Giuseppe Franco hat mich mit süditalienischer Liebenswürdigkeit dazu eingeladen, einen kleinen Beitrag zum vorliegenden Hommage-Band zu schreiben, in dem ich von meiner „intellektuellen Beziehung“ zu Dir und „von der Bedeutung des Kritischen Rationalismus“ für meinen „eigenen Denkweg“ berichte. Kennengelernt haben wir einander vor inzwischen 53 Jahren kurz nach Deinem Dienstantritt an der Mannheimer Wirtschaftshochschule. Ich studierte damals in Wien, vor allem bei Bela Juhos, der in einer Art Dachkammer der Alten Universität seine Seminare, z. B. eines über „Wissenschaftstheorie und Quantenmechanik“ (...) mit maximal zehn älteren Studenten und bereits habilitierten Wissenschaftsphilosophen abhielt, sowie beim Altmeister Victor Kraft, dessen Privatissime-Veranstaltungen in seiner Wohnung in der Walfischgasse von noch weniger, handverlesenen Geistesschaffenden besucht wurden. (shrink)
SummaryThough Peter Gordon mentioned philosophical anthropology in his book Continental Divide, he has not yet realized how it works independently from Cassirer's and Heidegger's prejudices. The whole argument between them before, in and after Davos raged around the status of philosophical anthropology: How do the spiritualisation of life and the enlivening of the spirit come about? This was not just the central question for philosophical anthropology founded by Max Scheler, but also in Wilhelm Dilthey's life philosophy, which was systematized (...) by Georg Misch. Cassirer and Heidegger shared three shortcomings with respect to the Life-philosophical Anthropology. Neither had a philosophy of nature or a philosophy of sociaty or a philosophy of history. The insight into the unfathomability of humans is given a political edge in Helmuth Plessner's book Power and Human Nature. Elevating it to the principle of democratic equality with respect to the worth of all cultures one opens up the potential for a form of civil competition that might supersede ethnocentric wars. (shrink)
Kaum ein anderer lebender Naturwissenschaftler besitzt die Fähigkeit, mit solcher Geistesklarheit die tiefsten Einsichten von moderner Quantenphysik mit dem uralten spirituellen Menschheitswissen zu verknüpfen wie - Hans-Peter Dürr! Es gelingt Dürr scheinbar mühelos, eine Synthese zwischen den meditativen Einsichten der Weisen des Ostens und den aktuellen Erkenntnissen der modernen Naturwissenschaften herzustellen. Dabei verliert er sich niemals in langatmigen akademischen Erläuterungen, sondern hat stets den Menschen und die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit des 21. Jahrhunderts im Blick. Ein Brückenschlag zwischen zwei Welten, (...) der vielleicht niemals notwendiger war als zurzeit. Eine kleines Meisterwerk, das in einleuchtender Weise aufzeigt - alles Leben ist EINS! (shrink)
If one takes seriously the idea that a scientific language must be extensional, and accepts Quine’s notion of truth-value-related extensionality, and also recognizes that a scientific language must allow for singular terms that do not refer to existing objects, then there is a problem, since this combination of assumptions must be inconsistent. I will argue for a particular solution to the problem, namely, changing what is meant by the word ‘extensionality’, so that it would not be the truth-value that had (...) to be preserved under the substitution of co-extensional expressions, but the state of affairs that the sentence described. The question is whether or not elementary sentences containing empty singular terms, such as ‘Vulcan rotates’, are extensional in the substitutivity sense. Five conditions are specified under which extensionality in the substitutivity sense of such sentences can be secured. It is demonstrated that such sentences are state-of-affairs-as-extension-related extensional. This implies that such sentences are also truth-value-related extensional in Quine’s sense, but not truth-value-as-extension-related extensional. (shrink)
The importance of Dilthey Why read Dilthey today? Why study the ideas of a nineteenthcentury German philosopher some seventy years after his death? ...
