Das primäre Ziel dieses Open-Access-Buches besteht in der Entwicklung einer Theorie pluraler epistemischer Autoritäten. Epistemische Autoritäten spielen in unserer durch Spezialisierung geprägten und hochgradig arbeitsteilig organisierten modernen "Informations-" oder "Wissensgesellschaft" eine zentrale Rolle. Die Philosophie hat diesem Umstand in den letzten Jahren durch eine zunehmend intensive Diskussion Rechnung getragen. Ein entscheidendes Defizit dieser Debatte besteht nach Diagnose des Autors allerdings darin, dass sie sich fast ausschließlich auf individuelle epistemische Autoritäten konzentriert hat. In unserer epistemischen Praxis sind plurale epistemische Autoritäten - (...) d.h. wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaften, Expertengremien, Geschworenenjurys usw. - aber mindestens genauso bedeutsam. Wir berufen uns auf "wissenschaftlichen Konsens", orientieren uns an "herrschenden Meinungen" usw. und stützen uns damit auf plurale epistemische Autoritäten. Das Buch möchte die Potentiale, aber auch die Herausforderungen und Fallstricke analysieren, die diese Praxis des Sich-Stützens auf plurale epistemische Autoritäten mit sich bringt. Der Autor Rico Hauswald ist Privatdozent am Institut für Philosophie der TU Dresden und Teilprojektleiter im BMBF-geförderten interdisziplinären Forschungsvorhaben "Verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit künstlicher Intelligenz in der Medizin". Arbeitsschwerpunkte liegen u. a. in der Wissenschafts-, Erkenntnis- und Medizintheorie. (shrink)

According to Kant's most important definition an analytic judgement obtains when the predicate of a judgement is already contained intensionally in the subject. It has been objected (most recently by Robert Hanna) that whereas this containment is a sufficient criterion, nevertheless there are analytic judgements that do not have a corresponding conceptual content. In these cases one needs to add an extensional criterion. The chief goal of this essay is to examine this argument critically and to reject it on the (...) grounds that although an analytic judgement can be defined extensionally, this does not achieve anything more than a conventional intensional definition. To this end Kant's argumentation on intension and extension will be reconstructed and this distinction will then be set in relation to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. This discussion requires especially a clarification of the role of modality. (shrink)

Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework and Mary Kate McGowan’s work on conversational scorekeeping, I argue that usage of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in ordinary language and public discourse typically entails the performance of what I call a dismissive conversational exercitive, a kind of speech act that functions to exclude certain propositions from (or prevent their inclusion in) the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While it can be legitimate to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, excluding alternatives (...) that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, it can give rise to what I call the problem of premature conclusions when subjects illegitimately dismiss certain propositions as irrelevant and, as a result, prematurely take certain conclusions or claims to be warranted. Depending on the kind of conclusion or claim, the problem can come in different variants, three of which I shall examine in more detail: the problem of premature knowledge claims, the problem of premature causal claims, and the problem of premature generic generalizations. (shrink)

The distinction between institution types and institution tokens plays an important role in Francesco Guala’s philosophy of institutions. In this commentary, I argue that this distinction faces a number of difficulties that are not sufficiently addressed in Understanding Institutions. In particular, I critically discuss Guala’s comparison between the taxonomy of organisms and the taxonomy of institutions, consider the semantics of institution terms on different levels in this taxonomy, and argue for an alternative solution to the problem of how to reconcile (...) reformism and realism about institutions like marriage. (shrink)

I examine situations in which we say that different subjects have ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon. In order to make sense of such situations, we should turn our attention to an often neglected ambiguity in the word ‘understanding’. Whereas the notion of understanding that is typically discussed in philosophy is, to use Elgin’s terms, tethered to the facts, there is another notion of understanding that is not tethered in the same way. This latter notion is relevant because, (...) typically, talk of two subjects having ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon does not entail any commitment to the proposition that these subjects understand the phenomenon in the tethered sense of the word. This paper aims, first, to analyze the non-tethered notion of understanding, second, to clarify its relationship to the tethered notion, third, to explore what exactly goes on when ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ clash and, fourth, to discuss the significance of such situations in our epistemic practices. In particular, I argue for a version of scientific pluralism according to which such situations are important because they help scientific communities achieve their fundamental epistemic goals—most importantly, the goal of understanding the world in the tethered sense. (shrink)

