How Classification Works attempts to bridge the gap between philosophy and the social sciences using as a focus some of the work of Nelson Goodman. Throughout his long career Goodman has addressed the question: are some ways of conceptualizing more natural than others? This book looks at the rightness of categories, assessing Goodman's role in modern philosophy and explaining some of his ideas on the relation between aesthetics and cognitive theory. Two papers by Nelson Goodman are (...) included in the collection and there are analyses of his work by seven leading academics in anthropology, philosophy, sociology and musicology. (shrink)
Paul Goodman, 1960’larda modern Amerikan toplumunun organize sistemi içerisinde dönemin gençliğinin sorunlarını ön plana çıkaran ‘Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized System’ (Saçmayı Büyütmek: Organize Sistemde Gençliğin Problemleri, 1960) eseri ile sosyal bir eleştirmen olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Amerikalı bir düşünür olan Paul Goodman’ın kısa öyküler, romanlar, şiirler ve makalelerden oluşan çalışmaları, siyaset, sosyal teori, eğitim, kentsel tasarım, edebi eleştiri, hatta psikoterapi gibi geniş bir yelpazeye dağılmıştır. Onun temel argümanı (1960: 9-10) tek bir merkez etrafında (...) örgütlenen teknoloji toplumunun başarısızlıklarını eleştirerek, mevcut düzenin insanın doğasına uygun bir biçimde yeniden inşasını vurgulamaktadır. Goodman’ın yeniden inşa süreci içerisinde insan doğasına önem veren faaliyete dayalı anarşist ideolojisi, sorumluluk duygusunun homojen bir şekilde bireyler arasında paylaşılması gerektiğini vurgular. Goodman merkeziyetçi olmayan siyaset anlayışı ile kendisini Amerikan siyasetinin ve kültürünün karşısında yer alan bir pozisyonda konumlandırmaktadır (Honeywell, 2011: 1). Diğer bir deyişle Goodman (1960: 36), anarşist geleneği formüle etmek amacıyla yirminci yüzyıl Amerikası’nın içinde bulunmuş olduğu mevcut durumdan yola çıkarak eleştirilerini ademi merkeziyetçilik, katılımcı demokrasi, özerk toplum temaları üzerine temellendirmiştir. -/- Goodman’a göre, sosyal, kültürel, ahlâk ve eğitim gibi alanlarda uygulanan kurallar günümüz devletlerini etkisi altına alan kapitalist düzen tarafından belirlenmektedir (Bakır, 2016: 110). Bu durum Goodman’ın da içerisinde bulunduğu anarşist düşünürler tarafından kabul edilebilecek bir husus değildir, çünkü anarşistler mevcut düzenin ve sosyal yaşamın otorite ve itaat yapılarıyla güçlendirilen belirli yaklaşımlar ile kontrol altına alınmasını, insanların fikirlerini özgürce ifade edemeyeceği, bir nevi entelektüel bir hapishane içerisinde yaşaması anlamına geleceğinden dolayı karşı çıkmaktadırlar (Sheean, 2003: 122). Aynı nedenlerden dolayı Goodman, modern liberalizm ve Marksizm gibi alternatif radikal ideolojileri yerinden yönetim düşüncesi ve sosyal mühendislik konusundaki eğilimleri dolayısıyla reddetmektedir. Goodman için anarşizm, özgürlük ve toplumsal değişime yeterli düzeyde arka çıkabilecek tek ideolojik çerçeve olarak görülmektedir. Ona göre (2010: 143), “anarşizm ya da daha iyisi, anarko-pasifizm (toplumsal değişim hareketleri içerisinde örgütlü şiddete ve kurumlara karşı çıkan anarşist anlayış) günümüzün gelişmiş toplumlarının bürokrasilerini, karar verme konusunda aşırı merkezîleşmelerini ve sosyal mühendislik gibi problematik durumlarını ve tehlikelerini tutarlı bir şekilde öngörmüştür”. -/- Siyaset, sosyoloji ve felsefe gibi çeşitli alanlar içerisinde etkili olan anarşist kuramlar, radikal bir söylem olarak eğitimcileri ve araştırmacıları yeni öğretilere ve uygulamalara teşvik etme konusunda itici bir güç oluşturabilmektedirler. Anarşist yaklaşımlardan eğitim kuramı ve araştırmalara yönelik daha belirleyici bir rol alması beklenmektedir, ancak bu yaklaşımlar mevcut radikal akademik görüşü büyük ölçüde etkisi altına alan Marksizm’in eğitim alanında göstermiş olduğu aynı etkiyi gösterememiştir. Anarşist düşünceleri eğitim alanı içerisinde daha etkili ve görünür kılabilmek amacıyla Paul Goodman, Francisco Ferrer ve Alexander Neill’ın ileri sürmüş olduğu çeşitli düşünceler, girişimler ve uygulamalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Goodman’ın anarşizme ilişkin düşünceleri ile bu çalışma sıkı bir anarşizm tahlili, eleştirisi ve felsefesinden öte anarşist anlayışın eğitimdeki uygulanabilirliğine yönelik bir soruşturma içerisine girmekte ve anarşist yaklaşımın mevcut eğitim sistemlerinden hangi yönleriyle farklılaştığını, sonucunda etkili bir eğitim anlayışı ortaya koyup koyamadığını tartışmaktadır. (shrink)
