Dieser interdisziplinär angelegte Sammelband erkundet die Relevanz wissenschaftlicher Erhellungen der Lebenswelt für Systematische und Praktische Theologie. Dazu begibt er sich in ein Gespräch mit philosophischer Phänomenologie, Religionsphilosophie und Sozialwissenschaft. Die einzelnen Beiträge markieren aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven das Interesse von Theologie an "Gelebter Religion". Abgeleitet wird daraus die Bedeutung der Phänomenologie für die Konstitution der Praktischen Theologie.

Summary A large survey of German and Israeli younger and older adolescents was conducted to reveal their opinions and attitudes towards violence and aggression, their personal engagement in aggressive and violent behaviors in and outside the school environment, their attitudes toward physical activity, their engagement in physical activity, and the linkage between physical activity engagement and conductance of violence and aggression. The findings point out that there are more similarities than differences between German and Israeli adolescents concerning violence and aggression (...) in and outside schools. No linkage between physical activity involvement and the extent of violent and/or aggressive acts is found. The findings pertaining adolescents’ opinions and attitudes toward aggression and violence and their behaviors in and outside school are encouraging. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

Emergence of the novel pathogenic coronavirus SARS‐CoV‐2 and its rapid pandemic spread presents challenges that demand immediate attention. Here, we describe the development of a semi‐quantitative high‐content microscopy‐based assay for detection of three major classes (IgG, IgA, and IgM) of SARS‐CoV‐2 specific antibodies in human samples. The possibility to detect antibodies against the entire viral proteome together with a robust semi‐automated image analysis workflow resulted in specific, sensitive and unbiased assay that complements the portfolio of SARS‐CoV‐2 serological assays. Sensitive, specific (...) and quantitative serological assays are urgently needed for a better understanding of humoral immune response against the virus as a basis for developing public health strategies to control viral spread. The procedure described here has been used for clinical studies and provides a general framework for the application of quantitative high‐throughput microscopy to rapidly develop serological assays for emerging virus infections. (shrink)

Comparing knowledge with belief can go wrong in two dimensions: If the authors employ a wider notion of knowledge, then they do not compare like with like because they assume a narrow notion of belief. If they employ only a narrow notion of knowledge, then their claim is not supported by the evidence. Finally, we sketch a superior teleological view.

Gerontologists have proposed different concepts for ageing well such as ‘successful ageing’, ‘active ageing’, and ‘healthy ageing’. These conceptions are primarily focused on maintaining health and preventing disease. But they also raise the questions: what is a good life in old age and how can it be achieved? While medical in origin, these concepts and strategies for ageing well also contain ethical advice for individuals and societies on how to act regarding ageing and old age. This connection between gerontology and (...) ethics is overlooked by both schools of thought. We thus develop this research programme for a systematic geroethics in four steps. First, we analyze ‘successful ageing’ as put forward by Rowe and Kahn as a paradigmatic example of a gerontological conception of ageing well. Then, in a second step, we move from criticisms within gerontology to an ethical perspective; in particular, we want to clarify the problem of the claim of universal validity of conceptions of the good life. In a third constructive step, we explain how the ‘capabilities approach’ could be applied in this context as a normative foundation for the implicit normative assumptions of gerontological conceptions of ageing well, such as a particular choice of functionings, the ethical relevance of human agency, and the resulting claims of individuals towards society. Finally, using a concept developed by the German philosopher Ursula Wolf, we systematically develop the different aspects of the connection between ageing well and the theory of the good life in their full complexity and show their interconnectedness. (shrink)

