founded a new non-goverment Institute of Logic, Cognitive Sciences and Development of Personality for performing research, teaching, editorial and organization activity in the field of humanities. At the Department of Philosophy of Moscow State University and at the Institute of Philosophy V. A. Smirnov and his close colleagues have founded a Russian logical school which brought up many talented researchers who work at several scientific centres in various countries. (shrink)

t. 1. Putʹ dukhovnogo obnovlenii︠a︡ ; Osnovy khristianskoĭ kulʹtury ; Krizis bezbozhii︠a︡ -- t. 2, kn. 1-2. Nashi zadachi -- t. 3. Shleĭermakher i ego "Rechi o religii" : religioznyĭ smysl filosofii : tri rechi, 1914-1923 ; I︠A︡ bgli︠a︡dyvai︠u︡sʹ v zhiznʹ : kniga razdumiĭ ; Poi︠u︡shchee serdt︠s︡e : kniga tikhakh sozert︠s︡aniĭ ; Putʹ k ochevidnosti -- t. 4. Poni︠a︡tii︠a︡ prava i sily ; Obshchee uchenie o prave i gosudarstve ; O suchnosti pravosoznanii︠a︡ ; O monarkhii i respublike -- t. 5. (...) Osnovnoe Nravstvennoe protivorechie voĭny ; O sopotivlenii zlu siloi︠u︡ ; Statʹi, Pisʹma -- t. 6, kn. 1. O li︠u︡beznosti sot︠s︡ialʹno-psikhologicheskiĭ opyt ; Osnovy khudozhestva, o sovershennom v iskusstve ; O tʹme i prosvetlenii : kniga khudozhestvennoĭ kritiki, Bunin, Remnozov, Shmelev -- t. 6, kn. 2. O Rossii ; Russkie pisateli, literatura, teatr, muzyka ; Khudozhnik i khudozhestvennostʹ -- t. 6, kn. 3. O Rossii i russkoĭ dushe ; Genii Rossii -- t. 7. O bolʹshevizme i kommunizme ; Muchenichestvo t︠s︡erkovʹ v sovetskom gosudarstve ; Sovetskiĭ soi︠u︡z ne Rossii︠a︡ ; O nat︠s︡ionalʹnom prievanii Rossii ; Tvorcheskai︠a︡ idei︠a︡ nashego budushchego -- t. 8. Bolʹshevist︠s︡kai︠a︡ politika mirovogo gospodstva ; Vzgli︠a︡d vi︠a︡alʹ ; Kniga razmyshleniĭ i upovaniĭ -- t. 9-10. Dnevnik ; Pisʹma ; Dokumenty (1903-1938) -- [t. 10.] Pisʹma ; Memuary (1939-1954) -- [t. 11. kn. 1] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1927-1934) -- [t. 11. kn. 2.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1935-1946) -- [t. 11. kn. 3.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1947-1950) godov -- [t. 12.] Stat·i, lekt︠s︡ii, vystuplenii︠a︡, ret︠s︡enzii (1906-1954) -- [t. 13.] Kto my?; O revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii ; O religioznom krizise nashikh dneĭ -- [t. 14. kn. 1.] Filosofii︠a︡ Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o Boge -- [t. 14. kn. 2.] Filosofi Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o cheloveke -- [t. 15. kn. 1.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta : issleovanie -- [t. 15. kn. 2.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta issledovanie -- [t. 16. kn. 1.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ -- [t. 16. kn. 2.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ ; Analiticherskie zapiski i publit︠s︡istika -- [t. 17.] Gitler i Stalin. Publit︠s︡istika 1939-1945 godov -- [t. 18.] Spravedlivostʹ ili ravenstvo? ; Publit︠s︡istika 1918-1947 godov -- [t. 19.] Russkiĭ kolokol : zhurnal volevoĭ idei [No special title]. (shrink)

