According to Smell Objectivism, the smells we perceive in olfactory experience are objective and independent of perceivers, their experiences, and their perceptual systems. Variations in how things smell to different perceivers or in different contexts raise a challenge to this view. In this paper, I offer an objectivist account of non-illusory contextual variation: cases where the same thing smells different in different contexts of perception and there is no good reason to appeal to misperception. My central example is that of (...) dihydromyrcenol, a substance that can smell both woody and citrusy depending on what other odourants one has recently been exposed to. I first argue that the subjects’ apparently conflicting reports about the way dihydromyrcenol smells are best understood as comparative characterisations of a smell. Given this understanding, different reports can be correctly made in response to perceiving the very same smell. I then argue that the phenomenal difference between the experiences subjects have across contexts can be explained compatibly with Smell Objectivism. On the account proposed, subjects perceive the very same smell but different qualities, notes, or aspects of it are salient to them, depending on the context of perception. I then consider how the proposed defence of Smell Objectivism can be adapted to other cases where the same thing is reported as smelling different in different contexts. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the philosophical debate on visual blur from a relationalist perspective. At the same time, it offers a methodological reflection on the adequacy of explanations of phenomenal similarities and differences among perceptual experiences. The debate on seeing blurrily has been shaped by two implicit assumptions concerning our explanations of differences and similarities between experiences of seeing blurrily and other experiences. I call those assumptions into question, and argue that we do not need to provide a (...) unified explanation of the character of blurry experiences for our account to be adequate. The diversity of blurry experiences supports a different, pluralist approach to explanations of how things appear to subjects. (shrink)

1. Historically, our sense of smell has been deemed informationally impoverished, not very discerning, subjective, ineffable, and generally of little value (for an overview, see e.g., Barwich, 2020...

Smells are often said to be ineffable, and linguistic research shows that languages like English lack a dedicated olfactory lexicon. Starting from this evidence, I propose an account of how we talk about smells in English. Our reports about the way things smell are comparative: When we say that something smells burnt or like roses, we characterise the thing's smell by noting its similarity to the characteristic smells of certain odorous things (burnt things, roses). The account explains both the strengths (...) and limitations of our smell discourse, and has implications for philosophical discussions of the relation between language and appearances. (shrink)

In this paper we claim, first, that there are high-level visual experiences of grouping properties, i.e., properties that an array of elements we see can have to be organised in a certain way. Second, we argue that there are auditory experiences of groupings that share certain important properties with visual experiences of groupings, thereby being perceptual and high-level as well. Third, these results enable us to understand the nature and structure of our meaning experiences. We claim that, although meaning experiences (...) depend on the auditory experiences we discuss, they are not perceptual, for they lack one of the features that make those auditory experiences perceptual; namely, being holistically attended to. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline and defend a view on which in olfactory experience we can, and often do, smell ordinary things of various kinds—for instance, cookies, coffee, and cake burnings—and the olfactory properties they have. A challenge to this view are cases of smelling in the absence of the source of a smell, such as when a fishy smell lingers after the fish is gone. Such cases, many philosophers argue, show that what we perceive in olfactory experience are odour (...) objects, and not ordinary things. On behalf of our opponent, we articulate a screening-off argument based on cases of lingering smells for the thesis that we do not smell ordinary things. We then develop an alternative account of these cases that is consistent with our view. In doing so, we call into question two claims that are typically built into the notion of an odour object. (shrink)

The thesis that smells are objective and independent of perceivers may seem to be in tension with the phenomenon of perceptual variation. In this paper, I argue that there are principled reasons to think that perceptual variation is not a threat to objectivism about smells and is indeed integral to our perceptual relation to the objective world. I first distinguish various kinds of perceptual variation, and argue that the most challenging cases for the objectivist are those where an odourant smells (...) different in different conditions or to different perceivers but the odourant does not change, and there is neither misperception nor a simple failure to perceive a smell. I then argue that there is an independently plausible conception of olfactory experience on which even these challenging cases do not pose a threat to objectivism about smells. Following Kalderon’s work in the domain of colour perception, I argue that olfactory perception provides us with a partial perspective on the smells around us, where this perspective is constrained by the conditions of perception as well as by features of the perceiver. Within this framework, we can allow that perceivers with different sensitivities, or the same perceiver in different conditions, genuinely perceive the same objective smell even though this smell appears different to them. In turn, smells are best understood as qualitatively complex entities, different aspects of which can become perceptually available in different conditions and to different perceivers. (shrink)

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A (...) view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a disjunctivist proposal for understanding the intentionality of perceptions and hallucinations within a naïve realist framework. For the case of genuine perceptual experience, naïve realists can endorse a version of the view that their intentionality is phenomenally-grounded: perceptual experiences have intentionality in virtue of being relations of conscious acquaintance to aspects of the mind-independent environment. By contrast, hallucinations have intentionality dependently or derivatively, in virtue of their indiscriminability from, or similarity with respect to, perceptual experiences. (...) Within this proposal, naïve realists can allow that perceptions and hallucinations have a property in common – that of being intentionally directed at apparently mind-independent entities – whilst having wholly different metaphysical natures. (shrink)

In this thesis, I defend a minimalist approach to perceptual appearances. On this approach, we aim at accounting for the ways things appear in perception compatibly with a view on which perceptual experience presents us with objective and perceiver-independent properties. The phenomenon of changing appearances has been taken to show that a minimalist approach is not viable. According to the Argument from Changing Appearances, in order to account for the ways things appear to subjects in certain conditions, we need to (...) appeal to special properties in addition to the objective and perceiver-independent properties that we are committed to on independent grounds. I focus on a variety of cases of changing appearances – three visual cases and two olfactory cases – and discuss how the minimalist can resist the Argument. Each case presents a somewhat different challenge, allowing us to explore different strategies that the minimalist can appeal to. (shrink)

Inflected seeing-in is a special experience of the vehicle and subject of a picture, which are experienced as related to each other. Bence Nanay recently defended the idea that inflected picture perception is central to the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. Here I critically discuss his characterization of inflection, and advance a new one, that better accounts for the structure and content of inflected experience in terms of properties of the pictures themselves and also clarifies the distinctive contribution of inflection to (...) pictorial aesthetics. Two kinds of inflected seeing-in are distinguished in terms of two functions the design properties of a picture can realize. One kind of inflected seeing-in allows us to experience how the picture design sustains what is seen in the picture and is responsible for the representation of the picture subject. The second kind, which is only supported by some pictures, also captures how properties of the vehicle alter or enrich the picture content so as to elicit an experience of the depicted subject as having properties it could not be seen as having in face-to-face experience. This inflected experience is distinctively associated with our visual experience of the aesthetically valuable relations between vehicle and content which are unique to pictorial representation. (shrink)

It has recently been suggested that seeing-in can sometimes be central to the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. The key concept is that of inflected seeing-in, a special case of picture perception connected with the wollheimean notion of twofoldness. In order to further understand inflection, I focus on Nanays account. He holds that conscious attention is essential to inflected seeing-in. I agree, but I suggest our conceptualization of the properties of the pictorial vehicle is necessary to account for the complexity of (...) this experience. Developing a suggestion from Wollheim, I then characterize inflected pictorial experience in terms of different pictorial hows and our grasping of them. This makes it possible to account for the intuitive link between properties of experiences and properties of the pictures that trigger them, as well as for the appealing idea that our conscious apprehension of the way a picture depicts its subject - what I may call the pictorial hows - plays a significant role in our aesthetic experience of pictures. I finally look at these results in the more general perspective of a representationalist theory of aesthetic experience. (shrink)