Aus ganz unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln, sei es aus musikhistorischer oder ethnomusikologischer Sicht, umkreisen zehn Beitrage das Thema aMusik - Zu Begriff und Konzepteno. Unter dieses Thema ein internationales Symposion in Berlin zu stellen, das zum Gedenken an Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht (1919-1999) veranstaltet wurde, erschien umso naheliegender, zumal Eggebrecht die Frage aWas ist Musik'o existenziell beruhrte, sie grundierte und sein Forscherleben als Musikwissenschaftler von den fruhen Veroffentlichungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zu den letzten Arbeiten durchzog. Inhalt Bruno Nettl: Was ist (...) Musik? Ethnomusikologische Perspektive Sabine Ehrmann-Herfort: Die Kantate. Musik zwischen asthetischer Autonomie und Ideologie Christian Berger: aMusiko nach Kant Erich Reimer: aMusikanto und aMusiko. Zur Geschichte einer wechselvollen Beziehung Christian Kaden: Musik bei denen, die keine aMusiko haben Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen: Hugo Riemann und der Musikbegriff der Musikwissenschaft Klaus-Jurgen Sachs: Musik - erfahren und erortert durch Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) Wolf Frobenius: Gestische Musik. Zur Fruhgeschichte des Begriffs Albrecht von Massow: Tonkorper - ein eigenstandiger Parameter der Wesensbestimmung und der Analyse von Musik Christian Thorau: Symphony in White - Musik als modus der Referenz. (shrink)

The category of ‘organism’ has an ambiguous status: is it scientific or is it philosophical? Or, if one looks at it from within the relatively recent field or sub-field of philosophy of biology, is it a central, or at least legitimate category therein, or should it be dispensed with? In any case, it has long served as a kind of scientific “bolstering” for a philosophical train of argument which seeks to refute the “mechanistic” or “reductionist” trend, which has been perceived (...) as dominant since the 17th century, whether in the case of Stahlian animism, Leibnizian monadology, the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch, or, lastly, of the “phenomenology of organic life” in the 20th century, with authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Georges Canguilhem. In this paper I try to reconstruct some of the main interpretive ‘stages’ or ‘layers’ of the concept of organism in order to critically evaluate it. How might ‘organism’ be a useful concept if one rules out the excesses of ‘organismic’ biology and metaphysics? Varieties of instrumentalism and what I call the ‘projective’ concept of organism are appealing, but perhaps ultimately unsatisfying. (shrink)

Introduction Jan Abbink and Hans Vermeulen This volume consists of essays and studies by authors inspired by the work of Eric Wolf, a central figure in ...

The category of« organism » has an ambiguous status: scientific or philosophical? In any case, it has long served as a kind of scientific « bolstering » for a philosophical train of argument which seeks to refute the « mechanistic » or « reductionist » trend, which is seen as dominant since the 17th century, whether in the case of Stahlian animism, Leibnizian monadology, the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch, or, lastly, of the « phenomenology of organic life » in (...) the 20th century, with authors such as Goldstein, Straws, and Weizsäcker, whose influence on Merleau-Ponty but also Canguilhem is obvious. The aim of this article is both to bring to light the sedimentation of this category and to give a critical evaluation of it, in other words, to sec in what way it might still be useful once one has eliminated the possibility of any « organicist » excesses. I suggest a notion of organism as an instrumental fiction. (shrink)

In recent years, an increasingly assertive People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership has sought to extend the PRC’s influence globally. To this end, it has developed diverse strategies ranging from soft power to more coercive means. The more visible strategies include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese Dream, and ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. At the soft power end of the spectrum, Chinese overseas students are at the nexus between two strategies of soft power – the Chinese diaspora and the (...) internationalisation of higher education. While there is an established literature analysing China’s soft power worldwide, relatively little has been done on the role of higher education, particularly where this concerns overseas Chinese students. The article will examine China’s use of overseas students to project its soft power. It then identifies the strategies that support this, viz. ideological and political education to prepare young people for this role and, once overseas, an appeal to a conception of the Chinese diaspora, as well as the organisations (e.g. embassies and student associations) that form potential channels to students and monitor and support them in their role. (shrink)

