Prince of Networks is the first treatment of Bruno Latour specifically as a philosopher. It has been eagerly awaited by readers of both Latour and Harman since their public discussion at the London School of Economics in February 2008. Part One covers four key works that display Latour’s underrated contributions to metaphysics: Irreductions, Science in Action, We Have Never Been Modern, and Pandora’s Hope. Harman contends that Latour is one of the central figures of contemporary philosophy, with a highly (...) original ontology centered in four key concepts: actants, irreduction, translation, and alliance. In Part Two, Harman summarizes Latour’s most important philosophical insights, including his status as the first ‘secular occasionalist.’ The problem of translation between entities is no longer solved by the fiat of God (Malebranche) or habit (Hume), but by local mediators. Working from his own ‘object-oriented’ perspective, Harman also criticizes the Latourian focus on the relational character of actors at the expense of their cryptic autonomous reality. This book forms a remarkable interface between Latour’s Actor-Network Theory and the Speculative Realism of Harman and his confederates. It will be of interest to anyone concerned with the emergence of new trends in the humanities following the long postmodernist interval. (shrink)

Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content, according to which the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. He explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.

"This is an excellent, readable and vigorous translation of _The Prince_, but it is much more than simply a translation. The map, notes and guide to further reading are crisp, to-the-point and yet nicely comprehensive. The inclusion of the letter to Vettori is most welcome. But, above all, the Introduction is so gripping and lively that it has convinced me to include _The Prince_ in my syllabus for History of Western Civilization the next time that I teach it.... Great price, (...) too! And lovely printing and layout." --Rachel Fulton, _University of Chicago_. (shrink)

The Prince and the Wolf contains the transcript of a debate which took place on February 5, 2008 at the London School of Economics (LSE) between the prominent French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher Bruno Latour and the Cairo-based American philosopher Graham Harman.

In 1992, as part of a larger charitable campaign, the Prince of Wales (Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s older son and heir) launched a line of organic food products called “Prince’s Duchy Originals”.1 The first product that went on sale was an oat cookie: “the oaten biscuit.” Since then the oaten biscuit has been joined by hundreds of other products and Duchy Originals has become one of the leading organic food brands in the UK. Presumably, the Prince (...) of Wales is very proud of his Duchy Originals products, and of the oaten biscuits in particular. Let’s imagine that he is so proud of the oaten biscuits that he eats them regularly. Also, let’s imagine that one day Queen Elizabeth asks the Prince to water the plant in her room. As she explains to him, she’ll be gone for the day and the plant needs to be watered every afternoon. But the Prince decides not to water the plant. Instead of watering the plant, he spends his afternoon savoring some oaten biscuits, and the Queen’s plant dies. (shrink)

Introduction -- The road to imperfection -- Cataloguing irrationality -- Some real life examples -- Science to the rescue -- A deeper look at what's wrong -- Assigning the blame -- Can it be fixed.

Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...) belief puzzles (Hesperus, Cicero, Pierre) involve reports about two different notions. So the analysis gets the puzzling truth values right. (shrink)

The conference where this article was originally presented solicited recommendations for the “right questions” to ask regarding education and technology. The author of this article suggests that we already know what the right questions are for illuminating technology and its social meaning. What the author wants to know is why those questions in fact are not being asked more widely—why is widespread disinclination to enter explicit deliberation on the proper place of technology so resilient? Langdon Winner uses the term “technological (...) somnambulism” to describe the predominant stance toward technology in our culture, that “we so willingly sleepwalk through the process of reconstituting the conditions of human existence” via the adoption of new technologies. The basic institutional and ideological forces shaping the development and use of technology are not mysterious. But, scrutiny of those forces remains limited to a relative handful of academics and activists. How can technological somnambulism be countered? (shrink)

