This paper examines David Hull’s and Peter Godfrey-Smith’s accounts of biological individuality using the case of biofilms. Biofilms fail standard criteria for individuality, such as having reproductive bottlenecks and forming parent-offspring lineages. Nevertheless, biofilms are good candidates for individuals. The nature of biofilms shows that Godfrey-Smith’s account of individuality, with its reliance on reproduction, is too restrictive. Hull’s interactor notion of individuality better captures biofilms, and we argue that it offers a better account of biological individuality. However, Hull’s notion of (...) interactor needs more precision. We suggest some ways to make Hull’s notion of interactor and his account of individuality more precise. Generally, we maintain that biofilms are a good test case for theories of individuality, and a careful examination of biofilms furthers our understanding of biological individuality. (shrink)
This textbook presents the basics of philosophy that are necessary for the student and researcher in science in order to better understand scientific work. The approach is not historical but formative: tools for semantical analysis, ontology of science, epistemology, and scientific ethics are presented in a formal and direct way. The book has two parts: one with the general theory and a second part with application to some problems such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of mathematics, and (...) the ontology of spacetime. The book addresses questions such as "What is meaning?", "What is truth?", "What are truth criteria in science?", "What is a theory?", "What is a model?" "What is a datum?", "What is information?", "What does it mean to understand something?", "What is space?", "What is time?", "How are these concepts articulated in science?" "What are values?" "What are the limits of science?", and many more. The philosophical views presented are "scientific" in the sense that they are informed by current science, they are relevant for scientific research, and the method adopted uses the hypothetical-deductive approach that is characteristic of science. The results and conclusions, as any scientific conclusion, are open to revision in the light of future advances. Hence, this philosophical approach opposes to dogmatic philosophy. Supported by end-of-chapter summaries and a list of special symbols used, the material will be of interest for students and researchers in both science and philosophy. The second part will appeal to physicists and mathematicians. (shrink)
de Queiroz (1995), Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) offer a new version of essentialism called "historical essentialism". According to this version of essentialism, relations of common ancestry are essential features of biological taxa. The main type of argument for this essentialism proposed by Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) is that the dominant school of classification, cladism, defines biological taxa in terms of common ancestry. The goal of this paper is to show that this argument for historical essentialism is unsatisfactory: cladism (...) does not assume that relations of common ancestry are essential attributes of biological taxa. Therefore, historical essentialism is not justified by cladism. (shrink)
Popper’s original definition of truthlikeness relied on a central insight: that truthlikeness combines truth and information, in the sense that a proposition is closer to the truth the more true consequences and the less false consequences it entails. As intuitively compelling as this definition may be, it is untenable, as proved long ago; still, one can arguably rely on Popper’s intuition to provide an adequate account of truthlikeness. To this aim, we mobilize some classical work on partial entailment in defining (...) a new measure of truthlikeness which satisfies a number of desiderata. The resulting account has some interesting and surprising connections with other accounts on the market, thus shedding new light on current attempts of systematizing different approaches to verisimilitude. (shrink)
Nature is replete with borderline cases that fall somewhere between organisms and communities, such as lichens, biofilms, and the Portuguese Man-of-War. At first glance, the existence of such borderline cases might suggest that the concept of what constitutes an organism is too fuzzy to be useful in evolutionary biology. Yet, the notion of organisms is entrenched within central debates in evolution, including discussions over how fitness should be measured, what the bearers of adaptations and fitness are, and the status of (...) holobionts. Finally, accounts of organisms can set the stage for explanations of how multicellularity evolved. In particular, characterizing multicellular organisms in terms of the level of cooperation between their cells suggests that their evolution required the presence of mechanisms that could suppress conflict between cells. (shrink)
Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are (as cognitive devices) and of what engineering is (in the case of cognition). And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this (...) programmatic paper is to overcome this knowledge gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theories of concepts and of cognition that will ground the systematic unified framework needed to effectively implement conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices. (shrink)