Nelson Goodman's acceptance and critique of certain methods and tenets of positivism, his defence of nominalism and phenomenalism, his formulation of a new riddle of induction, his work on notational systems, and his analysis of the arts place him at the forefront of the history and development of American philosophy in the twentieth-century. However, outside of America, Goodman has been a rather neglected figure. In this first book-length introduction to his work Cohnitz and Rossberg assess Goodman's lasting (...) contribution to philosophy and show that although some of his views may be now considered unfashionable or unorthodox, there is much in Goodman's work that is of significance today. The book begins with the "grue"-paradox, which exemplifies Goodman's way of dealing with philosophical problems. After this, the unifying features of Goodman's philosophy are presented - his constructivism, conventionalism and relativism - followed by an discussion of his central work, The Structure of Appearance and its significance in the analytic tradition. The following chapters present the technical apparatus that underlies his philosophy, his mereology and semiotics, which provides the background for discussion of Goodman's aesthetics. The final chapter examines in greater depth the presuppositions underlying his philosophy. (shrink)
Goodman’s theorem states that HAω+AC+RDC is conservative over HA. The same result applies to the extensional case, that is, E-HAω+AC+RDC is also conservative over HA. This is due to Beeson. In this article, we modified the Goodman realizability and provide a new proof of the extensional case.
Nelson Goodman's acceptance and critique of certain methods and tenets of positivism, his defence of nominalism and phenomenalism, his formulation of a new riddle of induction, his work on notational systems, and his analysis of the arts place him at the forefront of the history and development of American philosophy in the twentieth-century. However, outside of America, Goodman has been a rather neglected figure. In this first book-length introduction to his work Cohnitz and Rossberg assess Goodman's lasting (...) contribution to philosophy and show that although some of his views may be now considered unfashionable or unorthodox, there is much in Goodman's work that is of significance today. The book begins with the "grue"-paradox, which exemplifies Goodman's way of dealing with philosophical problems. After this, the unifying features of Goodman's philosophy are presented - his constructivism, conventionalism and relativism - followed by an discussion of his central work, The Structure of Appearance and its significance in the analytic tradition. The following chapters present the technical apparatus that underlies his philosophy, his mereology and semiotics, which provides the background for discussion of Goodman's aesthetics. (shrink)
It is now more than 50 years that the Goodman paradox has been discussed, and many different solutions have been proposed. But so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution to the paradox. In this paper, I present the naturalistic solutions to the paradox that were proposed in Quine (1969, 1974), Quine and Ullian (1970/1978), and Stemmer (1971). At the same time, I introduce a number of modifications and improvements that are needed for overcoming (...) shortcomings of the solutions. The discussion of this improved version suggests that the Goodman paradox actually embodies three different problems; yet, one of them is not Goodman’s but Hume’s problem. The discussion also suggests that the naturalistic approach is probably the best for basing on it a theory of confirmation. Finally, I analyze one of Hume’s insights that seems to have been largely ignored. This insight shows a surprising similarity to a central feature of the naturalistic solutions. (shrink)
