No one is responsible for their conduct because free will is an illusion, say some skeptics. Even when it seems that we have several options, we only have one. Hence, says the free will skeptic, we should reform our practices which involve responsibility attributions, such as punishment and blame. How seriously should we take this doctrine? Is it one that we could live by? One thorn in the side of the skeptic concerns deliberation. When we deliberate about what to do—what (...) film to go see, whom to befriend, which doctrine to follow—we must presume that our options are open to us. But then, every time that skeptics deliberate, they presume something which is incompatible with their doctrine, i.e. that they have several options. In a word, skeptics cannot deliberate qua skeptics. Some philosophers have responded that deliberators don’t have to presume that their options are open; they only have to presume that their choice will be efficacious. I argue that this proposal uses resources which, if they are available and successful, can be employed to refute skepticism. The upshot is that free will skeptics are pushing for a doctrine that is either false or in tension with deliberation. (shrink)

The recognition of animal sentience in law has created high expectations but has not yet lived up to them. In some jurisdictions, the recognition of animal sentience has formed the basis of new legal obligations imposed on humans to protect animal interests. So far, however, its potential has been limited because legal officials have interpreted sentience narrowly, as mainly referring to pain. This article proposes identifying other animal characteristics to better serve animal interests, namely sociability and agency. These animal characteristics (...) could, like sentience, be legally recognized by legislatures and receive normative force from the courts. This article argues that the legal recognition of sociability and agency could address animal exploitation and killing. Animal sociability and agency are already implicitly recognized by the law of most Western states, making it easier for them to be explicitly recognized in the future. Although these characteristics are already found in the law, they have the potential to be more disruptive than sentience because they have never served as the basis for the legal protection of animals. In other words, their potential as protective tools remains underexplored and underexploited. Moreover, sociability and agency more intuitively suggest normative implications because of their demanding nature. Acknowledging that a being is social and agential implies recognizing her need for social relationships and ensuring that her choices are fulfilled. This research article provides antispeciesist scholars and activists with a critical overview of new concepts around which some may wish to rally, particularly since the legal recognition of sentience has shown limits in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the potential of legally recognizing sociability and agency by taking examples from the lives of dogs, cows, cats, horses, northern gannets, and dolphins. (shrink)

Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit (...) que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène. -/- SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes. (shrink)

La fonction d’auteur se transforme en raison des nouvelles potentialités du numérique, particulièrement de la communication scientifique directe. Néanmoins, le statut de l’auteur d’un discours scientifique répond dans l’univers numérique aux mêmes critères que dans le monde de l’imprimé. Ce sont surtout les modalités d’expression et de diffusion des résultats de la recherche qui changent en raison d’infrastructures et de pratiques scientifiques d’un nouveau genre. Notamment, le dépôt de données dans des systèmes d’information homologués par les chercheurs est reconnu de (...) plus en plus comme une forme de publication. En cela, on assiste à une remise en question et à la proposition de nouveaux modèles d’évaluation et de reconnaissance. La révolution numérique provoque une restructuration des acteurs du système de communication scientifique qui, pour l’heure, donne à voir un tableau d’ensemble fragmenté.New digital potential is profoundly changing the authorship function, especially in direct scientific communication, although authorship of a scientific discourse nevertheless obeys the same criteria in the digital world as in print. What has mainly changed are the methods used to express and disseminate research results, because of the appearance of infrastructures and scientific practice of a new type. In particular, posting data to researcher-approved information systems is increasingly recognised as a legitimate form of publication. This implies that models for evaluation and recognition are being brought into question and new models are being proposed. The digital revolution is transforming the role structure of a scientific communication system where the overall picture, at present, is fragmentary. (shrink)

We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason (...) to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy. (shrink)

