Since it has generally been accepted that to Spinoza attributes are real features of substance, the interpretation of his attribute definition has become a notorious problem. The reason is that interpreters have failed to see that the definition formulates a purely epistemological account of the state of affairs. The article presents and justifies such an interpretation. It will be shown that the definition in spite of its epistemological character implies a real ontological definition, which specifies the critical features of an (...) attribute. As to the reason why Spinoza has stated the definition in an ‘indirect way’, it is shown that it is likely that he has done so in order to have a more efficient, a more unambiguous and a more elegant definition. The relevance of the new interpretation is not only that it provides us with an interpretable, transparent attribute definition, but it also contributes to the establishment of a coherent picture of Spinoza’s metaphysics around this definition. (shrink)

The Greek word afi≈n has a wide-ranging meaning as well as a wideranging history: it is most commonly translated as ‘eternity’ but has as its first meaning ‘life’ or ‘lifetime’; it has its place in Greek literature and philosophy, but also in the Greek Bible, where it represents the Hebrew word ‘olâm. In this article I intend to sketch the history of the meaning and interpretation of aiôn from the word’s first attestation in Homer up until the beginning of the (...) Christian era. The expanded version of this study was defended as a doctoral dissertation, entitled Life Time Entirety: A Study of AIVN in Greek Literature and Philosophy, the Septuagint and Philo, on 7 September 1999 at the University of Amsterdam. (shrink)

The Christian church had its early development in the Hellenistic, Greco-Roman world and for that reason it can certainly be stated that the church was “Hellenized”. But how should we define this Hellenization? And what should be our judgement of it? The collection of essays entitled Hellenization revisited centers on an important theme.

The Christian church had its early development in the Hellenistic, Greco-Roman world and for that reason it can certainly be stated that the church was “Hellenized”. But how should we define this Hellenization? And what should be our judgement of it? The collection of essays entitled Hellenization revisited centers on an important theme.

This article explores a new reading of an important section of Part II of Spinoza’s Ethics. It recognizes that Spinoza actually differentiates between the human mind conceived from the viewpoint of its cause and the human mind conceived from the viewpoint of its nature. It shows, most importantly, that Spinoza assigns different objects to those ‘minds’. Consequently they represent different knowledge of the body. It will appear that the human mind in respect of its cause represents non-conscious knowledge of the (...) human body and that the human mind in respect of its nature represents conscious knowledge of the human body. It will be shown that knowledge of the inner processes of the human body and of the body per se belongs to the domain of non-conscious knowledge. The same conclusion will be obtained in an analysis that starts from the distinction between the formal and the objective being of the human mind. (shrink)

The important conclusion of this article is that essences of singular things are not eternal in the sense of being distinctive eternal modes, as is generally held by Spinoza scholars. Both the essence and the existence of singular things are eternal in the sense that they are comprehended in God’s eternal nature, that is to say, in the sense that they follow necessarily from that nature. The second conclusion is that the essence and the existence of things are inseparable. There (...) are no essences of things when things do not exist. Another conclusion regards the meaning of ”formal essence’. It is argued that the formal essence of a thing is the essence of a thing that formally follows from an attribute. It is not in any sense opposite to the actual essence of a thing. The formal essence is simply the actual essence of a thing that formally follows from an attribute. (shrink)

Abstract: This article invalidates a central objection that has been brought up against Spinoza’s idea of idea doctrine as a theory of consciousness. Key point in the argument is that the perfection of ideas of ideas is as variable as the perfection of ideas and corresponds to the perfection of the associated bodies. This allows ideas of ideas to account for various degrees of consciousness. In its application to human beings the theory covers important aspects of consciousness: to know that (...) one knows a thing, to know what one knows and to know that is our mind that knows the thing. The doctrine is a theory of the self-reflectivity of ideas that explains the immediate awareness of thoughts. The author argues that the idea of idea doctrine is the make-up of a comprehensive theory of consciousness throughout nature. Keywords:. (shrink)