Results for 'Gintis Herbert'

910 found
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  1.  16
    Territoriality and Loss Aversion: The Evolutionary Roots of Property Rights.Herbert Gintis - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 117.
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  2. A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):1-16.
    The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, they (...)
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  3.  61
    (1 other version)Classical versus evolutionary game theory.Herbert Gintis - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Classical and evolutionary game theory attempt to explain different phenomena. Classical game theory describes socially and temporally isolated encounters while evolutionary game theory describes macro-social behavioural regularities. The actors in classical game theory are payoff maximizers whose identity remains fixed during the course of play. By contrast, in evolutionary game theory, the players are constantly changing, and the central actor is a replicator -- an entity having some means of making approximately accurate copies of itself. However successful in its own (...)
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  4.  12
    An Evolutionary and Behavioral Perspective.Herbert Gintis - 2012 - In Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods (eds.), Understanding Social Action, Promoting Human Rights. Oup Usa. pp. 135.
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  5.  14
    Economic Theory and Social Policy: Where We Are, Where We Are Headed.Herbert Gintis - 2018 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 2 (1):45-48.
    Standard economic theory has told us for more than half a century that, to attain a high level of social welfare, there is no viable alternative to a market economy regulated by a powerful state. Critics often represent standard economic theory as a doctrinal defense of the free market. The truth is quite the opposite. Free market ideology is unfounded. Standard economic theory provides the proper framework for analyzing market failure. This theory must of course be supplemented by a theory (...)
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  6.  53
    Social norms as choreography.Herbert Gintis - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):251-264.
    This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need in addition only to (...)
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  7.  61
    Behavioral ethics meets natural justice.Herbert Gintis - 2006 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):5-32.
    offers an evolutionary approach to morality, in which moral rules form a cultural system that is robust and evolutionarily stable. The folk theorem is the analytical basis for his theory of justice. I argue that this is a mistake, as the equilibria described by the folk theorem lack dynamic stability in games with several players. While the dependence of Binmore's argument on the folk theorem is more tactical than strategic, this choice does have policy implications. I do not believe that (...)
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  8.  98
    The social structure of cooperation and punishment.Herbert Gintis & Ernst Fehr - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):28-29.
    The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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  9.  17
    Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the Political Economy of Capitalism.Herbert Gintis & Samuel Bowles - 1990 - Politics and Society 18 (2):165-222.
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  10.  47
    The future of behavioral game theory.Herbert Gintis - 2011 - Mind and Society 10 (2):97-102.
    Behavioral economics has rejuvenated economic theory and deepened the bonds between economic theory and the other social sciences. Neoclassical economics does not depend on individual preferences being self-regarding. Moreover, in market contexts, laboratory experiments indicate that traditional theory works well. Behavioral economic findings thus enrich and expand neoclassical economics rather than undermining it. In particular, social norms are an emergent property of human sociality, and exist as macrosocial structures that are not reducible to the preferences of individuals. Behavioral economists are (...)
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  11.  54
    Towards the unity of the human behavioral sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):37-57.
    Despite their distinct objects of study, the human behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. Unity in the behavioral sciences requires that there be a common underlying model of individual human behavior, specialized and enriched to meet the particular needs of each discipline. Such unity does not exist, and cannot be easily attained, since the various disciplines have incompatible models and disparate research methodologies. Yet recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for unity in the behavioral (...)
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  12.  22
    The Crisis of Liberal Democratic Capitalism: The Case of the United States.Herbert Gintis & Samuel Bowles - 1982 - Politics and Society 11 (1):51-93.
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  13.  88
    Unifying the behavioral sciences II.Herbert Gintis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):45-53.
    My response to commentators includes a suggestion that an additional principle be added to the list presented in the target article: the notion of human society as a complex adaptive system with emergent properties. In addition, I clear up several misunderstandings shared by several commentators, and explore some themes concerning future directions in the unification of the behavioral science. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  14.  62
    The Foundations of Behavior: The Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints Model.Herbert Gintis - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (2):123-127.
  15.  17
    Efficient Redistribution: New Rules for Markets, States, and Communities.Herbert Gintis & Samuel Bowles - 1996 - Politics and Society 24 (4):307-342.
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  16.  55
    Inclusive fitness and the sociobiology of the genome.Herbert Gintis - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):477-515.
    Inclusive fitness theory provides conditions for the evolutionary success of a gene. These conditions ensure that the gene is selfish in the sense of Dawkins (The selfish gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976): genes do not and cannot sacrifice their own fitness on behalf of the reproductive population. Therefore, while natural selection explains the appearance of design in the living world (Dawkins in The blind watchmaker: why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design, W. W. Norton, New York, (...)
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  17. Moral Sense and Material Interests.Herbert Gintis - 2006 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 73 (2):377-404.
    Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity, is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. (...)
     
