This conference was devoted to the 80 years of the Copenhagen Interpretation, and to the question of the relevance of the Copenhagen interpretation for the present understanding of quantum mechanics. It is in this framework that fundamental questions raised by quantum mechanics, especially in information theory, were discussed throughout the conference. As has become customary in our series of conference in Växjö, we were glad to welcome a fruitful assembly of theoretical physicists, experimentalists, mathematicians and even philosophers interested in the (...) foundations of probability and physics. The nature of quantum fluctuations---in the form of Stochastic Electrodynamics or in other approaches to stochastic quantum mechanics---was also a central topic discussed during the conference, especially during debates. We should also mention talks on the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics; on macroscopic quantum systems; on Bell's inequality, entanglement and experiments on quantum nonlocality (and locality); on Bohmian mechanics; on the connection between quantum mechanics and general relativity; on quantum probability; on quantum computing, quantum teleportation and quantum cryptography technologies; and more generally on the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and on the philosophical problems raised by its interpretations. (shrink)

This Växjö conference was devoted to the reconsideration of quantum foundations. Due to increasing research in quantum information theory, especially on quantum computing and cryptography, many questions regarding the foundations of quantum mechanics, which have long been considered to be exclusively of philosophical interest, nowadays play an important role in theoretical and experimental quantum physics.

La réflexion philosophique, dont l'ouverture à l'univers dans lequel nous nous découvrons - avec une acuité proportionnelle à un étonnement renouvelé - n'a pas de limites, n'en est que plus tributaire des sciences et des techniques, des arts et de multiples activités qui régissent plus ou moins fructueusement notre expérience. Or, au sein des sciences humaines, privilégiées pour éclairer une condition que nous ne saurions cesser d'interpréter, peu d'oeuvres du dernier siècle auront enrichi en le précisant notre être-au-monde, comme la (...) théorie linguistique de Gustave Guillaume, assez solitaire, et les recherches multiformes de Jean Piaget - où la psychologie de l'enfant a souvent occulté la visée épistémologique et son enracinement biologique (cf Biologie et connaissance, 1967) et ses prolongements pédagogiques, voire éthiques. Le Cinquantenaire et le Trentenaire de leur disparition appelaient un hommage d'autant plus impératif qu'ils sont restés marginaux ou ignorés dans les milieux philosophiques, malgré la centralité de leurs élucidations. Leur commune orientation génétique et structurale n'ayant suscité aucun échange, pendant la contemporanéité de publications d'un tiers de siècle (1923-1960), mesurer leur complémentarité s'impose d'autant plus. S'ils peuvent aider à repenser la condition humaine, c'est qu'ils auront contribué à dissiper le "mystère de la pensée". L'un cherchant à habiliter les caractères systématique et cinétique des langues, irremplaçables moyens de penser ; l'autre dans un vis-à-vis cognitif et opératoire de Freud, en relavant sur les plans épistémologique et logique, notamment, l'élan révolutionnaire de la seconde modernité, autour de l'évolutionnisme. Mais les thèmes majeurs du constructivisme, du schème et de la symbolisation - et plus largement du temps et du langage - auront sans doute aidé à spécifier les mutations autorisées par la révolution critique. Entre l'Instant du je parle et un décentrement exigible pratiquement (éthique) comme théoriquement (épistémique), c'est bien la condition humaine dans son ensemble qui est concernée. Si repenser cette Condition s'impose en permanence, il importe de ne pas manquer des oeuvres qui, par-delà toute mode, proposent à notre expérience des fondations résistant à d'inéluctables vicissitudes. (shrink)

_A portrait of Martin Heidegger as a man and a philosopher_ In this biography of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), now available in English, historian Guillaume Payen synthesizes the connections between the German philosopher’s life and work. Critically, but without polemics, he creates a portrait of Heidegger in his time, using all available sources—lectures, letters, and the notorious “black notebooks.” Payen chronicles Heidegger’s “changing destinies”: after the First World War, an uncompromising Catholicism gave way to a vigorous striving for a philosophical (...) revolution—fertile ground for National Socialism. The book reflects a life of light and shadow. Heidegger was a great philosopher and teacher who cultivated friendships and love affairs with Jews but also was an anti-Semitic nationalist who lamented the “Judaization of German intellectual life.”. (shrink)