Here is a skeptical trilemma. We know that we are responsible. We do not know that determinism is false. Yet, if we do not know that determinism is false, we do not know that we are responsible. If we want to avoid the skeptical conclusion of rejecting the first claim, we ought to reject the third. It does not follow that compatibilism is true. But it follows that libertarianism, the view that we are responsible even though responsibility requires indeterminism, is (...) unknowable, at least for now. To see this, we need to compare different forms of skepticism and their response. (shrink)

Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so (...) between thecontent of free will scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self- defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the existence of leeway or reject the principle that ‘“ought” implies “can”’. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of ‘event’ and the manner in which it has been neglected in both ecocriticism and Hitchcock studies. Using The Birds (1963) to rethink the premises of ecocritics’ discussion of nature, animals, and disasters in cinema and Hitchcock scholars’ emphasis on representation and symbolism, the article argues that it has become imperative to philosophically foreground ‘events’ in light of the numerous contemporary films that revolve around them. Hitchcock’s film is shown to propose a renewed concept of (...) event, a concept that significantly departs from the two most influential conceptualisations of the event in post-1960 continental philosophy: those of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. Eschewing philosophical theories that equate the event with pure becoming or conceptualisations that characterise events as rupture and break, the film reveals a particular form of bird-event that posits relationality to address becoming and rupture simultaneously. Indeed, what distinguishes Hitchcock’s concept of event, contra Deleuze’s and Badiou’s, is that it emphasises relationality instead of pure continuity or radical rupture in the characterisation of corporeal or embodied individuation. Emphasising relationality helps understand the film’s deployment of a concept of event that departs from the aforementioned theorisations that exclude the human body (and therefore affect) from the event’s experiential import. Closely aligning bodies prior to and after the bird-events, The Birds ultimately discloses the paradox of body and event at the heart of contemporary event theory by way of linking or relating bodies and events, thus tapping into debates over embodiment and affect in cultural and media theory. Centering around modalities of evental experience rather than the controversial and endlessly debatable signification of the bird attacks, the analysis purports that the bird-event configures materiality only to reveal its relational and interstitial volatility. (shrink)

Ribosome biogenesis includes the making and processing of ribosomal RNAs, the biosynthesis of ribosomal proteins from their mRNAs in the cytosol and their transport to the nucleolus to assemble pre‐ribosomal particles. Several stresses including cellular senescence reduce nucleolar rRNA synthesis and maturation increasing the availability of ribosome‐free ribosomal proteins. Several ribosomal proteins can activate the p53 tumor suppressor pathway but cells without p53 can still arrest their proliferation in response to an imbalance between ribosomal proteins and mature rRNA production. Recent (...) results on senescence‐associated ribogenesis defects (SARD) show that the ribosomal protein S14 (RPS14 or uS11) can act as a CDK4/6 inhibitor linking ribosome biogenesis defects to the main engine of cell cycle progression. This work offers new insights into the regulation of the cell cycle and suggests novel avenues to design anticancer drugs. (shrink)

A version of the principle of alternate possibilities claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to reasonably opt for—is a good excuse. Yet, this principle is (...) subject to straightforward counterexamples, unless it is given an epistemicised reading. And in this latter case, it does not support PAP. So, PAP is unsupported, at least for now. (shrink)

Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? Call this the Deliberation Question. This paper has three aims in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the Deliberation Question. Finally, its disputative aim is to argue that leeway sceptics cannot (...) deliberate entirely rationally about what to do, because of the connection between deliberating and deciding. (shrink)

This article contrasts Epicurus's and Diogenes the Cynic's respective views on acceptable desires. I emphasize their appeals to nature to legitimize or de-legitimize certain types of desires.

Diogène de Sinope et Calliclès affirment tirer leurs éthiques de l'observation de la nature. En cela, ils s'opposent explicitement à Socrate. Mais leur position est-elle une véritable forme de naturalisme ou un simple usage métaphorique? Ce texte défend la première option, après avoir montré que malgré leur ressemblance métaéthique, ces deux éthiques normatives sont radicalement opposées.

