Visual and cognitive skills are key to successful functioning in highly demanding settings such as elite sports. However, their mutual influence and interdependencies are not sufficiently understood yet. This cross-sectional study examined the relationship between visual skills and executive functions in elite soccer players. Fifty-nine male elite soccer players performed tests assessing visual clarity, contrast sensitivity, near-far quickness, and hand-eye coordination. Executive function measures included working memory capacity, cognitive flexibility, inhibition and selective attention. Overall, visual abilities were largely correlated with (...) executive functions. Near-far quickness performance showed a large correlation with an executive function total score as well as with cognitive flexibility, working memory, and especially selective attention. Visual clarity and contrast sensitivity were moderately correlated with the cognition total score. Most consistent correlations with the visual functions were present for working memory. These findings present an overall vision-cognition relationship but also very specific linkages among subcategories of these functions, especially meaningful relations between near-far quickness, selective attention and cognitive flexibility. Further studies are needed to investigate the neuropsychological mechanisms accounting for the correlations and possible improvements of the executive functions by training specific visual skills. (shrink)

Om samfundsudviklingen i Sverige med udgangspunkt i aktuel forskning inden for sociologi, nationaløkonomi og statsvidenskab, og samtidig et stridsskrift mod nyliberalismen.

As a sovereign wealth fund, the $1 trillion Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global, which is managed by Norges Bank Investment Management on behalf of the welfare of Norway’s citizens, is supposed to be a flagship for socially responsible investments through its Council of Ethics. However, its investment in Delta Topco, the holding company of Formula 1 world championship that, through Formula One Group, brokered a deal with Russia to host a Formula 1 Grand Prix in 2014, raises the question of whether (...) the Oil Fund should enhance its due diligence processes. Although no evidence of corruption related to the race is introduced, the complex relation between financial logic and the world of sports still raises questions about the ethical solidity of the Oil Fund’s investment. Drawing upon reports of the relationship between political economy and sporting events, this paper therefore analyses, in light of the Oil Fund’s ethical guidelines, the complexities of its investment in Delta Topco. As a result, it is argued that a new set of examination methods by the Council of Ethics may be warranted. (shrink)

This article addresses the moral and legal difficulties sport governing bodies encounter as human rights promoters. The case presented here is the 2023 decision by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to allow athletes from Russia and Belarus to compete in international sport under neutral colours, after recommending complete exclusion a year before due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While IOC’s change of mind was influenced by UN experts on human rights, claiming that the ban discriminated against Russian athletes, the (...) same experts fail to take into account competing human rights elements that could favour the ban. To that end, this article discusses the complexities of prioritizing human rights in an Olympic context and, deriving from that, demonstrates the existence of moral and legal support for upholding the exclusion of Russia. Finally, the analysis of how to prioritize morally and legally between competing human rights offers deliberative material to other sport governing bodies which could be used to carve out preventive measures prior to their next encounter with a similar situation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTInternational sporting associations like the International Federation of Football Associations, the International Olympic Committee and Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile have throughout the twentieth century promoted political neutrality as a source of autonomy. With FIFA and the IOC’s official adherence to the United Nations’ human rights conventions in 2017, FIA remains one of the few large ISAs where neutrality is not underpinned by a corrective on human rights. However, this position is in conflict with the ethical obligations FIA contracted when it (...) was given full recognition by the IOC in 2013. To discuss this problematic, this paper draws upon J.S. Mill’s On Liberty and the concept of ‘inaction’ as a source for ways in which the FIA might reconsider its current stance.Abbreviations: IOC ; FIA ; FIFA ; ICRC (International Committee of... (shrink)

This conceptual paper explores whether the normative legitimacy of International Sports Associations such as Fédération Internationale de Football Association and Fédération Internati...