According to preemptionism, a layperson should treat the fact that an epistemic authority believes p as a reason to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. Many authors have found the unqualified version of preemptionism, as defended by Linda Zagzebski, too strong. At the same time, a number of them have recently advocated weakened or qualified preemptionist accounts. In this paper, I criticise these accounts. I argue that some of (...) them cannot explain the possibility of rational persistent disagreements between laypeople and epistemic authorities, while those that can explain it fail to account either for the extent to which justification is a holistic phenomenon or for the role of what I call ‘control reasons’ in the laypeople's epistemic conduct. (shrink)

What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform (...) a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis. (shrink)

There are a number of research fields that exhibit a special connection to some particular activist movement. Typically in these cases, we observe a remarkable degree of personnel overlap between the movements and the scientific communities. I have two primary aims. First, I shall explore the reasons why there are such close entanglements between some research fields and some activist movements. I argue that both scientists and activists have specific epistemic interests that help explain why both practices tend to intersect (...) functionally. Second, I shall evaluate these entanglements from an epistemological point of view. Drawing on a conception of science that has science consisting of two essential tasks—asking significant questions and adequately answering them—, I argue that activists’ contribution to science is ambivalent with regard to the first task because they can help to overcome the unjust distribution of resources, but they can also be the source of new inequalities. Regarding the second task, I similarly suggest that activists can serve a useful purpose in science, since they tend to exhibit certain epistemically valuable properties and can help compensate for what I call collective biases, although in certain situations they tend to reinforce collective biases. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 39 What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s _Preemption Thesis_, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that _epistemic deference_ (...) requires a layperson to perform a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 3 Seiten: 373-391.

According to John Searle, money is an institutional entity; it is among the things “that exist only because we believe them to exist”. I believe that Searle’s view is correct in some important respects. At the same time, I argue that money is a real or natural kind, much in the same way as biological species or chemical substances are real kinds about which empirical knowledge can be accumulated. The paper attempts to show the consistency of these assumptions. My argument (...) proceeds in two steps. First, I introduce homeostatic property cluster theory and characterize it as the most adequate account of real kinds that has been developed so far. Second, I reexamine, and to some extent reinterpret, money – one of Searle’s central examples of an institutional kind – and argue that it meets the conditions of a real kind as stated by HPC theory. An important part of the argument is a reconsideration of the circularity problem, i.e., the problem that Searle’s way of analyzing money already seems to presuppose the concept of money. (shrink)

Die Corona-Krise hat zugleich eine Krise der Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft ausgelöst und tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf die Generierung und Vermittlung von Wissen mit sich gebracht. Von Beginn der Pandemie an mussten Politik und Öffentlichkeit unter erheblichen Unsicherheiten agieren, während sich die wissenschaftliche Forschung mit der Herausforderung konfrontiert sah, schnellstmöglich belastbare Erkenntnisse bereitzustellen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellen sich zahlreiche Fragen zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit in grundlegender Form: Fragen nach der Funktion von Wissenschaft in der Politikberatung, dem Zusammenhang zwischen Faktenwissen (...) und normativen Bewertungen sowie den Implikationen von "Fast Science", dem vernünftigen Umgang mit Nichtwissen und Unsicherheit, der Rolle von epistemischem Vertrauen, Skepsis und kritischem Denken im Experten-Laien-Verhältnis oder dem Einfluss von Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien - aber auch dem Einfluss von Vorwürfen, solche zu verbreiten - auf den öffentlichen Diskurs. Der Band versammelt eine Reihe von Originalbeiträgen, die aus wissenschafts- und erkenntnistheoretischer Perspektive versuchen, Antworten auf diese und ähnliche Fragen zu formulieren. Dabei bilden sie ein breites Spektrum teils deutlich unterschiedlicher Positionen ab. Ein Anliegen des Bandes besteht auch darin, die Pluralität dieser Positionen sichtbar zu machen und einen Dialog zwischen ihnen anzuregen. (shrink)

