This encomium traces the fluctuations in Russell's theoretical position. These fluctuations spring from his attempt to retrieve a coherent morality from the logical doctrine that propositions asserting value are neither true nor false. The author carefully documents Russell's admissions that his own morality as a whole can claim no ground in reason or nature, and implicitly demonstrates that this state of affairs is a reasonable consequence of a fundamental belief in the unimpeachability of the fact-value distinction.--H. C.

With respect to "beginnings," Marxism-Leninism shares with Hegel the opinion that 1) man is a product of an historical process and hence has no fixed nature; 2) knowledge and its object are changeable, but there is an "absolute standpoint" created by change itself from which a view of the whole is obtainable. There is disagreement about the nature of the object known and hence also about the nature of the absolute standpoint. This study repeats the customary objection that Hegel begins (...) with thinking, whereas he ought to have begun with primitive human activity. Accordingly, Hegel ends with speculation whereas Marxism-Leninism issues in praxis. The best part of the study appears to be the discussion of the relation in Hegel between sensibility and thought, and therewith the relation between the beginning of the Logik and of the Phänomenologie.—H. C. (shrink)

Oehler here concerns himself with "the fundamental question, in which acts and forms did Platonic and Aristotelian thought attain certainty of itself and of the world?" The problem of consciousness is thus considered in the light of certainty. The inquiry centers on the manner in which the soul performs or executes judgments, the main texts being the Sophist and Metaphysics X. The "simple" and the "composite" is developed as the chief concrete problem. While the relation of the simple to certainty (...) is clear, its relation to self-consciousness remains dark.—H. C. (shrink)

Although 20th Century Polish philosophy is known in this country mainly through its logicians, there is also an active group of phenomenologists, whose most eminent member is Ingarden. These two volumes have been the lifework of the author in the sense that they present his systematic statement of themes he has pursued since his days in Freiburg as a student of Husserl. This book was published in Polish in 1946-1947. Niemeyer offers here not a translation but Ingarden's own German version. (...) It divides into two parts: existential ontology, which is contained in vol. I, and formal ontology, contained in vol. II and a soon to be published third volume. This work is not adequately characterized as phenomenology for the simple reason that phenomenologists are not thought to discuss science, while a great deal of Ingarden's discussion runs through areas presently known as philosophy of science, and moreover, the author makes extensive use of current logical and mathematical concepts and methods. Yet it is phenomenological in that Ingarden rejects the epistemological and semantical approaches to the external world as inadequate, holding that the problem can be articulated only on the level of ontology. His work is comparable in manner of treatment and purpose to Process and Reality and C. I. Lewis' Knowledge and Valuation. We recommend, for a brief look at what can and cannot be expected of this work, the section of vol. I entitled "Wissenschaft und Philosophie."—H. C. (shrink)

Hudson's contribution is a general critical introduction to eighteenth century ethical intuitionism. Hudson divides intuitionism into two basic views: 1) "sentimentalism" or the "moral sense" view propounded by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and 2) "intellectualism," or the view that intuition is a form of reason or understanding, held in one form or another by Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy, and Price. Mention is also made of Butler, whom Hudson sees in the bridge position between the other extremes. After expounding these views, Hudson discusses (...) three outstanding questions raised, but not satisfactorily answered, by the eighteenth century intuitionists: i) How does one decide between conflicting obligations?; ii) Do all men intuit the "heads" of virtue?; iii) Is it our duty to do what is right or what we think right? Finally, in a brief critique, Hudson presents objections to intuitionism based primarily on his own view of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to legitimately say "I know X." He also raises the problem of a criterion of "intuition."—C. L. H. (shrink)

The religious controversies of the 17th century are of central importance to any attempt to appraise the role of Christianity in the genesis of "modern secular society." In the 18th century there was a clear understanding that modern philosophy was hostile to religion, as the French Revolution proclaimed. The reappraisal of this relation began in Hegel's Phänomenologie, and became explicit with Max Weber: secularism is the consequence of Christianity. The adjudication of this issue demands an evaluation of the interpretations of (...) the Bible and of Christian morality made by such men as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle. According to the Enlightenment, they speak as believers only in order to interpret Christianity in such a way as to make it tolerate the new philosophy. Rex would correct this view of Bayle's intention; he would show that Protestantism, and in Bayle's case, Calvinism, is the source or a source of the belief in the sovereignty of reason. One may doubt whether Rex has proved that the Enlightenment misunderstood Bayle's intentions. Nevertheless, this study, the first part of which is devoted to the Pensées diverses sur la comète, the second to the Commentaire philosophique, is a very helpful guide to an extensive literature. And in his very attempt to prove his thesis Rex frequently brings to light aspects of Bayle's rhetoric that must be noticed in order to understand his writings.—H. C. (shrink)

