This collection of previously unpublished essays addresses a number of issues arising out of philosophical controversies over the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. Issues addressed include the form of a moral dilemma; the paradoxes a moral dilemma is said to entail; the question of whether a moral dilemma must exhibit inconsistency; the role of intractable circumstances in occasioning moral dilemmas; and the plausibility of supposing that there might be rational ways of addressing moral dilemmas in practice. The contributors, writing from (...) a number of widely differing points of view, include Simon Blackburn, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Alan Donagan, Terrance McConnell, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Mary Mothersill, Norman Dahl, David Brink, Peter Railton, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Christopher Gowans, and H.E. Mason. (shrink)

In 'Een handvol filosofen' staan de filosofen centraal die sinds de oprichting van de Vrije Universiteit in 1880 aan deze instelling verbonden zijn geweest. Het gaat hierbij niet alleen om de inhoud van hun werk, maar ook om de personen zelf. Er waren filosofiedocenten die zich met de universiteit identificeerden en zich volledig konden ontplooien. Er waren er echter ook voor wie dit niet gold, die geïsoleerd of in gewetensnood raakten. Veel filosofiestudenten waren actief betrokken bij wat er in hun (...) faculteit gebeurde. Zij namen initiatieven, protesteerden soms tegen de gang van zaken en kozen partij in conflictsituaties. Sinds het eind van de jaren zestig van de twintigste eeuw verloor de Vrije Universiteit geleidelijk haar christelijk karakter. Tegenwoordig werken alle stafleden vanuit hun eigen motivatie mee aan een hoofdzakelijk seculier geworden universiteit, die ruimte biedt voor religieuze en levensbeschouwelijke diversiteit. (shrink)

This article explores solidarity as an ethical concept underpinning rules in the global health context. First, it considers the theoretical conceptualisation of the value and some specific duties it supports (ie: its expression in the broadest sense and its derivative action-guiding duties). Second, it considers the manifestation of solidarity in two international regulatory instruments. It concludes that, although solidarity is represented in these instruments, it is often incidental. This fact, their emphasis on other values and their internal weaknesses diminishes the (...) action-guiding impact of the solidarity rules. The global health and human subject research scene needs a completely new instrument specifically directed at means by which solidarity can be achieved, and a reformed infrastructure dedicated to realising that value. (shrink)

A presentation, lucid and concise, of Aquinas' chief philosophical views, set against the historical background out of which they developed and supplemented by an appraisal of their present-day significance. Fr. Copleston's writing is precise without being elaborately technical, simple without being superficial; he succeeds in saying something both to the general reader and to the philosophical specialist.--L. H. E.

An analysis, of a rather general sort, of the nature and implications of human thought, based on the assumption that "the fundamental condition for successful [social] planning is consistency and propriety in our thinking."--L. H. E.

An exposition of some basic principles of a Weltanschauung heavily influenced by the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner, together with some enthusiastic reflections on art, education, and contemporary life.--L. H. E.

There are two main meanings of "Dasein" in Jaspers' Philosophie : the "that" of whatever can be encountered empirically, and the immediateness, the "there" of subjects. The author attempts to show the ultimate connection between these two meanings of "Dasein," and how, for Jaspers, "Dasein" is the basis for the realization of being. The book displays an excellent command of Jaspers' works and of the philosophical problematics for which Jaspers is significant.--L. H. E.

The author argues that legal judgments should be based upon the facts and realities of concrete situations, rather than be derived solely from preconceived statutes, and should be rendered by several judges cooperating with the interested parties and with various scientific experts. He calls his own attitude "existential"; one misses, however, any existential dialectic in his thinking.--L. H. E.

Argues for the desirability and estimates the results of applying the methods of the physical sciences to the field of politics.--L. H. E.

Analyzes, with considerable insight, the harmful effects of modern civilization upon the human spirit. To counteract these effects, Marcel proposes that modern man base his thought and action upon the fundamental Christian ideals of humility and charity.--L. H. E.

The author of this interesting study seeks to understand being in its unity--das Sein des Seienden--in terms of free will, the unifying base between death and existence. The work is rich in ideas and suggestive in its interpretations, though it suffers at times from a lack of clarity in expression. Part of Chapter Two appeared in this Review, IV.--L. H. E.