Cet article analyse le sens que prend, dans l’activité théorique de Lukács des années 1930, la notion de narration, cruciale dans ses travaux ultérieurs. On y fait l’hypothèse que c’est l’événement révolutionnaire russe et ses suites qui posent directement la question du statut de la narration dans le discours politique révolutionnaire et tous les problèmes liés : continuité historique et importance de l’héritage, point de vue de l’écriture de l’histoire, etc. Lukács partage ce questionnement avec les théoriciens du réalisme socialiste, (...) alors en voie de formalisation (et de stérilisation), mais il leur confère une dimension théorique qui sera plus tard réinvestie, en premier lieu dans l’ Esthétique, et lui permettra de préciser le statut du marxisme au sein des sciences sociales. (shrink)

Guillaume Collett questions to what extent we can locate Deleuze within the Lacanian School during the late-1960s, prior to Guattari. In so doing, he offers a new, integrated reading of Deleuze's The Logic of Sense by understanding it as a 'psychoanalysis of sense', and gives a new interpretation of Deleuze's conception of philosophy itself. The Psychoanalysis of Sense shows that Deleuze was not merely aware of the debates animating the Lacanian School during the 1960s: he sought to contribute to (...) them. Emphasising his appropriation of the work of post-Lacanian Serge Leclaire, Collett explains how Deleuze constructed a more singular and immanent theory of the linguistic structure of the unconscious - granting the erogenous body a larger structuring role. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the distribution and the interpretation of the temporal suffix -kue in Mbyá, a Guaraní language that is closely related to Paraguayan Guaraní. This suffix is attested both inside noun phrases and inside clauses. Interestingly, its nominal uses give rise to inferences that are unattested in its clausal uses. These inferences were first identified in Paraguayan Guaraní by Tonhauser, who called them the existence property and the change of state property. Tonhauser further argued that these properties (...) are built into the lexical entry of the nominal temporal marker -kue. By contrast, I argue that -kue denotes a relative past tense both in its nominal and clausal uses, and that the existence and change of state properties are pragmatic inferences that arise from the interaction of the literal meaning of -kue with general constraints on the interpretation of noun phrases, notably constraints on the topicality of the time of evaluation of noun phrases. This allows me to maintain a uniform analysis of -kue across its nominal uses and its clausal uses. The analysis of -kue in Mbyá is relevant to a number of current debates on the expression of tense crosslinguistically. Firstly, the existence of relative tenses has sometimes been called into question. Klein notably argues that relative tenses are actually combinations of tense with the perfect aspect. Others have argued that there exist true relative tenses in certain languages. I argue that facts of Mbyá support the latter view. Secondly, Klein famously defined tenses as relations between topic times and the time of utterance. I argue, on the other hand, that relative tenses only denote relations between times, and that the topicality or non-topicality of their temporal arguments depends on their context of use, including their syntactic environment. Thirdly, this paper contributes to debates on the nature and reality of nominal tenses The Oxford handbook of tense and aspect, 2012), by arguing that tense in Mbyá is a genuinely nominal category, in the sense that temporal functional projections are part of the extended projection of the noun phrase. (shrink)

In this paper, we use an experimental design to compare the performance of elicitation rules for subjective beliefs. Contrary to previous works in which elicited beliefs are compared to an objective benchmark, we consider a purely subjective belief framework. The performance of different elicitation rules is assessed according to the accuracy of stated beliefs in predicting success. We measure this accuracy using two main factors: calibration and discrimination. For each of them, we propose two statistical indexes and we compare the (...) rules’ performances for each measurement. The matching probability method provides more accurate beliefs in terms of discrimination, while the quadratic scoring rule reduces overconfidence and the free rule, a simple rule with no incentives, which succeeds in eliciting accurate beliefs. Nevertheless, the matching probability appears to be the best mechanism for eliciting beliefs due to its performances in terms of calibration and discrimination, but also its ability to elicit consistent beliefs across measures and across tasks, as well as its empirical and theoretical properties. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article is devoted to a thirteenth-century Latin text on how to construct, set up, and use a version of the so-called armillary instrument (instrumentum armillarum), which was first described in Ptolemy’s Almagest as a tool for measuring ecliptic coordinates. Written in 1264 by Guillaume des Moustiers, bishop of Laon, this hitherto unstudied Tractatus super armillas survives in a single manuscript, where it is accompanied by a copious set of glosses. The text and its glosses jointly offer an (...) unusually detailed account of the instrument’s material aspects and methods of assembly. In addition, they reflect a keen awareness of the potential sources of error that may arise in the context of astronomical observation, while making suggestions on how these errors may be minimized or avoided. The Tractatus super armillas accordingly is a valuable source on the observational side of medieval European astronomy, which has often been minimized in modern historical accounts. (shrink)

