T. H. Green was born April 7, 1836, and died in his forty-seventh year on March 26, 1882. He was appointed to lecture in ancient and modern history at Balliol College on April 11, 1860, and was awarded a fellowship at Balliol on November 30th of that year. For the last four years of his life, he was Whyte’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Oxford University. Apart from one short interruption as an assistant commissioner of schools and several as a result (...) of illness, Green was philosophically active until his death. Yet, for a philosopher who during his lifetime attained his degree of eminence and influence in moral and political thought, Green published remarkably little. With the exception of an essay on Aristotle, a lengthy critical introduction to an edition of Hume, and several minor essays and reviews, all Green’s writings were issued posthumously. (shrink)

T. H. Green was born April 7, 1836, and died in his forty-seventh year on March 26, 1882. He was appointed to lecture in ancient and modern history at Balliol College on April 11, 1860, and was awarded a fellowship at Balliol on November 30th of that year. For the last four years of his life, he was Whyte’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Oxford University. Apart from one short interruption as an assistant commissioner of schools and several as a result (...) of illness, Green was philosophically active until his death. Yet, for a philosopher who during his lifetime attained his degree of eminence and influence in moral and political thought, Green published remarkably little. With the exception of an essay on Aristotle, a lengthy critical introduction to an edition of Hume, and several minor essays and reviews, all Green’s writings were issued posthumously. (shrink)

In this slender volume in The Humanist Library series, Nielsen not only argues for the independence of morality from religion, but as well outlines a normative theory as an alternative to religious [[sic]] morality. The basis of religious morality is the belief that God is all good, and thus we should do what he commands. In response to this, Nielsen elaborates Plato’s argument that morality cannot be based upon religious belief. However one understands the claim "God is good," i.e., whether (...) it is analytic or not, understanding "good" is logically presupposed for one to be able to grasp the meaning or truth of the claim. It is more correct to say that religion is based upon morality since the basis of religious belief is that there is a being worthy of worship, and this conclusion must rest upon autonomous moral insight. The remainder of the book is concerned with two themes involving the competing claims of secular and religious morality. The first is that only the religious perspective provides an adequate account of man’s origin and destiny, and thus the perspective from which one can find happiness and fulfillment. In response, Nielsen invokes "all the old as well as some new objections to religion" as the perspective which provides a true account of the nature of things. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that only religious persons find happiness and meaning in life. The second claim of religious morality is that it alone can provide a satisfactory basis for moral theory. Secular moral theory can provide only conventional relativism. In reply, Nielsen outlines and defends a normative theory of the consequentialist variety. The last part of the book is a general defense of consequential ethical theories against Anscombe-like objections which are associated with "religious absolutism" for reasons not specified.—T.K.H. (shrink)

What mechanisms underlie children’s language production? Structural priming—the repetition of sentence structure across utterances—is an important measure of the developing production system. We propose its mechanism in children is the same as may underlie analogical reasoning: structure-mapping. Under this view, structural priming is the result of making an analogy between utterances, such that children map semantic and syntactic structure from previous to future utterances. Because the ability to map relationally complex structures develops with age, younger children are less successful than (...) older children at mapping both semantic and syntactic relations. Consistent with this account, 4-year-old children showed priming only of semantic relations when surface similarity across utterances was limited, whereas 5-year-olds showed priming of both semantic and syntactic structure regardless of shared surface similarity. The priming of semantic structure without syntactic structure is uniquely predicted by the structure-mapping account because others have interpreted structural priming as a reflection of developing syntactic knowledge. (shrink)

Few thinkers exerted a greater influence upon British thought and public policy between 1880 and 1914 than T. H. Green. In his appraisal Richter applies to Green, usually studied as a philosopher, the techniques of analysis taken from sociology and the history of ideas. The result is important both as a study of a man who considerably affected the thought of his time and also as a contribution to the social and intellectual history of Victorian England. The chapter headings include: (...) Idealism and the Crisis of the Evangelical Conscience; Metaphysical Foundations; the Principles of Political Obligation; From the Old Liberalism to the New: Private Property, Capitalism and State Intervention; and the Life of Citizenship. (shrink)

. Ill BERGSONS THEORY OF ART . . .141 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTENSIVE MANIFOLDS I I CINDERS ..... 215 APPENDICES A. REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE . . 249 B. PLAN FOR A ...