The work aims to demonstrate that at the heart of Eriugena’s approach to Christian theology there lies a profoundly philosophical interest in the necessity of a cardinal shift in the paradigms of thinking – namely, that from the metaphysical to the dialectical one, which wins him a reputation of the ‘Hegel of the ninth century,’ as scholars in Post-Hegelian Germany called him. The prime concern of Eriugena’s discourse is to prove that the actual adoption of the salvific truth of Christ’s (...) revelation about all humans’ Sonship to God directly depends on the way the truth of God’s Oneness is consistently thought of. It is exactly the dialectic of the universal and particular which allows Eriugena both to tackle the dichotomy between being and non-being and to proceed towards raising a question how the totality of God’s being can be approached so as to let him radically reconsider a predominantly metaphysical view of creation the theological reflection traditionally relies on. According to the dialectical understanding of unity that Eriugena does adhere to, the reality of creation cannot be thought of, and therefore known, otherwise than in the way of being inseparable from the universal Principle of all. This is the Principle abandoned by nothing, unless the mind corrupted by the senses thinks otherwise and, following the metaphysical pattern of dichotomy, improperly sets the creation and its Principle apart. Restoration of the mind to the proper rational motion of recta ratio freed, as Eriugena argues, from the dictates of senses therefore becomes the way of both the epistemological breakthrough to the infinite whole and practical return from the world of finite things to living in the divine reality of creation. The work’s argument is based on the assumption of close affinity between Eriugena’s discourse and that of his Islamic contemporaries, who developed their dialectical ideas within the Mu’tazilah tradition of a philosophically disciplined approach to the truth of God’s Oneness. In particular, al-Nazzam’s engagement with Parmenides’ Periphyseon and his resistance to the danger of a dualistic interpretation of its ontology seem to provoke Eriugena’s innovative approach to Christian theology with a view to suggesting a mode of overcoming dualism as the main obstacle on the way to the Truth revealed. This vision of the meaning of Eriugena’s undertaking allows us not only to better understand the novelty of his approach to Christian theology, but also reconsider some of the key points of his discourse that seem to have become a sort of commonplace in Eriugenian studies: 1. Unlike the prevalent opinion, not the forms of the division of Nature but the modes of interpreting being and non-being are to be understood to constitute the genuine subject-matter of each book of the Periphyseon and, hence, of the five parts of his system. 2. The fourfold division of Nature is to be interpreted not as a basic structure of the system offered by Eriugena, but as a means of introducing dialectic to the body of theology by refuting Augustine’s metaphysical vision of a hierarchical model of the universe and indicating the way of resolution of the cardinally theological contradiction – God does and does not create at the same time. 3. All this gives reason to disagree with a general tendency of associating Eriugena’s work with exploration of the division of God’s Nature and to reinterpret it as an immense anti-division project to be understood as an important turn in the history of Christian thought entirely focused on the truth of God’s Oneness and human life in conformity to it. *** I affirm that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for examination in any form elsewhere. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of my essays on philosophy of logic from a phenomenological perspective. They deal with the four kinds of logic I have been concerned with: formal logic, transcendental logic, speculative logic and hermeneutic logic. Of these, only one, the essay on Hegel, touches upon 'speculative logic', and two, those on Heidegger and Konig, are concerned with hermeneutic logic. The rest have to do with Husser! and Kant. I have not tried to show that the four (...) logics are compatible. I believe, they are--once they are given a phenomenological underpinning. The original plan of writing an Introduction in which the issues would have to be formulated, developed and brought together, was abandoned in favor of writing an Introductory Essay on the 'origin'- in the phenomenological sense -of logic. J.N.M. Philadelphia INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGIN OF LOGIC The question of the origin of logic may pertain to historical origin (When did it all begin? Who founded the science of logic?), psychological origin (When, in the course of its mental development, does the child learn logical operations?), cultural origin (What cultural - theological, metaphysical and linguisti- conditions make such a discipline as logic possible?), or transcendental constitutive origin (What sorts of acts and/or practices make logic possible?). (shrink)

The development of science and engineering, and the social transformations occurring in the world of today open entirely new prospects to humanity. The scale and consequences of decisions made are expanding as never before in any previous period of history, and people's responsibility is also increasing. Herein lies one of the reasons for the constantly increasing attention to human freedom and to the intimately related problems of choice and decision-making.

The article traces the lines of interrelation of philosophy as a systematic knowledge of the world and literature as a form of artistic contemplation. Conceptual and figurative comprehension of the world, according to the author, are attributive properties of the spiritual life of society. In the paradigm of this understanding, the union of philosophy with diverse types of literary creativity is considered as a basic component of the national spiritual culture of the XIX — early XX century, which (...) determined its national peculiarity, becoming a kind of symbolic code. On the one hand, she set the main vector of literary creativity, including the search for the meanings of being, and filled the intuitions of artistic and imaginative thinking with philosophical content, on the other hand, she "added" metaphysics of philosophical thought with ideological questions about progress, social justice and equality, insuring philosophical reflection from the dictates of rigid conceptual schemes. (shrink)

The article refutes the widespread view that Dostoevsky's Christian beliefs were strictly Orthodox. It is proved that Dostoevsky's religious and philosophical searches' central tendency is the criticism of historical, ecclesiastical Christianity as a false, distorted form of the teaching of Jesus Christ and the desire to restore this teaching in its original purity. Modern researchers of the history of early Christianity find more and more arguments in favor of the fact that the actual teaching of Jesus Christ is contained in (...) that religious movement, which the church called the Gnostic heresy. The exact philosophical expression of the teaching of Christ was received in the later works of J.G. Fichte, whose ideas had a strong influence on the Russian writer. Like Fichte, Dostoevsky understands Christ as the first person who showed the possibility of revealing God in himself and gaining divine omnipotence and eternal life directly in earthly reality. In this sense, every person can become like Christ. Dostoevsky's main characters walk the path of Christ and show how difficult this path is. The article shows that Dostoevsky used in his work not only the philosophical version of true Christianity developed by German philosophy, but also the key motives of the Gnostic myth, primarily the idea that our world, filled with evil and suffering, is created not by the supreme, good God-Father, but by the evil Demiurge, the Devil. (shrink)

Classical verse work, expounding the early Vedantic approach in Hindu philosophy; Sanskrit text with Hindi translation and exhaustive introduction.

