Political prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran are tortured to the point that they may be psychologically broken, confess to something against their will, and actively bring degrading effects upon themselves. Phenomenologists maintain that consciousness is thoroughly intertwined with the body. It is not that we have bodies but that we are our bodies. In light of this position, torturing the body thus allows the torturer to break the consciousness and freedom of the tortured. How can tortured individuals stand (...) up again as authentic and free agents after their forced confessions? I will examine the relationship between tortured confessions and human freedom, basing my examination on the experiences of Iranian political activists. I argue that, although the victim's consciousness has been manipulated, the victim's freedom is as intact as it was before the tortured confession. (shrink)

In classical literature on Islamic human rights, the concepts of dignity and honour are used interchangeably. Distinguishing modern and pre-modern conceptions of human life’s value, dignity represents a value everyone possesses simply in virtue of being human, regardless of social hierarchy or religious preference. Honour, on the contrary, demonstrates a status which someone achieves because of a religious or societal preference. I will explain this difference further, relying on the works of Peter Berger and Charles Taylor. Afterwards, I argue that (...) a large group of Muslim scholars who have tried to articulate a coherent Islamic version of human rights have neglected this crucial difference. I will focus my discussion on two scholars, Abdulaziz Sachedina and Mohammad Hashim Kamali, as examples of scholars who have neglected the difference. My conclusion is that anybody who intends to confront this topic must be clear about the difference between dignity and honour; otherwise, any argument for the compatibility or incompatibility in question is doomed to failure. (shrink)

Can all values be reduced to one or a few fundamental ones? Two values may neither exceed the other in importance nor be equal. In such situation, they cannot be reduced to each other or to a third value, and we can call such values as ”incommensurable”. Drawing on the concept of incommensurable values and what recently is called ”global ethics”, I will argue that if two values from two different cultures conflict, one must pay enough attention to the idea (...) of ”incommensurability of values” in order to avoid a bias judgment of either. I will show how this is the case in the conflict between the Islamic ethics and the secular ethics, examining a specific case: Islamic prohibition on images of Mohammed and the liberalist reverence for freedom of speech. (shrink)