Unlike in physics, the category of thought experiment is not very common in biology. At least there are no classic examples that are as important and as well-known as the most famous thought experiments in physics, such as Galileo’s, Maxwell’s or Einstein’s. The reasons for this are far from obvious; maybe it has to do with the fact that modern biology for the most part sees itself as a thoroughly empirical discipline that engages either in real natural history or in (...) experimenting on real organisms rather than fictive ones. While theoretical biology does exist and is recognized as part of biology, its role within biology appears to be more marginal than the role of theoretical physics within physics. It could be that this marginality of theory also affects thought experiments as sources of theoretical knowledge. Of course, none of this provides a sufficient reason for thinking that thought experiments are really unimportant in biology. It is quite possible that the common perception of this matter is wrong and that there are important theoretical considerations in biology, past or present, that deserve the title of thought experiment just as much as the standard examples from physics. Some such considerations may even be widely known and considered to be important, but were not recognized as thought experiments. In fact, as we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that what is arguably the single most important biological work ever, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, contains a number of thought experiments. There are also more recent examples both in evolutionary and non-evolutionary biology, as we will show. Part of the problem in identifying positive examples in the history of biology is the lack of agreement as to what exactly a thought experiment is. Even worse, there may not be more than a family resemblance that unifies this epistemic category. We take it that classical thought experiments show the following characteristics: They serve directly or indirectly in the non-empirical epistemic evaluation of theoretical propositions, explanations or hypotheses. Thought experiments somehow appeal to the imagination. They involve hypothetical scenarios, which may or may not be fictive. In other words, thought experiments suppose that certain states of affairs hold and then try to intuit what would happen in a world where these suppositions are true. We want to examine in the following sections if there are episodes in the history of biology that satisfy these criteria. As we will show, there are a few episodes that might satisfy all three of these criteria, and many more if the imagination criterion is dropped or understood in a lose sense. In any case, this criterion is somewhat vague in the first place, unless a specific account of the imagination is presupposed. There will also be issues as to what exactly “non-empirical” means. In general, for the sake of discussion we propose to understand the term “thought experiment” here in a broad rather than a narrow sense here. We would rather be guilty of having too wide a conception of thought experiment than of missing a whole range of really interesting examples. (shrink)

Brette presents arguments that query the existence of the neural code. However, he has neglected certain evidence that could be viewed as proof that a neural code operates in the brain. Albeit these proofs show a link between neural activity and cognition, we discuss why they fail to demonstrate the existence of an invariant neural code.

Corporate codes of ethics, which have spread in the last decades, have shown a limited ability to foster ethical behaviors. For instance, they have been criticized for relying too much on formal compliance, rather than taking into account sufficiently agents and their moral development, or promoting self-reflexive behaviors. We aim here at showing that a code of ethics in fact has meaning and enables ethical progress when it is interpreted and appropriated with practical wisdom. We explore a model that represents (...) an uncommon organizational code of ethics: the monastic Rule of St. Benedict, written in the sixth century and still used today. Our empirical study—conducted in several monasteries living under this rule—shows that organization members interpret this rule, both hermeneutically and ethically, to adapt it to situations. They also appropriate this rule as a way of life and treat it as a dynamic framework that helps them to follow their purpose within their organization. This exceptional code actually offers an alternative model for practicing codes of ethics, in a virtue-ethical manner, beyond mere compliance with the text. The way in which reflexive and active agents practice the code, both individually and collectively, shapes their organizational experience and fosters their moral development. (shrink)

Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective—to offer a description of our mental functions and of their relations to objects—and both called their respective research programs ‘descriptive psychology’, they seem to have used the term to refer to two different methods of psychological research. In this article, I compare analyses of these differences. Against the reading of Orth but also against a possible application of recent relativist accounts of the epistemology of peer disagreement to (...) this case, I argue that their apparent shared objective is not enough to support an understanding of their views as two alternatives within a given historical or scientific context, or as a mutual peer disagreement. I show that the impression of a shared objective can be explained away as stemming from the influence of their teacher Adolf Trendelenburg, and I stress that the case of introspection strongly suggests that an account in terms of peer disagreement is not plausible. Finally, I conclude that the opposition between two traditions, Austrian philosophy and historicism, might be better suited to account for the dispute and its apparent common historical context. (shrink)

