This Element provides a comprehensive introduction to contemporary theories of mental content. After clarifying central concepts and identifying the questions that dominate the current debate, it presents and discusses the principal accounts of the nature of mental content (or mental representation), which include causal, informational, teleological and structuralist approaches, alongside the phenomenal intentionality approach and the intentional stance theory. Additionally, it examines anti-representationalist accounts which question either the existence or the explanatory relevance of mental content. Finally, the Element concludes by (...) considering some recent developments in the debate about mental content, specifically the “explanatory turn” and its implications for questions about representations in basic cognitive systems and the representational character of current empirical theories of cognition. (shrink)

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some (...) truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher-level entities. Fortunately, there is a non-standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to (...) this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge’s insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge’s own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination—or so I will argue. (shrink)

According to standard teleosemantics, intentional states are selectional states. This claim is put forward not as a conceptual analysis, but as a ‘theoretical reduction’—an a posteriori hypothesis analogous to ‘water = H2O’. Critics have tried to show that this meta-theoretical conception of teleosemantics leads to unacceptable consequences. In this paper, I argue that there is indeed a fundamental problem with the water/H2O analogy, as it is usually construed, and that teleosemanticists should therefore reject it. Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative (...) to the water/H2O model which avoids the fundamental problem, while explaining the a posteriori character of teleosemantics equally well. (shrink)

This is the first coherent description of all levels of communication of ciliates. Ciliates are highly sensitive organisms that actively compete for environmental resources. They assess their surroundings, estimate how much energy they need for particular goals, and then realise the optimum variant. They take measures to control certain environmental resources. They perceive themselves and can distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘non-self’. They process and evaluate information and then modify their behaviour accordingly. These highly diverse competences show us that this is (...) possible owing to sign-mediated communication processes within ciliates, between the same, related and different ciliate species, and between ciliates and non-ciliate organisms. This is crucial in coordinating growth and development, shape and dynamics. This book further serves as a learning tool for research aspects in biocommunication in ciliates. It will guide scientists in further investigations on ciliate behavior, how they mediate signaling processes between themselves and the environment. (shrink)

The compatibilism debate revolves around the question whether moral responsibility and free will are compatible with determinism. Prima facie, this seems to be a substantial issue. But according to the triviality objection, the disagreement is merely verbal: compatibilists and incompatibilists, it is maintained, are talking past each other, since they use the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” in different senses. In this paper I argue, first, that the triviality objection is indeed a formidable one and that the standard replies (...) to it are unconvincing. This, however, does not mean that the objection succeeds. Starting with the debate about moral responsibility, I attempt to show that there is an account of moral responsibility which enables us to defend the compatibilism debate against the charge of triviality—namely, the normative conception of moral responsibility. If “moral responsibility” is defined in normative terms, then we cannot distinguish between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist sense of “moral responsibility”, because such a disambiguation would be inconsistent with the essential action-guiding force of normative expressions. Finally, I examine how the normative conception of moral responsibility can help us to defend the free will debate against the triviality objection and draw some general conclusions. (shrink)

Band 1. Prolegomena -- Band 2. Im Anfang erschafft Gott Himmel und Erde und den Menschen.

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV.

Desires, or directive representations, are central components of human and animal minds. Nevertheless, desires are largely neglected in current debates about the naturalization of representational content. Most naturalists seem to assume that some version of the standard teleological approach, which identifies the content of a desire with a specific kind of effect that the desire has the function of producing, will turn out to be correct. In this paper I argue, first, that this common assumption is unjustified, since the standard (...) approach is in fact deeply problematic. Secondly, I propose an alternative account of the content of desires which, while generating plausible and determinate content ascriptions, avoids the main problem that plagues the standard approach, and is also preferable on other grounds. (shrink)