Combining physics, philosophy and psychology, this book offers a revolutionary theory of the origins and nature of consciousness in terms of the new physics, pointing the way towards a new vision of the human self and its relationships, hence a new "quantum psychology" and a new "quantum morality". Written in an accessible style that makes quantum physics comprehensible, this book aims to interest anyone interested in the dynamics of the human personality and its dialogue with the physical world.;The author (...) has also written "Through the Time Barrier: A Study of Precognition and Modern Physics". (shrink)

Work on Sankhya system in Hindu philosophy; includes commentaries.

Hegels Auffassung vom Subjekt und von dessen Verhältnis zur Sprache ergibt eine gegenüber allen seinen Vordenkern neue Konzeption der Philosophie und der Aufgabe des Denkens überhaupt. Die Frage gilt nicht mehr der Erkenntnis der Prinzipien, die unserem Denken als das "Vorausseyende" zugrunde liegen, sondern in der Wissenschaft der Logik geht es um die Aufdeckung der Weise, in der sich das Vorgefundene im begreifenden Denken als das Wirkliche manifestiert. Die Vorstellungen machen sowohl für Kant als auch für Hegel den Stoff aus, (...) den das Denken zu verarbeiten hat. Der bei Kant noch vage und ambivalente Begriff von Vorstellung wird aber bei Hegel erheblich präziser: Als die Mitte zwischen der Anschauung und dem Denken ist die Vorstellung auf Versprachlichung angelegt und als Sprache aufzufassen: Die Produkte der Vorstellung (d.i. die Zeichen) haben als anschauliche Gebilde gegenständliche Existenz und Wirklichkeit. Auf diesem wirklichen Charakter der Produkte des Vorstellens basiert bei Hegel die schließliche Gleichsetzung des Wirklichen und des Denkens: "Das was ist zu begreifen, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie, denn das was ist, ist die Vernunft". (shrink)

In an almost forgotten passage of the Postenor Analytics (Bk I, ch. III) Aristotle argues against 'another school', according to which it is possible to proof things 'by each other and in a circle'. His logical refutation of this opinion became so dominant in the Western philosophical tradition, that the 'vicious circle' has always deemed a crime since. A scientific demonstration has to be built on firm premisses in order to deduce conclusions from them in a straight, ongoing proces, in (...) which one does not have to return to the premisses for a reconsideration of them on the basis of their implications. Although Aristotle does not mention names, he in fact reacts against Plato and the mainstream of Greek thought, which stresses the essential circularity of human argumentation. In the first, the historical part of the treatise the roots of this circular logic are unearthed in the work of Heraclitus and Parmenides, who both defended a ring structure of their metaphysical explication of nature. Truth is described as well-rounded, because you can follow it in a circle, passing through each of its links in turn, back to your startingpoint. The association of circular motion with thought is fully present in the work of Plato, who speeks many times about the 'periforas tès dianoias' and the essential interdependance of our ideas. Not the theory of an anonymous alternative school but Aristotle's own rectilinear formal logic was the exceptional, untraditional standpoint, which, moreover, was in conflict with his explication of divine thinking as 'noèsis noèseôs'. In modern times Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger were the main representatives of an anti-Aristotelian attitude. All three reject the logical prohibition of the circular argument, because it is inadequate to the life of concrete scientific thinking. The path of science always turns around towards its origins and results in a correction of its fundamental hypotheses on a higher level. Circularity is considered as a hallmark of sound logical procedure, as a characteristic of excellence in human understanding. The famous 'hermeneutic circle' is interpreted as the modern equivalent of the Hegelian 'Kreislauf and the Greek ' to par'allèlôn'. In the second, the more systematic part of the text the circular nature of our cognitive and scientific behaviour is demonstrated along three different lines. Reflection on the natural language with its finite stock of words, whose meanings are structurally connected, leads us to the so called semiotical circularity. Natural language is a complex network in which circular argumentation is not only unavoidable, but even the only means of explication. We have to work with the material contained in our dictionary, in which the items are defined by each other. The second reason is constituted by the system-orientation of science. In science we try to systematize our knowledge by means of formalisations and abstractions. The development of science can be characterised as a succession of systems, in which every element gets its meaning from the whole organisation. If we accept systematicity as the arbiter of truth, our logic is anti-fundamentalistic and the path of our thought is in fact circular (or better : spiralistic). The third adstruction of our theory is afforded by the coupling, that is realised in a rational proof. We draw conclusions from the coherence of our perceptions, from the reciprocal implications of our ideas. Never any of our ideas is without the repercussions of the movements elsewhere in the field. When we proof something, we also disproof and correct our startingpoints at the same time. The tradition of the circular nature of human thinking is very old, but not antiquated. The accusation of committing a fallacy in the case of circularity in normal and in scientific thinking is unfouded. It is now the formal logicians turn to defend his claim. (shrink)

