Democracy surrounds us like the air we breath, and is normally taken very much for granted. Across the world democracy has become accepted as an unquestionably good thing. Yet upon further examination the merits of democracy are both paradoxical and problematic, and the treasured values of liberty and equality can be used to argue both for and against it. In the historical section of the book, Ross Harrison clearly traces the history of democracy by examining the works of, amongst others, (...) Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. Informed by facts and detailed knowledge of these famous thinkers, Harrison provides a clear and cogent justification of democracy. (shrink)

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 5, Issue 2, Page 161-174, May 2011.

This article explores the meaning and moral significance of presumed consent with particular reference to an opt-out policy for postmortem organ donation. It does so under two general categories: circumstances where we believe consent to have been given and those where we have no reason to believe that it has either been given or been refused. In the context of an opt-out policy, the first category would relate to the idea of tacit consent. It is argued both that substituting the (...) term ‘presumed consent’ would be misleading and that it is unlikely that the conditions for tacit consent would be met in practice. Regarding the second category, where the claim would be one regarding counterfactual consent, two main points are made: that claims about consent are unwarranted, and also that they are unnecessary to moral argument, given that the moral work is done by reasons other than any supposedly provided by a presumption of consent. (shrink)

In the literature on the subject there is a trend towards understanding the idea of rationing in healthcare very broadly, to include any form of restriction in supply. It is suggested in this paper that there are good reasons to resist this move, since it would both render the concept redundant through being trivially true and displace an earlier, egalitarian one that retains great moral significance for the supply of healthcare. The nature and significance of the narrower, egalitarian conception is (...) set out, drawing particular attention to the fact that it marks a contrast with the idea of prioritising certain people or groups over others and to the fact that it is a form of rationing that is plausibly regarded as a morally desirable response to severe shortages. It is contrasted with the broad conception and arguments in favour of this latter are considered and rejected. (shrink)

A collection of essays that cover a range of topics of relevance to health care professionals. The book is intended to fill a gap between introductory texts on medical ethics and in-depth specialized books. It shows the importance of combining philosophical and ethical discussion.

ABSTRACT This paper takes issue with the idea that there is a variety of moral theories available which can in some way usefully be applied to problems in ethics. The idea is reflected in the common view that those favouring a systematic approach would do well to abandon consequentialist thinking and turn to some alternative theory. It is argued here that this is not an option, since each of the usual supposed alternatives lacks the independent resources to meet the minimal (...) requirements of being a moral theory at all. The aim is to demonstrate that virtue ethics, rights theory and deontology lack the different forms of explanation that would make them genuinely alternative theories. The conclusion is that this part of ethics is much more of a unity than is standardly assumed and that, far from our being able to move on from consequentialism, certain problems that arise from its very nature are bound to remain central to any attempt at moral theory. (shrink)

Utilitarianism faces a difficulty in that what are typically regarded as natural goods seem to have possible occurrences that strike most people as morally reprehensible, yet which according to the theory must be taken to add to the good in the world. Thus, totake a recent treatment of the problem by Geoffrey Scarre, it would seem that even sadistic pleasures must contribute to human happiness and thus morally offset the concomitant suffering of the victim. Scarre has offered a defence of (...) utilitarianism, arguing that in fact such pleasures will undermine the self-respect that is required for happiness. In this paper I argue that a partial undermining is plausible but leaves the problem untouched, while a complete undermining can be established only by a stipulation that is unmotivated from a utilitarian point of view. (shrink)

What makes for a good book on ethics in medicine? Given that no one can do another’s moral thinking for them, this much at least: it should stimulate in the reader an inclination to critical reflection that will persist when the book goes back on the shelf. And, since no one can do another’s philosophical thinking for them either, this requirement is doubly true when the basis of the work lies in moral philosophy. In addition, where the book is likely (...) to be used as an introduction, it has to achieve this for readers who may have little experience of philosophy or natural sympathy with its problems and methods. No doubt there are various ways of attempting this task, but one is to try to draw readers into the subject by giving them a sense of what it is to be involved in doing philosophy, with all its characteristic difficulties and doubts, rather than merely studying the results of some that was done earlier. I think that Jennifer Jackson has produced an excellent book of this kind; one that should engage the interest of anyone prepared to make a little effort. It is a lively and refreshing work, full of argument and comprising a good mixture of scholarly caution and forthright commitment. Rather than looking at the many specific issues, however, I will concentrate on the philosophical position that underlies the work as a whole.The book begins by taking seriously the doubts that exist about the place of philosophy in medical ethics and does particularly well in making the appropriate concessions, while still giving a firm defence of its …. (shrink)

This paper takes up the question of the role of philosophical moral theory in our attempts to resolve the ethical problems that arise in health care, with particular reference to the contention that we need theory to be determinative of our choice of actions. Moral theorizing is distinguished from moral theories and the prospects for determinacy from the latter are examined through a consideration of the most promising candidates: utilitarianism, deontology and the procedures involved in reflective equilibrium. It is argued (...) that the current lack of any generally accepted method of solving moral problems, together with the extreme improbability of philosophy achieving a plausibly determinate theory, should encourage us to approach the problems in a spirit of agnosticism regarding the way in which theoretical material might be of relevance. The practical test for both moral theorizing and moral theories is thus not determinacy but the degree to which they increase our understanding of moral problems by serving, as they do in philosophy, as a means of inquiry into their nature. (shrink)

It is a familiar idea that in learning to do philosophy we have to acquire new habits of thought, a supposition that may help explain why it does not happen quickly and why, especially in retrospect, the process has something of the feeling of an upbringing, of being gradually drawn into a distinctive way of life. Familiar also, to many, will be the instruction to concentrate purely on the arguments of those philosophers we study, ignoring the irrelevancies of character and (...) biography, advice seemingly aimed at a happy coincidence of moral and intellectual virtue, ruling out, as it does, the recourse to personal criticism in philosophical discussion.Yet if philosophy is correctly to be approached as a structure of ideas, detached from the life of its creators, why was it so intriguing, as students, to find, occasionally, a picture of the author on the dust jacket of our set text, and why were we so curious about the characters of the speakers invited to philosophy society? Partly, no doubt, this interest was, and is, no more than a natural curiosity about people from whom we might expect to learn, an entirely understandable attitude, and not necessarily trivial, but one with no essential connection to the subject. Yet reading Alex Voorhoeve’s beautifully produced collection of his conversations with 11 thinkers on ethics does make one wonder whether the personal has some further bearing on philosophy, and if so how this might be and with what significance. Perhaps even the dust jacket reflects this query, with 10 of the interviewees caught by Steve Pyke’s striking photographs, their faces sharply lit, yet not as we would ever meet them, emerging somewhat eerily from an impenetrably black background. All are reproduced in a larger format inside, together with an uncredited photograph of the 11th in an instructively contrasting style. (shrink)

The paper begins by defending the Hohfeldianaccount of rights (as equivalence relations) from thecharge that it cannot capture their specialsignificance, and thus cannot be used in a right-basedmoral theory. It goes on to argue that, because of amisunderstanding of this relational account, theconception of right-based morality that has emerged inrecent years has been variously flawed from theoutset. A particular form of explanatory priority waswrongly taken to be essential, and then eitherincoherently combined with equivalence, or taken to bea reason for rejecting (...) equivalence where right-basedthinking is concerned. In fact, this form of priorityis not sufficient for establishing a right-based moraltheory. It is also not necessary, since theHohfeldian analysis can be shown to be entirelyadequate to meeting the original aims of thoseproposing this approach to ethics. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).