The species of vitalism discussed here, to immediately rule out two possible misconceptions, is neither the feverish cosa mentale found in ruminations on ‘biopolitics’ and fascism – where it alternates quickly between being a form of evil and a form of resistance, with hardly any textual or conceptual material to discuss – nor the opaque, and less-known form in which it exists in the worlds of ‘Theory’ in the humanities, perhaps closely related to the cognate, ‘materiality’. Rather, vitalism here is (...) a malleable construct, often with a poisonous reputation, hovering in the realms of the philosophy of biology, the history of medicine, and the scientific background of the Radical Enlightenment. This is a more vital vitalism, or at least a more ‘biologistic’, ‘embodied’, medicalized vitalism. I first distinguish between what I would call ‘substantival’ and ‘functional’ forms of vitalism, as applied to the eighteenth century. Substantival vitalism presupposes the existence of something like a vital force which either plays a causal role in the natural world as studied by scientific means, or remains a kind of hovering, extra-causal entity. Functional vitalism tends to operate ‘post facto’, from the existence of living bodies to the desire to find explanatory models that will do justice to their uniquely ‘vital’ properties in a way that fully mechanistic models cannot. I discuss some representative figures of the Montpellier school as being functional rather than substantival vitalists. A second point concerns the reprisal of vitalism in ‘late modernity’; from Hans Driesch to Georges Canguilhem. I suggest that in addition to the substantival and functional varieties, we then encounter a third, more existential form of vitalism, articulated by Canguilhem, in which vitalism is a kind of attitude towards Life. All of this, I hope, argues for a form of vitalism which is neither tedious scientism nor dangerous political rhetoric of health and sickness; instead, a vitalism with its own discreet charm. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthält eine Sammlung von Beiträgen zum Problem der Wechselwirkung zwischen Geist und Materie, einem der zentralen Probleme europäischer Geistesgeschichte. Die Blickwinkel, die dabei eingenommen werden, sind vorrangig die der Physik und der Psychologie. Die Wechselwirkung dieser Gebiete wird so deutlich wie nie zuvor im Dialog zwischen zwei Forscherpersön lichkeiten dieses Jahrhunderts sichtbar: dem Physiker Wolfgang Pauli (1900- 1958) und dem Psychologen Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). In zahlreichen Brie fen und Manuskripten Paulis, die erst in den letzten Jahren (...) allgemein zugänglich wurden, finden sich bemerkenswerte und wichtige Beiträge zu diesem Dialog, die das Verständnis des Zusammenhanges von Geist und Materie in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lassen. Um den durch Pauli und Jung begonnenen Dialog fortzusetzen und weiter fruchtbar zu machen, ist das interdisziplinäre Gespräch zwischen Physikern und Psychologen nötig. Diesem Zweck diente eine von der Eidgenössischen Techni sehen Hochschule Zürich (der Hochschule, an der Pauli tätig war) und dem C.G.Jung-Institut Zürich (das Jung gegründet hat) gemeinsam veranstaltete Tagung im Centro Stefano Franscini (Monte Verita, Ascona) vom 13. bis 18. Juni 1993. Sie stand unter dem Thema Das Irrationale in den Naturwissenschaften: Wolf gang Paulis Begegnung mit dem Geist der Materie und wurde von Pier Luigi Luisi initiiert und organisiert. Als Berater fungierten Paul Brutsehe, Hans Primas und Eva Wertenschlag-Birkhäuser. Berichte und Kommentare zu dieser Tagung wurden in Heft 4/1993 der Zeitschrift Gaia veröffentlicht. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: W. Bartuschat: Recht, Vernunft, Gerechtigkeit H. Ruessmann: Normative Begruendungsmoglichkeiten jenseits der Gesetzesbindung G. Luf: Gerechtigkeitstheorie zwischen Gemeinsinn und transzendentaler Reflexion: Uberlegungen im Anschlua an Rawls' Theorie der Gerechtigkeit R. Trapp: Politisches Handeln im wohlverstandenen Allgemeininteresse P. Koller: Soziale Gueter und soziale Gerechtigkeit R. Zaczyk: Gerechtigkeit als Begriff einer kritischen Philosophie im Ausgang von Kant U. Steinvorth: Gerechtigkeit in einer Weltgesellschaft R. Knieper: Versuch ueber die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Nationalstaates B. Sitter-Liver: Natur als Polis R. Wolf: (...) Gerechtigkeit und Umweltschutz G. Haney: Gerechtigkeit bei Marx H. Rottleuthner: Gerechtigkeit bei und nach Marx G. Lohmann: Soziale Gerechtigkeit und soziokulturelle Selbstdeutungen. (shrink)

