In the face of the moral pluralism that results from the death of God and the abandonment of a God's eye perspective in secular philosophy, bioethics arose in a context that renders it essentially incapable of giving answers to substantive moral questions, such as concerning the permissibility of abortion, human embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, etc. Indeed, it is only when bioethics understands its own limitations and those of secular moral philosophy in general can it better appreciate those tasks that (...) it can actually usefully perform in both the clinical and academic setting. It is the task of this paper to understand and reevaluate bioethics by understanding these limits. Academic bioethicists can analyze ideas, concepts, and claims necessary to understanding the moral questions raised in health care, assessing the arguments related to these issues, and provide an understanding of the different moral perspectives on bioethical issues. In the clinical setting, bioethicists can provide legal advice, serve as experts on IRBs, mediating disputes, facilitating decision-making and risk management, and clarifying normative issues. However, understanding this is only possible when one understands the history, genesis, and foundations of bioethics and its inability to provide a resolution to postmodern moral pluralism. (shrink)

The object of this article is to examine, with the work of Jeremy Bentham as the principal example, one strand in the complex pattern of European social theory during the second half of the eighteenth century. This was of course the period not only of the American and French revolutions, but of the culmination of the movements of thought constituting what we know as the Enlightenment. Like all great historical episodes, the Enlightenment was both the fulfilment of long-established processes and (...) the inauguration of new processes of which the fulfilment lay in the future. Thus the seminal ideas of seventeenth-century rationalism realized and perhaps exhausted their potentialities in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The ideas with which this article is concerned, however—conveniently grouped and labelled as the ideas of utilitarianism—only began to achieve systematic development in these later decades of the eighteenth century. Within that period—during the first half and more of Bentham's long life—attempts to apply those ideas to the solution of social problems met largely with failure and frustration. Yet unrealized potentialities remained, the realization of which was reserved for a time when the world of the philosophes no longer existed. The movements for social and political reform which have played so large a part in modern history since the French Revolution may be judged in widely differing ways; but whatever the verdict, these movements surely cannot be understood without due consideration of that part of their origins which lies in eighteenth-century utilitarianism. (shrink)

Theories of epistemic justification are usually described as belonging to either deontological or nondeontological categories of justification with the former construing the concept of justification as involving the fulfillment of epistemic duty. Despite being the dominant view among traditional epistemologists, the deontological conception has been subjected to severe criticisms in the current literature for failing, among others, to do justice to the (alleged) truth-conducive character of epistemic justification. In this paper I set out to show that there is something deeply (...) unsatisfying about the way these different conceptions of justification are usually introduced and contrasted with each other leaving it unclear just what it is that renders a particular conception deontological. In particular I look at Alston's treatment of the issue, and show that his reasons for rejecting the deontological conception involve question-begging assumptions demonstrating, at best, the possibility of its divergence from truth-conductive justification. Far from being able to settle the issue one way or another, the arguments, I shall suggest actually seem to show some sort of tolerant pluralism in justification theory to be a live option. (shrink)

The cortical visual mechanisms involved in processing spatial relationships remain subject to debate. According to one current view, the ''dorsal stream'' of visual areas, emanating from primary visual cortex and culminating in the posterior parietal cortex, mediates this aspect of visual processing. More recently, others have argued that while the dorsal stream provides egocentric coding of visual location for motor control, the separate ''ventral'' stream is needed for allocentric spatial coding. We have assessed the visual form agnosic patient DF, whose (...) lesion mainly affects the ventral stream, on a prehension task requiring allocentric spatial coding. She was presented with transparent circular disks. Each disk had circular holes cut in it. DF was asked to reach out and grasp the disk by placing her fingers through the holes. The disks either had three holes (for forefinger, middle finger, and thumb) or two holes (for forefinger and thumb). The distance between the forefinger and thumb holes, and the orientation of the line formed by them, were independently varied. DF was quite unable to adjust her grip aperture or her hand orientation in the three-hole task. Although she was able to orient her hand appropriately for the two-hole disks, she still remained unable to adjust her grip aperture to the distance between the holes. These findings are consistent with the idea that allocentric processing of spatial information requires a functioning ventral stream, even when the information is being used to guide a motor response. (shrink)