In psychiatry there is no sharp boundary between the normal and the pathological. Although clear cases abound, it is often indeterminate whether a particular condition does or does not qualify as a mental disorder. For example, definitions of ‘subthreshold disorders’ and of the ‘prodromal stages’ of diseases are notoriously contentious. -/- Philosophers and linguists call concepts that lack sharp boundaries, and thus admit of borderline cases, ‘vague’. Although blurred boundaries between the normal and the pathological are a recurrent theme in (...) many publications concerned with the classification of mental disorders, systematic approaches that take into account philosophical reflections on vagueness are rare. This book provides interdisciplinary discussions about vagueness in psychiatry by bringing together scholars from psychiatry, psychology, philosophy, history, and law. It draws together various lines of inquiry into the nature of gradations between mental health and disease and discusses the individual and societal consequences of dealing with blurred boundaries in medical practice, forensic psychiatry, and beyond. -/- Part I starts with an overview chapter that helps readers to navigate through the philosophy of vagueness and through the various debates surrounding demarcation problems in the classification and diagnosis of mental illness. Part II encompasses historical and recent philosophical positions on gradualist approaches to health and disease. Part III approaches the vagueness of present psychiatric classification systems, and the debates concerning their revisions by scrutinizing controversial categories, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, and the difficulties of day-to-day diagnostic and therapeutic practice. Part IV finally focuses on social, moral, and legal implications that arise when being mentally ill is a matter of degree. (shrink)

In psychiatry there is no sharp boundary between the normal and the pathological. Although clear cases abound, it is often indeterminate whether a particular condition does or does not qualify as a mental disorder. For example, definitions of ‘subthreshold disorders’ and of the ‘prodromal stages’ of diseases are notoriously contentious. Philosophers and linguists call concepts that lack sharp boundaries, and thus admit of borderline cases, ‘vague’. This overview chapter reviews current debates about demarcation in psychiatry against the backdrop of key (...) issues within the philosophical discussion of vagueness: Are there various kinds of vagueness? Is all vagueness representational? How does vagueness relate to epistemic uncertainty? What is the value of vagueness? Given the immense social, moral, and legal importance of demarcating the normal from the pathological in psychiatry, what are the pros and cons of gradualist approaches to mental disorders, that is, of construing boundaries as matters of degree? (shrink)

Die Frage ›Warum ist überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts?‹ gehört zu den ebenso traditionsreichen wie umstrittenen Problemen der Philosophie. Bereits mehrmals in die Mottenkiste der Philosophiegeschichte verbannt, erlebt sie doch zuverlässig ihre Renaissancen. Der vorliegende Band nimmt sich der ›Grundfrage‹ in einer ideengeschichtlichen Perspektive an. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass die systematisch keineswegs erst mit Leibniz auftauchende Frage in ihrer Geschichte von der Antike bis zur gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie nicht nur jeweils unterschiedliche Antworten provoziert hat, sondern vor allem auch (...) ganz verschieden gestellt worden ist: Formuliert Leibniz »Pourquoi il y a plus tôt quelque chose que rien?«, heißt es bei Schelling »Warum ist nicht nichts, warum ist überhaupt etwas?«, während Schopenhauer ihr eine existentielle Wendung gibt (»Lieber nichts als etwas«). Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nihilismus führt zu der Frage: »Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?«, während Arendt sie ins Politische wendet (»Warum ist überhaupt jemand und nicht niemand?«). Der Band wird durch einen Überblick über die vielschichtige Diskussion der ›letzten Warum-Frage‹ in der Tradition der Analytischen Philosophie sowie einen Antwortversuch aus Sicht der aktuellen Physik und Kosmologie abgerundet. (shrink)

