The book presents Fichte’s position on free will as a form of compatibilism that has not yet been explored in the literature. Due to early rationalist convictions, Fichte is as much concerned with reconciling freedom with a logical and a theological determinism as he is with a causal determinism. He sees in Kant’s novel concept of a pure practical reason a new form of rationalism, one consisting of a system of moral rather than natural necessitating grounds. At the same time, (...) he adopts a more radically libertarian stance on free will than Kant. Every member in a sequence of free actions is a “first and absolute member” and could be other than it is given the same antecedent natural events and natural laws. The interest of Fichte as a theorist of freedom lies in how he brings together freedom and predetermination in a way that challenges our assumption about their mutual exclusivity. The book provides an overview of Fichte’s philosophical system – the so-called “Doctrine of Science” – from 1793 to 1800 with the aim of contextualizing his theory of free agency and destiny. In doing so, it sheds light on how consideration of these issues in turn shapes the system. (shrink)

This paper presents Fichte’s system of philosophical science with the aim of elucidating the boundary separating the pure, absolute I and the empirical, individual I in the system. Tapping on writings related to the two versions of the Jena Doctrine of Science, I represent Fichte’s philosophical project as the primarily epistemological one of maintaining the scientific status of pre-philosophical knowledge in the face of the Maimonian skeptical challenge. Apparently, Fichte analyzes the scientificity of a body of knowledge in terms of (...) its certainty and systematicity. But it is in connection with his conception of a philosophical-scientific system as a presentation of an autonomous “system of a human mind” that we are able to make sense of the systematicity and certainty that are at play in the concept. Moreover, the philosophical-scientific system falls short of meeting the Maimonian skeptical challenge so long as it remains incomplete. Most importantly, the human-mental system is no empirical subject, but a pure subject that maps the possible perceptions and actions which an empirical subject has the potential to realize for itself. (shrink)

"FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. It is co-edited by Daniel Breazeale and David W. Wood, with associate editor Kienhow Goh. -/- .

This issue 23 of FICHTEANA is dedicated to Daniel Breazeale, who passed away on 30 December 2023. -/- "FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an annual online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. Editors: Daniel (...) Breazeale (†) and David W. Wood; with associate editors Kienhow Goh and Gesa Wellmann. -/- . (shrink)

While Reinhold was no doubt interested in harnessing Kantian practical reason as a rational ground for our fundamental religious convictions, it remains unclear as to whether he reserves any role for theoretical or speculative reason in moral faith, and if so, what. This paper argues that he continues to assign an important role to speculative reason in the establishment and dissemination of a “religion of reason” in his efforts across three major texts of the Jena period (namely, the 1786-87 Letters (...) on the Kantian Philosophy, the 1789 Attempt at the New Theory of the Human Power of Representation, and the 1790 first edition of Contributions to the Correction of the Misunderstandings of Previous Philosophers) to outline a “new metaphysics” that accounts for supersensible objects (God, the soul, freedom and the physical, the moral and the intelligible world) in terms of forms of reason. It shows how Reinhold develops a unified account of speculative and practical reason by extending the former’s role to include that of producing ideas that pertain to the practical postulates and narrowing the latter’s role to that of imparting objective reality and further content to the ideas. (shrink)

In Schopenhauer’s thought, the will’s primacy over the intellect seems to suggest that the intellect plays no role in determining what we do. I provide an alternative picture of the intellect as actively deliberating and choosing in abstract cognition from what it passively receives from the will in natural cognition.