I offer an unorthodox argument for the thesis that prostitution is not just a normal job. It has the advantage of being compatible with the claim that humans should have full authority over their sexual life. In fact, it is ultimately the emphasis on this authority that leads the thesis that prostitution is a normal job to collapse. Here is the argument: merchants cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they transact with on the basis of factors like the ethnicity (...) or the religion of their client; but if prostitutes are ‘sex merchants’, then they cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they have sex with on the basis of these factors. Yet everyone should have the full discretionary power to refuse to have sex under any circumstances. (shrink)

Ce recueil réunit des articles qui s'interrogent, depuis un ensemble de perspectives philosophiques des plus diverses, sur le rapport entre nature et éthique.

Le solidarisme de Léon Bourgeois constitue une tentative convaincante de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre libertés individuelles et justice sociale. Bourgeois tente de relever ce défi en faisant appel aux nouvelles découvertes scientifiques en sociologie comme en biologie. En bref, l’observation de la nature nous montrerait que les humains sont en rapport de solidarité les uns avec les autres. De ce fait, on pourrait tirer un devoir de solidarité que l’État serait à même d’imposer aux individus. Fonder une théorie politique sur (...) des théories scientifiques présente un double risque : d’une part, subir l’influence des biologistes collectivistes et de leur vision organiciste de la société ; d’autre part et surtout, se rendre coupable du sophisme naturaliste. Nous exposerons comment Bourgeois tombe initialement dans le piège du sophisme naturaliste avant de s’en extirper. Entre son texte Solidarité (1987) et son Essai d’une philosophie de la solidarité (1907), la progression est frappante. Au final, donc, Bourgeois nous semble présenter une théorie politique qui, tout en s’inspirant des sciences, ne s’y assujettit pas. (shrink)

Ce compte-rendu résume les quatre dimensions de la philosophie de l’ action défendue dans Action, Knowledge and Will : physique, éthique, psychologique et intellectuel. Cela dit, les deux contributions principales du livre recensé relèvent de liens entre les différentes dimensions de l’ action. Il s’agit d’une distinction et d’une connexion. Premièrement, Hyman croit qu’il faut distinguer la dimension éthique et la dimension physique de l’ action. Plus précisément, il pense que le concept de volonté et le concept de volontaire doivent (...) être différenciés du concept d’ action ou de celui d’agencité, et d’actif. Deuxièmement, Hyman nous propose de connecter la dimension intellectuelle de l’ action avec la connaissance en avançant une théorie de la connaissance comme étant l’habileté d’être guidé par des faits. (shrink)

Ceci est un recensement du livre de John Hyman 'Action, Knowledge, and the Will'. -/- This is a book review (in French) of John Hyman's book 'Action, Knowledge, and the Will'.

: As the fifth national bioethics commission has concluded its work and a sixth is currently underway, it is time to step back and consider appropriate measures of success. This paper argues that standard measures of commissions' influence fail to fully assess their role as public forums. From the perspective of democratic theory, a critical dimension of this role is public engagement: the ability of a commission to address the concerns of the general public, to learn how average citizens resolve (...) moral issues in healthcare, and to monitor public opinion on the topics addressed in the commission. Such a public forum role is supported by the critical literature within bioethics, which has deemed some commissions successful, supported more generally by the history of bioethics as a reform discourse that has brought socially important values into the medical domain, and supported more generally still by the example of the great social issues commissions of the 1960s. (shrink)

: In a 2004 article, we argued that bioethics commissions should be assessed in terms of their usefulness as public forums. A 2006 article by Summer Johnson argued that our perspective was not supported by the existing literature on presidential commissions, which had not previously identified commissions as public forums and that we did not properly account for the political functions of commissions as instruments of presidential power. Johnson also argued that there was nothing sufficiently unique about bioethics commissions to (...) make the public forum perspective particularly applicable. We respond by arguing that analysis of commissions' work as public forums fits well within the literature on commissions, especially on their agenda-setting functions, and that the political functions of commissions are often compatible with their functioning as public forums. We also demonstrate how the origins and concerns of bioethics make public forum analysis particularly applicable to bioethics commissions. (shrink)

Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’ is notoriously abstract, and, no less notoriously, many take it to be false. In this paper, I explicate the theorem, examine the role that it played in Fisher’s general project for biology, and analyze why it was so very fundamental for Fisher. I defend Ewens (1989) and Lessard (1997) in the view that the theorem is in fact a true theorem if, as Fisher claimed, ‘the terms employed’ are ‘used strictly as defined’ (1930, (...) p. 38). Finally, I explain the role that projects such as Fisher’s play in the progress of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’ is notoriously abstract, and, no less notoriously, many take it to be false. In this paper, I explicate the theorem, examine the role that it played in Fisher’s general project for biology, and analyze why it was so very fundamental for Fisher. I defend Ewens and Lessard in the view that the theorem is in fact a true theorem if, as Fisher claimed, ‘the terms employed’ are ‘used strictly as defined’. Finally, I explain (...) the role that projects such as Fisher’s play in the progress of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’ is notoriously abstract, and, no less notoriously, many take it to be false. In this paper, I explicate the theorem, examine the role that it played in Fisher’s general project for biology, and analyze why it was so very fundamental for Fisher. I defend Ewens and Lessard in the view that the theorem is in fact a true theorem if, as Fisher claimed, ‘the terms employed’ are ‘used strictly as defined’. Finally, I explain (...) the role that projects such as Fisher’s play in the progress of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Given his expertise in the classroom and in school, the cooperating teacher is essential to teacher training. Expectations towards him are coming from ministerial authorities (gouvernement du Québec, 2002, 2008), but also from student teachers (Caron, Portelance and Martineau, 2013). In order to meet these expectations, the cooperating teacher is strongly encouraged to enroll in a continuous training process leading to enhance his training practices. With the intention of supporting the development of the expected cooperating teacher’s competencies (Portelance, Gervais, (...) class='Hi'>Lessard, Beaulieu et al., 2008), a research funded by the Quebec Ministry of Education [1] uses a collaborative approach with cooperating teachers gathered in a community of practice. The members are engaged in a reflection process and a co-construction of meaning (Bourassa, Philion and Chevalier, 2007). Discussions focus on their training practices. The analysis of their purposes emphasizes the manifestations of interactional dynamics that favor their professional co-development. (shrink)

Le but de ce recueil est d’offrir des commentaires accessibles et introductifs aux textes classiques qu’ils accompagnent, en ouvrant des perspectives de discussion sur le thème du capitalisme. C’est en ce sens qu’Emmanuel Chaput lance le débat en commentant le texte de Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, « Qu’est-ce que la propriété ? ». Les textes de Karl Marx ne sont bien sûr pas laissés pour compte : Samuel-Élie Lesage s’engage fermement dans cette voie en discutant L’idéologie allemande de Karl Marx, Christiane Bailey (...) nous offre d’approcher différemment l’œuvre marxienne en abordant son traitement de la question animale dans des extraits du Manifeste du parti communiste et du Travail salarié et capital, et Mathieu Joffre-Lainé nous présente une analyse fine des questions proprement économiques du Capital. Abordant les alternatives au capitalisme dans la pensée de Léon Bourgeois, Éliot Litalien commente La Solidarité et Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette s’attaque à l’analyse de l’Essai d’une philosophie de la solidarité. Enfin, en liant capitalisme, patriarcat et pouvoir politique, Tara Chanady propose une lecture du texte Du mariage et de l’amour de Emma Goldman. La conclusion de Marie-Eve Jalbert se situe dans une perspective contemporaine et critique en décortiquant la critique du socialisme avancée par Friedrich A. Hayek. (shrink)