The value of this book lies in its aspiration not to be a doxography, but to help us recover the tradition of the humanities or liberal arts, which Kristeller believes is presently threatened. It is easy to agree that this end would be promoted by a recovery of the original meaning of liberal education, as well as how it differs from the humanities and especially from humanism. The author intimates the rise of platonism in late medieval and renaissance thought signifies (...) a turn away from Aristotle's "divine science" and scholastic scientific theology to the study of man. The humanities would then take their origin from a change in orientation toward theology. While these opinions may be sound, this study does not show us that they are, for it rehearses opinion without exhibiting either its ground or import. Kristeller might have fulfilled his aim had he imitated the scholarship of the men he studies rather than that which thrives on the loss of the meaning of "liberal education." The eight philosophers are: Petrarch, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Telesio, Patrizi, Bruno. The appendix on the medieval antecedents of renaissance humanism is the best part of the book.—H. C. (shrink)

This work consists of three essays: "Descartes et la philosophie moderne," by Ervin Rozsnyai; "A propos de la morale 'définitive' de Descartes," by Dezcö Kalocsai; and "Esquisse de l'histoire du cartésianisme en Hongrie," by Zádor Tordai. The second essay, which is also the longest of the three, seems to promise by its title the discovery of the "perfect moral science" which Descartes says culminates his philosophy. But "définitive" is put in quotes just because, according to the author, Descartes never systematized (...) his morality: it must be pieced together from the Passions of the Soul and from correspondence. This view is in part a consequence of Kalocsai's inattention to the implications of Descartes' identification of virtue with passion. In general, while all these essays are eager to point out the progressive and "unchristian," i.e., "this-worldly" direction of Descartes' philosophy, it is not recognized that his conception of the "mastery of nature" put Descartes beyond biblical morality, to say nothing of bourgeoise morality.—H. C. (shrink)

This reflective work wants to disclose the intention moving early Greek philosophy, which, as the title hints, sought to lay bare the ground for "the way things are." The failure of the physiologoi to discover in nature an intelligible Gegenwart in which nature as a whole could appear led Heraclitus and Parmenides, to whom most of the book is devoted, to examine the ground of logos, and therewith, of truth and opinion. Commensurate with his intention to emphasize those elements of (...) early Greek philosophy common to its greatest representatives, Boeder concludes by pursuing his theme into Zeno's development of dialectic.--H. C. (shrink)

Julian H. Franklin, scholar of constitutionalism in the late sixteenth century, has extended his researches into the late seventeenth century with this fine work on Locke and Locke’s immediate sources. Franklin’s book is short, concise, well-focused and carefully argued. It is also thought-provoking to a degree one would not expect from the modesty or historicity of the subject. Controversy over this problem of political rhetoric and science, once heated while lives and fates were involved, is now cold, and the problem (...) no longer seems to be ours. Franklin follows the reasoning of past thinkers and deftly joins in when he can, providing for us an exemplary model of political theory on the quiet: he makes old arguments relevant to us without forcing them and he detaches us from our alleged necessities without resorting to silly hypotheses. (shrink)

Julian H. Franklin, scholar of constitutionalism in the late sixteenth century, has extended his researches into the late seventeenth century with this fine work on Locke and Locke’s immediate sources. Franklin’s book is short, concise, well-focused and carefully argued. It is also thought-provoking to a degree one would not expect from the modesty or historicity of the subject. Controversy over this problem of political rhetoric and science, once heated while lives and fates were involved, is now cold, and the problem (...) no longer seems to be ours. Franklin follows the reasoning of past thinkers and deftly joins in when he can, providing for us an exemplary model of political theory on the quiet: he makes old arguments relevant to us without forcing them and he detaches us from our alleged necessities without resorting to silly hypotheses. (shrink)

"Historical recurrence" is an idea of uncertain but considerable breadth conceived by G. W. Trompf. Vaguer and wider than the notion of a cycle, it can mean "typical changes" or that "history somehow repeats itself". Besides the cycle it is said to include the alternation view, the reciprocal view, the reenactment view, renaissance, recurrence proceeding from the uniformity of human nature, similarity, parallelism, and lessons of the past. As Trompf traces this idea from antiquity to the Reformation he points out (...) many along the way who somehow contributed to its formation but rests on three who chiefly formulated some version of it: Polybius, Luke, and Machiavelli. These are seen as historians—even Luke is "an historian of the Hellenistic period" —to whom history somehow repeats itself. (shrink)

Weber believes that we err in studying the Regulae as though it were composed with the same "homogeneity and rigor" as the Meditations and Principles. Prior to philosophic interpretation, it is necessary to assign each piece of the text to the historical "phase" in which it was written, that is, to trace the evolution of Descartes' thoughts on method. That this procedure is not barren of consequences for the understanding of the Regulae may be seen from the fact that Weber (...) discovers no less than ten phases of thought and ten methods, and declares that the mathesis universalis has nothing to do with the method. Since Descartes tells us that his posthumous works are written with the "same care" as the published works, we seem bound to conclude that the published works, upon the application of Weber's method, will reveal themselves to be composed as arbitrarily as the Regulae.—H. C. (shrink)