This paper considers what Fichte's conception of the human body as an instrument of perception entails for his radical principle of the primacy of practice. According to Fichte, perception is a function of what he calls the "articulation" of the human body, as opposed to its "organization." I first provide an interpretation of his theory of the human-bodily articulation by arguing that he construes it as a product of culture as well as nature. On this basis, I go on to (...) consider the theory's implications for perception: first, since our articulated body is the sphere of our free activity, it follows from its function as the instrument of perception that we always exercise some measure of control over what we perceive; second, because our articulated body is a product of culture, the way in which we perceive is conditioned by practical rules, precepts and laws that regulate our reciprocal interaction with nature and society. (shrink)

This essay investigates what a nuanced and revisionary interpretation of Fichte’s Critical-idealist philosophy could reveal about its impact on the philosophic thought of Friedrich Schlegel. It argues that Schlegel sees the Wissenschaftslehre through the lens of the distinction Fichte famous draws between the “spirit” (Geist) and the “letter” (Buchstaben) of a philosophy. He considers the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre to lie in its acute awareness of its own limitation as a work of art and its letter in the deductive or (...) demonstrative form it inevitably assumes upon being expounded. In the face of the discrepancy, Schlegel rejects the letter of the Wissenschaftslehre in favor of its spirit. (shrink)

This essay investigates what a nuanced and revisionary interpretation of Fichte’s Critical-idealist philosophy could reveal about its impact on the philosophic thought of Friedrich Schlegel. It argues that Schlegel sees the Wissenschaftslehre through the lens of the distinction Fichte famous draws between the “spirit” (Geist) and the “letter” (Buchstaben) of a philosophy. He considers the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre to lie in its acute awareness of its own limitation as a work of art and its letter in the deductive or (...) demonstrative form it inevitably assumes upon being expounded. In the face of the discrepancy, Schlegel rejects the letter of the Wissenschaftslehre in favor of its spirit. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the theory of consciousness that is contained in the “theory of the power of representation” or “elementary philosophy” of Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823) during the period of his professorship at the University of Jena. It examines the development the theory undergoes from its first formulation in the Versuch einer neuen menschlichen Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens (1789) to its subsequent revision in Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Miβverständnisse der Philosophen (1790). Following Martin Bondeli’s cue, it presents the (...) theory as delivering a dynamic view of consciousness, describing it as progressing toward an increasingly reflexive awareness of its components. It also considers some objections to the theory, particularly those raised by the incisive Polish-Jewish critic Salomon Maimon. (shrink)

This chapter elucidates the important Fichtean concept of drive by examining how it is put to use in the Jena Wissenschaftslehre to account for the I’s positing of an object in general, its comprehension of nature as purposive, and its consciousness of its own pure nature. In the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, the nature of drive is first clarified as the form the I necessarily takes in and for itself inasmuch as it strives. Further configurations of the determination are (...) used to explain the operation of the laws by which the I determines external objects, their changes, and the harmony or disharmony of their changes with the moral law. In the System of Ethics, the concept is further employed to provide a transcendental account of nature’s purposiveness. By the account, the I is compelled by the need to comprehend its own nature as a drive that constitutes an organized whole to posit to a drive to form parts of itself into such wholes in the rest of nature. Also, when the I refers natural objects to the original drive, it posits final purposes for the objects. In the popular lectures, the concept is employed as an anthropological and psychological concept to explain features that accrue to human beings on account of their rationality, such as their social, aesthetic, intellectual and moral nature. (shrink)

No concept is more controversial in, and yet more central to, the Wissenschaftslehre than that of freedom. This chapter presents Fichte as an empirical indeterminist and a transcendental determinist. Underlying his better-known empirical account of freedom of voluntary choice, I argue, is a transcendental account of “freedom in itself.” The latter, given from the transcendental viewpoint, presents my world as a thoroughly determinate system of possible (inner and outer) experience, including the possible experience of what I can and will do (...) in it. From the perspective of transcendental genesis, freedom of voluntary choice is the result merely of my reflection on and analysis (rather than of my determination and synthesis) of the system. Additionally, I discuss other empirical expressions of freedom than free voluntary choice, including freedom of self-cultivation, freedom of thinking, external freedom and moral freedom. (shrink)

