This edited volume is the first in English that covers the philosophy of feeling and related topics in Japanese philosophy on Nishida Kitarō and fellow thinkers. Part I focuses on Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy of feeling, including, but not limited to, comparisons with Tanabe Hajime, Koyama Iwao, and provides coverage of Buddhist, moral and Chinese philosophy. Part II goes beyond Kitarō into topics such as Japanese aesthetics, Nietsche’s reception in Japan, and the philosophy of AI. This is a comprehensive scholarly text (...) on feeling in Japanese philosophy, aimed at researchers and students working in the field. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to read Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) as a New Confucian, with a focus on his early moral philosophy. While the influence of Buddhism on Nishida’s philosophy is surely significant, this paper argues that it is actually Confucianism which plays a more important role. It is for this reason that fruitful comparisons can be made between his work and the so-called New Confucianism. I would like to explore three key questions with respects to this important yet relatively overlooked (...) aspect: Firstly, in what way has Nishida conformed to Confucian discourse in his moral philosophy? Secondly, what elements of Confucianism has Nishida revisited? Thirdly, what lessons can Nishida offer to philosophy as a New Confucian? It is my suggestion that reading Nishida as a New Confucian may help to further open up the potential of Nishida philosophy, Confucian philosophy, as well as philosophy in East Asia in general. (shrink)

本書透過考究江戶以降的日本思想和哲學中的儒學元素，揭示其倫理學潛力和議題。書中主要談及了日本著名思想家山崎闇齋、荻生徂徠、大西祝、西田幾多郎、柳田國男、和辻哲郎等人的論述，檢視他們如何創造富有儒學色彩 的日本倫理觀。另外，透過與中國、朝鮮等東亞儒學傳統作比較研究，本書也試圖進一步建構「東亞倫理學」的研究論域。 從東亞倫理學之發展的角度看，本書有三個重要的貢獻：其一在於揭示日本「倫理」、「倫理思想」及「倫理學」之中的儒家傳統是以何種面貌出現。其二是日本學者如何思考並發展倫理思想，使其成為具有西方意義的「學」。 其三是東亞世界仍然需要倫理學的建構，所謂倫理學即是對倫理思想產生懷疑，並經過理性的不斷追究，所產生的普遍性學問。.

對於person與self，「個人」與「自我」概念的釐清， 有助於東亞漢字文化圈內部的相互理解，並可作為東亞與西方對話的橋樑。 本書所收錄各篇論文大多涉及了「跨學科」與「跨文化」的研究，以「個人」（人格）與「自我」的概念作為串貫，當中包括中國思想、德國哲學、英國哲學、京都學派、當代新儒家哲學與臺灣日治時期哲學。在篇目安排上，以 〈非人類學觀點下的自我與個人〉作為全書在方法論上的引言，其後再列東亞傳統思想中具有主流意義的孔孟儒學、道家哲學與陽明心學，最後則列以東亞現代哲學。 本書所論及的中西思想家，主要有老子、孔子、孟子、莊子、王弼、王陽明、康德、海德格、謝勒、格林、西田幾多郎、田邊元、阿部次郎、和辻哲郎與洪耀勳等；主題方面，主要由人格、身心、語言與意識、場所、媒介、人間 與實存等議題組成。在個人與自我之概念的研討上，相當值得參考。.

Theories of quantum gravity generically presuppose or predict that the reality underlying relativistic spacetimes they are describing is significantly non-spatiotemporal. On pain of empirical incoherence, approaches to quantum gravity must establish how relativistic spacetime emerges from their non-spatiotemporal structures. We argue that in order to secure this emergence, it is sufficient to establish that only those features of relativistic spacetimes functionally relevant in producing empirical evidence must be recovered. In order to complete this task, an account must be given of (...) how the more fundamental structures instantiate these functional roles. We illustrate the general idea in the context of causal set theory and loop quantum gravity, two prominent approaches to quantum gravity. (shrink)

It’s intuitive to think that an intentional action requires that the agent knows that she’s doing so. In light of some apparent counterexamples, Setiya suggests that this intuitive insight is better captured in terms of credence: performing an intentional action requires the agent to have a higher credence that she’s doing so than she would have otherwise. I argue that there is no such thing as an agent’s credence for what she’s doing. After distinguishing this thesis from an idea some (...) defend under the slogan “deliberation crowds out prediction”, I explore the thesis’s broader epistemological implications for the belief-credence relation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper gives an analytical synopsis of the problem of developing medical ethics in the early half of the 1990s in China, as perceived by Chinese scholars and medical professionals interested in medical ethics. The views captured and analyzed here were expressed in one of the two major journals on medical ethics in China: Chinese Medical Ethics. The economic reform unleashed profound changes in Chinese society, including in the medical field, creating irregularities and improprieties in the profession. Furthermore, the (...) market reform also created new values that were in tension with existing values. In this transitional period, Chinese medical ethicists saw the need to rebuild medical morality for the new era. Using the code of conduct promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of Health in 1989 as a basis, assessment and e ducation aspects of the institutionalization of medical ethics are dis‐ cussed. In addition to institutional problems of institutionalising ethics, there are philosophical and methodological issues that are not easy to solve. After all, to institutionalize medical ethics is no easy task for a country as old and as big as China. Chinese medical ethicists seem ready to confront these difficulties in their effort to develop medical ethics in Reform China. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author's solution was narrative storytelling, featuring the voices of people experiencing a conflict in the world, a conflict that opened up a philosophical question. He begins with a hook story, like that of CH and his shopping for a good quality stereo system, one that requires him to make use of an obscure and counterintuitive piece of practical reasoning. The story of Dr. Shukor and the Fatwa Council presents the central conflict posed by the problem of (...) vagueness in real‐life decisions. Decisions about the meaning of central words in scripture would affect generations of Muslim astronauts in the future. The design of a piece of academic writing is to make a case for a claim using evidence and argument against an epistemically adversarial reader. One of the essential features of good narrative storytelling is change in fortune over time. (shrink)