Tanto la filosofía como la literatura, en cuanto búsquedas de la verdad, de respuestas frente a un núcleo de preguntas vitales, recurren a una estructura formal que necesariamente es la expresión de una actitud frente a la vida. Se plantea que la forma literaria no puede separarse del contenido filosófico, pues es el resultado de una indagación que intenta dar respuestas a asuntos particulares sobre la vida humana, así como el contenido filosófico halla expresión en una estructura formal que transmite (...) un sentido de la vida. La forma y el contenido no pueden separarse sin fracturar la visión de la vida que ofrecen tanto el texto literario como el texto filosófico. Sin embargo ¿cómo escribir, qué formas, qué estructuras, qué lenguaje utilizar para hablar de asuntos tan particulares como el amor? ¿Hasta dónde es posible escribir filosóficamente sobre la vida y sus interrogantes particulares? ¿Cuáles han sido los aportes de la literatura en la búsqueda de visiones alternativas frente a la experiencia humana? Tal es el punto de partida en la elaboración de este ensayo que intenta, por lo demás, concederle a la literatura y a sus formas de expresión, un lugar más central en el campo de la reflexión sobre el sentido de la vida y otros interrogantes importantes acerca de los asuntos humanos. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Little Hans’s Little SisterKelly OliverIn an important sense, Freud’s metapsychology is built on the back of animal phobias, which he repeatedly trots out whenever he needs to substantiate his theories of the castration complex, anxiety, and even the foundational Oedipal complex.1 From a feminist perspective, it is fascinating that behind the animal phobias that define Freud’s work—Little Hans’s horse, the Rat Man, the Wolf Man—there are (...) consistently fantasies of matricide, self-birth, and womb envy. Perhaps more significantly, there are sisters who both torment and titillate their brothers and thereby contribute to the onset of their phobias. Freud relegates to the background these terrible sisters and their abjected mothers to put the father at the center of animal phobia. In this essay, I will explore the mothers and sisters effaced by the father-animal and the ways in which they “bite back” in Freud’s own analysis of animal phobias.Eat or Be EatenIn the major cases of animal phobia that Freud analyzes and repeatedly invokes throughout his writings, from the “Analysis of Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (1909a) on, he identifies the threat posed by the animal with the father’s castration threats; the boy-child’s fear of being bitten by the animal in question is interpreted as a fear of castration. For example, in his analysis of Little Hans (the Five Year-Old Boy), Hans is afraid that a horse will bite him. Freud interprets his horse phobia as the substitution of the horse for his father, from whom he fears castration as punishment for his desires for his mother. Hans has ambivalent feelings toward his father, whom he both loves and fears, and “solves” the problem by splitting his father into the good father and the [End Page 9] bad father, the latter represented by the horse. The Rat Man and the Wolf Man both get their names from the animals that they fear will bite or devour them.The Rat Man is named for his famous story of an “Eastern” punishment whereby rats used their teeth to bore into the anus of the victim (Freud 1909b, 166). It doesn’t take long for Freud to discover that one of the imagined victims of this punishment is the patient’s father. The rest of the analysis turns around the patient’s relationship with his father, his father’s disapproval of his sexual relations, and the patient’s imagined punishment associated with sex. The Rat Man’s phobic fantasies involve being devoured by rats, or his father being devoured by rats as a sort of punishment levied for his father’s cruelty and the patient’s own sexual indiscretions. Later in his analysis, Freud links the rat phobia to anal eroticism associated with the patient’s childhood being plagued by worms. The rats come to represent many things, including money, disease, the penis, and children. The association between rats and children involves, among other things, the fact that as a child, the patient liked to bite people.The Wolf Man is also afraid of being devoured by animals. Although the fear of being devoured or bitten by wolves is central to Freud’s analysis, the patient reports other animal phobias—butterflies, caterpillars, swine—some involving similar fears. In the case of the Wolf Man, Freud interprets the dreaded wolf as a father substitute that threatens to devour the patient as he had seen a wolf devour seven little goats in a fairy-tale book that his sister used to torment him with as a child: “Whenever he caught sight of this picture [of a wolf] he began to scream like a lunatic that he was afraid of the wolf coming and eating him up. His sister, however, always succeeded in arranging so that he was obliged to see this picture, and was delighted at his terror” (Freud 1918, 16). Freud surmised that in the cases of the Wolf Man and of Little Hans, their fathers used to pretend to want to gobble them up (Freud 1925, 104). He likens this to another case of a young American whose father read him stories aboutan... (shrink)