The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called “free market environmentalism”, is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely (...) to contribute to environmental changes that violate traditional conceptions of property rights. Viewed globally, the actions of some countries—primarily industrialized nations—are likely to increase environmental harms suffered by other countries—less developed nations that have not made any significant contribution to climate change. It may well be that aggregate human welfare would be maximized in a warmer, wealthier world, or that the gains from climate change will offset environmental losses. Yet such claims, even if demonstrated, would not address the normative concern that the consequences of anthropogenic global warming would infringe upon the rights of people in less-developed nations. As a consequence, this paper calls for a rethinking of FME approaches to climate change policy. (shrink)

Professor H. James Birx shows how the never-ending controversy of human evolution came to be. He details the events that caused thinkers like Charles Darwin to develop his theory of evolution, and what ideas caused some people to reconcile a somewhat mystical theology with a concrete model of the universe. He tells you how Darwin's work infuriated everybody from "God-fearing" Christians to the church heirarchies. Birx explains how scientific advances and philosophical arguments have made beliefs about divine intervention as the (...) origin of man a moot point. He shows how creationism ignores proven scientific facts, and how human evolution remains a much sounder truth. You'll read how some western religions are starting to accept evolution as the process which creates life on earth. You'll also learn why scientific evolution and creationism have not been accepted together and how bold attempts to merge the two ideas have failed miserably. (shrink)

Aischylos darf als der eigentliche Schöpfer der Tragödie als literarischer Kunstform gelten, so sehr diese im 5. vorchristlichen Jahrhundert auch an ihren kultischen Ursprung gebunden bleibt. Aischylos führt den zweiten Schauspieler ein und nutzt technische Erfindungen zur Steigerung szenischer Effekte. Außerdem ist er der große Gestalter der tetralogischen Komposition, d.h. der Verbindung dreier Tragödien und eines Satyrspiels zu einer Handlungseinhait, die es ihm ermöglicht, die Verkettung von Hybris, Ate und Dike an ganzen Geschlechtern über Generationen hin zur Darstellung zu bringen. (...) Im Mittelpunkt seines Denkens steht die notwendig schuldhafte Existenz des handelnden Menschen, für den die Erfüllung einer überpersönlichen Forderung zugleich den Verstoß gegen eine andere, ebenso gültige Norm bedeutet. Überbrückt wird diese tragische Weltsicht im Glauben an die von Zeus repräsentierte Weltordnung, die den Menschen im einzelnen zwar unbegreiflich bleibt, deren grundsätzliche Sinnhaftigkeit sich ihm jedoch im Leiden erschließt. Adäquaten Ausdruck findet dieses Denken in einer urtümlichen und gewaltigen Sprache, deren Übersetzung in der hier vorliegenden Ausgabe philologisch präzis ist und gleichzeitig das Verständnis des aischyleischen Dramas erleichtert. (shrink)

H. P. Owen; VII—The Evidence for Christian Theism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 123–138, https://doi.org/10.1.

The author re-Examines the evidence (including the manuscript evidence) relevant to an understanding of the historico-Philosophical relationship of john locke to rene descartes and, Consequently, Of the relationship of "the empirical school" to "rationalism." arguing against a standardly accepted view (that of, Among others, Richard aaron), He suggests that, Both early and late, In the drafts of 1671 and in the "mature" "essay", Locke rejected descartes' science and philosophy of science precisely because he rejected his epistemology; furthermore, He rejected descartes' (...) epistemology precisely because he rejected his method and logic. (shrink)

