In this paper I argue for three theses. First, most philosophical analyses of the problem of normative conflict, being based on the impossibility-of-joint-compliance test for conflict, are inadequate. Second, expanding on suggestions made by H. L. A. Hart and Stephen Munzer, I develop an understanding of normative conflict which is not tied to the concept of obedience. Such an understanding of normative conflict is expressly functional: normative conflicts arise when one norm interferes with the intended functioning of another. Third, working (...) from a functional concept of normative conflict, I develop a taxonomical classification scheme for the phenomenon of normative conflict. Normative conflict is the genus within which there are three species: normative contradiction, normative collision, and normative competition. Department of Philosophy, Southeast Missouri State University, Cape Girardeau, MO 63701, U.S.A. (shrink)

This paper chronicles the author’s experience, as an instructor and as an administrator, taking up the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and implementing changes in the curriculum to accommodate a logic student with dyslexia. The author discusses his misconceptions about dyslexia and his attempts to determine more precisely how it affected his student’s reading abilities. While his student struggled with abstract symbol systems (e.g. standard logical notation), the student had no difficulty with sequences of letters. The author elected to teach (...) the introductory logic course with a logical notation composed entirely of letters, namely Lukasiewicz’ notation. The author details the work that went into learning this notation and teaching an introductory logic course in it, including overviews of lessons on semantics, syntax, and introduction/elimination rules for proofs. The student learned the material very quickly and with great success, progressing to moderately sophisticated proofs. The author reflects on how this reformulated version of an introductory logic course squares with the ADA’s language of “reasonable accommodations” and implores professional philosophers to take seriously what the ADA means for their pedagogy. (shrink)

"Aristotelian Dialectic" is a dialogue between two persons, T and Q, concerning Aristotle's views on the nature of dialectic and rhetoric and also on the role of dialectic and rhetoric in modern education. T advances two theses: that Aristotle views dialectic and rhetoric as intellectual martial arts. to be used to combat the sophists; and that these arts form the basis of Homeric education. T defends this view by examining what Aristotle has to say in the Topics, The Sophistical Refutations, (...) The Posterior Analytics, and The Rhetoric. T also indicates a strong belief that these arts are as important for education today as they were in Aristotle's time. To drive home this point, T uses many of the techniques he ascribes to Aristotle on Q in the course of their discussion. (shrink)

Dewey's most direct treatment of law and legal theory, "Logical Method and Law," presents a sketch of a pragmatic theory of law. Dewey claims the law needs "a logic relevant to consequences, not antecedents." This paper unpacks Dewey's pragmatic theory of law and outlines some criticisms of Dewey's legal views set forth by the American Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn in an unpublished manuscript titled "John Dewey and Our Law." This paper aims to identify where Dewey and Llewellyn agree and where (...) they, as representatives of major schools of thought, part company. (shrink)