Goodman concurs in Hume’s contention that no theory has any probability relative to any set of data, and offers two accounts, compatible with that contention, of how some inductive inferences are nevertheless justified. The first, framed in terms of rules of inductive inference, is well known, significantly flawed, and enmeshed in Goodman’s unfortunate entrenchment theory and view of the mind as hypothesizing at random. The second, framed in terms of characteristics of inferred theories rather than rules of inference, (...) is less well known, but provides a compelling view of inductive justification. Once the two accounts are clearly delineated, one can see that both are driven by a single deep conviction: that inductive justification can only be understood in terms of our actual inductive practice. (shrink)
Article presenting basic methodological tenets in Goodman's philosophical development with their mutual connections, like the new riddle of indutcion, counterfactual conditionals and his use of reflective equilibrium as a methodological basis.
First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed. Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between (...)Goodman's problem, and the "problem of old evidence". Several other novel aspects of Goodman's argument are also discussed. (shrink)
An incorrect interpretation of Goodman’s theory of counterfactuals is persistently being offered in the literature. I find that strange. Even more so since the incorrectness is rather obvious. In this paper I try to figure out why is that happening. First I try to explain what Goodman did say, which of his claims are ignored, and what he did not say but is sometimes ascribed to him. I emphasize one of the bad features of the interpretation: it gives (...) counterfactuals some formal properties that neither Goodman nor (usually) the interpreter would accept. The usual interpretation (UI), which I claim should not be ascribed to Goodman, considers a counterfactual A>C true iff A, together with natural laws and all contingent truths cotenable with it, entails C. (UI) makes valid the law of conditional excluded middle, which Goodman clearly rejected. Among possible reasons for which the interpreters might find (UI) adequate is that (UI), as I argue, smuggles in the idea of minimal change, which is otherwise attractive, natural to many, but not to be found anywhere in Goodman’s paper. At the end I stress the significance of Goodman’s theory by arguing that we still need some of his notions to test the adequacy of our modern theories. (shrink)
In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining (...) which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman's claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. (shrink)
Several authors argue that historical works should be viewed as relatively complex and autonomous constructions that are of interest in their own right. In the paper I follow this general approach to history and provide an analysis of historical representation inspired mainly by Nelson Goodman’s observations about symbols. In Languages of Art, Goodman makes a number of interesting claims regarding pictorial representation, exemplification and expression, which could be employed to clarify certain semantic questions of history. He convincingly shows (...) that there are two important questions about any representation: What is the representation about and what kind of representation is it? In the paper I make use of this two-questions point in order to explore the semantics of historical representation. In particular, this point helps to emphasize that historical works are not simple reports about past events but rather symbols revealing what kinds of representations they are, i.e. what they exemplify or express. (shrink)
In this paper, I examine Nelson Goodman’s pluriworldism, understood as the claim that there exists a plurality of actual worlds. This proposal has generally been quickly dismissed in the philosophical literature. I argue that we ought to take it more seriously. As I show, many of the prima facie objections to pluriworldism may receive straightforward answers. I also examine in detail Goodman’s argument for the conclusion that there are many worlds and attempt to show how it might be (...) supported. Eventually, I discuss some underexplored challenges to pluriworldism. (shrink)
Reviews goodman's claims about representation, Expression and identity of works of art. Claims that the underlying nominalist logic effectively prohibits our understanding of these notions (pace goodman) and leaves everything which is of specific artistic and aesthetic interest out of account.