This chapter offers a fresh perspective on Fichte’s controversial critique of dogmatism in the “First and Second Introductions” to the Attempt at a New Presentation of the Science of Knowledge. It argues that the issue at stake in Fichte’s anti-dogmatism is the demand that reason be thoroughly determined from within itself and hence not be determined by anything outside it. It then addresses the charge of Fichte’s two-mindedness about the effectiveness of his refutation of dogmatism by arguing that the absolute (...) autonomy of reason deprives the idealist of any objective foothold upon which to refute the dogmatist outside of moral belief, it furnishes him with the subjective ground of rational justified by means of which the dogmatist can be refuted in his own terms. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify how, as Fichte himself claims in a 1800 letter draft, the theory of intersubjectivity he presents in the 1800 Vocation of Man marks an improvement over the theory he presents in the 1798 System of Ethics. Taking my departure from Marco Ivaldo’s suggestion that Fichte ceases to rely on the “good” but still “rather dogmatic” Leibnizian hypothesis of preestablished harmony in the former work in the way that he does in the latter, I argue that (...) the difference lies in his no longer counting on the hypothesis to secure the agreement of each of our worlds and our perception of each other’s actions in it. Fichte attempts to dispense with this last vestige of dogmatism in the Vocation of Man by employing the ethical drive in its material determinateness (in other words, each of our final end) as a transcendental ground for the agreement of our worlds, and thereby the possibility of intersubjectivity. The communal conception of our final end which Fichte develops in the last part of the System of Ethics prepares it for its role as such a ground. For it is in the demand of the “voice of conscience” in us to co-operate with others to bring about “one great free moral community” that he finds in the Vocation of Man a transcendental source and basis for our conviction that the worlds of others’ perceptions agree with the world of our perception. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify how, as Fichte himself claims in a 1800 letter draft, the theory of intersubjectivity he presents in the 1800 Vocation of Man marks an improvement over the theory he presents in the 1798 System of Ethics. Taking my departure from Marco Ivaldo’s suggestion that Fichte ceases to rely on the “good” but still “rather dogmatic” Leibnizian hypothesis of preestablished harmony in the former work in the way that he does in the latter, I argue that (...) the difference lies in his no longer counting on the hypothesis to secure the agreement of each of our worlds and our perception of each other’s actions in it. Fichte attempts to dispense with this last vestige of dogmatism in the Vocation of Man by employing the ethical drive in its material determinateness (in other words, each of our final end) as a transcendental ground for the agreement of our worlds, and thereby the possibility of intersubjectivity. The communal conception of our final end which Fichte develops in the last part of the System of Ethics prepares it for its role as such a ground. For it is in the demand of the “voice of conscience” in us to co-operate with others to bring about “one great free moral community” that he finds in the Vocation of Man a transcendental source and basis for our conviction that the worlds of others’ perceptions agree with the world of our perception. (shrink)

This article considers how the I furnishes a ground for the reality or applicability of the moral principle, or the synthetic unification of the higher and the lower powers of desire, through its originally determined nature. It argues that the nature of I-hood as an immediate unity of seeing and being, an absolute identity of the subjective and objective, is key to establishing the moral principle’s applicability. On its basis, Fichte envisages an originally determined system of drives and feelings on (...) the one side, and of ends on the other, in and through which each of our dutiful actions in each given situation is determined. For Fichte, the question of the moral law’s application has more to do with demonstrating the moral law’s applicability as a principium executionis (or what is the same, the real, practical efficacy of reason) than with employing the law as a discursive criterion for deciding whether actions are dutiful or not. The article clarifies this point by reference to Rehberg’s critique of Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

This article considers how the I furnishes a ground for the moral principle’s reality or applicability, or the synthetic unification of the higher and the lower powers of desire, through its originally determined nature. It argues that the nature of I-hood as an immediate unity of seeing and being, an absolute identity of the subjective and objective, is key to securing the moral principle’s applicability. On its basis, Fichte envisages an originally determined system of drives and feelings on the one (...) side, and of ends on the other, in and through which each of our dutiful actions in each given situation is determined. For Fichte, the question of the moral law’s application has more to do with demonstrating the moral law’s applicability as a principium executionis (or what is the same, the real, practical efficacy of reason) than with employing the law as a discursive criterion for deciding whether actions are dutiful or not. The article clarifies this point by reference to Rehberg’s critique of Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