The Zaydī-Muʿtazilī interaction, which dates back to the early periods, increased when The Būyid vizier al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād invited Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār to Rayy and many Caspian Zaydī scholars studied with Qāḍī. Ibn Sharwīn, who is mentioned among the students of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār and accepted as one of the Zaydī- Muʿtazilī scholars, is one of these names. The works of Ibn Sharwīn, who had writings in the field of kalām and fiqh, did not remain within the borders of the (...) Caspian and reached the Zaydīs of Yemen; one of these works is Ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ. Considering that, unlike other theological schools, there are not many works on the definitions of theological concepts in Muʿtazilī literature and -as far as is known- did not reach today, this treatise helps to understand better especially the terms in Zaydī- Muʿtazilī theology and the effects of Bahshamiyya on Zaydī thought. This work, edited and translated based on the only extant manuscript only manuscript found in Yemen and a previous publication, on the one hand, is important in understanding the point of view of Zaydī- Muʿtazilī thought on the disciplines of theology, jurisprudence, debate, history of Islamic sects, on the other hand, it is a helpful resource for understanding the terms used in the theory of aḥwāl, which is still an intricate issue. Ibn Sharwīn in his Ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ; explains over 150 terms in relation to cosmology such as substance, accident, line, surface, space; to ontology such as existing, non-existence, originated (muḥdath); to epistemology such as knowledge, creed, ignorance, doubt, skepticism, obligatory and acquired knowledge; to methodology such as evidence, madlūl, debate, and disputation; to fiqh such as sunnah, farḍ, mandūb, cause, command-prohibition, general-particular (ʿumūm-ḫuṣūṣ); to the history of sects such as ʿadliyya, compulsionists (mujbira) and qadarī; to divinity such as the oneness of God (tawhīd); to justice such as promise and threat (al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd), good and evil, necessary and acquired, grace, compensation, repentance, major and minor sins; to the theory of al-aḥwāl such as attribute of the essence, determinant (muḳtaḍī), entail (muḳtaḍā), muṣaḥḥiḥ, cause. Describing ḥadd that corresponds to “definition” and ḥaḳīḳat that he used together with it as collectively exhaustive, mutually exclusive, Ibn Sharwīn defines knowledge, power, living (ḥayy), speech (kalām), speaker (mutakallim), permanent (bāqī) etc. in a way that is true for both God and human beings. While making these definitions, he draws on poems, linguistic usages and verses and divides the nouns into three parts at the end of his work, namely linguistic, religious and conventional (sharʿī and waḍʿī); in particular, he gives detailed information about metaphors and parts of truth. Another striking aspect of the work is the explanation of the meanings of the imperative mood which is included in the subjects of the Methodology of Fiqh. (shrink)

One of the most important theoretical and ideological tasks of Marxist philosophy is the critical study of the philosophical thought of the West. In the second half of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the ideological struggle on the international arena entered a new stage. It was characterized by the turn of the forces of imperialist reaction away from the politics of detente to the politics of the "cold war," to the active opposition to the forces of peace, (...) democracy, and socialism. The struggle of ideas has swung back and forth in the context of, on the one hand, a resurgence of reactionary anticommunist tendencies, and the stimulation and expansion of antimilitary movements and the struggles of the peoples for peace and socialism on the other. (shrink)

We present a dynamic programming model which is used to investigate hypothermia as an adaptive response by small passerine birds in winter. The model predicts that there is a threshold function of reserves during the night, below which it is optimal to enter hypothermia, and above which it is optimal to rest. This threshold function decreases during the night, with a particularly sharp drop at the end of the night, representing the time and energy costs associated with returning to normal (...) body temperature. The results of the model emphasise the trade-off between energy and predation, not just between foraging options, but also between foraging during the day and entering hypothermia at night. The value of being able to use hypothermia represents not just energy savings, but also reduced predation risk due to changes in the optimal foraging strategy. Conditions which give a high value of hypothermia are short photoperiod, variable food supply, low temperatures, poor and scarce food supplies. (shrink)

Believers regularly refer to God as “forgiving and merciful” when praying for divine forgiveness. If one is committed to divine immutability and impassability, as Maimonides is, one must deny that God is capable, in principle, of acting in a forgiving manner. If one rejects divine impassability, maintaining that God has a psychology, as Muffs does, one must reckon with biblical depictions of divine vengeance and rage. Such depictions suggest that while being capable, in principle, of acting in a forgiving way, (...) God has a difficulty to manage God’s anger and do so in practice. Employing a Wittgensteinian perspective, I argue that utterances, e.g., “God merciful and gracious, slow to anger. . . forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin”, need not be understood as involving mistaken or confused descriptions of God’s nature and manner of acting. Rather, they can be understood as speech-acts of various types and functions: mystical, theurgic and others, that purport to bring about or transform various states of affairs in this world and/or beyond it. As such, they can function as non-semantic instruments that purport to elevate the believer to the “upper worlds”, or as anger-management devices that purport to help God implement His second order desire to act in a forgiving manner, despite His difficulty to do so. (shrink)

