Results for 'Heejo You'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  4
    EARSHOT: A Minimal Neural Network Model of Incremental Human Speech Recognition.James S. Magnuson, Heejo You, Sahil Luthra, Monica Li, Hosung Nam, Monty Escabí, Kevin Brown, Paul D. Allopenna, Rachel M. Theodore, Nicholas Monto & Jay G. Rueckl - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2.  4
    Friends in Low‐Entropy Places: Orthographic Neighbor Effects on Visual Word Identification Differ Across Letter Positions.Sahil Luthra, Heejo You, Jay G. Rueckl & James S. Magnuson - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (12).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  20
    In “You're Not in Kansas Anymore,” Canadian author Ivan E. Coyote prepares to change her legal name and writes about the anxieties that this creates.Who Do You ThinkYou Are - 2009 - In Laurie J. Shrage (ed.), You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity. Oup Usa.
  4. Xin Bu Xin You Ni: Cong Zhe Xue Kan Zong Jiao.Zongqi You - 2006 - San Min Shu Ju.
    上帝存在? 上帝不存在? 神祕的宗教經驗令人驚怖! 誰說出來的話才稱得上是宗教語言…… 本書從哲學角度看待宗教問題,以八個子題循序漸進地簡介西方哲學向來處理宗教的方式。西方哲學從古希臘到十九世紀末為止,其論辯、批判與質疑的焦點集中在「上帝是否存在」上。而二十世紀的西方哲學家,在乎的是「宗 教人的神聖經驗」、「宗教語言」、「宗教象徵與神話」等新議題。至於身為世界公民的我們,如何面對宗教多元的現象?應該怎樣思考宗教多樣性與彼此相互關係的問題呢? 一切,就從「信不信由你」開始吧…….
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  1
    You Are Old, but Are You Out? Intergenerational Contact Impacts on Out-Group Perspective-Taking and on the Roles of Stereotyping and Intergroup Anxiety.Yanxi Long, Xinxin Jiang, Yuqing Wang, Xiaoyu Zhou & Xuqun You - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Perspective-taking is an important ability to imagine the world from another’s point of view. Prior studies have shown that younger adults are more likely to consider the opinions of age-based in-group members relative to out-group members. However, the cause of this priority is still unknown. We conducted three independent studies to explore the effect of intergenerational contact on younger adults’ PT toward older adults and the possible roles of stereotyping and intergroup anxiety. A total of 192 college students completed the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  19
    Can You Succeed in Intentionally Deceiving Yourself?Dion Scott-Kakures Scott-Kakures - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):17-40.
    According to intentionalists, self-deceivers exercise the sort of control over their belief-forming processes that, in standard cases of interpersonal deception, the deceiver exercises over the deceived’s belief forming processes — they intentionally deceive themselves. I’ll argue here that interpersonal deception is not an available model for the sort of putatively distinctive control the self-deceiver exercises over her belief-forming processes and beliefs. I concentrate attention on a kind of case in which an agent allegedly intentionally causes herself to come to have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask.Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  8. What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  9. You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  10.  42
    “You Ain’t a Person, and We’ll Keep It That Way”: A Reply to Berkich.Daniel Propson - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (4):563-573.
    Don Berkich has argued that the so-called Trajectory Argument for the moral impermissibility of abortion falls short because it fails to establish that an embryo that never becomes a person has the same rights as an embryo that becomes a person. I argue that Berkich’s argument fails to be convincing, since aborting a particular embryo itself causes the embryo not to become a person, and the premise that abortion would be wrong if it were done with the intention of preventing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  42
    When you fail to see what you were told to look for: Inattentional blindness and task instructions.Anne M. Aimola Davies, Stephen Waterman, Rebekah C. White & Martin Davies - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):221-230.
    Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Nutrition and Hydration.I. Assure You That May - forthcoming - Hastings Center Report.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
    I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  14.  7
    Are You an Illusion?Mary Midgley - 2014 - Routledge.
    Renowned philosopher Mary Midgley explores the remarkable gap that has opened up between our own understanding of our sense of our self and today's scientific orthodoxy that claims the self to be nothing more than an elaborate illusion. Bringing her formidable acuity and analytic skills to bear, she exposes some very odd claims and muddled thinking on the part of cognitive scientists and psychologists when it comes to talk about the self. Well-known philosophical problems in causality, subjectivity, empiricism, free will (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15.  86
    "You're Just Jealous!": On Envious Blame.Neal Tognazzini - 2022 - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 147-162.
    One common reaction to criticism is to try to deflect it by calling into question the motivations of the person doing the criticizing. For example, if I feel like you are blaming me for something that you yourself are guilty of having done in the past, I might respond with the retort, "Who are you to blame me for this?", where this retort is meant to serve not as an excuse but rather as a challenge to the standing of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Between You and I: Dialogical Phenomenology.Beata Stawarska - 2009 - Ohio University Press.