In Hanks I defend a theory of propositions that locates the source of propositional unity in acts of predication that people perform in thought and speech. On my account, these acts of predication are judgmental or assertoric in character, and they commit the speaker to things being the way they are represented to be in the act of predication. This leads to a problem about negations, disjunctions, conditionals, and other kinds of embeddings. When you assert that a is F or (...) b is G you do not assert that a is F, nor do you commit yourself to a’s being F. According to my theory, however, in uttering the disjunction you predicate F of a. What is going on? I account for these cases using the concept of cancellation. In uttering the disjunction, the act of predicating F of a is cancelled, and when an act of predication is cancelled it does not count as an assertion and does not commit the speaker to anything. But what is it for an act of predication to be cancelled? One immediate concern is that cancelled predication won’t provide a unified proposition to be the input to disjunction. In this paper I answer this and related objections by explaining and defending my concept of cancellation. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates the celebrated paper of Hanks and McDermott on temporal projection, non-monotonic reasoning, and the frame problem. First I argue against their intuitions, and a fortiori, against their proposed solution. Next, I suggest how the solution they desire could be obtained, were they willing to represent the problem a bit differently.

Craig Hanks and Aili Bresnahan are contributing editors only -- not main editors.

Vier namhafte Philosophinnen und Philosophen (ergänzt durch zwei Beiträge der Herausgeber) erörtern in diesem Band eines der Leitprinzipien des philosophischen Diskurses der Moderne. »Subjektivität« ist die Schlüsselkategorie, die den Argumentationsverläufen der modernen Philosophie implizit zugrunde liegt und sie als solche prägt. Das gilt für den komplexen Zusammenhang von Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik: Hier stellen sich die Fragen nach dem Zugang zur Wirklichkeit und ihrer Struktur, nach der Vermittlung von subjektiver Erfahrung und objektivem Wissen, nach der Relation von Subjekt und Objekt. Ebenso (...) gilt es für den sich daraus ergebenden spezielleren Komplex der Frage nach Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis. -/- Axel Honneth und Angelica Nuzzo verfolgen dabei einen anerkennungstheoretischen Ansatz, während Manfred Frank, Tobias Rosefeldt und Klaus Viertbauer die Verfasstheit des Subjekts im Rahmen der Bewusstseinsanalyse thematisieren. Thomas Hanke unternimmt den Versuch eines Brückenschlages zwischen beiden Paradigm. (shrink)

À la manière de Machiavel dans Le prince, le philosophe s'interroge sur l'utilité de la dictature en 2020. S'appuyant sur les exemples de C. de Gaulle, A. Lincoln, V. Poutine, Lee Kuan Yew ou N. Nazarbaïev, il montre que la concentration du pouvoir dans les mains d'un seul homme peut apparaître comme une solution pour sauver une société menacée d'implosion ou en établir une nouvelle.0.

Dans les études sur la corruption politique, on trouve fréquemment des retours au lieu commun que les problèmes d’abus de charge publique en vue d’un intérêt privé ne peuvent être réglés sans la magie du leadership (l’anglicisme malheureux s’impose ici), cette qualité énigmatique de commandement qui saurait mettre en place les dispositifs d’incitatifs, de surveillance et de contrôle nécessaires pour contrer les abus. Mais un tel argument mène à une aporie, car les études qui placent ainsi leur confiance dans cet (...) énigmatique leadership sont également traversées par l’idée, aussi un lieu commun, que toute autorité qui n’est pas sujette à la surveillance et au contrôle aura tendance à être corrompue. Dans cet essai, je propose de lire Le Prince de Machiavel comme une méditation sur le paradoxe suivant : l’autorité du principe est à la fois la source de la purification politique et la cause principale de la corruption. Le Prince, souvent considéré comme un texte fondateur des « leadership ethics », sera mal compris s’il n’est pas lu à la lumière de la préoccupation centrale de Machiavel républicain : la corruption. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an account of the nature of propositional content according to which the proposition expressed by a declarative sentence is a certain type of action a speaker performs in uttering that sentence. On this view, the semantic contents of proper names turn out to be types of reference acts. By carefully individuating these types, it is possible to provide new solutions to Frege’s puzzles about names in identity- and belief-sentences.

To date, a wide range of interdisciplinary scholarship has done little to clarify either the why or the how of empathy. Preston & de Waal attempt to remedy this, although it remains unclear whether empathy consists of two discrete processes, or whether a perceptual and motor component are joined in some sort of behavioral inevitability. Although it is appealing to offer a neuroanatomy of empathy, the present level of neuropsychology may not support such reductionism.