This article shows that Fichte’s ethics and theology in the Jena period are conceived in intimate connection with each other. It explores what Fichte’s theology, as it is promulgated in the “Divine Governance” essay of 1798, might tell us about his account of the ethical law’s material content, as it is expounded in the System of Ethics of the same year. It does so with the aim of defending the standard interpretation of Fichte as a staunch advocate of deontology. From (...) the theological vantage point, a plan for the realization of the final end is laid out in and through the moral world-order. The material of our duty is signified by the place we are assigned in and through the order. On account of our lack of insight into the “higher law” through which our place in the order is determined, no abstract, discursive criterion for what we ought to do here and now is forthcoming. While Fichte characterizes ethically right actions in terms of their tendency to produce the final end, he regards them as being so in an ideal, intelligible world rather than the real, empirical one. (shrink)

This article investigates how the Kantian moral law is employed by Fichte in the System of Ethics of 1798 as a cosmic principle in order to deliver a deduction of its applicability in the world of sense. It considers how Kant’s conception of a moral teleology in the 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment inspires Fichte to harness the concept of the original, determinate end of a natural thing in the deduction as a means of mediating the Kantian “supersensible (...) idea of the morally good” by sensible intuitions. He goes beyond Kant by taking the law to be “actually operative” in ordinary consciousness and consequently “a theoretical principle for the determination of the world.”. (shrink)

This book review offers the reader some perspectives on Benjamin Rutter's book Hegel on the Modern Arts as well as a concise summary of its contents.

Auditory perception is traditionally conceived as the perception of sounds — a friend’s voice, a clap of thunder, a minor chord. However, daily life also seems to present us with experiences characterized by the absence of sound — a moment of silence, a gap between thunderclaps, the hush after a musical performance. In these cases, do we positively hear silence? Or do we just fail to hear, and merely judge or infer that it is silent? This longstanding question remains controversial (...) in both the philosophy and science of perception, with prominent theories holding that sounds are the only objects of auditory experience and thus that our encounter with silence is cognitive, not perceptual. However, this debate has largely remained theoretical, without a key empirical test. Here, we introduce a novel empirical approach, presenting experimental evidence that silence can be genuinely perceived (not just cognitively inferred). We ask whether silences can ‘substitute’ for sounds in event-based auditory illusions — empirical signatures of auditory event representation in which auditory events distort perceived duration. Seven experiments introduce three new ‘silence illusions’ — the one-silence-is-more illusion, silence-based warping, and the oddball-silence illusion — each adapted from a prominent perceptual illusion previously thought to arise only from sounds. Subjects were immersed in ambient noise interrupted by silences structurally identical to the sounds in the original illusions. In all cases, silences elicited temporal distortions perfectly analogous to the illusions produced by sounds. Our results suggest that silence is truly heard, not merely inferred, introducing a general approach for studying absence perception. (shrink)

Collection of quotes of Chinese philosophy by Laozi, Confusius, Sunzi, and Mencius.

Like other health care practices, the increasing complexity in dentistry signals the need for a reconceptualisation of dentist professional learning. Professional dental bodies, at large, still privilege formal continuing professional development (CPD) provisions focusing on off-the-job activities despite growing evidence that much invaluable learning occurs through and at work. In exploring the two common dentist CPD approaches, this article critiques the narrow conceptions of learning inscribed in these frameworks, which are individualistic and acquisition oriented. Drawing on a vignette of dentists’ (...) professional practice at work, this paper argues for a shift in discussion from an emphasis on which CPD models work best to what counts as professional learning for dentists. To flesh out these arguments, the paper proposes using an innovative conceptual approach through the lens of ‘complexity thinking’ and the concept of ‘co-present group’. Through this lens, the reframing of thinking brings out two key features of learning: Emergent learning cannot be specified in advance and much significant learning is typically beyond an individual’s learning. Given the learning potentials of group practice and group learning, the paper concludes with suggestions to support dentists’ lifelong learning at work. (shrink)