Archaea represent a third domain of life with unique properties not found in the other domains. Archaea actively compete for environmental resources. They perceive themselves and can distinguish between 'self' and 'non-self'. They process and evaluate available information and then modify their behaviour accordingly. They assess their surroundings, estimate how much energy they need for particular goals, and then realize the optimum variant. These highly diverse competences show us that this is possible owing to sign- mediated communication processes within archaeal (...) cells, between the same, related and different archaeal species, and between archaea and non-archaeal organisms. This is crucial in coordinating growth and development, shape and dynamics. Such communication must function both on the local level and between widely separated colony parts. This allows archaea to coordinate appropriate response behaviors in a differentiated manner to their current developmental status and physiological influences. This book will orientate further investigations on how archaeal ecosphere inhabitants communicate with each other to coordinate their behavioral patterns and whats the role of viruses in this highly dynamic interactional networks. (shrink)

Fungi are sessile, highly sensitive organisms that actively compete for environmental resources both above and below the ground. They assess their surroundings, estimate how much energy they need for particular goals, and then realise the optimum variant. They take measures to control certain environmental resources. They perceive themselves and can distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘non-self’. They process and evaluate information and then modify their behaviour accordingly. These highly diverse competences show us that this is possible owing to sign-mediated communication processes (...) within fungal cells, between the same, related and different fungal species, and between fungi and non-fungal organisms. Intraorganismic communication involves sign-mediated interactions within cells and between cells. This is crucial in coordinating growth and development, shape and dynamics. Such communication must function both on the local level and between widely separated mycelium parts. This allows fungi to coordinate appropriate response behaviors in a differentiated manner to their current developmental status and physiological influences. (shrink)

The reconstruction of meaning in the aftermath of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) is part of the grieving process but has to date been poorly understood. Earlier theorists including Freud, Bowlby and Kübler‐Ross provided a foundation for what occurs during this time using stage theories. More recent researchers, often using qualitative techniques, have provided a more complex and expanded view that enhances our knowledge of meaning reconstruction following infant loss. This overview of representative contemporary authors compares and contrasts them with (...) the longstanding models that are being supplanted within the emerging field of thanatology. Understanding parental reactions within this new framework can help healthcare professionals in dealing with those affected by SIDS and provide a more empathic and sensitive approach to individual differences. Parents’ own accounts of their post‐SIDS experience are consistent with these newer theories. Comprehending how parents cope and reconstruct their lives is an important element in providing appropriate psychological support services. (shrink)

In the history of Tibetan Buddhism, the eleventh-century Indian mystic Nbropa occupies an unusual position, for his life and teachings mark both the end of a long tradition and the beginning of a new and rich era in Buddhist thought. Nbropa's biography, translated by the world-renowned Buddhist scholar Herbert V. Guenther from hitherto unknown sources, describes with great psychological insight the spiritual development of this scholar-saint. It is unique in that it also contains a detailed analysis of his teaching that (...) has been authoritative for the whole of Tantric Buddhism. This modern translation is accompanied by a commentary that relates Buddhist concepts to Western analytic philosophy, psychiatry, and depth psychology, thereby illuminating the significance of Tantra and Tantrism for our own time. Yet above all, it is the story of an individual whose years of endless toil and perseverance on the Buddhist path will serve as an inspiration to anyone who aspires to spiritual practice. (shrink)

The article discusses topics in the context of contemporary legal argumentation. It starts with a sketch of the development of topics from ancient times until the present day. Here the author focuses on the theory of the German legal philosopher Theodor Viehweg, which was most influential to legal argumentation in the 20th century. Then a modern concept of topics is introduced and finally the author discusses the role of topics in contemporary legal argumentation. In this part the distinction between topoi (...) in the weak sense (practically all argumentation schemes) and in the strong sense (specific legal topoi as listed by Gerhard Struck in 1971 is introduced. The author argues that Viehweg’s claim that topics plays an important role in legal argumentation is problematic, because topoi in the weak sense are certainly of high importance, but this is almost trivial. Topoi in the strong sense on the other hand are only of minor importance for legal practice. What characterises legal discourse much more is a set specific pragmatic discourse rules, discussed at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Steven Rose's book is essentially a plea for considering the variety and complexity of life and against simplistic reductions of human and animal behavioral phenomena to single genetic causes.

The Chorus representation is a sparse, similarity-preserving representation achieved by a feedforward neural network. Hence it is probably better suited for interpolation than for categorization. This commentary raises the question of how to combine categorization with interpolation, whether feedforward networks can be reasonable models for parts of the cerebral cortex, and whether people can perform more than one interpolation at a time.