Die Corona-Krise hat zugleich eine Krise der Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft ausgelöst und tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf die Generierung und Vermittlung von Wissen mit sich gebracht. Von Beginn der Pandemie an mussten Politik und Öffentlichkeit unter erheblichen Unsicherheiten agieren, während sich die wissenschaftliche Forschung mit der Herausforderung konfrontiert sah, schnellstmöglich belastbare Erkenntnisse bereitzustellen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellen sich zahlreiche Fragen zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit in grundlegender Form: Fragen nach der Funktion von Wissenschaft in der Politikberatung, dem Zusammenhang zwischen Faktenwissen (...) und normativen Bewertungen sowie den Implikationen von "Fast Science", dem vernünftigen Umgang mit Nichtwissen und Unsicherheit, der Rolle von epistemischem Vertrauen, Skepsis und kritischem Denken im Experten-Laien-Verhältnis oder dem Einfluss von Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien - aber auch dem Einfluss von Vorwürfen, solche zu verbreiten - auf den öffentlichen Diskurs. Der Band versammelt eine Reihe von Originalbeiträgen, die aus wissenschafts- und erkenntnistheoretischer Perspektive versuchen, Antworten auf diese und ähnliche Fragen zu formulieren. Dabei bilden sie ein breites Spektrum teils deutlich unterschiedlicher Positionen ab. Ein Anliegen des Bandes besteht auch darin, die Pluralität dieser Positionen sichtbar zu machen und einen Dialog zwischen ihnen anzuregen. (shrink)

The objective of the present research was two-fold: to provide a new definition of ethical competence, and to clarify the influence of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model of personality on ethical competence. The present research provides a comprehensive overview about recent approaches and empirically explores the interconnections of these constructs. 366 German undergraduate students were examined in a cross-sectional study that investigated the relationship of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model of personality with moral judgment competence and (...) counterproductive work behavior as indicators of moral judgment and behavior. We found self-transcendence values to be related to both, high levels of empathy and ethical competence, in contrast to self-enhancement values. Multiple mediation analysis revealed unique effects of empathy on ethical competence through values as mediators. Affective empathy transmitted its effect on ethical competence through benevolence, conformity, tradition, power, and hedonism. Most importantly, perspective taking lost its predictive power when investigated alongside affective empathy dimensions. These results converge to an important role of affective empathy, in particular empathic concern, with regard to personal values and ethical competence. Furthermore, the five-factor model of personality explained variance in measures of ethical competence. Our research suggests that organizational decision makers should consider the role of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model in their human resource management in order to select employees with high ethical competence. (shrink)

Cantor argued that absolute infinity is beyond mathematical comprehension. His arguments imply that the domain of mathematics cannot be grasped by mathematical means. We argue that this inability constitutes a foundational problem. For Cantor, however, the domain of mathematics does not belong to mathematics, but to theology. We thus discuss the theological significance of Cantor’s treatment of absolute infinity and show that it can be interpreted in terms of negative theology. Proceeding from this interpretation, we refer to the recent debate (...) on absolute generality and argue that the method of diagonalization constitutes a modern version of the vianegativa. On our reading, negative theology can evoke an attitude of humility with respect to the boundedness of the human condition. Along these lines, we think that the foundational problem of mathematics concerning its domain can be addressed through a methodological attitude of humility. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...) of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ (...) Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism. (shrink)

