Context -- A Jew in Amsterdam -- Conflicts and communities -- Christian philosophy? -- A Bible gallery -- Religion and politics in the TTP -- Miracles, meaning, and moderation -- Christian pluralism -- Ethics reconsidered -- Providence, obedience, and love -- Spinoza and Christianity.
Spinoza is supposed to have denied the existence of miracles. I argue that instead of denying them he offers his readers a way of understanding miracles within his own metaphysical system in which God and nature are identified. I then offer some historical conjectures as to why his view has been misunderstood so often and for so long.
Im ersten Teil dieses Aufsatzes versuche ich, die fundamentalen Irrtiimer in der heutigen Leibnizliteratur, die zu einer fatalistischen Auslegung der Leibnizschen Theorie der Essentia geführt haben, aufzuspüren. Der zweite Teil enthält eine genauere Darstellung der Wesenslehre. Sie wird am Schluß gegen zwei zunachst plausibel erscheinende Einwände verteidigt.
This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of André de Muralt, the author introduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, with substantial forays into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its raison d’être than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of (...) thought amid the galaxy of the modern school of natural right. (shrink)
In this paper I show that Arnauld defends a traditional Roman Catholic position on miracles, though he might have been expected to do otherwise. This oddity is explained by the fact that Arnauld, as spokesman for Port-Royal, was called upon to defend one of the most startling and best-documented miracles in history.
The last decade of the twentieth century has been good to modern philosophy. Stephen Gaukroger’s intellectual biography of Descartes was published by Oxford University Press in 1995, setting a very high standard for philosophical biography, and now Steven Nadler has established another benchmark, dealing in a different way with the very different figure of Spinoza.
Stuart Hampshire's Spinoza depicts Spinoza as having tried to free language from its intimate association with the imagination in order to enable it to convey the clear and distinct ideas of true philosophy. The inaccuracy and insufficiency of this account was pointed out by David Savan in an article in the Philosophical Review in 1958. Savan showed that concerns about language were more deeply and widely woven into Spinoza's thought than Hampshire had noticed; and he argued that, for Spinoza, understanding (...) occurs by a sort of simple mental perception, after we have weaned ourselves from our natural dependence on words and images. Savan's paper appeared in the heyday of linguistic analysis and was articulate... (shrink)
Steven Nadler hopes to interest a readership wider than just professional philosophers in a largely forgotten debate he admits was not one of philosophy’s “marquee events.” It sounds like an uphill battle, even for a writer as skilled and for a historian of modern philosophy as accomplished as Nadler. Yet The Best of All Possible Worlds succeeds in unfolding a compelling tale without distorting the fundamental doctrines of its protagonists.And what protagonists they were, however much the passing centuries have dimmed (...) their renown. G. W. Leibniz is still likely to have some name recognition with the target audience. But it would be unsafe to assume it for either the Oratorian Nicolas Malebranche or the Jansenist Antoine Arnauld. So Nadler weaves enough historical and biographical detail into his story, both to introduce all three and to create a background of human interest against which their philosophical differences are displayed. (shrink)
Kant's Theory of Justice is divided into five chapters, but into two halves. The first half, consisting of chapters 1 to 3, explores once again the subterraneous, labyrinthine plumbing of the edifice of Kantian moral philosophy, unearthing some connections not previously noticed and maintaining that, in theory, the quirky old system is still basically sound.
In this paper, I argue a position that has almost never been held: that Leibniz was a materialist. At the conclusion of my article, I consider whether the difficulty of reconciling Leibnizs idea of concluding that there is instead a Leibnizian idea of which does a better job.
This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of André de Muralt, the author introduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, with substantial forays into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its raison d’être than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of (...) thought amid the galaxy of the modern school of natural right. (shrink)
A paper which succeeds in being erudite, yet lively, and which tells an amusing tale without digressing from its theme, deserves great admiration. Such is Professor George's discussion of Kant and liberalism. He first points out briefly that in fact Kant exercised small influence on liberal thought in the nineteenth century. The bulk of his paper is devoted to the question of whether Kant was a liberal at all and to justifying his unconventional negative answer. In the course of so (...) doing he presents the diverting tale of the ingenuous young aristocrat who solicits Kant's opinion as to whether one's wife should be inoculated against the pox. But the diversion is pertinent. Kant's two answers to the question reveal two different ways in which the Kantian moral theory, sententiously expressed in the so-called “categorical imperative”, might be incompatible with liberal opinion. (shrink)
In diesem Aufsatz suche ich zu zeigen, daß das Streitgespräch zwischen Hobbes und Bramhall über das Problem des Fatalismus scheitern mußte, weil der erste von der mechanistischen Philosophie ausging und der zweite von der scholastischen.