The energy-spectrum of two point-like particles interacting in a 3-D isotropic Harmonic Oscillator (H.O.) trap is related to the free scattering phase-shifts \(\delta \) of the particles by a formula first published by Busch et al. It is here used to find an expression for the shift of the energy levels, caused by the interaction, rather than the perturbed spectrum itself. In the limit of high energy (large quantum number \(n\) of the H.O.) this shift (in H.O. units) is shown (...) to be given by \(\Delta =-2\frac{\delta }{\pi }\) , also exact in the limit of infinite scattering length ( \(\delta =\pm \frac{\pi }{2}\) ) in which case \(\Delta =\mp 1\) . Numerical investigation shows that this expression otherwise differs from the exact result of Busch et al., by less than \(\frac{1}{2}\,\%\) except for \(n=0\) when it can be as large as \(\approx \) 2.5 %. This result for the energy-shift is well known from another exactly solvable model, namely that of two particles interacting in a spherical infinite square-well trap (or box) of radius \(R\) in the limit \(R\rightarrow \infty \) , and/or in the limit of large energy. It is in solid state physics referred to as Fumi’s theorem. It can be (and has been) used in (infinite) nuclear matter calculations to calculate the two-body effective interaction in situations where in-medium effects can be neglected. It is in this context referred to as the phase-shift approximation a term also used throughout this report. (shrink)

It is proposed in this paper to develop a method by which the most general problem of the algebra of propositions is solved. This problem is to construct all propositions whose truth is independent of the form of the variables. As might be expected this method will enable us to determine without the use of matrices the consistency and independence of propositions, except in the case of those fundamental properties, which taken together define consistency itself. In the discussion which follows (...) no limitations are placed on the meaning of the terms and the word proposition is used simply in the sense of a variable. If we were to say, for example, that our variables must be restricted to zero or one values, we would be introducing a limitation which would reduce the generality of our science. A logic may be false in the sense that its postulates lead to contradictory theorems, or it may be false in the sense that it lacks generality, and the situation is not saved by calling it a two-valued, or a three-valued logic, or a logic of “propositions,” or by designating it by some other euphuism. (shrink)

Theories of linguistic meaning have been a major influence in twentieth century philosophy. This is due, in part, to the assumption that meaning is the crucial and interesting thing about language. To know the meaning of an expression is to understand it, and since understanding is central to philosophy in many different ways, it should be no surprise that the notion of meaning has often taken center stage. The aim of this paper is to briefly explore some influential views concerning (...) linguistic meaning. The final objective will be to demonstrate some alternatives which are open to theory with respect to this notion,for there are those who have wanted to ban talk of meaning from serious scientific discourse. The point is that many of the disadvantages of traditional notions of meaning are avoidable¾in particular, they are avoidable along a path which starts from Frege and moves on via Tarski and Davidson. (shrink)

One area of language research that has received a great deal of attention, both theoretical and empirical, is the use of anaphoric expressions. Such expressions can be thought of as serving two functions: the primary function is to refer back to a referent from previous discourse, and the secondary, but no less important, function is to help provide discourse coherence and structure. Third person pronouns such as he or she are anaphoric expressions par excellence, but fuller anaphoric expressions, including demonstrative (...) and definite noun phrases (NPs) such as that woman and the woman are also used in natural discourse. In this chapter we shall focus primarily on issues concerning definite NP anaphor resolution, and in particular we shall examine the interaction of two factors that are related to the identification of antecedents: the focus status of the antecedent and the semantic relationship between the antecedent and the anaphor (including semantic overlap). After presenting these factors, we will discuss one particular approach to anaphor resolution, Almor's (1999) Informational Load Hypothesis (ILH), and present three experiments that examined the findings presented in Almor (1999). The results of these experiments will lead us to consider in more detail the secondary, discourse-structuring function of anaphoric expressions. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se estudia la crítica que Charles Taylor ha formulado al modelo del liberalismo procedimental y a la concepción de racionalidad práctica moderna. El punto de partida es que la crítica de Taylor se sustenta en los aportes de la tradición filosófica sustantiva, la cual posibili..