Doxastic voluntarism is the philosophical doctrine according to which people have voluntary control over their beliefs. Philosophers in the debate about doxastic voluntarism distinguish between two kinds of voluntary control. The first is known as direct voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that if a person chooses to perform them, they happen immediately. For instance, a person has direct voluntary control over whether he or she is thinking about his or her favorite song at a given moment. (...) The second is known as indirect voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that although a person lacks direct voluntary control over them, he or she can cause them to happen if he or she chooses to perform some number of other, intermediate actions. For instance, a person untrained in music has indirect voluntary control over whether he or she will play a melody on a violin. Corresponding to this distinction between two kinds of voluntary control, philosophers distinguish between two kinds of doxastic voluntarism. Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that people have direct voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs. Indirect doxastic voluntarism, however, supposes that people have indirect voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs, for example, by doing research and evaluating evidence. This article offers an introductory explanation of the nature of belief, the nature of voluntary control, the reasons for the consensus regarding indirect doxastic voluntarism, the reasons for the disagreements regarding direct doxastic voluntarism, and the practical implications for the debate about doxastic voluntarism in ethics, epistemology, political theory, and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophy has aimed not only at theoretical insight, but also at personal development and transformation. This implies a new relationship to the self and the world, which can result, for example, from existential experiences triggered by the engagement with philosophical problems. Drawing on the examples of facticity and scepticism, this paper develops the thesis that transformative philosophical experience and a corresponding new view of the world can be accompanied by a new understanding of the philosophical problem that triggered (...) the experience. This would involve a non-propositional form of knowledge that is more than practical or phenomenal knowledge. A precise model of such a form of non-propositional insight could shed new light on the transformative dimension of philosophy and, with respect to, e. g., facticity and scepticism, provide a better understanding of limits of knowledge. (shrink)

Descartes’s concern with the proper method of belief formation is evident in the titles of his works—e.g., The Search after Truth, The Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and The Discourse on Method of rightly conducting one’s reason and seeking the truth in the sciences. It is most apparent, however, in his famous discussions, both in the Meditations and in the Principles, of one particularly noteworthy source of our doxastic errors—namely, the misuse of one’s will. What is not widely (...) recognized, let alone appreciated and understood, is the relationship between his concern with belief formation and his concern with virtue. In fact, few seem to realize that Descartes regards doxastic errors as moral errors and as sins both because such errors are intrinsically vicious and because they entail notably deleterious social consequences. Reforming the Art of Living seeks to rectify this rather common oversight in two ways. First, it aims to elucidate the nature of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation. Second, it aims both (i) to illuminate the social significance of Descartes’s philosophical program as it relates to the understanding and practice not of science, but of religion and (ii) to develop a kind of Leibnizian critique of this aspect of his program. More specifically, it aims to show that Descartes’s project is “dangerous,” insofar as it is subversive not only of traditional Christianity but also of other traditional forms of religion, both in theory and in practice. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...) of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

This book explores the notion of the human psyche ('soul') and its continuing usefulness in the background of the ongoing and always accelerating techno-scientific revolution. The main argument here follows the assumption that this revolution, while not necessarily being a threat to humankind, is often blind or ignorant as to its subject, the 'human being'. In the first chapters, the reader is invited to reflect on the notion of 'thinking' as a phenomenon of consciousness that transcends merely 'having thoughts'. Relating (...) thinking to consciousness requires reconsidering the phenomena of 'inspiration' and 'ecstasy'. Provided that such a thing as 'inspiration' exists, it makes sense to revise the solipsist or substantialist account often given of the human mind. The book defines inspiration as a 'clairvoyance of one's psyche', and ecstasy as the experience of this clairvoyance. Next, a case is made for synchronicity experiences as a key to a better understanding of the human psyche. While being enigmatic all throughout, synchronicity experiences, both on the individual and on the collective level, help overcome both subject/object and body/mind dualisms. It is not likely, though, that the solution they could offer will be readily accepted by (what is called) 'science' today, since it challenges one of the latter's basic premises, 'causality'. As a more concrete example of a condensed synchronicity experience, the author dwells on 'physiognomy'. In the final chapter, death and suffering are discussed as extreme, and therefore relevant, experiences of consciousness. The book interprets death in terms of 'enhanced subliminality', and 'suffering' as unconscious resistance against maturing. Generally, this book explores a psycho-philosophical tradition, rooted in Romantic thinking (from Schelling and Schopenhauer until Klages and Jung), which has hitherto been unjustly neglected, if not repressed, by mainstream materialism and positivism. It makes a strong case for an intellectual account of the soul. (shrink)