Previously, the author tried to show that some arguments in one of the two versions of Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Quaestio de intensione visionis are taken almost verbatim from the anonymous Tractatus de sex inconvenientibus. This paper concentrates on the arguments themselves in order to consider two main issues: the ‘translatability’ of limit decision problems, manifest in Autrecourt’s juxtaposition of questions de maximo et minimo, de primo et ultimo instanti, and the intension and remission of forms; the importance of Parisian discussions (...) of limit decision problems prior to the adoption of the new analytical languages developed at Oxford. Thus, the paper is divided in two sections, the first concerning some arguments of Autrecourt’s question, the second focusing on the link between one of Autrecourt’s arguments and the medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s De caelo, in which it is possible to find some antecedents of the analytical approach that later Parisian scholars would apply to these problems. (shrink)
Kripke argues for origin essentialism, the view that the same individual cannot have multiple origins. Sober hypothesises that Kripke's origin essentialism applies to biological species. This paper shows that Sober's hypothesis fails. Because Kripke's original argument is invalid, it cannot vindicate Sober's proposal. Salmon offers an influential reformulation of Kripke's argument but his argument fails to extend to species: the notion of an individual's origin is too narrow to apply to species, and Salmon's argument rests on a thought experiment that (...) conflicts with how species evolve. Thus, Sober and others are wrong to think that Kripke's origin essentialism can save species essentialism. (shrink)
The present article is the third part of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In Part I (Picazo 2021), the discussion was set out by examining a number of typical traces of Platonism in semantic theory since Frege. In Part II (Picazo 2021a), additional illustrations of such traces were provided, taken from a collection of recent commissioned essays on the philosophy of language (Schantz 2012). The present part is devoted (...) to providing yet additional illustrations of such traces, taken from a collection of classic essays on the subject: the book Modern Philosophy of Language, edited by Maria Baghramian in 1998. We shall, thus, describe a number of examples in which the influence of semantic Platonism on these essays can be felt. Prominent among these examples are the confusion between sentences and propositions (and related confusions), the avoidant attitude with respect to basic aspects of linguistic meaning, the overuse of analytic methodology for semantic research, the adoption of a background Platonic metaphysics of meanings and the overreaction against semantic Platonism and germane views, witnessing an inverse influence (‘by opposition’) from these views. (shrink)
There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...) everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)
Doolittle :351–378, 2013) and Ereshefsky and Pedroso argue that selection can act at the level of biofilms and other microbial communities. Clarke is skeptical and argues that selection acts on microbial cells rather than microbial communities. Her main criticism is that biofilms lack one of the ingredients required for selection to operate: heritability. This paper replies to her concern by elaborating how biofilm-level traits can be inheritable.
Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these (...) criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory. (shrink)
Microbes often live in association with dense multicellular aggregates, especially biofilms, and the construction of these aggregates typically requires microbial cells to produce public goods, such as enzymes and signaling molecules. Public-goods producers are, in turn, vulnerable to exploitation by free-rider cells that consume the public goods without paying for their production costs. The cell population of a biofilm or other microbial aggregates are expected to pass through bottlenecks due to a wide range of factors, such as antibiotic treatments and (...) dispersal. The goal of this article is to make the case for the relevance of population bottlenecks at shaping the social interactions within microbial aggregates. The effect of bottlenecks on microbial aggregates is complex in that bottlenecks can favor producers under certain circumstances, but not in others. The concept of the Volunteer’s Dilemma from game theory will be used to motivate the hypothesis that this partly occurs because of how bottlenecks alter the risk of being a producer in a microbial aggregate. Finally, the role of bottlenecks in the microbial world impacts key issues in evolutionary biology, including the importance of ecology at shaping social evolution, and the evolution of multicellularity from unicellular ancestors. (shrink)
Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. Some have recently claimed that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative projects is truth-driven and should thus be epistemically constrained, ultimately at least (Simion 2018; cf. Podosky 2018). This paper challenges that claim on the assumption of a social constructionist analysis of ideologies, and provides an alternative, pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining the legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects overall. The upshot is that one should (...) not ameliorate for the sake of truth or knowledge, in the case of ideologies—at least, not primarily. (shrink)
