12 found
Gregory R. Lockhead [10]Gregory Lockhead [2]
  1.  36
    Psychophysical scaling: Judgments of attributes or objects?Gregory R. Lockhead - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):543-558.
    Psychophysical scaling models of the form R = f, with R the response and I some intensity of an attribute, all assume that people judge the amounts of an attribute. With simple biases excepted, most also assume that judgments are independent of space, time, and features of the situation other than the one being judged. Many data support these ideas: Magnitude estimations of brightness increase with luminance. Nevertheless, I argue that the general model is wrong. The stabilized retinal image literature (...)
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  2.  17
    Modeling temporal and spatial differences.Gregory R. Lockhead - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):302-303.
  3.  28
    A parallel view of the history of psychophysics.Gregory R. Lockhead - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):154-155.
  4.  14
    Infants' formation and use of categories to segregate objects.Amy Needham, Gwenden Dueker & Gregory Lockhead - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):215-240.
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  5.  17
    Assessment of the McCollough effect by a shift in psychometric function.Lorraine G. Allan, Shepard Siegel, Pamela Toppan & Gregory R. Lockhead - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (1):21-24.
  6.  15
    Psychophysical scaling methods reveal and measure context effects.Gregory R. Lockhead - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):607-612.
    People cannot make independent judgements of stimulus attributes and so (Lockhead 1992, p. 551) rather than in terms of stimulus features. The new commentaries here further this statement and also support the observations in the target article that psychophysical scaling methods allow us to measure (1) how context determines judgments and (2) what people remember about prior stimuli.
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  7.  33
    Isomorphisms and subjective colors.Gregory R. Lockhead & Scott A. Huettel - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):959-960.
    Palmer describes a “subjective barrier” that limits knowledge of others' experience. We discuss how this barrier extends to all knowledge, becoming less distinct as theoretical constructs are strengthened. We provide evidence for isomorphic experience, among individuals with similar physiologies, by showing that perceived relations between colors are as similar when viewing pigments as when viewing subjective colors caused by flickering bars.
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  8.  27
    Variability is not uniformly bad: The practices of psychologists generate research questions.Scott A. Huettel & Gregory Lockhead - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):418-419.
    The practices of economists increase experimental reproducibility relative to those of selected psychologists but should not be universally adopted. Procedures criticized by Hertwig and Ortmann as producing variable data are valuable, instead, for generating questions. The procedure of choice should depend on the theoretical goal: measure a known factor or learn what factors are important and need to be measured.
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  9.  11
    Emmert’s imaginal law.Gregory R. Lockhead & Nancy J. Evans - 1979 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 13 (2):114-116.
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  10.  11
    Constancy in a changing world.Gregory R. Lockhead - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):587-600.
  11.  7
    Psychophysical measures of objects and their features: It is time for a change.Gregory R. Lockhead - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):766-772.
  12.  39
    A framework for structural constraints on feature creation.Scott A. Huettel & Gregory R. Lockhead - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):29-29.
    We address two major limitations of Schyns et al. First, we clarify their concept of “features” by postulating several levels for processing. The composition of the feature set at each level determines the set at the next higher level, following simple structural guidelines. Second, we show that our proposed framework reconciles feature-creation and fixed-feature approaches.
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