In classical physics, the world is considered as a matter-based reality, the arrangement of whose parts in time is uniquely determined by certain dynamic laws. By contrast, modern quantum physics reveals that matter is not composed of matter, but reality is merely potentiality. The world has a holistic structure, which is based on fundamental relations and not material objects, admitting more open, indeterministic developments. In this more flexible causal framework, inanimate and animate matter are not to be considered as fundamentally (...) different but as different order structures of the same immaterial entity. In a stable configuration, effectively all the uncertainties are statistically averaged out, thus the unique and deterministic behavior of ordinary inanimate matter is exhibited; whereas in the case of statically unstable but dynamically stable configurations, the “lively” features of the underlying quantum structure have a chance to surface to the mesocopic level and to be connected with what we observe as the phenomenon of life. This supposition can be more explicitly treated and clarified by identifying the electric dipole moment of biomolecules as the ordering parameter of the corresponding macroquantum system. This has important consequences for biology and medicine. In particular, it suggests the existence of a quantum-based “software,” essential perhaps for the logistics of biological processes, which are hidden behind the matter/energy-based “hardware” that alone is considered in the conventional approach. In medicine it opens an opportunity to build bridges between conventional medicine based essentially on the classical paradigm, and the various forms of complementary medicine, which have strong affinities with the new features of the modern holistic worldview. (shrink)
In the following the details of a state-of-affairs semantics for positive free logic are worked out, based on the models of common inner domain - outer domain semantics. Lambert's PFL system is proven to be weakly adequate (i.e., sound and complete) with respect to that semantics by demonstrating that the concept of logical truth definable therein coincides with that one of common truth-value semantics for PFL. Furthermore, this state-of-affairs semantics resists the challenges stemming from the slingshot argument since logically equivalent (...) statements do not always have the same extension according to it. Finally, it is argued that in such a semantics all statements of a certain language for PFL are state-of-affairs-related extensional as well as salva extensione extensional, even though their salva veritate extensionality fails. (shrink)
In German discussions over the last twenty years of the difference between what it is to be a body (in German: Leibsein) and what it is to have a body (Körperhaben), many have been concerned to remind us that we owe this conceptual distinction to the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner. He introduces the distinction in an essay from 1925—written in collaboration with the Dutch behavioral researcher Frederick Jacob Buytendijk—“Die Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewusstsein des anderen (...) Ichs” (“The Interpretation of Mimetic Expressions: A Contribution to Understanding One’s Consciousness of Other Subjects”). Buytendijk later explained that it was Plessner who worked out the .. (shrink)
Gödel’s slingshot-argument proceeds from a referential theory of definite descriptions and from the principle of compositionality for reference. It outlines a metasemantic proof of Frege’s thesis that all true sentences refer to the same object—as well as all false ones. Whereas Frege drew from this the conclusion that sentences refer to truth-values, Gödel rejected a referential theory of definite descriptions. By formalising Gödel’s argument, it is possible to reconstruct all premises that are needed for the derivation of Frege’s thesis. For (...) this purpose, a reference-theoretical semantics for a language of first-order predicate logic with identity and referentially treated definite descriptions will be defined. Some of the premises of Gödel’s argument will be proven by such a reference-theoretical semantics, whereas others can only be postulated. For example, the principle that logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object cannot be proven but must be assumed in order to derive Frege’s thesis. However, different true (or false) sentences can refer to different states of affairs if the latter principle is rejected and the other two premises are maintained. This is shown using an identity criterion for states of affairs according to which two states of affairs are identical if and only if they involve the same objects and have the same necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining. (shrink)
In Nietzsche verstehen, Christian Niemeyer aims at “correcting mistaken readings of Nietzsche” (10), by which he means clichéd misunderstandings of Nietzsche as a racist eugenicist, an advocate of a superiority of “German nature,” an anti-Semite, a warmonger, and a nihilistic negator of any ethics. In other words, the book addresses those aspects that portray Nietzsche as a kind of proto-Nazi. In doing so, Niemeyer also exposes the “genealogies” of such misreadings, in good Nietzschean style. He discusses these issues in seven (...) chapters dedicated to seven “commandments,” each of which concerns a particular set of problems in the interpretation of Nietzsche and how to avoid the usual misunderstandings that they .. (shrink)
Summary In the field of scientific knowledge âtruthâ can be defined exactly by mathematical methods (topology), provided there is a certain interaction between theories and experiments.
In Popper's Logik der Forschung, a theoretical system is a set of sentences that describe a particular sub-area of science, in particular of empirical science. The goal of axiomatizing a theoretical system is to specify a small number of "axioms" describing all presuppositions of the sub-area under consideration, so that all other sentences of this system can be derived from them by means of logical or mathematical transformations. The paper discusses two philosophical interpretations of these proper axioms. First, proper axioms (...) stipulate the use of the signs for the basic concepts of the system. Consequently, the proper axioms turn out to be analytic relative to a class of interpretations of the underlying logic. Hence, they cannot be falsified by refuting their logical consequences because these consequences are analytic as well. Secondly, proper axioms are synthetic, falsifiable and uncertain sentences. Hence, they are not immunized against falsification by refuting their logical consequences. (shrink)
The search for the extensions of sentences can be guided by Frege’s “principle of compositionality of extension”, according to which the extension of a composed expression depends only on its logical form and the extensions of its parts capable of having extensions. By means of this principle, a strict criterion for the admissibility of objects as extensions of sentences can be derived: every object is admissible as the extension of a sentence that is preserved under the substitution of co-extensional expressions. (...) The question is: what are the extensions of elementary sentences containing empty singular terms, like ‘Vulcan rotates’. It can be demonstrated that in such sentences, states of affairs as structured objects (but not truth-values) are preserved under the substitution of co-extensional expressions. Hence, such states of affairs are admissible (while truth-values are not) as extensions of elementary sentences containing empty singular terms. (shrink)