Zeno’s arrow does not move “in the now” (Phys. VI 8, 239b2) or, equivalently, “in the place it is” (DK 29 B 4). Zeno concludes from this that the arrow does not move at all. In Aristotle (ibid. 9, 239b5–9, 31–33), Zeno’s argument takes the form of an invalid inference from instants to periods of time. Insofar as it fails to bring out an inconsistency in Aristotle’s account of motion, the paradox is thus eliminated. That instantaneous motion is a contradiction (...) in terms belongs to the common ground Aristotle shares with Zeno. That’s why information concerning Zeno’s relevant argument must be sought elsewhere (see section 3). Aristotle’s discussion of the Arrow pertains to the conclusions drawn from the denial of instantaneous motion. But the argument he refutes is of his own making, or so I will argue (section 2). In particular, Aristotle fails to address the presentist commitment adumbrated in his account, which would leave nothing beyond the denial of instantaneous motion for Zeno to prove. Presentism is no option in Phys. VI where a tenseless account of time and motion is offered. I will argue that Aristotle’s account of the tenses in De interpretatione is prone to Zeno’s argument if the present is conceived as an instant – which it arguably is not (section 4). (shrink)

Wholes have parts, and wholes are prior to parts according to Aristotle. Aristotle’s accounts of continuity, in _Phys_. V 3 (plus sections in Metaph. Δ 6 and Ι 1) on the one hand and in _Phys_. VI on the other, are specified in terms of ways in which wholes are related to parts. The synthesis account in Phys. V 3 etc. applies primarily to bodies (in, e.g., anatomy). It indicates a variety of ways in which parts of a body are (...) kept together by a common boundary and are thereby combined into a mostly inhomogeneous, functional whole. Only the analysis account in _Phys_. VI applies primarily to linear continua such as movements, paths of movements, and time. The structure it indicates is only superficially described as indefinite divisibility: what matters is the transfer of potential divisions from path to movement and time (and conversely) which, surprisingly, requires an equivalent to Dedekind’s continuity principle to be tacitly presupposed. – In the present paper, my agenda will focus on the exposition of the relevant theories offered by Aristotle in _Phys_. V 3 and _Phys_. VI 1-2, respectively, with a view to the applications envisaged by Aristotle and to the mathematics involved. (shrink)

Whitehead’s metaphysics involves an event ontology. Fundamental—that is, in Whitehead’s language: “actual”—entities are events, described as acts of experience. It also involves presentism since past events have perished and future events do not yet exist according to Whitehead. Hence the question alluded to in the title of the present paper: “How are you going to move forward into the future?… If you conceive it under the guise of a temporal transition into the non-existent, you can’t get going.” I will argue (...) that, to a large extent, Whitehead’s metaphysics is designed to answer that question. (shrink)