Summary With the help of psychological and biological concepts it is possible todescribe adequately a fundamental class of inductive inferences that are intuitively correct. Moreover, by relying on evolutionary theories it is possible tojustify them, because they reflect innate, hence useful, capacities. These inferences, however, refer to the past, i.e. the inferred generalization is of the form All Awere B . The reason is that evolutionary theories only claim that innate capacitieshad survival value. With respect to inductive inferences about the (...) future the situation is different. In particular, they are affected by the Goodman paradox. In the article, a method is proposed which enables us to describe adequately a basic class of inductive inferences about the future which are intuitively correct. These inferences can also be justified, but their justification requires a very specific assumption. The conclusions arrived at in the article can be viewed as a satisfactory solution to the Goodman paradox. (shrink)
We present a proof of Goodmanʼs Theorem, which is a variation of the proof of Renaldel de Lavalette . This proof uses in an essential way possibly divergent computations for proving a result which mentions systems involving only terminating computations. Our proof is carried out in a constructive metalanguage. This involves implicitly a covering relation over arbitrary posets in formal topology, which occurs in forcing in set theory in a classical framework, but can also be defined constructively.
Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.
Nelson Goodman claims to have given us a criterion for likeness of meaning that is more stringent than simple coextensiveness and yet that avoids the familiar extentionalist objections. The notion of a nominal compound plays a key role in his account. I show that Goodman's comments concerning this notion are inadequate, that his comments concerning expressions like unicorn-picture are subject to two serious objections: they don't support his claims about likeness of meaning and they make English an unlearnable (...) language. (shrink)
O artigo de Goodman “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” teve um papel central no debate relativo a análise adequada dos condicionais contrafactuais. A seguir examinarei o artigo de Goodman em detalhe e discutirei algumas objeções e sugestões de Parry em seu artigo “A Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. Restringirei minha discussão ao “problema das condições relevantes”, assim denominado por Goodman, que é o tema principal das críticas de Parry e que considero ser o problema principal (...) para a abordagem de Goodman. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p383. (shrink)
Nelson Goodman equates expression with metaphorical exemplification. That is, a character C in a symbol system expresses a property P if three conditions are fulfilled: C has P ; C exemplifies P ; and C has P metaphorically. Two points are emphasized. The first point is that a character actually is what it metaphorically is: sad music really is sad, really does express sadness, just as loud music really is loud. The decision to apply to works of art language (...) that is literally applicable only to persons is arbitrary, in that no reason can be given for it other than its felt aptness; but, once the decision to use the terminology has been made, decisions about which terms are applicable to which works are no more arbitrary than any other decisions about the applications of terms. The second point is that there is no intimate connection between the concept of expression as thus defined and the concepts of emotion or feeling. The latter merely furnish one common set of metaphors. (shrink)
It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate "grue" presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these "difficulties" has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that "grue" raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intuitive appeal offered. However "grue" is shown to (...) raise an informal, "over-arching" difficulty of great magnitude for all theories of confirmation, including Hempel's theory. (shrink)
Goodman sustentou que o ajuste mútuo entre inferências indutivas particulares e princípios indutivos constitui a única justificação necessária para ambos. Porém, a sua caracterização desse ajuste, posteriormente denominado de “equilíbrio reflexivo”, foi superficial. Isso levantou dúvida sobre a sua adequação. Neste artigo, argumento que o equilíbrio reflexivo, corretamente caracterizado, fornece a única justificação necessária e a melhor que podemos dar para a prática indutiva.
Expressions of the form "s represents an F", "s represents t as G", and "s represents an F as G" are analysed by means of C. S. Peirce's and Nelson Goodman's semiotic theories, and these theories are compared with each other. It is argued that Peirce's concept of interpretant provides a plausible account of what Goodman calls the exemplification features of aesthetic signs (works of art).