    Classical phenomenology -- The transcendental tradition -- The logical investigations of the I -- From the I to the ego -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Strawson on the primacy of personhood -- Wittgenstein on the lure of words -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Zahavi on transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity -- Contemporary arguments for the transcendental ego : Marbach, Soffer -- Schutz, Theunissen on social phenomenology -- Husserl's later thought -- The multidiscipline of dialogical phenomenology (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  17. You can call me 'stupid', ... just don't call me stupid.Delia Graff Fara - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):492-501.
    In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  18. “Screw you!” & “thank you”.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.
    If I do you a good turn, you may respond with gratitude and express that gratitude by saying “Thank you.” Similarly, if I insult you, you may react with resentment which you express by shouting, “Screw you!” or something of the sort. Broadly put, when confronted with another’s morally significant conduct, we are inclined to respond with a reactive attitude and to express that reactive attitude in speech. A number of familiar speech acts have a call-and-response structure. Questions, demands and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  19. Now you know who Hong oak yun is.David Braun - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.
    Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall. And now you know who Hong Oak Yun is. For if someone were to ask you ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, you could answer that Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall, and you would know what you were saying. So you know an answer to the question ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, and that is sufficient for knowing who Hong Oak Yun is. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  20. If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  21. Were You a Part of Your Mother?Elselijn Kingma - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):609-646.
    Is the mammalian embryo/fetus a part of the organism that gestates it? According to the containment view, the fetus is not a part of, but merely contained within or surrounded by, the gestating organism. According to the parthood view, the fetus is a part of the gestating organism. This paper proceeds in two stages. First, I argue that the containment view is the received view; that it is generally assumed without good reason; and that it needs substantial support if it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  22. Now you know it, now you don’t.Keith DeRose - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  23. If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich.G. A. Cohen - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (1-2):1-26.
    Many people, including many egalitarian political philosophers, professa belief in equality while enjoying high incomes of which they devotevery little to egalitarian purposes. The article critically examinesways of resolving the putative inconsistency in the stance of thesepeople, in particular, that favouring an egalitarian society has noimplications for behaviour in an unequal one; that what''s bad aboutinequality is a social division that philanthropy cannot reduce; thatprivate action cannot ensure that others have good lives; that privateaction can only achieve a ``drop in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   196 citations  
  24. How you can help, without making a difference.Julia Nefsky - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2743-2767.
    There are many cases in which people collectively cause some morally significant outcome (such as a harmful or beneficial outcome) but no individual act seems to make a difference. The problem in such cases is that it seems each person can argue, ‘it makes no difference whether or not I do X, so I have no reason to do it.’ The challenge is to say where this argument goes wrong. My approach begins from the observation that underlying the problem and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  25. You are simple.David Barnett - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--174.
    I argue that, unlike your brain, you are not composed of other things: you are simple. My argument centers on what I take to be an uncontroversial datum: for any pair of conscious beings, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious. Consider, for instance, the pair comprising you and me. You might pinch your arm and feel a pain. I might simultaneously pinch my arm and feel a qualitatively identical pain. But the pair we form would not (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  26.  3
    You Look Human, But Act Like a Machine: Agent Appearance and Behavior Modulate Different Aspects of Human–Robot Interaction.Abdulaziz Abubshait & Eva Wiese - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27. You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination.Peter Kung - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):90-120.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  28.  58
    Do You Have To Be A Lesbian To Be A Feminist?Marilyn Frye - manuscript
  29. You Don't Say?Kent Bach - 2001 - Synthese 128 (1):15-44.
    This paper defends a purely semantic notion of what is said against various recent objections. The objections each cite some sort of linguistic, psychological, or epistemological fact that is supposed to show that on any viable notion of what a speaker says in uttering a sentence, there is pragmatic intrusion into what is said. Relying on a modified version of Grice's notion, on which what is said must be a projection of the syntax of the uttered sentence, I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  30. Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  31. Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.
    According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to “traditional factors,” our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  32. Do you see what I see? How social differences influence mindreading.Spaulding Shannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4009-4030.
    Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  33. You gotta do what you gotta do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.
    One question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns the pro-attitudes: can any set of beliefs, without the help of a desire, rationalize or make reasonable a desire, intention, attempt, or intentional action? After criticizing Michael Smith’s argument for a negative answer to this question, I present two arguments in favor of a positive answer. Another question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns belief: what gives you a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34.  28
    Should You Buy Local?Carson Young - 2022 - Journal of Business Ethics 176 (2):265-281.
    Buying local is a prominent form of ethical consumption. We commonly assume that products that are local are in some respect ethically superior to ones that are not. This article contributes to research on local food by scrutinizing this assumption in light of some central values of the locavore movement. It identifies four central ethical causes from prior literature on locavorism: protecting the environment, promoting community, promoting small business, and contributing to the prosperity of one’s local economy. It then analyzes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35.  77
    You Didn't Build That: Equality and Productivity in a Complex Society.Sean Aas - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):69-88.