An aspect of the question of the relationship between reason and faith concerns the compatibility between philosophy and religious commitment. I begin by considering some attempts that have been made in both the analytic and Continental traditions to divorce philosophy from the life of religious faith as far as possible: in particular, I discuss Martin Heidegger’s critique of the very idea of a ‘Christian philosophy’ and Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Aquinas for not living up to the Socratic (...) ideal of following the argument wherever it leads. I then seek further to develop these criticisms by reviewing the current debate around the problem of evil in philosophy of religion as a case study of the dangers and drawbacks of religious commitment in philosophy. I conclude with some comments on the connection between ideology and philosophy, and claim that much of what passes as Christian philosophy is ideological as opposed to rational or truth-seeking in character. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to bring together two thinkers that are concerned with the limits of what can be said, Wittgenstein and Maimonides, and to explore the sense of the good life and of the mystical to which their therapeutic linguistic work gives rise. I argue that despite the similarities, two different senses of the "mystical" are brought to light and two different "forms of life" are explicated and recommended. The paper has three parts. In the first part, (...) I discuss certain key components in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy and the sense of the mystical to which they give rise. In the second part, I discuss Maimonides’ negative theology and its implications for his conception of the ’via mystica’. I end, with a discussion of the relation between the two ideals and its significance. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Arne Grøn’s reading of Søren Kierkegaard’s authorship revolves around existential challenges of human identity. The 35 essays that constitute this book are written over three decades and are characterized by combining careful attention to the augmentative detail of Kierkegaard’s text with a constant focus on issues in contemporary philosophy. Contrary to many approaches to Kierkegaard’s authorship, Grøn does not read Kierkegaard in opposition to Hegel. The work of the Danish thinker is read as a critical development of Hegelian phenomenology (...) with particular attention to existential aspects of human experience. Anxiety and despair are the primary existential phenomena that Kierkegaard examines throughout his authorship, and Grøn uses these negative phenomena to argue for the basically ethical aim of Kierkegaard’s work. In Grøn’s reading, Kierkegaard conceives human selfhood not merely as relational, but also a process of becoming the self that one is through the otherness of self-experience, that is, the body, the world, other people, and God. This book should be of interest to philosophers, theologians, literary studies scholars, and anyone with an interest not only in Kierkegaard, but also in human identity. (shrink)

Hace falta valor hoy día para abordar una cuestión con tantas aristas como la de la idea de Dios. Y hacerlo desde una perspectiva que parte de la experiencia poética requiere, además de valor, una peculiar honestidad intelectual y personal. Ése es el empeño de Álvaro Pombo en su primera experiencia en el campo del ensayo. Una obra que, desde lo 'vivido y pensado en primera persona del singular', se despliega y ramifica en relecturas y reflexiones de enjundia y lucidez (...) turbadoras. 'La ficción suprema' combina erudición, lecturas y vivencias con sutileza e intensidad; pasan por estas páginas recuerdos de infancia, poemas de juventud y sospechas de madurez, deslumbramientos y desapegos temporales, pero también Rilke, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Wallace Stevens, Santo Tomás o superhéroes de cómics. El resultado es un luminoso ejercicio de búsqueda de sí conducido por un maravilloso lenguaje y esa sorprendente capacidad para deleitar en la búsqueda de ese Dios que se nos 'sustrae' en cuanto aparece. Incluye la correspondencia entre autor y editor que dio origen al libro. Una emotiva reflexión sobre el oficio de editar, la amistad y el conocimiento"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Philosophy of religion, in both its analytic and Continental streams, has been undergoing a renewal for some time now, and I seek to explore this transformation in the fortunes of the discipline by looking at how truth – and religious truth in particular – is conceptualised in both strands of philosophy. I begin with an overview of the way in which truth has been commonly understood across nearly all groups within the analytic tradition, and I will underscore the (...) difficulties and shortcomings of the analytic approach by comparing it with a Continental, and specifically Heideggerian, approach. I then proceed to a conception of truth that is even further removed from the analytic tradition, one that is prominent in the theology of Christianity and which identifies truth with Christ. The point of this detour through divergent understandings of truth is to show how philosophy of religion, whether analytic or Continental, remains entrenched in forms of thinking that will need to be overcome if it is to have a credible future. (shrink)

Книга рассчитана на тех, кто по своей специальности занимается философией, литературоведением и в дальнейшем углубят свои знания в этом вопросе, а также для широкого круга читателей.

The paper explores the manners in which suffering, both natural and moral suffering, is understood and defeated in the lives of different ‘knights of faith,’ who emerge in ‘conversation’ with the book of Job. I begin with Maimonides’ Job who emerges as a ‘knight of wisdom’; it is through wisdom that his suffering is defeated, dissolving into mere pain. I proceed with Kierkegaard’s Job, who emerges as a ‘knight of loving trust,’ who defeats suffering by seeing it as a divine (...) gift, and by obediently and lovingly accepting it as such. Through his loving trust, suffering transforms into blessedness and joy, without diminishing or disappearing, a transformation referred to as a ‘miracle’ by Kierkegaard. I end with my own Hasidic-inspired Job, whom I portray as a ‘knight of protest,’ who defeats what he takes to be divine abuse by protesting against it, forgiving God while refusing to be reconciled with Him. I argue that it is by paying attention to these diverse Jobs that the complex nature of faith can be elucidated. Moreover, I argue that all three Jobs, despite their differences, may be embraced, both from a philosophically descriptive perspective as well as from a religiously committed one. (shrink)

