Several countries have implemented COVID-19 health passes or certificates to promote a safer return to in-person social activities. These passes have been proposed as a way to prove that someone has been vaccinated, has recovered from the disease, or has negative results on a diagnostic test. However, many people have questioned their ethical justification. This article presents some practical and ethical problems to consider in the event of wishing to implement these passes. Among the former, it is questioned how accurate (...) diagnostic tests are as a means of ensuring that a person is not contagious, whether vaccination guarantees immunity, the fact that health passes can be forged, whether they encourage vaccination, and the problem that there is no universally recognized health pass. Among the ethical issues, it is discussed whether health passes promote discrimination and inequality and whether they violate rights to privacy and freedom. It is concluded that health passes have enough ethical justification to be implemented. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSince 2007, when Mexico City decriminalized abortion during the first trimester, a debate has been taking place regarding abortion and the right to conscientious objection. Many people argue that, since the provision of abortions is now a statutory duty of healthcare personnel there can be no place for “conscientious objection.” Others claim that, even if such an objection were to be allowed, it should not be seen as a right, since talk about a right to CO may lead to a (...) slippery slope where we may end up recognizing a right to disobey the law. In this paper, I argue that there is a right to CO and that this may be justified through the notions of autonomy and integrity, which a liberal democracy should respect. However, it cannot be an absolute right, and in the case of abortion, it conflicts with women’s reproductive rights. Therefore, CO should be carefully regulated so that it does not obstruct the exercise o... (shrink)

This article aims at raising awareness about the intersection of populism and bioethics. It argues that illiberal forms of populism may have negative consequences on the evolution of bioethics as a discipline and on its practical objectives. It identifies at least seven potential negative effects: (1) The rise of populist leaders fosters “epistemological populism,” devaluing the expert and scientific perspectives on which bioethics is usually based, potentially steering policies away from evidence-based foundations. (2) The impact of “moral populism” is evident (...) in legislative prioritization of the “morality of common people,” often solicited through popular consultations on issues like abortion, drug legalization, or LGBT issues. (3) Populist distrust in autonomous governmental agencies and advisory bodies, including national bioethics commissions, can compromise expert advice, challenging both their authority and decisions. (4) Populists may erode transparency by undermining institutions responsible for it, hindering access to vital information for bioethical research. (5) “Medical populism” creates adversarial dynamics, prompting politicians to make simplistic healthcare policy decisions based on political rather than informed criteria, adversely affecting vulnerable populations. (6) Radical-right populist parties’ “welfare chauvinism” may shape healthcare policies, impacting service access and resource allocation, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups such as migrants, but indirectly affecting the rest of the population. (7) Nationalist sentiments associated with populism may obstruct international collaborations, posing challenges for global bioethics that seeks to address ethical concerns beyond national borders. In summary, these dynamics raise significant bioethical concerns encompassing evidence-based decision-making, transparency, healthcare equity, and global collaboration. How bioethicists may respond to these challenges is discussed. (shrink)

The 2016 Royal Society of Chemistry’s report Future of the Chemical Sciences presents four different scenarios for the future of chemistry: chemistry saves the world; push-button chemistry; a world without chemists; and free market chemistry. In this paper we ethically assess them. If chemistry is to solve many of the greatest challenges facing the contemporary world, prioritization of research topics will need to be done explicitly on the basis of moral values, ​​such as solidarity and equity, but also environmental justice, (...) which will have to be central in determining a research agenda for chemistry. The decentralization of chemistry will also present ethical challenges to the research standards established by the scientific community. Ethical education in chemistry may help counteract these risks. We also argue that if chemistry and its subdisciplines are to fulfil their goal of generating knowledge and helping us solve the great challenges of the contemporary world, then it is ethically imperative that scientists from different disciplines be more open to interdisciplinary work. Finally, if the future of chemistry is in free market forms, then it is necessary that we pay more attention to the possible risks that this model has. We call attention to two: first, it is likely that problems that affect the lowest income countries or the most disadvantaged sectors of society, who do not have the means to pay for some of the goods and services, will not be addressed; second, the free market tends to foster unsustainable forms of development. (shrink)

