Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

This is the first book to provide a coherent overview over the ethical implications of AI-related technologies in medicine. It explores how these technologies transform practices, relationships, and environments in the clinical field. It provides an introduction into ethical issues such as data security and privacy protection, bias and algorithmic fairness, trust and transparency, challenges to the doctor-patient relationship, and new perspectives for informed consent. The book focuses on the transformative impact that technology is having on medicine, and discusses several (...) strategies for dealing with the resulting challenges. It also introduces innovative methods of ethics research for addressing existing desiderata and future challenges. This book is written to inform health care professionals, policy-makers, and researchers in medicine, health sciences, nursing science, social sciences, and ethics, but may also function as a primary textbook for graduate as well as undergraduate university courses. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (Sect. 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one’s engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (Sect. 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological (...) devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (Sect. 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, _allusion_, which means that the subject acts _as if_ the virtual experiences are real (Sect. 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind—given the current state of technology—between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science. (shrink)

We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017) and Linguistic Bodies (Di Paolo et al. 2018). We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them in order to show an important point of convergence, namely, (...) that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasizes the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto & Myin's (2013) Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. (2018) that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

The problem of self-knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in the context of traditional epistemology. In parallel to the traditional approach to epistemology, Radically Embodied Cognitive Science (RECS) has emerged in the last 30 years as a genuine contender in its field. According to RECS, the unity of analysis of cognitive processes is the dynamics between brain, body and environment. In this paper, I advance a RECS approach to self-knowledge, which immediately suggests that knowing oneself is a matter of knowing what (...) one’s body can do. I then turn to resistance training, particularly weightlifting, and argue that it offers a paradigmatic case of self-knowledge in RECS’s terms. More precisely, resistance training allows the trainee to achieve knowledge of themselves in a fundamentally practical manner—and doing so is transformative of the kind of actions they are capable of. (shrink)

Rational beliefs and actions are typically evaluated against certain benchmarks, e.g., those of classical logic or probability theory. Rationality therefore is traditionally taken to involve some sort of reasoning, which in turn implies contentful cognition. Radically Enactive views of Cognition, on the other hand, claim that not all cognition is contentful. In order to show that rationality does not need to lie outside of REC’s scope of radicalizing cognition, I develop a Radically Enactive notion of Rationality, according to which rationality (...) is embodied, situated and contentless. For RER, an organism acts rationally insofar as it sustains a proficient interaction with its environment, which in turn requires the coordination of cognitive abilities in accordance with environmental constraints. Rationality is thus distinguished from reasoning, for reasoning is understood as a capacity to coordinate representational cognitive abilities. (shrink)

In 1685, during the heyday of Scottish Cartesianism, regent Robert Lidderdale from Edinburgh University declared Cartesianism the best philosophy in support of the Reformed faith. It is commonplace that Descartes was ostracised by the Reformed, and his role in pre-Enlightenment Scottish philosophy is not yet fully acknowledged. This paper offers an introduction to Scottish Cartesianism, and argues that the philosophers of the Scottish universities warmed up to Cartesianism because they saw it as a newer, better version of their own traditional (...) Reformed scholasticism, chiefly in metaphysics and natural philosophy. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Biomedical research based on big data offers immense benefits. Large multisite research that integrates large amounts of personal health data, especially genomic and genetic data, might contribute to a more personalized medicine. This type of research requires the transfer and storage of highly sensitive data, which raises the question of how to protect data subjects against data harm, such as privacy breach, disempowerment, disenfranchisement, and exploitation. As a result, there is a trade-off between reaping the benefits (...) of big-data-based biomedical research and protecting data subjects’ right to informational privacy. Arguments Blockchain technologies are often discussed as a technical fix for the abovementioned trade-off due to their specific features, namely data provenance, decentralization, immutability, and access and governance system. However, implementing blockchain technologies in biomedical research also raises questions regarding consent, legal frameworks, and workflow integration. Hence, accompanying measures, which I call enablers, are necessary to unleash the potential of blockchain technologies. These enablers are innovative models of consent, data ownership models, and regulatory models. Conclusion Blockchain technologies as a technical fix alone is insufficient to resolve the aforementioned trade-off. Combining this technical fix with the enablers outlined above might be the best way to perform biomedical research based on big data and at the same time protect the informational privacy of data subjects. (shrink)

Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

The core of this article is a comparative analysis of the double movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with the double movement of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In both periods the movement toward allegedly self-regulating markets called forth a countermovement of protection. Nevertheless, important differences exist due, first, to differences in the nature of the hegemonic state and, second, to the greater role of subordinate forces in constraining the movement toward self-regulating markets in the (...) late twentieth century. (shrink)