In Freedom's Right Axel Honneth seeks to provide a theory of justice by appropriating Hegel's account of ethical substance in the Philosophy of Right, but he wants to do so without endorsing Hegel's more robust idealist commitments. I argue that this project can only succeed if Honneth can offer an alternative, comparatively robust demonstration of the rationality and normative coherence of existing social institutions. I contend that the grounds Honneth provides for this claim are insufficient for his purposes. In (...) particular, I argue that Honneth's claim that “justice and individual self-determination are mutually referential,” even were it to be accepted, would be insufficient to underwrite his more robust identification between the normative foundations of justice, autonomy and reciprocal self-realization. In the final section of the paper, I turn to Honneth's analysis of the “social institution” of friendship, which he, following Hegel, holds up as a paradigmatic instantiation of social freedom understood as, in Hegel's words, “being with oneself in another” . I argue that an analysis of the normative import of friendship wholly in terms of mutual recognition misses an important aspect of the kind of self-realization that friendship makes possible. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on conceptual, empirical and practical arguments why corporations need to focus on their social dimensions, in order to further enhance organizational performance. The paper starts with an introduction on the general trend towards inclusiveness and connectedness. It then elaborates on the phase-wise development of cultures and organizational structures. Managing corporate improvement by building cultures of trust is the central focus of this contribution. By showing the cultural dimensions of Great Places to Work and their workplace practices, worthwhile (...) experiences leading to organizational improvement and superior financial performance are demonstrated. (shrink)

“Risk” is all about living a faith filled life. Within the pages of this work you will discover the year-by-year history of the ups and downs of the happenings regarding Foursquare Church. There are no sure things in this crazy epic journey called life. The only constant we can hang our hope upon is the name of Jesus. Christ has called us to live beyond what we can see and lean only to what He has said. In the parable of (...) the talents Jesus was very clear about how He felt regarding those who would not risk. In Matthew 25:28-30 He states, “‘Take the thousand and give it to the one who risked the most and get rid of this “play-it-safe-mentality” who won’t go out on a limb. Jesus rewards those who Risk. Foursquare Church and its history is one successive detail regarding progressive risking on God and his faithfulness to reward said risk. I invite you to read and risk on God. You will find great joy in discovering the rewards of a life that is lived by faith. (shrink)

Sam Lebens’ The Principles of Judaism is an extraordinary book in its rigor and richness. It is a sophisticated examination of three central propositions, which Lebens maintains, are the fundamental doctrines that “can make sense of continued commitment to an Orthodox Jewish lifestyle.” (Lebens, 273). He presents and discusses the following three propositions: 1) The universe is the creation of one God; 2) The Torah is a divine system of laws and wisdom, revealed by the creator of the universe; and, (...) 3) The creator exercises provi-dential care over his creation, manifest in the creator’s continued sustenance of the world, reward and punishment for human action, and in the promise of ultimate salvation. (Lebens, 3).Lebens presents the principles as they were variously explicated and de-fended in key Jewish texts written by the most influential Jewish thinkers; he then turns to search for “the most plausible rendering of this set of prin-ciples...” (Lebens, 274). After so doing, he specifies those doctrinal compo-nents among them, which he deems necessary “for making sense of commit-ment to Judaism” (Lebens, 275), identifying a “commitment to Judaism” with being “faithful to the tenets of Judaism” in the sense of having faith in them:To the extent that these principles are necessary for making sense of commitment to Judaism, I argue that you cannot be considered faithful to the tenets of Judaism without holding an attitude of faith toward some element of each of the three principles... (Lebens 275).The distance between Lebens’ philosophical and religious outlook and pre-suppositions, as they show themselves in his Principles of Judaism, and my own is great. I shall start with a critique of Lebens’ reduction of Judaism to so-called Orthodox Judaism, and argue that Lebens has no justification for characterizing the principles that he identifies, as the “principles of Judaism” without qualification. I shall then turn to argue that there are grounds for questioning whether the principles that Lebens identifies can be understood as the principles that so-called “Orthodox Jews”, too, have faith in. It is, how-ever, clear that the utterances that Lebens discusses do play a central role within the life of committed Jews. I shall end by proposing that we adopt the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical method for making perspicuous their meaning and their different roles. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a new conception of religious justifications which takes the performance of miracles as the paradigm of reasoning in religion. The paper has two parts: In the first part, I argue against Swinburne’s parity argument for the existence of God by showing that religious perceptions fit more comfortably among aspect perceptions, e.g., the perceptions of beauty and courage, than among our perceptions of objects and colors. In the second part of the paper I employ the (...) analogy between seeing God and seeing beauty and the moral features of an act to propose a performative and transformative conception of religious reasoning. I argue that an argument in religion is a performance which brings various facts or events into life in a particular manner, so that God may be seen in or through them. Any such performance through which God is seen may be properly called a "miracle". Thus, the performance of miracles, i.e., of acts that are directed at becoming the vehicles throu. (shrink)

