The preceding Preface, which Professor William Frankena had the great kindness to write as an introduction for the readers of the present English translation of my major work, still requires several supplementary com­ ments on my part. Professor Frankena rightly considered it to be an advan­ tage to introduce the English-speaking world to my moral philosophy through its presentation in this book. As an introduction to my moral philosophy, Professor Frankena provided a concise formulation of the fun­ damental ideas of (...) my ethics by quoting from an article I had just recently published. Several points worth mentioning remain. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish the two editions of the text here translated. The first edition was published in 1951 by Anton Hain in Meisenheim am Glan, under the title Pflicht und Neigung (Duty and In­ clination), with the subtitle Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit, erOrtert und neu bestimmt mit besonderem Bezug auf Kant und Schiller (The Fun­ damentals of Morality, Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller). In 1974, a revised and enlarged second edition was published by the same publisher and was entitled Die Grundlagen der Sitt­ Iichkeit (The Fundamentals of Morality). Of this second edition, the first four chapters have been translated in the present volume, along with four more recent essays. (shrink)

La «Règle d' Or» , qui est bien connue de la Bible (Tob. 4, 15; Matt. 7, 12; Luc. 6, 31) et qui nous invite à prendre pour critère de notre propre conduite envers autrui les modes d'action que nous (ne) voulons (pas) qu' on envisage envers nous-mêmes, est répandue parmi la plupart des peuples civilisés dès le 5e siècle av. J.-Chr. Elle s'articule principalement de trois façons: 1) comme «règle de sympathie» qui nous engage à (ne pas) imposer à (...) autrui ce que nous (ne) voulons (pas) subir nous-mêmes; 2) comme «règle d'authenticité» qui nous demande de nous en tenir nous-mêmes dans nos actes aux exigences que nous imposons à la conduite d'autrui et que, ce faisant, nous reconnaissons comme universellement valables; 3) comme «règle de réciprocité» qui nous engage à agir nous-mêmes envers autrui comme nous désirons qu'on agisse envers nous. Tout homme revendiquant son corps comme n'appartenant qu' à lui seul, cette règle amène par voie de réciprocité à poser le droit naturel d'un chacun à l'intégrité de son corps, à sa liberté, et à ses biens. (shrink)

The basic thought of Schweitzer's ethic, the reverence for life, has manifold significance. First, it is an appeal to our moral feeling. But secondly, Schweitzer lent this thought also a general, fundamental and therewith philosophical meaning: proceeding from the “most immediate and encompassing fact of consciousness,” described by him with the proposition “I am life that will live in the midst of life that will live,” Schweitzer believed to have found in the idea of reverence for life the fundamental principle (...) of all morality; this consists in the fact “that I experience the need to extend to all wills to live the same reverence that I extend to my own.” In addition to its effect on moral feeling and on ethical theory, the future of the thought, “reverence for life,” also depends on its compliance in the activity of men.The future prospects of the appeal to moral feeling appear good insofar as testimonies from history permit one to assume that the awareness of the reverence for life can be awakened in all men. The ancient Greeks knew such sensibility in theaidos, Goethe in the “reverence for that which is in our midst.” This ever strengthening recognition among the peoples of the earth will, through historically succeeding generations, increasingly eliminate a full disregard for such reverence.Less promising are the prospects of acknowledging the reverence for life as a fundamental principle of morality. On its basis Schweitzer rests his aversion to harming anything living. He does not fail to see thereby that, in order to preserve life, we must destroy some life (at least that of plants). But, says Schweitzer, I become guilty in sacrificing life, and we must constantly remain conscious of this guilt; any attempts at justification, through considerations of differences in the value of various lives, must be rejected.However, an ambiguity in the word “guilt” underlies Schweitzer's position. On the one hand “guilt” is understood as a regrettable cause for the subsistence or eventuation of an evil, on the other as the moral reprehensibility of an attitude. Only the latter represents guilt in a moral sense. Whoever follows the necessity to destroy other, less valuable life in order to preserve his own or another life, assumes guilt only in the second sense. Therefore ethics must raise and pursue the question concerning the value priority of one life over another. This question leads to an encounter with the modern directions of ethics which proceed from the concept of value, and to the continuation of Schweitzer's ethics through this encounter. Schweitzer's explanation that life in the world is “to be brought to its highest value” likewise conduces to the same point, since it necessitates an investigation of the rank order of values.We can note a slow progress of the reverence for life in the private domain of human activity. On the other hand in the interrelationship of peoples there is danger of monstrous mass murder through the atomic bomb. (shrink)