AgeTech involves the use of emerging technologies to support the health, well-being and independent living of older adults. In this paper we focus on how AgeTech based on artificial intelligence (AI) may better support older adults to remain in their own living environment for longer, provide social connectedness, support wellbeing and mental health, and enable social participation. In order to assess and better understand the positive as well as negative outcomes of AI-based AgeTech, a critical analysis of ethical design, digital (...) equity, and policy pathways is required. A crucial question is how AI-based AgeTech may drive practical, equitable, and inclusive multilevel solutions to support healthy, active ageing. In our paper, we aim to show that a focus on equity is key for AI-based AgeTech if it is to realize its full potential. We propose that equity should not just be an extra benefit or minimum requirement, but the explicit aim of designing AI-based health tech. This means that social determinants that affect the use of or access to these technologies have to be addressed. We will explore how complexity management as a crucial element of AI-based AgeTech may potentially create and exacerbate social inequities by marginalising or ignoring social determinants. We identify bias, standardization, and access as main ethical issues in this context and subsequently, make recommendations as to how inequities that stem form AI-based AgeTech can be addressed. (shrink)

With the arrival of new methods of genome editing, especially CRISPR/cas 9, new perspectives on germline interventions have arisen. Supporters of germ line genome editing claim that the procedure could be used as a means of disease prevention. As a possible life-saving therapy, it provides benefits that outweigh its risks. Opponents of GGE claim that the medical and societal risks, especially the use of GGE for genetic enhancement, are too high. In our paper, we analyze the risks and benefits of (...) GGE. We show that the medical risk on an individual level might be reduced by further research in the near future so that they may be outweighed by the benefits. We also show that the societal risks of the procedure, i.e. genetic enhancement, are manageable by establishing a regulative framework before the GGE is implemented. Since the effects of modifying genes for the genepool of a given population are extremely difficult to model, the medical risks on the population level might be too high. (shrink)

Desde os anos 90, a corporeidade vem ocupando um papel cada vez mais central nas explicações das ciências cognitivas. Com isso, surgiram críticas contundentes, tanto do ponto de vista empírico quanto conceitual, à suposição de que a representação é a marca do mental. Apesar disso, cientistas cognitivos parecem relutar em desfazer- se do vocabulário representacionalista. Este artigo tenta lançar luz sobre a questão do suposto representacionalismo de um dos principais paradigmas das ciências cognitivas, o Processamento Preditivo, revisando argumentos pela interpretação (...) não- representacionalista de alguns de seus pontos, assim resgatando a ideia avançada pelas teorias da cognição corporificada segundo a qual a atividade exploratória de um organismo em seu ambiente não exige a geração de modelos representacionais acerca do ambiente. (shrink)

Per Martin-Löf's work on the development of constructive type theory has been of huge significance in the fields of logic and the foundations of mathematics. It is also of broader philosophical significance, and has important applications in areas such as computing science and linguistics. This volume draws together contributions from researchers whose work builds on the theory developed by Martin-Löf over the last twenty-five years. As well as celebrating the anniversary of the birth of the subject it covers many of (...) the diverse fields which are now influenced by type theory. It is an invaluable record of areas of current activity, but also contains contributions from N. G. de Bruijn and William Tait, both important figures in the early development of the subject. Also published for the first time is one of Per Martin-Löf's earliest papers. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe options of reproductive medicine are expanding. In some cases, it is unclear whether there is a medical indication for applying procedures of assisted reproduction or whether this application is wish-fulfilling. The distinction between medical indication and wish fulfilment depends on the concept of indication. Thus, the concept of indication has a special status in reproductive medicine. The distinction between medical indication and wish-fulfilling treatment is mostly based on implicit or explicit normative judgements, rather than on mere (...) clinical facts. The use of “indicated” suggests a purely empirical-clinical judgment, whereas the normative judgements behind the concept are concealed. The aim of this paper is to analyze the normative implications of indication in reproductive medicine. Therefore, the concept of indication and its special status within reproductive medicine is scrutinized.ArgumentsThe analysis shows that the normative implications of indication are tied to a sociocultural script of parenthood, which manifests in the regulations of reimbursement. This script encompasses societal views, norms, and role models, and can be described as “good parenting”. The script of good parenting acts as a regulatory instance that determines the access to procedures of assisted reproduction. It is based on traditional heteronormative concepts of marriage and family, and reserves reproduction exclusively for heterosexual, married couples.ConclusionThe sociocultural script of good parenting in reproductive medicine implies a contradiction: Assisted reproduction technologies provide the opportunity of reproduction for individuals outside the heteronormative frame, yet they are legitimized and limited by this exact frame. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Medical ethics is increasingly faced with issues that result from power asymmetries and epistemic injustice. However, medical ethics lacks the epistemic lenses for analyzing these social context factors of clinical practice. A theoretical and conceptual reconfiguration is necessary in order to be able to address these issues. Arguments This paper discusses the foundations of critical medical ethics, which takes perspectives and epistemic categories from critical theories. This includes the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School as well (...) as those approaches from social sciences and cultural studies that reflect on power asymmetries. By drawing on these theories, the epistemic spectrum of medical ethics could be broadened in order to better include real power relations into normative analyses. The paper starts by outlining the contribution of social sciences to empirical medical ethics. This shows that an empirical approach as such cannot bridge the epistemic gap. In a further step, epistemic lenses and concepts from critical theories are discussed, such as Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, feminist approaches, postcolonial approaches, queer theory, gender studies, and science and technology studies (STS). The conclusion sums up the foundations of critical medical ethics and discusses its limitations. Conclusion Critical medical ethics possesses the epistemic categories and broader social perspective needed to address issues in medicine that result from power asymmetries and epistemic injustice in society. (shrink)