The philosophical definition of violence today is “incomplete” and leaves a “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of “violence” was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of “power”, which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally (...) do we find “traces” of this concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek δύναμις, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force ; in its turn, “force” lost relation to “violence” and “necessity”. Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one’s “own decision”, freedom, something that “prevents desire” and contrary to “common thinking,” as well as the absence of “good”. Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of “good” and of one’s own “desire”. Force remains in the shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode. (shrink)

Si bien hubo grandes pensadores a lo largo de la historia que hicieron referencia al concepto de «terror» (Kant y lo sublime, Hegel y el terror posrevolucionario francés, Heidegger y la significación ontológica del término, o la aproximación del psicoanálisis a lo siniestro), escasean aún los estudios vinculados a esta temática y los pocos que existen carecen de la profundidad adecuada para tratar este fenómeno. La presente edición cuenta con una serie de textos escritos por reconocidos especialistas (Vicente Serrano, Antonio (...) Castilla, Arturo Leyte, Miguel Morey, Mauricio Mancilla Muñoz, Ana Carrasco Conde, Jorge Fernández Gonzalo y Enrique Lynch) que nos permitirán adentrarnos de lleno en el tema del terror y sus principales vinculaciones con la filosofía, el psicoanálisis, la literatura y la sociedad en general. ¿Qué es el terror? ¿Cómo interpretarlo? ¿Cómo se representa en la literatura y el cine? ¿Cuál es, realmente, su función política? La filosofía, el terror y lo siniestro nos da la llave para acceder a estas y a otras cuestiones y abre vías de reflexión que resultan de vital importancia para comprender los resortes que operan detrás de nuestra sociedad contemporánea. (shrink)

The problem of evil is regularly regarded as posing a serious threat to theistic belief. However, contemporary philosophers of religion have overlooked the ways in which this problem has been, or could be, handled by theists committed to the metaphysics of idealism. In seeking to redress this lacuna, I turn to the systems of the British idealists, popular in the late nineteenth century though now out of favour, and in particular the work of F.H. Bradley, while also drawing parallels with (...) the Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. The central argument of this paper is that these idealist traditions have greater resources to adequately deal with the problem of evil than comparatively mainstream theist views. While standard forms of theism struggle to make sense of the facts of evil, or are even resoundly defeated by them, the conception of divinity suggested or developed by the British idealists offers possibilities for innovative and fruitful ways of thinking about the relationship between God and evil. (shrink)

Extract in lieu of Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to propose a hypothesis to illuminate Ortega's critical response to Heidegger's question of being (Seinsfrage). While Ortega integrated the classical requirements for the idea of Being into his idea of human life as radical reality, Heidegger's delineation of human life (Dasein) was only preliminary to the final philosophical task of understanding the question of Being itself (Sein) as the transcendent horizon for human life. For Ortega human life is not (...) merely a preliminary ontology that points to another transcendent reality, but final reality itself. I shall argue here that: (1) Ortega saw Heidegger's Seinsfrage as both empty and dead-ended as a philosophical enterprise; (2) by Heidegger's refusal to understand human life and its circumstances as the final goal of philosophy, he failed to account for the reality of human life in its circumstantial, historical, and methodological dimensions; and (3) Heidegger's philosophical project results in a frozen and metaphysical concept of human nature that transcends the historicality of humanity's actual existence and artificially bifurcates history into opposed metaphysical and empirical dimensions that only Ortega's doctrine of historical reason can synthesize. (shrink)

This paper undertakes two tasks. It will endeavour, first of all, to establish that there is a difficult discipline called Absolute-theory - Aristotle called it First Philosophy or Theology - which builds itself around the concept of a unique something which exists in an unqualified and necessary manner, and to which everything not itself attaches, or from which it in one manner or another derives. We shall try to distinguish the different strands or strata in the conception of an (...) Absolute, and shall then consider the alternative ways in which such a concept can be developed. For though, if there is or can be anything Absolute, it is one and unique and without rivals or alternatives, there are for us a large number of alternative ways of conceiving of what is absolute, some of which are arguably better and less exposed to antinomy than others. And of course there is always for us the alternative of not conceiving or not believing in any Absolute at all. And we shall briefly glance at the great historical dynasty of Absolutes: the infinitely arbitrary, anthropomorphic, of the Judaic-Christian-Islamic tradition, the less arbitrary Aristotelian-Neoplatonic Absolute of Thomas Aquinas, the Substantial Absolute of Spinoza, the Leibnizian-Wolffian Absolute of which Kant made his Ideal of Pure Reason, the Upanishadic Absolute of Shanaracharya, the infinitely vacuous Absolute of Mahayana Buddhism, the Deistic and Materialistic Absolutes of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, the absolute Space-Time of modern physicists, the Aussersein of Alexius Meinong and the Logical Space of Ludwig Wittgenstein. If the construction of Absolutes is an unrewarding language-and thought-game, it is none the less one which practically all the more intense thinkers have tried to play. I shall next, in the second part of my paper, try to establish that Hegel is by far the subtlest and the most successful of all the Absolute-theorists. His whole philosophy may be regarded as an essay in Absolute-theory, in that it throughout does nothing but try out, modify or discard categories of thought and forms of being because they fail to measure up to an adequate conception of an Absolute. And in his vast rehearsal of categories and forms of being Hegel arguably works up to a conception of the Absolute which takes account of a far wider and richer array of issues, and forestalls a more varied assemblage of objections than any other exercise in Absolute-theory. Sometimes Hegel anticipates thought-moves that will occur long after his death: the moves, e.g., of John Stuart Mill regarding the Syllogism’s being a Petitio Principii, and inductive reasoning’s being really an inference from particulars to particulars. And it will be our contention, finally, that Hegel is by far the most successful of Absolutists, in that he, and he alone, has worked out a many-sided Logic which, whatever its imperfections, is the only sort of instrument with which Absolute-theory can be tackled. In arguing in this manner I shall be contributing to the main theme of this Congress, the nature of the Universe, for the Universe, I believe, is a very vague and degenerate sort of Absolute. (shrink)