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's rationale for supporting the development and approval of BiDil for heart failure specifically in black patients was based on under-powered, post hoc subgroup analyses of two relatively old trials , which were further complicated by substantial covariate imbalances between racial groups. Indeed, the only statistically significant difference observed between black and white patients was found without any adjustment for potential confounders in samples that were unlikely to have been adequately randomized. Meanwhile, because the accepted (...) baseline therapy for heart failure has substantially improved since these trials took place, their results cannot be combined with data from the more recent trial amongst black patients alone. There is therefore little scientific evidence to support the approval of BiDil only for use in black patients, and the FDA's rationale fails to consider the ethical consequences of recognizing racial categories as valid markers of innate biological difference, and permitting the development of group-specific therapies that are subject to commercial incentives rather than scientific evidence or therapeutic imperatives. This paper reviews the limitations in the scientific evidence used to support the approval of BiDil only for use in black patients; calls for further analysis of the V-HeFT I and II data which might clarify whether responses to H-I vary by race; and evaluates the consequences of commercial incentives to develop racialized medicines. We recommend that the FDA revise the procedures they use to examine applications for race-based therapies to ensure that these are based on robust scientific claims and do not undermine the aims of the 1992 Revitalization Act. (shrink)

Huxley, the visionary, was a key figure in creating modern science education. He was also an employee and bureaucrat of the Science and Art Department most of his working life. The Department was established to organize scientific education for the working class, and many of Huxley's activities on its behalf marked him as a friend of the artisan. It will be argued here that Huxley's vision of working-class scientific education was not in the least radical but reflected the middle-class views (...) of his contemporaries in the Department. Their views, by as late as the 1890s, were little different from those of the late 1840s. Huxley's attitudes were narrowly meritocratic and in no way egalitarian. By the time the movement for technical instruction gathered momentum in the 1880s, Huxley's ideas were distinctly old-fashioned. (shrink)

Young children judge that violations of ordinary, causal constraints are impossible. Yet children’s religious beliefs typically include the assumption that such violations can occur via divine agency in the form of miracles. We conducted two studies to examine this potential conflict. In Study 1, we invited 5- and 6-year-old Colombian children attending either a secular or a religious school to judge what is and is not possible. Children made their judgments either following a minimal prompt or following a reminder of (...) God’s extraordinary powers. Irrespective of their education, and whether or not they had been reminded of God’s extraordinary powers, children systematically judged violations of ordinary, causal constraints to be impossible. In Study 2, we asked if more extensive reminders of God’s special powers would prompt religious children to say that the impossible can happen. Five- and 6-year-old Colombian children attending either a secular or a religious school were presented with narratives in which the protagonist desired an ordinarily impossible outcome. In half the stories, the protagonist prayed to God for the desired outcome. Irrespective of education and of whether the protagonist prayed, children systematically concluded that the desired outcome would not occur and justified that conclusion by reference to ordinary causal constraints. Nevertheless, in a minority of their replies children did assert that violations of ordinary causality are possible. Overall, irrespective of their religious education, young children judge that events rarely deviate from their natural course; only occasionally do they acknowledge exceptions. (shrink)

In this article we would like to scrutinize the particular problems which are connected with the self-reflection of theoretical thinking and its meaning. Often, philosophy is considered as the science of science. In philosophy the demarcation between true knowledge and sheer belief or opinion must be justified. One could say that this task is as old as Western philosophy itself. Since Greek philosophy one of the main questions is how we can know the truth and how we are able to (...) discern true from alleged knowledge. (shrink)