Christopher Nolan is the writer and director of Hollywood blockbusters like The Dark Knight and The Dark Knight Rises, and also of arthouse films like Memento and Inception. Underlying his staggering commercial success however, is a darker sensibility that questions the veracity of human knowledge, the allure of appearance over reality and the latent disorder in contemporary society. This appreciation of the sinister owes a huge debt to philosophy and especially modern thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud and Jacques Derrida. (...) Taking a thematic approach to Nolan's oeuvre, Robbie Goh examines how the director's postmodern inclinations manifest themselves in non-linearity, causal agnosticism, the threat of social anarchy and the frequent use of the mise en abyme, while running counter to these are narratives of heroism, moral responsibility and the dignity of human choice. For Goh, Nolan is a 'reluctant postmodernist'. His films reflect the cynicism of the modern world, but with their representation of heroic moral triumphs, they also resist it. (shrink)

This volume focuses on the relational aspect of Jean-Luc Nancy's thinking. As Nancy himself showed, thinking might be a solitary activity but it is never singular in its dimension. Building on or breaking away from other thoughts, especially those by thinkers who had come before, thinking is always plural, relational. This "singular plural" dimension of thought in Nancy's philosophical writings demands explication. In this book, some of today's leading scholars in the theoretical humanities shed light on how Nancy's thought both (...) shares with and departs from Descartes, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Weil, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, and Lyotard, elucidating "the sharing of voices," in Nancy's phrase, between Nancy and these thinkers. Contributors: Georges Van Den Abbeele, Emily Apter, Rodolphe Gasché, Werner Hamacher, Eleanor Kaufman, Marie-Eve Morin, Timothy Murray, Jean-Luc Nancy, and John H. Smith. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealing to the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises because traditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannot do wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lack significant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and the redeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, if significant freedom is not intrinsically (...) valuable, then Plantinga’s reply to the logical problem of evil fails. In this paper, we assess three contemporary solutions to the dilemma above. The first is the love solution, which proposes that significant freedom is necessary for agents to love, and loving others is intrinsically good. The second is the soul-making solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for self-developing one’s moral character, and having a self-developed moral character is intrinsically good. The third is the derivative free will solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for derivative free will in heaven, and derivative free will is intrinsically good. We raise problems against all three solutions and instead defend a fourth solution – the ultimate responsibility solution. That is, significant freedom is instrumentally valuable as it gives agents ultimate responsibility with regards to morally significant acts. Finally, we defend the ultimate responsibility solution against two major objections. (shrink)

In this work we investigate the Weihrauch degree of the problem Decreasing Sequence of finding an infinite descending sequence through a given ill-founded linear order, which is shared by the problem Bad Sequence of finding a bad sequence through a given non-well quasi-order. We show that $\mathsf {DS}$, despite being hard to solve, is rather weak in terms of uniform computational strength. To make the latter precise, we introduce the notion of the deterministic part of a Weihrauch degree. We then (...) generalize $\mathsf {DS}$ and $\mathsf {BS}$ by considering $\boldsymbol {\Gamma }$ -presented orders, where $\boldsymbol {\Gamma }$ is a Borel pointclass or $\boldsymbol {\Delta }^1_1$, $\boldsymbol {\Sigma }^1_1$, $\boldsymbol {\Pi }^1_1$. We study the obtained $\mathsf {DS}$ -hierarchy and $\mathsf {BS}$ -hierarchy of problems in comparison with the Baire hierarchy and show that they do not collapse at any finite level. (shrink)