This co-edited volume compares Chinese and Western experiences of engineering, technology, and development. In doing so, it builds a bridge between the East and West and advances a dialogue in the philosophy of engineering. Divided into three parts, the book starts with studies on epistemological and ontological issues, with a special focus on engineering design, creativity, management, feasibility, and sustainability. Part II considers relationships between the history and philosophy of engineering, and includes a general argument for the necessity of dialogue (...) between history and philosophy. It continues with a general introduction to traditional Chinese attitudes toward engineering and technology, and philosophical case studies of the Chinese steel industry, railroads, and cybernetics in the Soviet Union. Part III focuses on engineering, ethics, and society, with chapters on engineering education and practice in China and the West. The book’s analyses of the interactions of science, engineering, ethics, politics, and policy in different societal contexts are of special interest. The volume as a whole marks a new stage in the emergence of the philosophy of engineering as a new regionalization of philosophy. This carefully edited interdisciplinary volume grew out of an international conference on the philosophy of engineering hosted by the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. It includes 30 contributions by leading philosophers, social scientists, and engineers from Australia, China, Europe, and the United States. (shrink)

Abstract Our growing demand for meat and dairy food products is unsustainable. It is hard to imagine that this global issue can be solved solely by more efficient technologies. Lowering our meat consumption seems inescapable. Yet, the question is whether modern consumers can be considered as reliable allies to achieve this shift in meat consumption pattern. Is there not a yawning gap between our responsible intentions as citizens and our hedonic desires as consumers? We will argue that consumers can and (...) should be considered as partners that must be involved in realizing new ways of protein consumption that contribute to a more sustainable world. In particular the large food consumer group of flexitarians offer promising opportunities for transforming our meat consumption patterns. We propose a pragmatic approach that explicitly goes beyond the standard suggestion of persuasion strategies and suggests different routes of change, coined sustainability by stealth, moderate involvement, and cultural change respectively. The recognition of more routes of change to a more plant-based diet implies that the ethical debate on meat should not only associate consumer change with rational persuasion strategies and food citizens that instantiate “strong” sustainable consumption. Such a focus narrows the debate on sustainable protein consumption and easily results in disappointment about consumers’ participation. A more wide-ranging concept of ethical consumption can leave the negative verdict behind that consumers are mainly an obstacle for sustainability and lead to a more optimistic view on modern consumers as allies and agents of change. Content Type Journal Article Category Articles Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9345-z Authors Erik de Bakker, LEI Wageningen UR (Agricultural Economics Research Institute), P.O. Box 29703, 2505 LS The Hague, The Netherlands Hans Dagevos, LEI Wageningen UR (Agricultural Economics Research Institute), P.O. Box 29703, 2505 LS The Hague, The Netherlands Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863. (shrink)

This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by (...) environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified. Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create. The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally. (shrink)

Dieses Buch versammelt einige der führenden Köpfe heutiger pragmatischer Philosophie zu einem konstruktiven Gespräch über die Zukunft des Pragmatismus. Robert B. Brandom, dessen Theorie der Bedeutung im Mittelpunkt mehrerer Beiträge des Bandes steht, hat das Einleitungskapitel geschrieben. Sämtliche zentrale Problemstellungen der pragmatischen Tradition werden aus teilweise sehr unterschiedlichen Perspektiven eingehend beleuchtet. Neben den Artikeln von Brandom und den Herausgebern, André Fuhrmann und Erik J. Olsson, enthält das Buch Originalbeiträge von Michael Esfeld, Wolfram Hinzen, Friedrich Kambartel, Isaac Levi, Ulrich Metschl, (...) Cheryl Misak, Jaroslav Peregrin, Sven Rosenkranz, Hans Rott und Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. (shrink)

"For at kunne leve og virke og for at kunne planlægge vort eget liv på længere sigt, må vi tage stilling til livets tre hovedproblemer: Hvad kan vi vide? Hvad tør vi håbe? Og hvad skal vi gøre? Det er netop disse problemer, de store filosoffer har tænkt igennem langt mere dybtgående og grundigt, end man sædvanligvis har mulighed for at gøre det." I en vis forstand er vi alle sammen filosoffer, for vi har alle et bestemt livssyn, om vi (...) er klar over det eller ej. Professor i filosofi Svend Erik Stybes bog beskriver ikke blot forskellige livssyn, som er opstået gennem filosofihistorien i løbet af de sidste mange århundreder. Han giver også en definition af begrebet livssyn, som de fleste vil kunne relatere til og få til at give mening i forhold til deres eget liv. Bogen "De store tænkere og vort livssyn" fra 1963 henvender sig til enhver, der har interesse for livets store og små spørgsmål og forskellige filosoffer og idéhistorikeres tilgang dertil. Svend Erik Stybe (1919-1995) var en dansk idéhistoriker og forfatter, der udgav et væld af bøger om både dansk og europæisk filosofi- og idéhistorie gennem de sidste mange hundrede år. Han skrev blandt andet bøger til brug i undervisning i idéhistorie på gymnasiet og universitetet, opslagsværker om filosofi og idéhistorie samt bøger om specifikke filosoffer som Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke og Baruch de Spinoza. Svend Erik Stybe blev udnævnt til professor i filosofi ved Københavns Universitet i 1970, hvor han forblev frem til sin pension i 1989. (shrink)