A collection of articles, mainly by members of the faculty of St. John's University, on the concept of freedom as now held and taught by Roman Catholic philosophers. After discussions of the epistemological, metaphysical and psychological aspects of freedom, its relevance in individual acts and in various social contexts is described. The book is of considerable interest, and deserves the special prize it received from the Freedoms Foundation.--L. H. E.

Kant's philosophy of arithmetic / by Charles Parsons -- Visual geometry / by James Hopkins -- The proof-structure of Kant's transcendental deduction / by Dieter Henrich -- Imagination and perception / by P.F. Strawson -- Kant's categories and their schematism / by Lauchlan Chipman -- Transcendental arguments / by Barry Stroud -- Strawson on transcendental idealism / by H.E. Matthews -- Self-knowledge / by W.H. Walsh -- The age and size of the world / by Jonathan Bennett.

The author's treatment of western philosophers depends on their relevance to his interpretation of the character of western thought. Ancient qualitative rationalism conflicts and becomes reconciled with the biblical tradition in medieval philosophy. The subsequent split between the quantitative rationalism of the Cartesians and the experimental rationalism of the English thinkers leads to Kant. The ferment of the nineteenth century then raises the question of the possibility of an equilibrium between science, philosophy and moral value.--L. H. E.

Twenty-five excerpts from books and articles, arranged under four headings: The Human Person, Man and Political Society, The Gospel and Human Society, and The New Socio-temporal Order. The selections have been chosen to represent their author's standpoint concerning the validity of the Christian "ought" in the reality of worldly affairs.--L. H. E.

Funke has taken upon himself the task of refining and answering the question "What is philosophy?" His answer results in the proof that all philosophy in order to be philosophy must not neglect the question as to the transcendental determination and form of its own consciousness. As such, philosophy is, according to Funke, neither merely stating facts nor describing qualities. Rather philosophy wants to know why something is the way it is, that is, why something occurs as a phenomenon in (...) exactly the way it does and not otherwise. Consequently, philosophy is a critical transcendental phenomenology that has to understand the object regressively as the correlate of a subjective achievement. Being a universal transcendental philosophy, pure phenomenology has the task of not merely seeking for the constitutive conditions of the phenomena in their peculiarity but also that of proving the validity of its own undertaking. Phenomenology as reflective consciousness has to turn back to the conditions of its own possibility. This demand leads back to an iterative regress in which each proposition about transcendentals must be justified transcendentally. The chapter on "The Reflective Consciousness and the Iterating Regress of the Conditions of Possibility" exhibits this problem while the chapter on "The Topical Consciousness and the Utopical Regress to the Ultimate Experiences of the Life-World" provides an answer and demonstrates why the phenomenological regress of reflection can and must never be completed. Interpreting Husserl, Funke explains that the transcendental reduction in Husserl does not lead back to an ego, a transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity, as generally assumed. Rather, as Funke attempts to prove, the state of awareness of subjectivity and the context of meaning of objectivity belong to one another correlatively and universally. According to Funke, phenomenology is essentially the method which in critical reflection makes reason advance further in its process of self-enlightenment. This book is written in an interesting and lively way and Funke does not fail to anticipate and address possible critical objections to his own position. At the same time he involves himself in an apologetic discussion with the philosophical literature on this issue.—H. E. M. H. (shrink)

A detailed and comprehensive study of the impact of Leibnizian ideas upon French opinion before 1760. Leibniz was read, during this period, primarily as a speculative metaphysician and rationalistic theologian. Part I deals with the Leibnizian critique of Cartesianism, Part II with the adventures of the Leibnizian theodicy--not only as Leibniz expounded it but also as interpreted by Pope and by Wolff--and Part III presents an extended account of the reactions to Leibnizianism by Voltaire. --L. H. E.

I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions that (...) we regard as bad, they are typically better off having their acquired preferences satisfied. If they are badly off it is because they cannot get what we and they, would regard as more desirable alternatives. Preference utilitarianism explains why individuals in such circumstances are badly off whether they have adapted to their deprived circumstances or not. Even if they prefer the conditions of their lives to all other available alternatives, most would prefer alternatives that are not available to them which would, on the preferentist account, make them better off. And that, on the preferentist account, is the basis for a radical critique of unjust institutions that limit people's options and prevent them from getting what they want. (shrink)