Une pensée qui voyage. Voici ce que donne à voir Guillaume Tusseau, théoricien du droit devenu comparatiste sans avoir jamais quitté les rives de la théorie, dans ce petit ouvrage en français, dense et stimulant, publié au Canada. L’avant-propos retrace les expériences de recherche mais aussi les contrées par lesquelles cette réflexion est passée pour se livrer enfin sous la forme modestement désignée de « Notes sur quelques allers-retours aporétiques » entre le droit comparé et la théorie générale du (...) droit. Plaçant ainsi sa réflexion sous le signe de la légèreté, Guillaume Tusseau désamorce l’appréhension que peut susciter un tel programme associant droit comparé et théorie générale du droit ; rien de moins. Inspiré par un colloque de 2016, organisé à La Rochelle par Isabelle Boucobza aujourd’hui professeure à l’Université Paris Nanterre, intitulé « Le droit comparé : de la périphérie au centre? », l’auteur a depuis cheminé, chargé de cette recherche initiale, de Paris à Bogotá, pu... (shrink)

One way social scientists explain phenomena is by building structural models. These models are explanatory insofar as they manage to perform a recursive decomposition on an initial multivariate probability distribution, which can be interpreted as a mechanism. Explanations in social sciences share important aspects that have been highlighted in the mechanisms literature. Notably, spelling out the functioning the mechanism gives it explanatory power. Thus social scientists should choose the variables to include in the model on the basis of their function (...) in the mechanism. This paper examines the notion of ‘function’ within structural modelling. We argue that ‘functions’ ought to be understood as the theoretical underpinnings of the causes, namely as the role that causes play in the functioning of the mechanism. (shrink)

Guillaume Fréchette | : Il est généralement admis dans la littérature analytique sur l’intuition que celle-ci est principalement, ou même fondamentalement, une attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, elle est aussi souvent caractérisée comme une croyance que P, comme la formation d’une croyance sans inférence que P, comme une impression que P, comme une impression intellectuelle que P, comme l’attitude consistant à être poussé, mu par P. Dans tous les cas, la spécificité de l’intuition reposerait au moins en partie sur (...) les propriétés doxastiques qui la distingue d’autres attitudes propositionnelles, comme savoir que P ou douter que P.Cette caractérisation de l’intuition semble à première vue incommensurable avec le concept d’intuition discuté dans la tradition phénoménologique, où l’intuition est caractérisée comme ce type d’expérience qui rend les objets présents, et peut certes être caractérisée en termes d’attitude propositionnelle, mais ne l’est pas essentiellement.Dans ce qui suit, je soulève quelques problèmes auxquels fait face la conception de l’intuition comme attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, j’aimerais suggérer qu’en amendant cette idée, on peut développer une théorie de l’intuition qui peut employer de manière fructueuse les ressources de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. Cette suggestion montre que l’incommensurabilité des conceptions analytiques et phénoménologiques de l’intuition est superficielle, plus superficielle que ne le laissent entendre ses défenseurs respectifs. | : It is generally acknowledged in the analytic literature on intuitions that these are generally, or even fundamentally, propositional attitudes. For this reason, intuitions are often characterized as beliefs that P, as seeming that P, as the intellectual seeming that P, or as the attitude of being pushed by P. In all cases, the specificity of intuitions would consist at least in part in the doxastic properties that distinguishes them from other propositional attitudes, such as knowing that P or doubting that P.At first glance, this characterization of intuitions seems incommensurable with the concept of intuition discussed in the phenomenological tradition, where intuition is characterized as the type of experience that make objects present to us. While intuitions in this sense may be characterized as propositional attitudes, it doesn’t imply that they fundamentally are propositional.In the following paper, I raise some problems which faces the conception of intuitions as propositional attitudes. I would suggest that amending this idea allows to develop a theory of intuition which can use fruitfully both the resources of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. As a consequence, the alleged incommensurability of analytical and phenomenological conceptions of intuitions appears to be more superficial than it is usually taken to be defenders of intuitions as propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Guillaume Lejeune | : La philosophie de Bradley se présente moins comme une tentative d’importation de la pensée allemande en Angleterre que comme une volonté de régler par le recours à divers écoles les problèmes dans lesquels la tradition empiriste se dépêtre : un atomisme de la connaissance et une conception externaliste des relations qui rendraient impossible une vision unitaire de l’expérience. La critique que développe Bradley de l’association d’idées dans la mesure où elle fait ressortir les présuppositions de (...) la tradition empiriste et en rejette le bien-fondé peut se lire comme une tentative de déconstruction de celle-ci. | : Bradley’s philosophy is not a mere attempt to import German thought in Great-Britain, but a willingness to regulate the problems in which the empiricist tradition is entangled — an atomism of knowledge and an externalist conception of relation that make impossible a unitary view of experience — by borrowing ideas from various schools. According to Bradley, associationism clearly brings out the two problematic aspects of the whole empiricism. That is why his rejection has a strategic character. It can be read as an attempt to “deconstruct” the empiricist tradition. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage se propose de degager un champ de recherche aux confins de la psychomecanique du langage et de la psychologie genetique, de mettre a jour les desseins croises de ces deux theories. De la reussite de l'entreprise ou de son echec depend en partie une meilleure comprehension de l'acquisition des connaissances linguistiques par l'enfant et celle du rapport langage-pensee et donc du fonctionnement du langage pris en charge par un sujet parlant ou ecrivant, celles des mecanismes structuraux porteurs de (...) la realisation de l'acte de langage avec ses variations idiolectales ou sociolectales. Pour acceder a la psycholinguistique et plus generalement a une anthropologie du langage, le chercheur doit disposer d'une theorisation precise de l'objet qu'est le langage, condition de toute amplification interdisciplinaire. (shrink)

