In this innovative book, Gloria Frost reconstructs and analyses Aquinas's theories on efficient causation and causal powers, focusing specifically on natural causal powers and efficient causation in nature. Frost presents each element of Aquinas's theories one by one, comparing them with other theories, as well as examining the philosophical and interpretive ambiguities in Aquinas's thought and proposing fresh solutions to conceptual difficulties. Her discussion includes explanations of Aquinas's technical scholastic terminology in jargon-free prose, as well as background on medieval scientific (...) views - including ordinary language explanations of the medieval physical theories which Aquinas assumed in formulating his views on causation and causal powers. The resulting volume is a rich exploration of a central philosophical topic in medieval philosophy and beyond, and will be valuable especially for scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas and on medieval natural philosophy. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs and analyzes Thomas Aquinas’ intriguing views on transeunt causal activity, which have been the subject of an interpretive debate spanning from the fifteenth century up until the present. In his Physics commentary, Aquinas defends the Aristotelian positions that the actualization of an agent’s active potential is the motion that it causes in its patient and action and passion are the same motion. Yet, in other texts, Aquinas claims that action differs from passion and “action is in the (...) agent” as subject. This paper proposes a solution for how to reconcile Aquinas’ varying claims about what transeunt causal activity is in reality. In addition to advancing understanding of Aquinas’ views on causal activity, the paper also offers insights into more general topics in his thought, such as the relationship between actualities and accidents and the nature of extrinsic accidents. (shrink)

The relationship between divine and created causality was widely discussed in medieval and early modern philosophy. Contemporary scholars of these discussions typically stake out three possible positions: occasionalism, concurrentism, and mere-conservationism. It is regularly claimed that virtually no medieval thinker adopted the final view which denies that God is an immediate active cause of creaturely actions. The main aim of this paper is to further understanding of the medieval causality debate, and particularly the mere-conservationist position, by analysing Peter John Olivi's (...) neglected defence of it. The paper also includes discussion of Thomas Aquinas's arguments for concurrentism and an analysis of whether Olivi's objections refute his position. (shrink)

This paper discusses Scotus’s view of how God knows sins by analyzing texts from his discussions of God’s permission of sin and predestination. I show that Scotus departed from his standard theory of how God knows contingents when explaining how God knows sins. God cannot know sins by knowing a first-order act of his will, as he knows other contingents according to Scotus, since God does not directly will sins. I suggest that Scotus’s recognition that his standard theory of God’s (...) knowledge of contingents could not account for how God knows sins may have contributed to his ultimate rejection of this theory. (shrink)

Both Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus were committed to the view that effects with a contingent modality exist in the created world. This is to say that there are things that could have been otherwise. This chapter explores their respective accounts of the ontological reason for why there are effects with a contingent modality. Leibniz considered Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views on this issue, concluding that they were in fundamental disagreement about the ‘root of contingency.’ This chapter first makes a (...) distinction between two different senses in which an object can have a contingent modality, one having to do with causation and the other with modes of existence. Then it applies this distinction to Aquinas’s and Scotus’s texts to show that their views on why there is contingency in creation are in fact quite similar. (shrink)

(2013). Thomas Bradwardine on God and the Foundations of Modality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 368-380. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.689754.

It is commonplace in mainstream analytic philosophy to conceive of causation as a relation between events. On this picture, both causes and effects belong to the same ontological category—event—and in order to have an instance of causation you need at least two of them. ‘Dropping’ causes ‘breaking,’ ‘cutting’ causes ‘splitting,’ and ‘raising my arm’ causes it ‘to be raised.’ It is well-known that philosophers from the ancient through the early modern period conceived of the relata of causation quite differently. On (...) their accounts causes are substances—not events. The ball which strikes causes the nine ball to sink, the child who drops causes the vase to break, and the person who raises her arm causes it to go up. (shrink)

Aquinas thinks that if we want to understand causal interactions between material substances, we cannot focus exclusively on agents and their active powers. In his view, there are also passive potencies which enable material substances to be acted upon. He claims that for every type of active potency, there is a corresponding passive potency. This article aims to clarify Aquinas’s views about the passive potencies of material substances. It recovers his thinking on three key questions: first, what is the basis (...) or source of a material substance’s passive potentialities? Put otherwise, what constituents of material substances explain why they have capabilities for being acted upon? Second, how are a material substance’s passive potencies identified and distinguished from one another? Lastly, are passive potencies for undergoing action the same as a substance’s potencies for existing in determinate ways? For example, is a pot of water’s potentiality for being heated the same as its potentiality to be hot? (shrink)

The metaphysics underlying differences in degree of qualitative intensity was widely debated in the medieval period. Medieval Aristotelians agreed that subjects possess qualities in virtue of inherent accidental forms. Yet, there was considerable disagreement about what happens at the level of form when a quality increases or decreases in its intensity. For instance, what happens when a pot of water on the stove gets hotter? Is the water’s previous form of heat replaced by a new one, or does the same (...) form of heat persist? Does the form of heat itself undergo a change, or does only the water undergo a change? While there have been several important studies on the medieval debate about the “intension and remission of forms,” little attention has been paid to Thomas Aquinas’s intriguing theory. Aquinas claims that a subject’s quality increases in intensity in virtue of the subject “participating” more perfectly in an invariable form. This paper examines Aquinas’s conception of the participation relationship between a substance and its accidental forms; and his metaphysical analysis of changes of intensification. (shrink)