AgeTech refers to a growing sector that is advancing the use of technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICTs), mobile technologies, robotics, wearables and smart home systems to enhance the lives of older adults. Although AgeTech can be seen as an opportunity for empowering older people and enhance their overall quality of life, crucial ethical issues have to be addressed. The articles in this topical collection focus on these and other ethical questions, particularly in respect to key emerging technologies (...) of AI and robotics. The overall aim is to explore the multifaceted ethical landscape of emerging AgeTech and to provide frameworks and strategies for ethically-appropriate technologies that support the health, well-being, and quality of life of older adults. (shrink)

The article tries to retrace the emergence of kant's "critique of pure reason". Already in the sixties, Kant faced the problem of metaphysics and came to the result that the conclusions of pure reason have only a subjective value. Hereby the material content of transcendental dialectic was reached. Only afterwards kant examined the underlying ontology and came to his transcendental idealism. On this new base kant should have had to revise his former critique of special metaphysics. However, He did this (...) only partially. (shrink)

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In this paper, I present a possible solution to the puzzle unveiled by Kornblith about the sources and the possibility of knowledge of epistemic norms. The puzzle is: if such norms cannot be discovered solely by reflection, and if there are correct ways of thinking and inferring, then such norms can only be discovered by investigating the world —a counterintuitive conclusion. To avoid skepticism about normativity, I argue that we create normative correctness and discover normative demands by investigating the world (...) and reflecting about our epistemic practices. This is done by an exposition of the method known as reflective equilibrium, which is defended against Kornblith’s thesis that the appeal to reflective equilibrium is doomed to failure because it implies reflection. (shrink)

Primeiro apresento as linhas gerais do programa de pesquisa sobre cognição corporificada. Em uma posição central nesse programa, está a tese de que a cognição atravessa cérebro, corpo e mundo – e que, portanto, atividades cognitivas não são eventos exclusivamente intracraniais que ocorrem pela manipulação de representações. Eu apresento a gênese histórica desse programa, a saber, o projeto autopoiético dos chilenos Humberto Maturana e Francisco Varela. Desse projeto, é possível atestar um plano de fundo antirrealista e construtivista, segundo o qual (...) a cognição é uma construção do mundo pelo organismo. Depois, eu apresento o fundamento teórico que recentemente tomou os holofotes do programa, a saber, o enativismo sensório-motor. Esse enativismo manifesta o compromisso com um realismo comedido, segundo o qual há estruturas objetivas a serem exploradas de acordo com a morfologia corpórea do organismo. Assim, observa-se uma tensão epistemológica no cerne do programa. Eu apresento uma possibilidade de resolução dessa tensão pela rejeição de uma das teses centrais do projeto autopoiético – a continuidade forte entre vida e cognição – e por uma melhor interpretação do que significa dizer que a cognição requer que o oragnismo “construa” o seu ambiente. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...) an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds. RESUMO Proponho um meio-termo entre um modelo perceptual de autoconhecimento, segundo o qual os objetos de autoconhecimento são acessadas mediante um tipo de mecanismo causal, e um modelo racionalista, segundo o qual o autoconhecimento é constituído pela agência racional. Por analogia ao papel que o exercício de habilidades sensório-motoras desempenham no conhecimento perceptual racionalmente fundado, autoconhecimento é entendido como um exercício de habilidades que são orientadas pela e orientam a ação. Essa imagem satisfaz a condição de acesso privilegiado que geralmente é associada ao autoconhecimento sem implicar uma lacuna intransponível entre autoconhecimento e conhecimento de outras mentes. (shrink)

Community psychologists address social inequalities and problems by employing ecological principles, multiple methodologies, and participatory approaches to empower individuals, organizations, and communities to organize action and systems change. This article aims to contribute to mixed methods literature by presenting three models of mixed methods participatory research across a variety of geographic and sociocultural contexts. The models outline participatory processes and points of qualitative and quantitative data integration. Challenges related to the interplay between participatory approaches and mixed methods studies as well (...) as implications on social science research are discussed. (shrink)