We briefly review the long-standing ideas about the use of synchronicity in the brain, which rely on Donald Hebb's views on cell assemblies and synaptic plasticity. More recently the distinction among several timescales in the description of neural activity has become a focus of theoretical discussion. Phillips & Singer's target article is criticized mainly because it does not distinguish these timescales properly and hence does not really address the questions so intensely debated today.

Drawing on recent findings in the cognitive and neurosciences, this article discusses how people manage to predict each other’s actions, which is fundamental for joint action. We explore how a common coding of perceived and performed actions may allow actors to predict the what, when, and where of others’ actions. The “what” aspect refers to predictions about the kind of action the other will perform and to the intention that drives the action. The “when” aspect is critical for all joint (...) actions requiring close temporal coordination. The “where” aspect is important for the online coordination of actions because actors need to effectively distribute a common space. We argue that although common coding of perceived and performed actions alone is not sufficient to enable one to engage in joint action, it provides a representational platform for integrating the actions of self and other. The final part of the paper considers links between lower‐level processes like action simulation and higher‐level processes like verbal communication and mental state attribution that have previously been at the focus of joint action research. (shrink)

In this chapter, I show that there is at least one crucial, non-short, argument, which does not involve arguments about spatiotemporality, why Kant’s subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge, argued in the Transcendental Deduction, must lead to idealism. This has to do with the fact that given the implications of the discursivity thesis, namely, that the domain of possible determination of objects is characterised by limitation, judgements of experience can never reach the completely determined individual, i.e. the thing in itself (...) or the unlimited real, but only objects as objects of possible experience. As such, it can be shown by reference to a key argument from Kant, that Hegel’s famous criticism that Kant is not licensed, on the basis of his core arguments concerning the original-synthetic unity of apperception, to restrict our knowledge to appearances, is mistaken on purely systematic grounds. More specifically, I argue that idealism follows already from the constraints that the use of the categories, in particular the categories of quality, places on the very conceivability of things in themselves. My claim is that, although it is not only possible but also necessary to think things in themselves, it does not follow that by merely thinking them we have a full grasp of the nature of things in themselves, as some important commentators claim we have. We must therefore distinguish between two kinds of conceiving of things in themselves: conceiving in the standard sense of ‘forming the notion of’, and conceiving in the narrow sense of ‘having a determinate intellectual grasp’. So although we must be able notionally to think things in themselves, as the grounds of their appearances, we cannot even conceive, through pure concepts, of how they are in themselves in any determinate, even if merely intellectual, sense. To put it differently, we cannot have a positive conception of things in themselves (this is in line with Kant’s distinction between noumena in the negative and positive senses; cf. B307–9). For support, I resort to a much overlooked chapter in the Critique, concerning the transcendental Ideal, where Kant discusses what it is for a thing to be a thing in itself proper, namely, something that is thoroughly determined. This concerns the real ontological conditions of things, which are not satisfied by the modal categories alone, namely, their existence conditions. I claim that the chief reason why, given Kant’s view of determinative judgement, we cannot determine a thing in itself is because of two connected reasons: (1) a thing in itself is already fully determined and therefore not further determinable and (2) we cannot possibly determine all of the thing’s possible determinations. In this context, I also discuss the notion of material (not: empirical) synthesis—of which Kant speaks in the chapter on the transcendental Ideal—which must be presupposed as the ground of the formal a priori synthesis that grounds possible experience. This material synthesis, which is an idea of reason that defines a thing as thoroughly determined with regard to all of its possible predicates and has mere regulative status, can by implication not be determined by the forms of the understanding, which synthesise only a limited set of predicates. As a result, given this definition of ‘thing in itself’, any object (appearance) as at best44 a limited set of determinations of the thing can never be numerically identical to the thing in itself as thoroughly determined individual. This undercuts a standard assumption about the identity relation between appearances and things in themselves in many contemporary interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Nietzsche gilt als faszinierender Philosoph, der das Denken zu einer gefährlichen Sache, zu einem Abenteuer erklärt und der den/die Leser*in verlockt, sich auf das Wagnis seines Denkens einzulassen. Philosophie erscheint nicht als abstrakte Angelegenheit, sondern als eine zutiefst persönliche Auseinandersetzung, die das Leben des/der Einzelnen verwandeln soll, selbst um den Preis seiner möglichen Zerstörung. Welche Bedeutung aber hat das gefährliche Moment innerhalb von Nietzsches Philosophie für den/die Einzelne*n - und welche für die Gesellschaft? Und wie weit darf man in Selbst- (...) und Fremdgefährdung gehen? Diesen Fragen geht die vorliegende Arbeit nach, wobei die Interpretation von Nietzsches Denken eingerahmt wird von zwei rezeptionsgeschichtlichen Untersuchungen: Von Beginn seiner Wirkung bis heute wurde Nietzsche als der gefährliche Philosoph par excellence verstanden. Inwieweit er glorifiziert, vereinnahmt oder verurteilt wird, sagt aber nicht zuletzt einiges über die Rezipierenden selbst aus und gibt Antwort auf die Frage, wieviel gefährliches Denken wir in einer Gesellschaft für zumutbar halten. Ein Einblick in die frühe und späte Nietzscherezeption zeigt dem/der Leser*in die Bandbreite an Reaktionen von Verherrlichung bis Verdammung, die Nietzsches Philosophie bis heute provoziert. Die Autorin Natalie Schulte arbeitet am philosophischen Seminar in Freiburg. Sie hat an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Fach Philosophie promoviert. (shrink)