The aim of this research is to ascertain whether a firm’s environmental motivations may help to predict how complete or incomplete its environmental management will be, understanding incomplete management to be that which neglects one or more of the three keys aspects of such management, namely, monitoring, action and results. We specifically posit that while motivations based on the search for legitimation lead to more incomplete styles of environmental management, competitive motivations entail a more complete management. The analyses conducted with (...) a sample of 1,902 plants provide empirical evidence in favour of such reasoning. The contribution this research makes, therefore, is not restricted solely to showing the effect motivations have on the environmental performance of organisations, as it also introduces a new dimension of environmental management—the degree of completeness, which needs to be considered when understanding and evaluating this effect. (shrink)
Black holes are arguably the most extraordinary physical objects we know in the universe. Despite our thorough knowledge of black hole dynamics and our ability to solve Einstein’s equations in situations of ever increasing complexity, the deeper implications of the very existence of black holes for our understanding of space, time, causality, information, and many other things remain poorly understood. In this paper I survey some of these problems. If something is going to be clear from my presentation, I hope (...) it will be that around black holes science and metaphysics become more interwoven than anywhere else in the universe. (shrink)
One curious phenomenon of several social groups is that they are ‘redundant’ in the sense that they contain more cooperators than strictly needed to complete certain group tasks, such as foraging. Redundancy is puzzling because redundant groups are particularly susceptible to invasion by defectors. Yet, redundancy can be found in groups formed by a wide range of organisms, including insects and microbes. Birch has recently argued that coercive behaviours might account for redundancy using insect colonies as a case study. However, (...) microbial examples suggest redundancy can evolve without coercive behaviours. This paper formulates an explanation for redundancy that does not require targeted punishment of defectors; instead, it proposes that redundancy might be due to ignorance. Specifically, it is suggested that redundancy evolves as a by-product of selection when group members have to opt whether to cooperate or not while being blind to the strategies of others. Accordingly, possessing information about the strategies of the group members might undermine rather than facilitate cooperation within groups. 1The Evolution of Redundancy 2Explaining Redundancy via Coercion 3Explaining Redundancy via Ignorance 3.1Cooperation behind the Darwinian veil of ignorance 3.2Modelling group tasks with a public goods game 3.3Group tasks under harsh environments 4Conclusion. (shrink)
I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)
I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.
The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary (...) quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)
A supertask consists in the performance of an infinite number of actions in a finite time. I show that any attempt to carry out a supertask will produce a divergence of the curvature of spacetime, resulting in the formation of a black hole. I maintain that supertaks, contrarily to a popular view among philosophers, are physically impossible. Supertasks, literally, collapse under their own weight.
Disagreement in philosophy is all-pervasive and irresolvable. There is almost no thesis in philosophy about which philosophers agree. In contrast to most contemporary accounts of philosophical disagreement, I argue that a significant proportion of philosophical disagreements are rooted in differences regarding values. A second thesis that I shall defend in this paper is that disagreements regarding values are not resolvable by argumentative means.
Presentism is, roughly, the metaphysical doctrine that maintains that whatever exists, exists in the present. The compatibility of presentism with the theories of special and general relativity was much debated in recent years. It has been argued that at least some versions of presentism are consistent with time-orientable models of general relativity. In this paper we confront the thesis of presentism with relativistic physics, in the strong gravitational limit where black holes are formed. We conclude that the presentist position is (...) at odds with the existence of black holes and other compact objects in the universe. A revision of the thesis is necessary, if it is intended to be consistent with the current scientific view of the universe. (shrink)
Em um dos vários encontros mundiais sobre a obra do filósofo tcheco-brasileiro Vilém Flusser, os autores deste livro decidem escrever juntos uma introdução a seu pensamento que ao mesmo tempo homenageie o pensador. Nasce daí 'Vilém Flusser - uma.
I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.
