The article discusses Meinong’s theory of values in its later version as laid down in his studies Über emotionale Präsentation and Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie. His early psychological works are omitted. The principal purpose aim of the article is to show that Meinong’s axiology was essentially antipsychological in its character. For the philosophical foundation of his theory of values Meinong took the theory of object which furnishes a general solution of the question of relations between emotional experience, its content (...) and its object. The intentional interpretation of feelings as emotional experiences relating to objects suggested to Meinong a new approach to values – to treat them as correlates of those experiences. (shrink)

Husserl’s contribution to the investigation of problems concerning the epistemological and ontological status of value resulted in the creation of a new well defined solution. The starting point of this conception was the refutation of sensualistic psychologism. By granting to emotional acts possession of content which points to intentional objects Husserl revealed their epistemological function and ability to objectivise. The new interpretation of emotions attributing existence not only to affective inner states of the self but also to conscious acts that (...) transcend beyond the self introduced a conception of value conceived as an objective correlate of emotions. Values may consequently be said to have been the universe of the objects whose existence was not determined by individual psychological emotions. This meant that Husserl’s professed axiological objectivism. By assigning objective character to value Husserl outlined a new field of investigation that may be called ontology of value. It concerned both problems of existence and problems of qualitative and structural characteristics of value. (shrink)

The article contains an analysis of the theory of value and valuation discussed in the works of Dewey. The essence of Dewey’s conception is to surmount dichotomies of description and valuation as well as of fact and value. According to the author, overcoming of both dichotomies is a characteristic thesis not only for instrumentalism of Dewey, but also for a whole pragmatism. Pragmatism leads to absolutisation of the normative function of thought, and this creates a basis for a specific pragmatic (...) reductionism with respect to many philosophical problems. (shrink)

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?