This paper investigates the relation of the Calculus of Individuals presented by Henry S. Leonard and Nelson Goodman in their joint paper, and an earlier version of it, the so-called Calculus of Singular Terms, introduced by Leonard in his Ph.D. dissertation thesis Singular Terms. The latter calculus is shown to be a proper subsystem of the former. Further, Leonard’s projected extension of his system is described, and the definition of an intensional part-relation in his system is proposed. The final (...) section discusses to what extend Goodman might have contributed to the formulation of the Calculus of Individuals. (shrink)
A review of the Czech translation of Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art. I emphasize Goodman's move away from the issue of the definition of art, and the fruitfulness of the autographic/allographic distinction.
Expressions of the form "s represents an F", "s represents t as G", and "s represents an F as G" are analysed by means of C. S. Peirce's and Nelson Goodman's semiotic theories, and these theories are compared with each other. It is argued that Peirce's concept of interpretant provides a plausible account of what Goodman calls the exemplification features of aesthetic signs.
Based on Nelson Goodman?s conception of language and of pragmatically inherited meaning, this book looks at the arts as systems of particular symbols. The author offers an approach to kalology as a metaphysical implication of symbological functioning.
Goodman criticizes the how-what definition of style as how something is said by contrast with the content or substance of what is said. He rejects a literal version of the definition as applying too specifically only to literature and other artworks in which linguistic expression is possible. He also complains that in many artworks what is said and how it is said are so intertwined that it is impossible to distinguish the two for purposes of identifying an artistic style. (...)Goodman then argues for an alternative account, according to which style is a metaphorical signature involving the characteristic symbolic functioning of an artwork. I raise a number of conceptual difficulties about Goodman's proposal, suggesting that where symbols are not narrowly linguistic, Goodman's category of symbolic functioning is so broad as to include natural objects to which it is implausible to attribute style. In its place, I defend a modified expanded formulation of the how-what definition by describing what any activity or its result does at a higher level of abstraction than the description of how it is done, in order to avoid confusing the what of substance with the how of style. (shrink)
The five commentators on my paper ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ (GCEL) demonstrate how fruitful the topic can be. Especially in Brian Weatherson's contribution, and to some extent in those of Jennifer Nagel and Jeremy Goodman, much of the material constitutes valuable development and refinement of ideas in GCEL, rather than criticism. In response, I draw some threads together, and answer objections, mainly those in the papers by Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña and by Goodman.
The aim of the present paper is to provide a model-theoretic explication of Goodman's concept of extensional isomorphism. After some conceptual clarifications Goodman's concept of isomorphy turns out to be closely related to some variant of set-theoretic definability and some variants of syntactical interpretability.
In this paper, I consider Goodman’s new riddle of induction and how we should best respond to it. Noticing that all the emeralds so far observed are green, we infer that all emeralds are green. However, all emeralds so far observed are also grue, so we could also infer that they are grue. Only one of these inductive inferences or projections could, however, be valid. For the hypothesis that all emeralds are green predicts that the next observed emerald will (...) be green; whereas the hypothesis that they are grue predicts that it will blue. Goodman’s new riddle is the problem of saying why the inductive inference involving “green” is the valid one. Goodman’s own solution appeals to the idea of entrenchment. His idea is that “green” is a more entrenched predicate than “grue” in the sense that it has figured many more times in our past projections than has “grue”. In his view, this explains why “green” is projectible whereas “grue” isn’t. I argue that this response doesn’t go far enough and that we additionally need an explanation of why “green” is more entrenched than “grue”—that we are otherwise left with the unsatisfactory view that its superior entrenchment is a mere linguistic accident. I try to supplement Goodman’s solution with an explanation of this kind. I argue that “grue” is not entrenched be- cause past successful inductions involving “green” show that past projections that could have been made using what I call “grue-like” predicates—predicates which are like “grue” except that the times featuring in their definitions are past—would have been unsuccessful. (shrink)
This paper shows that goodman's influential theory of the work of art's identity suffers from what for him is a serious omission, the lack of a nominalistic formulation of his definitions of the works of the various arts. i examine the possible nominalistic translations of goodman's platonistic definitions and show that they would either be unsuitable to goodman's views or unacceptable "simpliciter". among the possibilities considered are type-individuals, superindividuals, and multiply-referential labels.