It seems natural enough to suppose that there must be some very close connection between our feelings of sympathy and our moral principles. A large part, at any rate, of the badness of bad men seems to consist in their lack of real concern for other people, and a large part of the goodness of good men consists in the regard they have for their fellows. Could a man who never felt with of for another be regarded as good, or (...) even as a moral being at all ? We should be inclined to say that this was impossible were it not that some philosophers appear to maintain that reason is the fundamental moral requirement and that unsympathetic beings might act rightly from some purely rational principle. Kant, for example, in a well-known passage, contrasts the man who helps others because he is sympathetically inclined towards them with the man who is too unhappy to feel with them but nevertheless helps them because he thinks he ought to. It is the second of these men, in his view, whose action is most clearly moral. In reply to this we may say that although a man's personal griefs at a particular time may render him at that time unable to feel with others even though he helps them as he ought, nevertheless he could not have performed such an act of heroic beneficence if his heart had never warmed towards anybody. (shrink)