Background Participants' understanding of clinical trials is important in informed consent. However, little is known about what information participants really want to know. Aims To demonstrate the existence of a discrepancy between participants' understanding and their desire to know. Methods The participants in clinical trials at Seoul National University Hospital were surveyed. The survey consisted of 11 statements based on the essential elements of informed consent. The participants gave two responses to each statement on a five-point Likert scale to rate (...) their subjective understanding and desire to know, respectively. Information discrepancy was defined as the difference between these two ratings: if understanding exceeded desire to know for a particular item, it was defined as ‘over-informed’; if desire to know exceeded understanding for a particular item, it was defined as ‘under-informed’. Results Participants reported good understanding of ‘voluntariness’, ‘duration’, ‘study involves research’ and poor understanding of ‘confidentiality’, ‘compensation’, ‘benefits’, ‘procedures’ and ‘risks or discomforts’. For ‘risks or discomforts’, ‘who to contact’, ‘voluntariness’, ‘duration’ and ‘procedures’, participants reported high desire to know compared with ‘confidentiality’, ‘purpose’, ‘study involves research’ and ‘benefits’. The elements ‘study involves research’, ‘voluntariness’, ‘duration’, ‘purpose’ and ‘who to contact’ were over-informed, while ‘compensation’, ‘risks or discomforts’, ‘procedures’, ‘confidentiality’ and ‘benefits’ were under-informed. Participants over 50 years of age, those without a college education and those whose participation was less voluntary were relatively less informed about the clinical trials. Conclusions An information discrepancy was observed between the participants' understanding and their desire to know. By putting more emphasis on under-informed elements, the quality of informed consent could be improved. (shrink)

In _The Deconstruction of Sex_, Jean-Luc Nancy and Irving Goh discuss how a deconstructive approach to sex helps us negotiate discourses about sex and foster a better understanding of how sex complicates our everyday existence in the age of #MeToo. Throughout their conversation, Nancy and Goh engage with topics ranging from relation, penetration, and subjection to touch, erotics, and jouissance. They show how despite its entrenchment in social norms and centrality to our being-in-the-world, sex lacks a clearly defined essence. At (...) the same time, they point to the potentiality of literature to inscribe the senses of sex. In so doing, Nancy and Goh prompt us to reconsider our relations with ourselves and others through sex in more sensitive, respectful, and humble ways without bracketing the troubling aspects of sex. (shrink)

This article reports the results of a survey, by mailed questionnaire, of the attitudes, values and practices of doctors in Singapore with respect to the doctor-patient relationship. Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 475 doctors (261 general practitioners and 214 medical specialists), out of which 249 (52.4%) valid responses were completed and returned. The survey is the first of its kind in Singapore. Questions were framed around issues of medical paternalism, consent and patient autonomy. As the doctors were (...) exposed to Western ethical concepts in their training, we were not surprised to find that they would mostly allow patients some say in decision-making and keep patients reasonably informed. In respecting patient autonomy, they would usually seek to influence patient choice by persuasion. However, the residual "Asian-ness" of doctors in Singapore gives rise to some inconsistencies between values and practices. Many doctors still believe that a number of their patients are incapable of rational choice. There is some lack of openness in telling patients the whole truth. When patients choose to refuse treatment, many doctors are prepared to involve family members in making a consensus decision. Doctors were also asked how they made ethical judgements in the face of dilemmas, and how they would like disputes with patients to be resolved. By and large, the doctors prefer to make their own judgements rather than to rely on rules. They also wish to keep the law courts out of disputes with patients, preferring less public ways of settling disputes. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy stands as one of the great French theorists of "deconstruction." His writings on philosophy, politics, aesthetics, and religion have significantly contributed to the development of contemporary French thought and helped shape and transform the field of continental philosophy. Through Nancy's immense oeuvre, which covers a wide range of topics such as community, freedom, existence, sense/ touch, democracy, Christianity, the visual arts and music, and writing itself, we have learned to take stock of the world in a more nuanced (...) fashion. In this collection, contemporaries of Nancy and eminent scholars of continental philosophy, including Giorgio Agamben, Étienne Balibar, Ginette Michaud, Georges Van Den Abbeele, Gregg Lambert and Ian James, have been invited to reflect on the force of Nancy's "deconstruction" and how it has affected, or will affect, the ways we approach many of the most pertinent topics in contemporary philosophy. The collection also includes Jean-Luc Nancy's previously unpublished 'Dialogue Beneath the Ribs', where he reflects, twenty years after, on his heart transplant. Nancy Now will be of critical interest not only to scholars working on or with Nancy's philosophy, but also to those interested in the development and future of French thought. (shrink)