I argue that there are no physical singularities in space–time. Singular space–time models do not belong to the ontology of the world, because of a simple reason: they are concepts, defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I discuss the actual implication of the so-called singularity theorems. In remarking the confusion and fog that emerge from the reification of singularities I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of the theory of general relativity.
Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad-spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation-involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad-spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively (...) defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad-spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)
Physics and Philosophy of Physics in the Work of Mario Bunge.Gustavo E. Romero - 2019 - In Mario Augusto Bunge, Michael R. Matthews, Guillermo M. Denegri, Eduardo L. Ortiz, Heinz W. Droste, Alberto Cordero, Pierre Deleporte, María Manzano, Manuel Crescencio Moreno, Dominique Raynaud, Íñigo Ongay de Felipe, Nicholas Rescher, Richard T. W. Arthur, Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson, Evandro Agazzi, Ingvar Johansson, Joseph Agassi, Nimrod Bar-Am, Alberto Cupani, Gustavo E. Romero, Andrés Rivadulla, Art Hobson, Olival Freire Junior, Peter Slezak, Ignacio Morgado-Bernal, Marta Crivos, Leonardo Ivarola, Andreas Pickel, Russell Blackford, Michael Kary, A. Z. Obiedat, Carolina I. García Curilaf, Rafael González del Solar, Luis Marone, Javier Lopez de Casenave, Francisco Yannarella, Mauro A. E. Chaparro, José Geiser Villavicencio- Pulido, Martín Orensanz, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Reinhard Kahle, Ibrahim A. Halloun, José María Gil, Omar Ahmad, Byron Kaldis, Marc Silberstein, Carolina I. García Curilaf, Rafael González del Solar, Javier Lopez de Casenave, Íñigo Ongay de Felipe & Villavicencio-Pulid (eds.), Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift. Springer Verlag. pp. 289-301.details
This brief review of Mario Bunge’s research on physics begins with an analysis of his masterpiece Foundations of Physics, and then it discusses his other contributions to the philosophy of physics. Following that is a summary of his more recent reactions to scientific discoveries in physics and a discussion of his position about non-locality in quantum mechanics, as well as his changing opinions on the nature of spacetime. The paper ends with a brief assessment of Bunge’s legacy concerning the foundations (...) of physics. (shrink)
This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of 'proof'; (2) Kreisel's explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of 'proofs from premises' results in a loss of the inductive character of (...) the definitions of ∨ and ∃; and (5) the same occurs with the definition of ∀ in terms of 'proofs with free variables'. (shrink)
Materialism has been the subject of extensive and rich controversies since Robert Boyle introduced the term for the ﬁrst time in the 17th century. But what is materialism and what can it oﬀer today? The term is usually deﬁned as the worldview according to which everything real is material. Nevertheless, there is no philosophical consensus about whether the meaning of matter can be enlarged beyond the physical. As a consequence, materialism is often deﬁned in stark exclusive and reductionist terms: whatever (...) exists is either physical or ontologically reducible to it. This conception, if consistent, mutilates reality, excluding the ontological signiﬁcance of political, economic, sociocultural, anthropological and psychological realities. Starting from a new history of materialism, the present book focuses on the central ontological and epistemological debates aroused by today’s leading materialist approaches, including some little known to an anglophone readership. The key concepts of matter, system, emergence, space and time, life, mind, and software are checked over and updated. Controversial issues such as the nature of mathematics and the place of reductionism are also discussed from different materialist approaches. As a result, materialism emerges as a powerful, indispensable scientifically-supported worldview with a surprising wealth of nuances and possibilities. (shrink)
The body of Eva in Thomas Aquinas The constitution of the first female body or the body of Eva presents several physical and metaphysical problems, problems that have gone through the centuries and reach the present, generating social and cultural consequences for women. The non-existence of parents demands from Aquino answers that go beyond the anthropological and biological and lead to the search of philosophical answers intertwined with the theological ones. Thomas Aquinas provides rational answers although the background is of (...) faith, and even, with literal interpretations of the Sacred Scriptures now abandoned. The Aquinate makes an intellectual effort to find answers in a rational field because the matter of the body of the first woman brings difficulties for its elucidation and understanding. As in other parts of his extensive work, Thomas Aquinas, follows the biological and physical works of Aristotle. Although the Aristotelian background is in line with Christian thought, Aquinas shows his extraordinary capacity for synthesis between the faith received and reason argued, between revelation and the principles of reason. (shrink)
This article aims to indicate another possible comprehension of war and its relations in the Yugoslavian region. Focused on the construction of national identity, this paper uses the post-structuralist theoretical argumentative movement to invert the common logic of interpretation – to which Foucault and Deleuze are used as reference. Knowing this, the problem is how war, interpreted in another way, can build not only national integration, but also a subjective identity through Football.