Bioethics should pay more attention to globalization and some of its consequences than it has done so far. The COVID-19 pandemic would not have been possible without globalization, which has also increased some of its negative consequences. Globalization has intensified wildlife trade in the world. One of the main hypotheses about the origin of this pandemic is that it originated in illegal forms of wildlife trade in China. In the last 30 or 40 years, there have been zoonotic outbreaks at (...) a much frequent pace than before, many of those have been related to wildlife trade. Legal and illegal wildlife trade has grown in the shadow of globalization. Second, globalization has had a huge impact on the redistribution of wealth in the world. Since 1990 income inequality has increased in most high- and in many middle- and low-income countries. A country’s level of pre-COVID income inequality is the best predictor of the COVID death rate. These two issues are not unrelated. People living in poverty in LMIC tend to suffer more from infectious diseases and tend to be marginalized from the health sector. Additionally, poverty tends to reproduce the conditions under which zoonotic diseases can more easily spread. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when (...) we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a position to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two characteristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value.Neste artigo eu argumento que o modo pelo qual nós revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças é diferente daquele pelo qual revisamos e mudamos nossos juízos de valor; isto se dá porque juízos de valor, ao contrário de crenças, não possuem nenhum valor de verdade. Mudanças de juízos de valor não estão sujeitas às mesmas restrições que se aplicam às mudanças de crenças e que são determinadas pelas normas que governam estas. Eu argumento que, primeiro, quando revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de suspender juízos e, ao tentarmos suprimir dúvidas, deveríamos tentar evitar a falsidade e, segundo, ao mudarmos as crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de atribuir probabilidades àquelas conjecturas sobre as quais nós estamos em dúvida. Estas duas condições se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de atitudes com valores de verdade, tais como crenças; eu argumento que estas duas características não se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de juízos de valor. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when (...) we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a posi-tion to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two charac-teristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value. (shrink)

Para muchos filósofos y poetas, la poesía es una forma de conocimiento. A esta tesis la llamo cognoscitivismo poético. Aquí analizo qué podemos entender por esta tesis, proponiendo diferentes interpretaciones y tratando de responder a las preguntas acerca de qué conocemos y cómo lo conocemos. Argumento que hay formas de conocimiento que difícilmente pueden ser cuestionadas y que, tal vez por lo mismo, han hecho aparecer la tesis como trivial. Sin embargo, tradicionalmente esta tesis se ha tratado de extender a (...) objetos que nos darían tipos discutibles de conocimiento: aquí el cognoscitivismo poético debe ser seriamente cuestionado. Finalmente, argumento que el modo en que la poesía puede ser fuente de conocimiento es a través de las perspectivas que nos da de la realidad, y en este sentido también puede tener un impacto cognoscitivo sobre nosotros y sobre nuestra comprensión del mundo. (shrink)

Hay ocasiones en que los valores que un agente sostiene entran en conflicto, tiene una presión para decidir y actuar y no sabe qué hacer. En ese momento se encuentra en un aprieto. De hecho, nuestros valores entran en conflicto constantemente, a veces es fácil decidir qué hacer porque tenemos una jerarquía de valores bien establecida, tenemos criterios que nos ayudan a decidir y preferimos cosas que valoramos más por sobre otras que valoramos menos. Todo el tiempo estamos tomando este (...) tipo de decisiones y nos resolvemos fácilmente por un curso de acción entre muchos otros que incesantemente se nos presentan. No obstante, en otras ocasiones la situación es más difícil ya sea porque tenemos que elegir entre dos o más cosas que valoramos mucho o porque existen dos obligaciones que nos demandan actuar en sentidos opuestos, no podemos satisfacer ambas demandas, no tenemos criterios o procedimientos que dirijan claramente nuestras decisiones y, con frecuencia, tenemos que sacrificar alguna de las opciones. Para la persona que se encuentra en este tipo de situaciones, estas no son agradables, sin embargo, para la filosofía son precisamente este tipo de situaciones difíciles las que son más atractivas. Y lo son porque nos revelan mucho acerca de nuestros sistemas normativos, de nuestros juicios de valor, de nuestras experiencias evaluativas y también de los sacrificios que a veces se demandan de nosotros. (shrink)