Sokrates var inte bara en filosofisk nydanare. Genom sitt sätt att involvera sina samtalspartners i den filosofiska processen var han också i hög utsträckning en pedagogisk nydanare. Hans pedagogiska grundidé var den så kallade majeutiska metoden – det vill säga ”barnmorskemetoden”. Med det menade han att han inte överförde sina egna färdiga tankar till den han talade med utan han hjälpte sin samtalspartner att föda sina egna tankar. Inom pedagogiken är det vanligt att använda den så kallade ”Sokratiska metoden” (...) vilket i sin enklaste form bara innebär att man ställer frågor till studenterna. Den här artikeln kommer emellertid att handla om en mer sofistikerad metod som används för begreppsanalys/begreppsdefinition i grupp. Metoden är inspirerad av Sokrates men skiljer sig också en del från hur Sokrates själv grep sig an sina dialoger – åtminstone så som de beskrivs av Platon. Artikeln innehåller en kort historisk och pedagogisk bakgrund men syftar framför allt till att utgöra en praktisk vägledning för genomförande av sokratiska dialoger i filosofiundervisningen. Artikeln bygger framför allt på mina egna erfarenheter av att använda Sokratisk Dialog i undervisningen vid Filosofiska institutionen vid Lunds universitet, Lunds Tekniska Högskola, Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet och i det privata näringslivet. Artikeln vänder sig till alla som undervisar i filosofi på universitetet eller gymnasiet eller i filosofiska metoder för studenter vid andra utbildningar, t.ex. värdeteori, vetenskapsteori eller tillämpad etik för ingenjörer eller medicinare – eller i vilket annat ämne som helst där det förekommer begrepp som saknar en enkel och knivskarp definition men som är viktiga för ämnet. (shrink)

Actually possible and conceivable future uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and germ-line genetic intervention in assisted reproduction seem to offer increasing possibilities of choosing the kind of persons that will be brought to existence. Many are troubled by the idea of these technologies being used for enhancement purposes. How can we make sense of this worry? Why are our thoughts about therapeutic genetic interventions and non-genetic enhancement (for instance education) not accompanied by the same intuitive uneasiness? I argue that (...) the concepts of autonomy and freedom of choice, typically invoked to delimit the morally acceptable uses of reproductive technologies, cannot fully answer these questions. Instead, I suggest that an alternative answer might begin with reflections on the notion of interfering with nature. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and Hans Jonas’s moral philosophy, I outline an argument that attempts to capture what might be particularly troubling about the idea of “designing” future persons. At the core of the argument is the suggestion that enhancing selections and modifications on embryos might be bound up with an instrumentalising, non-responsive perspective on the future persons into which they are intended to grow. (shrink)

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are (...) not forthcoming. (shrink)

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are (...) not forthcoming. (shrink)

Hans Rott is well-known for his work on belief revision theory in the tradition founded by Carlos Alchourro´ n, Peter Ga¨ rdenfors and David Makinson to which he has contributed in a number of fine articles. One of his main achievements is the establishment of far-reaching connections between AGM-style belief revision theory and the classical theory of rational choice, as the latter is understood by mathematical economists like Paul Samuelson and Amartya Sen.