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  18. A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise.Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):75.
    We consider two reasons why firms should be owned and run democratically by their workers. The first concerns accountability : Because the employment relationship involves the exercise of power, its governance should on democratic grounds be accountable to those most directly affected. The second concerns efficiency : The democratic firm uses a lower level of inputs per unit of output than the analogous capitalist firm.
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  19.  41
    (1 other version)Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory.Herbert Gintis - 2005 - Analyse & Kritik 27 (1):48-72.
    It is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of (...)
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  20. Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradiction of Economic Life.Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - 1977 - Science and Society 41 (2):232-234.
     
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  21.  75
    (1 other version)Modalities of Word Usage in Intentionality and Causality.Herbert Gintis - 2010 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):336-337.
    Moral judgments often affect scientific judgments in real-world contexts, but Knobe's examples in the target article do not capture this phenomenon.
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  22.  35
    Mutualism is only a part of human morality.Herbert Gintis - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):91-91.
    Baumard et al. mischaracterize our model of individual and social choice behavior. We model individuals who maximize preferences given their beliefs, and subject to their informational and material constraints (Fehr & Gintis 2007). Individuals thus must make trade-offs among self-regarding, other-regarding, and character virtue goals. Two genetic predispositions are particularly crucial. The first is strong reciprocity. The second is the capacity to internalize norms through the socialization process. Our model includes the authors' model as a subset.
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  23. Power and wealth in a competitive capitalist economy.Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - 1992 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (4):324-353.
  24.  78
    Altruism and emotions.Herbert Gintis - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):258-259.
    If altruism requires self-control, people must consider altruistic acts as costly, the benefits of which will only be recouped in the future. By contrast, I shall present evidence that altruism is dictated by emotions: Altruists secure an immediate payoff from performing altruistic acts, so no element of self-control is present, and no future reward is required or expected.
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  25.  56
    A critique of team and stackelberg reasoning.Herbert Gintis - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):160-161.
    Colman's critique of classical game theory is correct, but it is well known. Colman's proposed mechanisms are not plausible. Insufficient reason does what “team reasoning” is supposed to handle, and it applies to a broader set of coordination games. There is little evidence ruling out more traditional alternatives to Stackelberg reasoning, and the latter is implausible when applied to coordination games in general.
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  26.  19
    A framework for modeling human evolution.Herbert Gintis - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.
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  27.  37
    An implausible model and evolutionary explanation of the revenge motive.Herbert Gintis - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):21-22.
    McCullough et al.'s target article is a psychological version of the reputation models pioneered by biologist Robert Trivers (1971) and economist Robert Frank (1988). The authors, like Trivers and Frank, offer an implausible explanation of the fact that revenge is common even when there are no possible reputational effects. I sketch a more plausible model based on recent research.
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  28.  14
    Reply to Our Critics.Herbert Gintis & Samuel Bowles - 1990 - Politics and Society 18 (2):293-315.
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  29.  68
    The contribution of game theory to experimental design in the behavioral sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):411-412.
    Methodological practices differ between economics and psychology because economists use game theory as the basis for the design and interpretation of experiments, while psychologists do not. This methodological choice explains the “four key variables” stressed by Hert-wig and Ortmann. Game theory is currently the most rigorous basis for modeling strategic choice.
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  30. (2 other versions)The evolution of altruistic punishment.Robert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Peter Richerson & J. - 2003 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100 (6):3531-3535.
     