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1979.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist eine Auseinandersetzung mit der kausalen Handlungstheorie. Der These, dass Handlungen entweder unmittelbar durch einen Akteur oder durch seine mentalen Zustande verursacht werden, wird entgegengehalten, dass bisher keine Handlungstheorie vorliegt, die dieses kausale Verhaltnis zu belegen vermag und dass es auch bisher in der Philosophie des Geistes keinen Ansatz gibt, der erklart wie mentale Verursachung moglich ist. Eine Alternative wird in einer Handlungstheorie gefunden, der eine monistische Ontologie zugrunde liegt. Im ihrem Zentrum steht die Person. Personsein wird (...) als die Erfahrung der Einheit von Mentalem und Physischem im Handeln gedeutet. Das Verhaltnis von Akteur zur Handlung wird daher als ein normatives und nicht als ein kausales aufgefasst.". (shrink)

A renaissance of virus research is taking centre stage in biology. Empirical data from the last decade indicate the important roles of viruses, both in the evolution of all life and as symbionts of host organisms. There is increasing evidence that all cellular life is colonized by exogenous and/or endogenous viruses in a non-lytic but persistent lifestyle. Viruses and viral parts form the most numerous genetic matter on this planet.

Every coordination within or between animals depends on communication processes. Although the signaling molecules, vocal and tactile signs, gestures and its combinations differ throughout all species according their evolutionary origins and variety of adaptation processes, certain levels of biocommunication can be found in all animal species: Abiotic environmental indices such as temperature, light, water, etc. that affect the local ecosphere of an organism and are sensed, interpreted. Trans-specific communication with non-related organisms. Species-specific communication between same or related species. Intraorganismic communication, (...) i.e., sign-mediated coordination within the body of the organism. This book gives an overview of the manifold levels of animal communication exemplified by a variety of species and thereby broadens the understanding of these organisms. (shrink)

Communication is defined as an interaction between at least two living agents which share a repertoire of signs. These are combined according to syntactic, semantic and context dependent, pragmatic rules in order to coordinate behavior. This volume deals with the important roles of soil bacteria in parasitic and symbiotic interactions with viruses, plants, animals and fungi. Starting with a general overview of the key levels of communication between bacteria, further reviews examine the various aspects of intracellular as well as intercellular (...) biocommunication between soil microorganisms. Th is includes the various levels of biocommunication between phages and bacteria, between soil algae and bacteria, and between bacteria, fungi and plants in the rhizosphere, the role of plasmids and transposons, horizontal gene transfer, quorum sensing and quorum quenching, bacterial-host cohabitation, phage-mediated genetic exchange and soil viral ecology. (shrink)