Gustavo Machado, pertenece a la generación de intelectuales que se nutrió fundamentalmente de la doctrina marxista e hizo de ella la herramienta para desarrollar la interpretación de nuestra realidad. Este estudio recoge referencias sobre su vida, analiza su postura antiimperialista y la defensa que hace de la democracia participativa. Además desarrolla su postura ante la educación, la iglesia y su concepción de la historia.
A distinction is introduced between itemized and non-itemized plural predication. It is argued that a full-fledged system of plural logic is not necessary in order to account for the validity of inferences concerning itemized collective predication. Instead, it is shown how this type of inferences can be adequately dealt with in a first-order logic system, after small modifications on the standard treatment. The proposed system, unlike plural logic, has the advantage of preserving completeness. And as a result, inferences such as (...) ‘Dick and Tony emptied the bottle, hence Tony and Dick emptied the bottle’ are shown to be first-order. (shrink)
More than two decades after his seminal paper ‘Subjective Well-Being’, Ed Diener wrote that he substituted happiness with well-being to obtain scientific credibility. Are the arguments echoed in positive psychology rigorous enough to justify this substitution? This article focuses on the historical examination of the word happiness, covering the lexical universes of ancient Greek, Latin, and English, seeking to identify the connections between them. We found that arguments for such substitution are sustained by a fragile appreciation of the semantic depth (...) of happiness. Although it favors quantification, the current understanding of well-being obliterates the plurality of the debate about happiness and the recognition of other ideals of life. Thus, we conclude that well-being and happiness are semantically close, but conceptually, metaphysically, and empirically distinct, demanding, as objects, particular investigations. (shrink)
Dung’s argumentation frameworks have been applied for over twenty years to the analysis of argument justiﬁcation. This representation focuses on arguments and the attacks among them, abstracting away from other features like the internal structure of arguments, the nature of utterers, the speciﬁcs of the attack relation, etc. The model is highly attractive because it reduces most of the complexities involved in argumentation processes. It can be applied to different settings, like the argument evaluation of an individual agent or the (...) case of dialectic disputes between two agents (pro and con), or even in multi-agent collective argumentation. The latter case involves agents with possibly different arguments and/or opinions on how to evaluate them, leading to the possibility of considering multiple sets of arguments and attack relations. Two basic questions can be asked here, namely ‘what to aggregate’ and ‘how to aggregate’. The former concerns what kinds of entities do the agents intend to choose (arguments, attacks, assessments, etc.), while the second one focuses on which aggregation mechanisms yield rational choices (voting on arguments, merging procedures to obtain a common argumentation framework, deliberation processes, etc.). In particular, the question about the rationality of a collective argument choice relates this topic to Social Choice and Judgment Aggregation theories, while its associated strategic issues relate it to Game Theory. The research efforts on the disparate problems elicited by collective argumentation have generated a considerable corpus of literature that deserves an orderly evaluation. This survey is intended as a contribution to that end. (shrink)
In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of scientific (...) beliefs in the evidence, and it is therefore unable (a) to reconstruct in a satisfactory way some hypothetical cases of scientific progress, and (b) to provide an explanation of the aversion to falsity that characterizes scientific practice. We rebut both of these criticisms and argue that they reveal a misunderstanding of some key concepts underlying VS. (shrink)
Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual (...) engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. (shrink)