A broad introduction to Christian ethics based on a covenantal understanding of Christian life rooted in Scripture.

The number of ethical issues that demand a response from Christians today is almost dizzying. How can Christians navigate such matters? With an unflinching yet irenic approach, this volume invites engagement with the biggest ethical issues by drawing on real-life experiences and offering a range of responses to some of the most challenging moral questions confronting the church today.

Mengzi states that our human nature consists of our ability to feel compassion, disdain, respect, and (dis-)approval: all human beings have them. But he also states that we lose these four emotional capacities if we don’t reflect on or attend to them. There is an apparent contradiction in saying that all humans have them, but some have lost them. This essay offers a close reading of Mengzi’s phrase “to lose it” that helps explain away this appearance of contradiction. In doing (...) so, Mengzi is interpreted to be offering an ethics of attention about how we should attend to ourselves and others selectively to have a functional social life. (shrink)

An increasing number of regulations propose the notion of ‘AI audits’ as an enforcement mechanism for achieving transparency and accountability for artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Despite some converging norms around various forms of AI auditing, auditing for the purpose of compliance and assurance currently have little to no agreed upon practices, procedures, taxonomies, and standards. We propose the ‘criterion audit’ as an operationalizable compliance and assurance external audit framework. We model elements of this approach after financial auditing practices, and argue (...) that AI audits should similarly provide assurance to their stakeholders about AI organizations’ ability to govern their algorithms in ways that mitigate harms and uphold human values. We discuss the necessary conditions for the criterion audit, and provide a procedural blueprint for performing an audit engagement in practice. We illustrate how this framework can be adapted to current regulations by deriving the criteria on which ‘bias audits’ for hiring algorithms can be performed, as required by the recently effective New York City Local Law 144 of 2021. We conclude by offering critical discussion on the benefits, inherent limitations, and implementation challenges of applying practices of the more mature financial auditing industry to AI auditing where robust guardrails against quality assurance issues are only starting to emerge. Our discussion as informed by experiences in performing these audits in practice highlights the critical role that an audit ecosystem plays in ensuring the effectiveness of such methodology. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

1. cilt. İnsan, evren, zaman -- 2. cilt. Yaradılış.

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

An agent’s knowledge of her own intentional actions (agential knowledge) is non-observational. Yet, intentional actions typically consist of happenings external to the agents. A theory is needed to explain how agents are warranted to form such beliefs independent of observation. This paper first argues for three desirable features of an ideal theory about agential knowledge. After showing that no existing theories possess all three, a novel theory that does is presented. According to this theory, agential knowledge is the same kind (...) of knowledge as the Kripkean contingent a priori: they are knowledge justified a priori by stipulation. (shrink)

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

The paper argues that there are structures rather than objects with an intrinsic identity in the domain of fundamental physics. We line out the standard metaphysics of objects with an intrinsic identity, recall the main objection against that position (section 1) and then retrace the development to epistemic structural realism (section 2) and to ontic structural realism (section 3). We elaborate on the arguments for ontic structural realism from quantum physics (section 4) and from space-time physics (section 5). Finally, we (...) claim that the main objection against the standard metaphysics of objects with an intrinsic identity is countered by structural realism only if the fundamental physical structures are conceived as causal structures (section 6). (shrink)

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the (...) agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

This book explores and elaborates three theories of public reason, drawn from Rawlsian political liberalism, natural law theory, and Confucianism. Drawing together academics from these separate approaches, the volume explores how the three theories critique each other, as well as how each one brings its theoretical arsenal to bear on the urgent contemporary debate of medical assistance in dying. The volume is structured in two parts: an exploration of the three traditions, followed by an in-depth overview of the conceptual and (...) historical background. In Part I, the three comprehensive opening chapters are supplemented by six dynamic chapters in dialogue with each other, each author responding to the other two traditions, and subsequently reflecting on the possible deficiencies of their own theories. The chapters in Part II cover a broad range of subjects, from an overview of the history of bioethics to the nature of autonomy and its status as a moral and political value. In its entirety, the volume provides a vibrant and exemplary collaborative resource to scholars interested in the role of public reason and its relevance in bioethical debate. (shrink)