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  31.  41
    Social preferences, homo economicus, and zoon politikon.Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - 2006 - In Robert E. Goodin & Charles Tilly (eds.), The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis. Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 172--86.
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  32. Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought.Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - 1987 - Science and Society 51 (3):362-364.
  33.  14
    Unequal Chances: Family Background and Economic Success.Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis & Melissa Osborne Groves (eds.) - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
    Is the United States "the land of equal opportunity" or is the playing field tilted in favor of those whose parents are wealthy, well educated, and white? If family background is important in getting ahead, why? And if the processes that transmit economic status from parent to child are unfair, could public policy address the problem? Unequal Chances provides new answers to these questions by leading economists, sociologists, biologists, behavioral geneticists, and philosophers.New estimates show that intergenerational inequality in the United (...)
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  34. Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules for Communities, States and Markets.Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis & Erik Olin Wright - 2000 - Utopian Studies 11 (2):233-235.
  35. Rawlsian justice and economic systems.Barry Clark & Herbert Gintis - 1978 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (4):302-325.
  36. Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small- scale Societies.Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - unknown
    Recent investigations have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the predictions of the textbook representation of Homo economicus (Roth et al, 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Camerer 2001). One problem appears to lie in economists’ canonical assumption that individuals are entirely self-interested: in addition to their own material payoffs, many experimental subjects appear to care about fairness and reciprocity, are willing to change the distribution of material outcomes at personal cost, and reward those who act in a cooperative manner while punishing (...)
     
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  37.  27
    Review of J. McKenzie Alexander, The Structural Evolution of Morality[REVIEW]Herbert Gintis - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
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  38.  15
    Paul, Robert A. 2015. Mixed Messages: Cultural and Genetic Inheritance in the Constitution of Human Society. [REVIEW]Herbert Gintis - 2017 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 1 (1):265-268.
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  39.  26
    Foundations of Human Sociality - Economic Experiments and Ethnographic: Evidence From Fifteen Small-Scale Societies.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments?Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of (...)
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  40. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Kenneth Arrow, Richard Edwards, Herbert Gintis & Michael C. Jensen - 1983 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (4):354-368.
     
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  41. “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe & John Q. Patton - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):795-815.
    Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...)
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  42. Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe, John Q. Patton & David Tracer - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):838-855.
    We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient (...)
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  43.  28
    Species (Human Reciprocity and its Evolution).Samuel Bowles–Herbert Gintis & A. Cooperative - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (2):260-266.
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  44.  45
    Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences.Henrich Joseph, Boyd Robert, Bowles Samuel, Camerer Colin, Fehr Ernst, Gintis Herbert, McElreath Richard, Alvard Michael, Barr Abigail & Ensminger Jean - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6).
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  45.  16
    Gintis, Herbert. 2017. Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life. [REVIEW]Sanjit Dhami - 2017 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 1 (2):133-137.
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  46. (1 other version)Bowles, Samuel, Gintis, Herbert and Ravitch, Diane-a classic controversy in education revisited.J. Ripton - 1992 - Educational Studies 18 (2):223-234.
     
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  47.  9
    Herbert “Ulysses” Gintis.Mauro Gallegati - 2018 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 2 (1):27-30.
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  48.  13
    Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd y Ernst Fehr (Eds.): Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005.Jorge Luis Salcedo - 2007 - Foro Interno. Anuario de Teoría Política 7:179-182.
  49.  30
    Socialist Revolution: Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and the Emergence of Marxist Thought in the Field of Education.Isaac Gottesman - 2013 - Educational Studies: A Jrnl of the American Educ. Studies Assoc 49 (1):5-31.
    Upon its publication in 1976, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis? Schooling in Capitalist America was the most sophisticated and nuanced Marxian social and political analysis of schooling in the United States. Thirty-five years after its publication, Schooling continues to have a strong impact on thinking about education. Despite its unquestionable influence, it has received strikingly little historical attention. This historical article revisits the scholarship of Bowles and Gintis and the milieu in which Schooling was conceived. Specifically, it (...)
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  50.  50
    Review of Herbert Gintis’s Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 357 pp. [REVIEW]Michiru Nagatsu - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (1):117-124.
    In his own words, Herbert Gintis’s latest book is “an analysis of human nature and a tribute to its wonders” (3).1More prosaically, it is a collection of essays, some of which are original and others published elsewhere. Instead of being structured around topics in decision and game theory,like his previous book (2009), this book develops interrelated themes, such as the evolutionary origins of moral sense, its central role in political games, and the socially entangled nature of human rationality (...)
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