Biological research on aggression is increasingly consulted for possible answers to the social problems of crime and violence. This paper reviews some contrasting approaches to the biological understanding of behavior-behavioral genetic, social-environmental, physiological, developmental-as a prelude to arguing that approaches to aggression are beset by vagueness and imprecision in their definitions and disunity in their measurement strategies. This vagueness and disunity undermines attempts to compare and evaluate the different approaches empirically. Nevertheless, the definitions reveal commitments to particular metaphysical views concerning (...) behavior. Alternative understandings of aggression suggest even different research approaches than those most commonly found in the literature. (shrink)

Funke has taken upon himself the task of refining and answering the question "What is philosophy?" His answer results in the proof that all philosophy in order to be philosophy must not neglect the question as to the transcendental determination and form of its own consciousness. As such, philosophy is, according to Funke, neither merely stating facts nor describing qualities. Rather philosophy wants to know why something is the way it is, that is, why something occurs as a phenomenon in (...) exactly the way it does and not otherwise. Consequently, philosophy is a critical transcendental phenomenology that has to understand the object regressively as the correlate of a subjective achievement. Being a universal transcendental philosophy, pure phenomenology has the task of not merely seeking for the constitutive conditions of the phenomena in their peculiarity but also that of proving the validity of its own undertaking. Phenomenology as reflective consciousness has to turn back to the conditions of its own possibility. This demand leads back to an iterative regress in which each proposition about transcendentals must be justified transcendentally. The chapter on "The Reflective Consciousness and the Iterating Regress of the Conditions of Possibility" exhibits this problem while the chapter on "The Topical Consciousness and the Utopical Regress to the Ultimate Experiences of the Life-World" provides an answer and demonstrates why the phenomenological regress of reflection can and must never be completed. Interpreting Husserl, Funke explains that the transcendental reduction in Husserl does not lead back to an ego, a transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity, as generally assumed. Rather, as Funke attempts to prove, the state of awareness of subjectivity and the context of meaning of objectivity belong to one another correlatively and universally. According to Funke, phenomenology is essentially the method which in critical reflection makes reason advance further in its process of self-enlightenment. This book is written in an interesting and lively way and Funke does not fail to anticipate and address possible critical objections to his own position. At the same time he involves himself in an apologetic discussion with the philosophical literature on this issue.—H. E. M. H. (shrink)