How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic ends ought to be, and (...) the way in which these issues are related to other traditional questions in epistemology. The section concludes by examining questions of epistemic value, of whether knowledge is in some sense primary, and of whether the ethics of belief falls within the domain of epistemology or ethics. The second section extends this traditional debate to issues concerning the social dimensions of belief formation. It begins with essays by social psychologists discussing the past three decades of research in 'lay epistemics'. It continues by examining Humean, Kantian, and feminist insights into the social aspects of belief formation, as well as questions concerning the ethics of assertion. The section concludes with a series of essays examining a topic that is currently of great interest to epistemologists: namely, the significance of peer disagreement. (shrink)

In this fine collection, Bob Dylan at 80, Gary Browning and Constantine Sandis have curated a book which is Janus-faced. It develops a simple premise, to reflect on the career of Dylan and the mult...

Capitalismo y nihilismo constituye un clarificador análisis del nihilismo normal, cotidiano, alegre y moralizante del capitalismo y de sus instrumentos de dominación, así como de los peligros que entraña para la supervivencia misma de la humanidad.

This essay brings Italian political philosopher Giambattista Vico’s thought to bear on the issue of contemporary populism. Contemporary populism can be refected in Vico’s cyclical philosophy of the three ages of civilisation: the divine, heroic and human ages. Contemporary populism represents a return to the barbarism of the heroic age through the descent into individualism and private interest, the return of divinely ordained rulers and the recourse to myth, violence and morality. Humankind’s reason has become corrupted by the complexity of (...) highly developed society, releasing the destructive forces of contemporary populism and a descent into a ‘barbarism of refection’. Corsi e ricorsi illustrates how contemporary populism remains but a stage in the Vichian cycle, alluding to how it represents an essential form of political life throughout history. (shrink)

In de?Hal van de acht wijzen? in de Sankeientuin (Yokohama, Japan) staan de standbeelden van grote leraren van de mensheid: Boeddha, Confucius, Jezus en enkele Zenleraren. Onder hen is ook het beeld van Socrates. Voor Kenzo Adachi, die de hal bouwde, was Socrates vooral een spirituele leider, een levensgids, een voorbeeld van deugd, wijsheid en geluk.0Bij welke filosofische traditie je ook te rade gaat, overal kom je Socrates tegen. Sommigen noemen hem de vader van de filosofie, anderen zien hem als (...) een leermeester in correct denken of morele moed. Zoveel tradities, zoveel Socratessen. En, opmerkelijk: al die Socratessen zijn nog geloofwaardig ook.0Rico Sneller presenteert een geschiedenis van de filosofie aan de hand van alle Socratessen die de filosofische traditie rijk is.Na Xenofons en Aristofanes? Socrates gaat hij onder meer in op de Socrates van Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Strauss en Derrida.0We zijn nog lang niet uitgepraat over Socrates. En de lezer van 'Het raadsel Socrates' al helemaal niet. (shrink)

Im Zentrum von Heideggers Denken steht eine quasireligiöse Umwendung des Menschen. Davon ausgehend entwickelt diese Arbeit das Konzept einer post-theistischen Religiosität, das nicht nur zum philosophischen Verständnis der religiösen Rede beiträgt, sondern auch eine neue Interpretation von Heideggers Spätwerk ermöglicht. In beiden Fällen geht es um die Unbegreiflichkeit der menschlichen Situation, die Religion wie Philosophie gleichermaßen herausfordert.

Mit dem Begriff der Theoriennachbarschaft und einer darauf aufbauenden neuen Definition von Reduktion ermöglicht diese Arbeit eine angemessene Beschreibung und Einteilung der vielen diffizilen Beziehungen zwischen physikalischen Theorien. Mithilfe dieser Konzepte wird in drei Fallstudien exemplarisch gezeigt, dass moderne physikalische Theorien zwar meist benachbart zueinander sind, aber nicht so aufeinander reduzierbar, dass eine reduzierte Theorie für die wissenschaftliche Beschreibung der Welt entbehrlich wäre. Die Einheit der Physik kann daher nicht auf eliminativen Reduktionen auf fundamentale Theorien beruhen, lässt sich aber dennoch (...) mit zahlreichen Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen begründen. (shrink)