In the selection of job candidates who have the mental ability to become professional ATCOs, psychometric testing has been a ubiquitous activity in the ATM domain. To contribute to psychometric research in the ATM domain, we investigated the extent to which spatial orientation ability (SOA), as conceptualized in the spatial cognition and navigation literature, predicted air traffic conflict detection performance in a simulated free route airspace (FRA) environment. The implementation of free route airspace (FRA) over the past few years, notably (...) in Europe, have facilitated air traffic services by giving greater flexibility to aviation operators in planning and choosing preferred air routes that can lead to quicker arrivals. FRA offers enhanced system safety and efficiency, but these benefits can be outweighed by the introduction of air traffic conflicts that are geometrically more complex. Such conflicts can arise from increased number and distribution of conflict points, as well as from elevated uncertainty in aircraft maneuvering (for instance, during heading changes). Overall, these issues will make conflict detection more challenging for air traffic controllers (ATCOs). Consequently, there is a need to select ATCOs with suitably high levels of spatial orientation ability (SOA) to ensure flight safety under FRA implementation. In this study, we tested 20 participants who are eligible for ATCO job application, and found that response time-based performance on a newly developed, open access, computerized spatial orientation test (SOT) predicted time to loss of minimum separation (tLMS) performance on an air traffic conflict detection task (AT-CDT) we designed. We found this predictive relationship to be significant to a moderately large extent under scenarios with high air traffic density (raw regression coefficient = 0.58). Moreover, we demonstrated our AT-CDT as a valid test in terms of eliciting well-known mental workload and spatial learning effects. We explained these findings in light of similar or overlapping mental processes that were most likely activated optimally under task conditions featuring approximately equal numbers of outcome-relevant stimuli. We conclude by discussing the further application of the SOT to the selection of prospective ATCOs who can demonstrate high levels of conflict detection performance in FRA during training simulations. (shrink)

Halin in 1965 proved that if a graph has [Formula: see text] many pairwise disjoint rays for each [Formula: see text] then it has infinitely many pairwise disjoint rays. We analyze the complexity of this and other similar results in terms of computable and proof theoretic complexity. The statement of Halin’s theorem and the construction proving it seem very much like standard versions of compactness arguments such as König’s Lemma. Those results, while not computable, are relatively simple. They only use (...) arithmetic procedures or, equivalently, finitely many iterations of the Turing jump. We show that several Halin-type theorems are much more complicated. They are among the theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. Such theorems imply the ability to iterate the Turing jump along any computable well ordering. Several important logical principles in this class have been extensively studied beginning with work of Kreisel, H. Friedman, Steel and others in the 1960s and 1970s. Until now, only one purely mathematical example was known. Our work provides many more and so answers Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics in 2011. Some of these theorems including ones in Halin in 1965 are also shown to have unusual proof theoretic strength as well. (shrink)

It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has been recently challenged. One challenge appeals to approximate truths. Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri argue that false-but-approximately-true propositions can be known. They provide experimental findings to show that their view enjoys intuitive support. In addition, they argue that we should reject the factive account of knowledge to avoid widespread skepticism. A second challenge, advanced by Nenad Popovic, appeals to multidimensional geometry to build (...) a case where it seems intuitive that a person knows p even though p is false. In addition, Popovic argues that we should reject the factive account of knowledge because most of us would not become widespread skeptics if we discovered that ordinary objects in our world are actually four-dimensional. In this paper, we defend the factive account of knowledge against these arguments by challenging the intuitive appeal of the cases and arguing that there is no real threat of widespread skepticism for the factive account of knowledge. (shrink)