En este ensayo discuto si deberíamos entender la objetividad que predicamos de juicios evaluativos en los mismos términos en que lo hacemos de juicios epistémicos. Argumento a favor de un entendimiento de dominio específico de la objetividad, según el cual deberíamos ver a la verdad como central para la objetividad epistémica, pero no para la objetividad evaluativa. Sin embargo, esta posición tradicionalmente ha conducido a ver los juicios evaluativos como subjetivos. Aquí argumento que la carencia de valores de verdad no (...) necesariamente conduce al subjetivismo; no, si no se conciben los juicios evaluativos como expresiones de sentimientos o deseos sin ninguna restricción racional. Más que en el concepto de verdad, en el caso de la objetividad de juicios evaluativos, el énfasis debe ponerse en el de justificación. Sin embargo, este concepto por sí solo no es garante de objetividad (del mismo modo en que tampoco lo es el de verdad). Trato de ahondar en algunas de las condiciones para predicar objetividad de juicios evaluativos y para ello también distingo entre tipos de objetividad. (shrink)

En Vértigos argumentales, Carlos Pereda propone una clasificación de teorías fundacionistas sobre la justificación epistémica y sugiere que algo similar se puede hacer para la justificación práctica. Aquí desarrollo una clasificación de teorías acerca de la justificación moral en los mismos términos. Finalmente, analizo cómo sería lo que Pereda llama una teoría multifundacionista de la justificación en ética.

Mark Platts is responsible for the first systematic presentation of truth-conditional semantics and for turning a generation of philosophers on to the Davidsonian program. He is also a pioneer in discussions of moral realism, and has made important contributions to bioethics, the philosophy of human rights and moral responsibility. This book is a tribute to Platts's pioneering work in these areas, featuring contributions from number of leading scholars of his work from the US, UK and Mexico. It features replies to (...) the individual essays from Platts, as well as a concluding chapter reflecting on his philosophical career from Oxford to Mexico City. Mind, Language and Morality will be of interest to philosophers across a wide range of areas, including ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of law, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

En este artículo analizo los principales argumentos del libro Tauroética de Fernando Savater. Él afirma que existen argumentos morales a favor de las corridas de toros, por lo que ser taurino es una opción ética legítima. Aquí sostengo que está en un error y que los argumentos morales no tienen la fuerza que él les adjudica; puede haber razones económicas, políticas o de otro tipo a favor de las corridas, pero no hay razones morales. Afirmo, en cambio, que sí hay (...) razones morales fuertes en contra de las corridas que se basan en que los toros son objeto de consideración moral, es decir, tienen un estatus moral independiente de nuestros intereses. A partir de esta premisa examino y objeto, bajo una perspectiva ética, otros argumentos de Savater. (shrink)

El presente trabajo investiga las tesis sobre el poder civil de Alonso de la Veracruz que buscan incorporar en la comunidad política española a los habitantes autóctonos del Nuevo Mundo, tesis que suelen relacionarse con F. de Vitoria y el tomismo español, y que últimamente son consideradas parte del republicanismo novohispano elaborado desde la periferia americana. Se busca demostrar que su propósito era aplicar una teoría de derechos naturales, sin que ello implique participación política de los indios americanos. Se analiza (...) la postura del fraile frente a la diversidad cultural y la guerra contra los indios. The paper explores Alonso de la Veracruz's theses on civil power, which sought to integrate the native inhabitants of the New World into the Spanish political community. These theses, which have usually been associated with F. de Vitoria and Spanish Thomism, have recently come to be considered part of a Novohispanic republicanism developed in the American periphery. The article seeks to show that the purpose of such theses was to apply a theory of natural rights that did not entail the political participation of the indigenous population, as well as to analyze Veracruz's position regarding cultural diversity and the war against the indigenous peoples. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Argentina Mexico The Southern Cone The Northern Part of South America and Central America Conclusion References Further Reading.