Vlachos' study reaches toward the center of Kant's political philosophy, and therewith presses pertinent difficulties in liberal or enlightenment politics. The central polemic arises from the attempt to unite an unchanging, universal morality with the ideal of the progress of mankind as the goal of all moral action. The good man strives after an ideal which is in principle unrealizable; he is estranged from the community and becomes a perpetual reformer. The many who are not capable of such moral striving (...) must be ruled either by the persuasion and habituation of positive law and the beliefs that support it, or by the force and terror of a tyrant. Kant's attempt to make his moral law politically responsible is appropriately called by the author la dialectique du progrès. From this standpoint Vlachos is able to present a comprehensive view of "cosmopolitan" morality.—H. C. (shrink)

Plamenatz here attempts to revive political philosophy through an examination of the great modern thinkers. In the introduction, he meets objections to political philosophy. His defense rests on the claim that there are fundamental and enduring problems common to political philosophy and social science, and that philosophers often discuss them more profoundly and succinctly than social scientists. He has difficulty meeting the charge that political philosophy is unscientific. Since the question of the nature, legitimacy and purpose of political philosophy is (...) thematic in every major writer Plamenatz examines, one expects to find it stressed, yet it is noticed only cursorily, perhaps because the author agrees with the critics that political philosophers "were under illusions about their theories." Volume I contains chapters on Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Burke and Rousseau; Volume II on Bentham, early socialism, Hegel and Marxism.—H. C. (shrink)

This is a study of what Spinoza intended to be the refutation of orthodox Judaism, and indeed, of all religious orthodoxy. The recovery of that refutation, as Strauss illustrates in his preface to this translation, is needed by theology because the progressive liberalization of religion has now reached the point where theology is hardly able to distinguish itself from sundry civil moralities. Owing to this beginning, both in its plan and execution this study has little in common with historical studies (...) of the origin of religious liberalism. Part I distinguishes the classical or Epicurean critique of religion, which did not entail enlightenment, from the modern critique, whose origin Strauss finds in Hobbes. Part II examines Spinoza's critique of orthodoxy, the critique of Calvin, the teaching on the relation between religion and politics, and the concept of Bible criticism. Since Strauss' guiding concern is to discover whether the critique of orthodoxy can be met from the grounds of orthodoxy, he takes great care to specify precisely the assumptions of each argument and the belief against which it is directed. When completed, this effort becomes the articulation of the conflict between reason and revelation. That conflict is shown as it is understood by each side, and Strauss assesses the vulnerability of each to the other.—H. C. (shrink)

Rescher is one of the few logicians equipped to deal with the whole of logic in the original languages. Arabic logic is particularly fortunate in finding such an interpreter. This book however is not a systematic treatment, but a series of topical essays. Perhaps its usefulness is to acquaint the un initiated with the flavor and tone of Arabic logic. One can then pass on to Rescher's systematic study—The Development of Arabic Logic—which is promised this year.—H. C.

The thesis of this work is that Spinoza's great originality was in methodology, and indeed, that he was "primarily a methodologist." Since the explicit theme of Spinoza's major works is politics and ethics, support for this thesis would require at a minimum an account of the relation of method to ethics, metaphysics and mechanistic physics. Not only is such an account wanting, but even while taking the Ethics as his primary text, the author dismisses as "irrelevant" its ostensible geometrical method. (...) Further, while "all Spinoza's thinking can be called mathematical," barely two pages are devoted to an exposition of his "mathematical method" per se. The thesis then can hardly be said to have been presented, much less sustained.—H. C. (shrink)

This is Volume Six of Scheler's Gesammelte Werke. The contents of this volume were published in 1922 in four small volumes, corresponding to the four groupings of the present edition: Moralia, Nation und Weltanschauung, Christentum und Gesellschaft, Zusätze. Corrigenda and comprehensive indices have been added.—H. C.

This anthology is designed to introduce the reader to existentialism by arranging texts according to their views on five specific themes—phenomenology and ontology, the existential subject, inter-subjectivity, religion and atheism, and psychotherapy. The anthologist's desire to acquaint the reader with the diversity of existentialism has led him to cite forty-seven authors, with the result that the selections from any given author on a given subject are very brief: Heidegger is allowed five pages on ontology, Nietzsche one page on religion, etc. (...) In order to make such abbreviations appear viable, the anthologist has contrived discourses by pasting together sentences which in the original texts are paragraphs and even pages apart. It is doubtful, therefore, that this "critical reader" will enable the student to form a critical judgment of existentialism.—H. C. (shrink)

This is a posthumous work of one of the "new conservatives." Weaver criticizes what is both new and bad in modernity. There is no concern here for method. The phenomena are seen from the point of view of the concerned citizen. The remarks on total war are probably the most perceptive part of the book.—H. C.

The theme of this work is most simply stated by recalling the question that reputedly vexed the auditors of Plato's lecture on the Good—what does the Good have to do with mathematics? or, what is wisdom that it unites knowledge of nature and knowledge of political matters? Burkert hopes to throw light on this question through philological and historical investigations of sources and events bearing on Pythagoras, his pupil Philolaos and Plato. The book will be considered an important contribution to (...) philological studies of Pythagoras. In view of the author's documentation and thoroughness, it should also prove helpful to those interested in classical mathematics and the mathematical sciences, such as music and astronomy, and their relation to philosophy.—H. C. (shrink)