The fundamental tenet of contemporary sociobiology, namely the assumption of a single process of evolution involving the selection of genes, is critically examined. An alternative multiple-level, multiple-process model of evolution is presented which posits that the primary process that operates via selection upon the genes cannot account for certain kinds of biological phenomena, especially complex, learned, social behaviours. The primary process has evolved subsidiary evolutionary levels and processes that act to bridge the gap between genes and these complex behaviours. The (...) subsidiary levels are development, individual animal learning, and socioculture itself. It is argued that individual learning is pivotal to the derivation and biological analysis of culture. The differences between cultural and noncultural societies are stressed. It is concluded that such a multiple-level model of evolution can form the basis for reconciling opposing sides in the sociobiology debate. (shrink)

H. C. for Life, That Is to Say... is Derrida's literary critical recollection of his lifelong friendship with Hélène Cixous. The main figure that informs Derrida's reading here is that of "taking sides." While Hélène Cixous in her life and work takes the side of life, "for life," Derrida admits always feeling drawn to the side of death. Rather than being an obvious choice, taking the side of life is an act of faith, by wagering one's life on life. H. (...) C. for Life sets up and explores this interminable "argument" between Derrida and Cixous as to what death has in store deep within life itself, before the end. In addition to being a memoir, it is also a theoretical confrontation—for example about the meaning of "might" and "omnipotence," and a philosophical and philological analysis of the crypts within the vast oeuvre of Hélène Cixous. Finally, the book is Derrida's tribute to the thought of the woman whom he regards as one of the great French poets, writers, and thinkers of our time. (shrink)

_H. C. for Life, That Is to Say..._ is Derrida's literary critical recollection of his lifelong friendship with Hélène Cixous. The main figure that informs Derrida's reading here is that of "taking sides." While Hélène Cixous in her life and work takes the side of life, "for life," Derrida admits always feeling drawn to the side of death. Rather than being an obvious choice, taking the side of life is an act of faith, by wagering one's life on life. _H. (...) C. for Life_ sets up and explores this interminable "argument" between Derrida and Cixous as to what death has in store deep within life itself, before the end. In addition to being a memoir, it is also a theoretical confrontation—for example about the meaning of "might" and "omnipotence," and a philosophical and philological analysis of the crypts within the vast oeuvre of Hélène Cixous. Finally, the book is Derrida's tribute to the thought of the woman whom he regards as one of the great French poets, writers, and thinkers of our time. (shrink)

In this book Professor Baldry describes this development from Homer to Cicero when, although the traditional divisions and prejudices still remained string, the ...

The eleven papers comprising this book were read at two Bergson Centennial celebrations in 1959--at Hollins College and in Paris. From Pelikan's discussion of Bergson's place in theology to Merleau-Ponty's account of his view of history, the contributions lay bare many more enigmas in Bergson's relation to subsequent thought than they solve. Starkie's paper on the literary merits and impact of the work of Bergson makes such a compelling case for its kinship to Symbolism and Proust that one is tempted (...) to accept the thesis that the Bergsonian Heritage is most alive in those who are not philosophers. Contains a bibliography of books and articles by and on Bergson.--W. H. C. (shrink)

In this preface to his recent Critique de La Raison Dialectique, Sartre poses, and outlines an answer to, the question of the Critique, "Do we have today the means to constitute a structural, historical anthropology?" Distinguishing between "true" Marxism and that of Garaudy, Lefebvre, Lukacs and others, he accuses his contemporaries of explaining historical events by a rationalistic and fatalistic scientism in which the concrete existing subject gets lost. This un-Marxian "sclerosis" of Marxist concepts, says Sartre, is what accounts for (...) the prominence of existentialism; once Marxist anthropology recovers its "human foundation" in the comprehension of existence, existentialism will be re-absorbed within the sought-for method. Convinced that "true" Marxism does not consider human existence to be merely an economic-historical event, Sartre is not aware that the envisioned anthropology may transform Marxism more than existentialism.--W. H. C. (shrink)

The scope and length of this anthology make it one of the best recent introductions to Continental thought for the English-speaking reader. Despite the editor's efforts to compass a century and a half of European thought under the somewhat inflated title of a "search for being," each of the fourteen contributors is allowed enough space to show that no single problem or quest concretely typifies European philosophical activity in our time. If one overlooks the dramatic cutting and pasting required by (...) the attempt to give an existential flavor to the thinkers, one finds the merit of the book to be precisely the inclusion of authors whose interests are in important respects quite divergent from those of the existentialists. There are new, long translations from Schelling, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Simmel, Husserl, and Heidegger. There is a selected bibliography.--W. H. C. (shrink)

There are many passages in ancient literature which depict an imaginary existence different from the hardships of real life-an existence blessed with Nature's bounty, untroubled by strife or want. Naturally this happy state is always placed somewhere or sometime outside normal human experience, whether ‘off the map’ in some remote quarter of the world, or in Elysium after death, or in the dim future or the distant past. Such an imaginary time of bliss in the past or the future has (...) become known as the ‘golden age’. This is the name which modern scholars generally give to the ancient belief. The phrase is often echoed by modern poets. The same language has been transferred from the unknown to the known, and it has become a commonplace to describe an outstanding period of history or literature as a ‘golden age’. (shrink)

What credentials does evolutionary epistemology have as science? A judgement based on past performance, both in terms of advancing an empirical programme and further ng theory construction, is not much. This paper briefly outlines some of the research areas, both theoretical and empirical, that can be developed and that might secure for evolutionary epistemology a future in evolutionary biology.

The extent of the dependence of early Greek cosmogony on mythical conceptions has long been a prolific source of controversy. Views on the subject have varied from Professor Cornford's claim that ‘there is a real continuity between the earliest rational speculation and the religious representation that lay behind it’ to Professor Burnet's extreme statement, ‘it is quite wrong to look for the origins of Ionian science in mythological ideas of any kind.’ The solution of the problem that I wish to (...) suggest is one which should satisfy those who insist on ‘the scientific character of the early Greek cosmology,’ while retaining a direct connection with pre-scientific beliefs—namely, that some, at least, of the earliest philosophers founded their doctrines of the beginning of the universe on a deliberate rationalization of earlier and contemporary mythical ideas. The appearance of notions like the ‘world-egg’ in a number of passages, too well known for quotation, shows that primitive cosmogony assumed an analogy between the generation of the world and the generation of animate creatures. I believe it can be proved that, so far from the ‘renunciation of sexual imagery’ which even Professor Cornford has recently attributed to Anaximander, he and other philosophers retained the habit of regarding cosmogony and anthropogony as parallel phenomena, only substituting for the mythical ‘world-egg’ a more scientific view of the embryo and its development. They looked at the world through the same spectacles as their predecessors, but after wiping from them the rose tint of mythological fancy. (shrink)