An energy condition, in the context of a wide class of spacetime theories, is, crudely speaking, a relation one demands the stress-energy tensor of matter satisfy in order to try to capture the idea that "energy should be positive". The remarkable fact I will discuss in this paper is that such simple, general, almost trivial seeming propositions have profound and far-reaching import for our understanding of the structure of relativistic spacetimes. It is therefore especially surprising when one also learns that (...) we have no clear understanding of the nature of these conditions, what theoretical status they have with respect to fundamental physics, what epistemic status they may have, when we should and should not expect them to be satisfied, and even in many cases how they and their consequences should be interpreted physically. Or so I shall argue, by a detailed analysis of the technical and conceptual character of all the standard conditions used in physics today, including examination of their consequences and the circumstances in which they are believed to be violated. (shrink)

We argue that two well-known examples (strawberry distribution and Konigsberg bridges) generally considered genuine cases of distinctively _mathematical_ explanation can also be understood as cases of distinctively _generic_ explanation. The latter answer resemblance questions (e.g., why did neither person A nor B manage to cross all bridges) by appealing to ‘generic task laws’ instead of mathematical necessity (as is done in distinctively mathematical explanations). We submit that distinctively generic explanations derive their explanatory force from their role in ontological unification. Additionally, (...) we argue that distinctively generic explanations are better seen as standardly mathematical instead of distinctively mathematical. Finally, we compare and contrast our proposal with the work of Christopher Pincock on abstract explanations in science and the views of Michael Strevens on abstract causal event explanations. (shrink)

Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.

Science policy mandates across the industrialized world insinuate more active roles for publics, their earlier participation in policy decisions, and expanded notions of science and technology governance. In response to these policies, engaged scholars in science studies have sought to design and conduct exercises aimed at better attuning science to its public contexts. As demand increases for innovative and potentially democratic forms of public engagement with science and technology, so also do the prospects for insights from science studies to contribute (...) to policy agendas and institutional capabilities. This collection brings together an international set of scholars in science, technology and society who inquire into the meaning, efficacy and responsibility of engaged science studies scholarship as a public matter. (shrink)

The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...) the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. (shrink)

We have argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) violates the plausible adequacy condition that an act that would harm an agent cannot leave her much better off than an alternative act that would benefit her. In a recent paper in this journal, however, Neil Feit objects that our argument presupposes questionable counterfactual backtracking. He also argues that CCA proponents can justifiably reject the condition by invoking so-called plural harm and benefit. In this reply, we argue (...) that Feit’s lines of criticism are both unsuccessful. (shrink)

Analyzing how Plotinus’ critical reception of the Aristotelian, Stoic and Middle-Platonist notions of 'that which depends on us' lead him to a highly original interpretation of the notion, this book shows the central role of this notion in the Plotinian account of human agency.

In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.

Divine command theory is experiencing something of a renaissance, inspired in large part by Robert Adams’s 1999 masterpiece Finite and Infinite Goods. I argue here that divine commands are not always necessary for actions to be morally obligatory. I make the case that the DCT-ist’s own commitments put pressure on her to concede the existence of some moral obligations that in no way depend on divine commands. Focusing on Robert Adams’s theistic framework for ethics, I argue that Adams’s views about (...) good, evil, reasons, and the nature of moral obligation suggest that there can be moral obligations that exist independently of any divine commands. My argument proceeds through the development of an example in which there is a moral obligation that is not even partially grounded in a divine command. I focus primarily on Adams’s view because, many contemporary divine command theorists work in a broadly Adams-ian framework, so the argument that I advance here poses a challenge for many contemporary versions of DCT. (shrink)

Seeing from somewhere in particular -- Embracing binocularity -- Creativity and gratitude -- Technology as vlaue-free and as value-laden -- Nobody's against true enhancement -- Comprehending persons as subjectss and as objects -- Respecting persons as subjects and as objects.

Learned, exigent, original, and timely, Erik Roraback's The Power of the Impossible: On Community and the Creative Life presents authoritative readings of what important theorists from Spinoza to Bataille, Blanchot, Nancy, Žižek, and others have had to say about community and the individual, with sections along the way on how those theorists might lead us to approach work by Henry James, James Joyce, Ralph Ellison, Dante Alighieri, and, surprisingly, the great tennis player, Ivan Lendl. Roraback also develops on the (...) basis of his theorists his own persuasive concept of an impossible/possible global community yet to come that would facilitate individual creativity as well as contest the repressive hegemony of finance capitalism and technology, especially digital technology. (J. Hillis Miller, The University of California at Irvine). (shrink)

In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (...) (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity. (shrink)