Analysis of the etymology of the name of the Tangut emperors.

Contributions de : Brumberg-Chaumont, J. ; Burnett, C. ; Caiazzo, I. ; Dutton, P. ; Fidora, A. ; Fredborg, M. ; Gautier Dalché, P. ; Jacquart, D. ; Jeauneau, E. ; Jolivet, J. ; Obrist, B. ; Poirel, D. ; Rodnite Lemay, H.

(2012). DEL-sequents for regression and epistemic planning. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 337-367. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2012.736703.

Résumé Cet article présente les recherches de Jochen Hoock (1939-2019) qui se situent au carrefour de l’histoire sociale, de l’histoire du droit et de l’histoire des savoirs. Après avoir analysé les débats autour de la réforme de l’État en France (1880-1936), Hoock a étudié la constitution de la bourgeoisie marchande à Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles en soulignant les tensions qui la traversaient et l’importance des institutions dans son affirmation. Ses recherches se sont également orientées vers l’étude du savoir (...) commercial (avec le projet Ars Mercatoria sur les manuels à l’usage des marchands) et des savoirs économiques et statistiques en France et en Allemagne. Très impliqué dans le « tournant critique » des Annales à partir de la fin des années 1980. Hoock a également été un passeur entre les historiographies allemande et française comme en témoignent ses traductions et ses présentations de l’œuvre de Reinhart Koselleck. (shrink)

Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is (...) one of the agents involved in the situation. For this approach we propose and axiomatize a logical formalism based on epistemic logic. This leads us to formalize some intuitions about the internal approach and about its connections with the external ones. Finally, we show that our internal logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete. (shrink)

Conventional economic theory assumes that agents should be consistent across decisions. However, it is often observed that experimental subjects fail to report consistent preferences. So far, these inconsistencies are almost always examined singly. We thus wonder whether the more inconsistent individuals in one task are also more inconsistent in other tasks. We propose an experiment in which subjects are asked to report their preferences over risky bets so as to obtain, for each subject, three measures of inconsistencies: classical preference reversals, (...) framing effects and preference instability. In line with previous experimental findings, subjects are largely inconsistent according to each of these three measures and there are considerable individual differences. The main result is that we find no correlation among these three measures of inconsistency. (shrink)

A l'automne de 1534, alors que le débat religieux en France est dominé par l'interférence des doctrines luthériennes et sacramentaires, et soudainement dramatisé par l'" affaire des Placards ", Guillaume Budé - tout en jetant sur son temps un regard lucide et souvent prophétique - écrit le livre qui couronne une quête spirituelle de plus de vingt années, justifiant ainsi (au sens théologique du terme) sa propre vie intellectuelle et l'humanisme dont il est le champion. Ce " livre-testament ", (...) tout vibrant d'une éloquence tendue, somptueuse et savante, opère dans sa complexe écriture le transfert de toutes les ressources des lettres profanes (dont le mot hellénisme est l'indice) au christianisme. Alchimie de la culture, alchimie du verbe. (shrink)

A l'automne de 1534, alors que le débat religieux en France est dominé par l'interférence des doctrines luthériennes et sacramentaires, et soudainement dramatisé par l'" affaire des Placards ", Guillaume Budé - tout en jetant sur son temps un regard lucide et souvent prophétique - écrit le livre qui couronne une quête spirituelle de plus de vingt années, justifiant ainsi (au sens théologique du terme) sa propre vie intellectuelle et l'humanisme dont il est le champion. Ce " livre-testament ", (...) tout vibrant d'une éloquence tendue, somptueuse et savante, opère dans sa complexe écriture le transfert de toutes les ressources des lettres profanes (dont le mot hellénisme est l'indice) au christianisme. Alchimie de la culture, alchimie du verbe. (shrink)