    This paper argues for Serious Distributive Egalitarianism – the view that some material inequalities are seriously objectionable as such; not merely, say, because such inequalities tend to generate inequalities in status. Social justice requires equality, I argue, because basic social institutions produce important goods and are produced in turn by the relevantly equal contributions of all those that comply with them. E.g., basic social institutions make it much easier to produce cooperatively than it would be in their absence; therefore, these (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36.  22
    Are You Satisfied With Your Pay When You Compare? It Depends on Your Love of Money, Pay Comparison Standards, and Culture.Thomas Li-Ping Tang & Roberto Luna-Arocas - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 128 (2):279-289.
    We develop a theoretical model of income and pay comparison satisfaction with two mediators, examine the direct and the indirect paths of our model, and treat culture as a moderator. Based on 311 professors in the US and Spain, we demonstrate a positive direct path and a negative indirect path. Our subsequent multi-group analysis illustrates: For American professors, their direct path shows that income is directly related to high pay comparison satisfaction. Their indirect path reveals the following new insights: Professors (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  37. Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand: Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna.Michael H. Shank - 2014 - Princeton Legacy Library.
    Founded in 1365, not long after the Great Plague ravaged Europe, the University of Vienna was revitalized in 1384 by prominent theologians displaced from Paris--among them Henry of Langenstein. Beginning with the 1384 revival, Michael Shank explores the history of the university and its ties with European intellectual life and the city of Vienna. In so doing he links the abstract discussions of university theologians with the burning of John Hus and Jerome of Prague at the Council of Constance (1415-16) (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome.Zach Barnett - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (4):422-446.
    Prevailing opinion—defended by Jason Brennan and others—is that voting to change the outcome is irrational, since although the payoffs of tipping an election can be quite large, the probability of doing so is extraordinarily small. This paper argues that prevailing opinion is incorrect. Voting is shown to be rational so long as two conditions are satisfied: First, the average social benefit of electing the better candidate must be at least twice as great as the individual cost of voting, and second, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  39. Trying: You’ve Got to Believe.Frederick Adams - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:549-561.
    Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  35
    Constraints, You, and Your Victims.Bastian Steuwer - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Deontologists believe that it is wrong to violate a right even if this will prevent a greater number of violations of the same right. This leads to the paradox of deontology: If respecting everyone’s rights is equally important, why should we not minimize the number of rights violations? One possible answer is agent-based. This answer points out that you should not violate rights even if this will prevent someone else’s violations. In this paper, I defend a relational agent-based justification that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.
    This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  42.  15
    Transparency you can trust: Transparency requirements for artificial intelligence between legal norms and contextual concerns.Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux, Christoph Lutz, Eduard Fosch Villaronga & Heike Felzmann - 2019 - Big Data and Society 6 (1).
    Transparency is now a fundamental principle for data processing under the General Data Protection Regulation. We explore what this requirement entails for artificial intelligence and automated decision-making systems. We address the topic of transparency in artificial intelligence by integrating legal, social, and ethical aspects. We first investigate the ratio legis of the transparency requirement in the General Data Protection Regulation and its ethical underpinnings, showing its focus on the provision of information and explanation. We then discuss the pitfalls with respect (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  43.  10
    So you think gestures are nonverbal?David McNeill - 1985 - Psychological Review 92 (3):350-371.
  44.  28
    If you want to get ahead, get a theory.Annette Karmiloff-Smith & Bärbel Inhelder - 1974 - Cognition 3 (3):195-212.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   143 citations  
  45.  70
    If You’re an Egalitarian, You Shouldn’t be so Rich.Jason Brennan & Christopher Freiman - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (3):323-337.
    G.A. Cohen famously claims that egalitarians shouldn’t be so rich. If you possess excess income and there is little chance that the state will redistribute it to the poor, you are obligated to donate it yourself. We argue that this conclusion is correct, but that the case against the rich egalitarian is significantly stronger than the one Cohen offers. In particular, the standard arguments against donating one’s excess income face two critical, unrecognized problems. First, we show that these arguments imply (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Synthese 38 (3):415-449.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  47.  90
    Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain in a Vat?Ned Markosian - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):161-181.
    The topic of this paper is the familiar problem of skepticism about the external world. How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat being fooled byalien scientists? And if you can't know that, how can you know anything about the external world? The paper assumes Evidentialism as a theory about justification, and then argues that you are justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat, in virtue of the fact that your (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48. What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.
    It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this, it has become popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a view about rationality—the view that what one is rationally required to do is determined by the normative reasons one possesses—by showing that it can vindicate that one ought to be rational. I do this by showing that it is independently very plausible that what (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  49. You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  50. Are You Morally Modified?: The Moral Effects of Widely Used Pharmaceuticals.Neil Levy, Thomas Douglas, Guy Kahane, Sylvia Terbeck, Philip J. Cowen, Miles Hewstone & Julian Savulescu - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (2):111-125.
    A number of concerns have been raised about the possible future use of pharmaceuticals designed to enhance cognitive, affective, and motivational processes, particularly where the aim is to produce morally better decisions or behavior. In this article, we draw attention to what is arguably a more worrying possibility: that pharmaceuticals currently in widespread therapeutic use are already having unintended effects on these processes, and thus on moral decision making and morally significant behavior. We review current evidence on the moral effects (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000