For over a century, Hegel’s view of war is seen as controversial that results in mutually exclusive interpretations. To reach a proper evaluation of Hegel’s views, it is necessary to consider both Hegel’s initial states of philosophical doctrine about war and peace, and the development of his understanding of war from early works to mature ones. In the first part of the paper, I characterize Kant’s position on war, since it was the starting point for Hegel. Contrary to popular representations (...) about Kant as an exclusive pacifist, the philosopher of Koenigsberg had a philosophical-historical treatment of war, in which the war appeared as something sublime. However, both legal-ethical peace understanding and veto of war from the point of practical reason were not dominant in Kant’s philosophy, subordinating the sublime treatment of war. Kant’s next contemporaries could not already keep this position, emphasizing either one or the other side of war interpretation. Starting from the early writings (the paper “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” or manuscripts “System of Ethical Life” and “The German Constitution”), Hegel stresses an ethical aspect of war and its necessity, so that the shield is arranged on the way of systems isolation and individuals atomization, and the unity in its ethical health is saved. Perpetual peace, on the contrary, leads to diseases. The statement about equality of claims and the same truthfulness of warring parties’ rights is the originality of Hegel’s view. It makes absolutely impossible the war evaluation from the point of its justice and injustice. (shrink)

Contemporary continental philosophy approaches metaphysics with great reservation. A point of criticism concerns traditional philosophical speaking about God. Whereas Nietzsche, with his question "God is dead; who killed Him?" was, in his time, highly 'unzeitgemäß' and shocking, the twentieth century by contrast, saw Heidegger's concept of 'onto-theology' and its implied problematization of the God of the metaphysicians quickly become a famous term. In Heidegger's words, to a philosophical concept or 'being' we can neither pray, nor kneel. Heidegger did not, (...) however, return to the God of Christian faith. He tried to initiate a new way of speaking about God--a way that reveals the limits of philosophical discourse. Derrida, Marion, Bataille, Adorno, Taubes and Bakhtin, each in their own way, continue this exploration begun by Nietzsche and Heidegger. This book takes a fresh look at these developments. The 'death of God' as the editors say in an introductory study, announces not so much the death of the 'old God'--the God of philosophers, theologians and believers--but rather the death of the god who put himself on His throne: autonomous human reason. In listening to the reactions to this dethronement of autonomous reason, the editors believe they hear the echoes of an experience of an embarrassment rooted partly in an old medieval tradition: negative theology. With the death of this 'new god', might a sensitivity reappear for transcendence? Here the editors want to offer a platform where contemporary philosophers of culture can again pose the question of speaking about God. (shrink)

In “The Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Philosophy of Right”, Hegel gives a detailed specification of the theses about the war that were claimed in earlier papers and manuscripts, but his position is not fundamentally changed. In the “The Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel advocates governments’ need and right to initiate a war from time to time in order to prevent both the isolation and atomization, and let individuals feel the death. As in the past, the war, as Hegel says, has (...) a moment of ethical life. In the “Philosophy of Right” Hegel introduces final deliberations about war that rely on ideas of his earlier paper about natural law even more than in the “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Hegel emphasizes the ethical role of sacrifice in the war and expresses opinions critical of not an abstract perpetual peace but a concrete philosophical project of Kant. Due to Hegel, Kant’s perpetual peace does not resemble a perpetual deception, since the required union of states is elusive and none except the world spirit in the world history can be a praetor. In line with Heraclitus, Hegel maintains that wars underlie the nature of things. I contribute to the discussions of Hegel scholars if Hegel’s philosophy glorifies a war or not as follows: I substitute the term “glorification” with the term “bellicisme” that suits better to measured, not snobbish and deprived of certain historical implications Hegel’s theses about reasonableness, necessity, the ethicality of war and ethicality of perpetual peace illness. (shrink)

“The ineffable” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is an essential term that has various interpretations. It could be divided into two types, namely, positive and negative, or real and fake. The negative or fake type can be clarified by logical analysis, while the positive or real type can be understood only through philosophical critique. Both the positive and negative types consist of infinity or absoluteness, but the infinity is subject to distinctions in meaning and logic.