My topic is the materialist appropriation of empiricism – as conveyed in the ‘minimal credo’ nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (which interestingly is not just a phrase repeated from Hobbes and Locke to Diderot, but is also a medical phrase, used by Harvey, Mandeville and others). That is, canonical empiricists like Locke go out of their way to state that their project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall (...) not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind” (Essay, I.i.2, in Locke 1975; which Kant gets exactly wrong in his reading of Locke, in the Preface to the A edition of the first Critique). Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere, contrary to a prevalent reading of Locke, that the Essay is not the extension to the study of the mind of the methods of natural philosophy; that he is actually not the “underlabourer” of Newton and Boyle he claims politely to be in the Epistle to the Reader (Wolfe and Salter 2009, Wolfe 2010). Rather, Locke says quite directly if we pay heed to such passages, “Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct” (Essay, I.i.6). There would be more to say here about what this implies for our understanding of empiricism (see Norton 1981 and Gaukroger 2005), but instead I shall focus on a different aspect of this episode: how a non-naturalistic claim which falls under what we now call epistemology (a claim about the senses as the source of knowledge) becomes an ontology – materialism. That is, how an empiricist claim could shift from being about the sources of knowledge to being about the nature of reality (and/or the mind, in which case it needs, as David Hartley saw and Denis Diderot proclaimed more overtly, an account of the relation between mental processes and the brain). (David Armstrong, for one, denied that there could be an identification between empiricism and materialism on this point: eighteenth-century history of science seems to prove him wrong: see Armstrong 1968 and 1978.) Put differently, I want to examine the shift from the logic of ideas in the seventeenth century (Locke) to an eighteenth-century focus on what kind of ‘world’ the senses give us (Condillac), to an assertion that there is only one substance in the universe (Diderot, giving a materialist cast to Spinozism), and that we need an account of the material substrate of mental life. This is neither a ‘scientific empiricism’ nor a linear developmental process from philosophical empiricism to natural science, but something else again: the unpredictable emergence of an ontology on empiricist grounds. (shrink)

Sensibility, in any of its myriad realms – moral, physical, aesthetic, medical and so on – seems to be a paramount case of a higher-level, intentional property, not a basic property. Diderot famously made the bold and attributive move of postulating that matter itself senses, or that sensibility (perhaps better translated ‘sensitivity’ here) is a general or universal property of matter, even if he at times took a step back from this claim and called it a “supposition.” Crucially, sensibility is (...) here playing the role of a ‘booster’: it enables materialism to provide a full and rich account of the phenomena of conscious, sentient life, contrary to what its opponents hold: for if matter can sense, and sensibility is not a merely mechanical process, then the loftiest cognitive plateaus are accessible to materialist analysis, or at least belong to one and the same world as the rest of matter. This was noted by the astute anti-materialist critic, the Abbé Lelarge de Lignac, who, in his 1751 Lettres à un Amériquain, criticized Buffon for “granting to the body [la machine, a common term for the body at the time] a quality which is essential to minds, namely sensibility.” This view, here attributed to Buffon and definitely held by Diderot, was comparatively rare. If we look for the sources of this concept, the most notable ones are physiological and medical treatises by prominent figures such as Robert Whytt, Albrecht von Haller and the Montpellier vitalist Théophile de Bordeu. We then have, or so I shall try to sketch out, an intellectual landscape in which new – or newly articulated – properties such as irritability and sensibility are presented either as an experimental property of muscle fibers, that can be understood mechanistically (Hallerian irritability, as studied recently by Hubert Steinke and Dominique Boury) or a property of matter itself (whether specifically living matter as in Bordeu and his fellow montpelliérains Ménuret and Fouquet, or matter in general, as in Diderot). I am by no means convinced that it is one and the same ‘sensibility’ that is at issue in debates between these figures (as when Bordeu attacks Haller’s distinction between irritability and sensibility and claims that ‘his own’ property of sensibility is both more correct and more fundamental in organic beings), but I am interested in mapping out a topography of the problem of sensibility as property of matter or as vital force in mid-eighteenth-century debates – not an exhaustive cartography of all possible positions or theories, but an attempt to understand the ‘triangulation’ of three views: a vitalist view in which sensibility is fundamental, matching up with a conception of the organism as the sum of parts conceived as little lives (Bordeu et al.); a mechanist, or ‘enhanced mechanist’ view in which one can work upwards, step by step from the basic property of irritability to the higher-level property of sensibility (Haller); and, more eclectic, a materialist view which seeks to combine the mechanistic, componential rigour and explanatory power of the Hallerian approach, with the monistic and metaphysically explosive potential of the vitalist approach (Diderot). It is my hope that examining Diderot in the context of this triangulated topography of sensibility as property sheds light on his famous proclamation regarding sensibility as a universal property of matter. (shrink)

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

A unique and interdisciplinary collection in which scholars from Philosophy join those from Film Studies, English, and Comparative Literature to explore the nature and limits of love through in-depth reflection on particular works of literature and film.

Bringing these two emergent areas of thought into direct conversation in Before the Law, Cary Wolfe fosters a new discussion about the status of nonhuman animals and the shared plight of humans and animals under biopolitics.

Robert Wolfe writes about the nature of the ajata teachings, or the nature of emptiness and absolute reality.

Ziel dieses Buches ist es, ein Nachdenken (idealerweise eine Diskussion) über ein grundlegendes, methodologisches Problem in der Wissenschaft von der Logistik anzuregen (gelegentlich auch zu provozieren) - ein Problem, über das niemand spricht, obwohl es für die Fortentwicklung dieser Disziplin von grundlegender Bedeutung ist. Dieser Disziplin mangelt es an einer kritischen Reflexion der Erfolgsvoraussetzungen und Grenzen des eigenen Forschens, und das gilt im Grundsatz für alle drei hier beleuchteten Forschungsansätze. Dementsprechend kann eine solche Reflexion auch große Chancen erschließen, für die (...) Wissenschaft und für die Praxis. (shrink)

In 2015, Willem Halffman and Hans Radder published in Minerva a paper, in which they diagnosed that our universities are colonized by “The Wolf of management.” Using the example of the reforms afflicting the Polish academic world, I show that this colonization has intensified, and apart from the processes described in the aforementioned paper, it brought consequences that have changed academic culture: research is subjected to publication policy, many academic activities are treated as a hobby, researchers must be (...) in a stand-by mode to react quickly to new regulations, and responsibility for the institutional prestige is collective. I argue that the attempts to reduce research results into numbers and algorithms stem from a quest for objectivity and a mistrust of academics’ ability to pass fair judgments. The Wolf tries to realize a utopian dream: the building of a structure that by necessity secures the productivity of research, which in turn brings the prestige of institutions, ultimately measured by rankings. Yet, prestige is not an epistemic but rather a political value, and when academics are forced to aim at prestige, vital academic values are endangered. Any efficient resistance to the Wolf requires grassroots work on the part of academics. By reconsidering the nature of research and education as well as their role in society, academics might be able to develop viable alternatives to the “productivist university.” This requires cooperation with broader society. As such, the alternative of either remaining in the ivory tower or submitting to the Wolf is a false dilemma. (shrink)